In this paper I look at the evolving role of Russia in the Middle East, analyzing transfers of Russian military equipment to its main ally in the region, the Syrian Arab Republic. By using Syria as a case study, I provide insight as to the evolution of Russia’s Middle Eastern policy, examine the motivations that play a role in Moscow’s decision-making process and the discuss the changes that have taken place in the Middle East military landscape. My research illustrates that Russia is a prestige seeking state that is motivated my domestic issues. Furthermore, sixty years of arms transfers indicate that Russia has never sold game-changing weapons to Syria as this would be counterproductive to Moscow’s main goal in the region: the brokering of a new Middle East peace deal. / text

yes / The purpose of this paper is to identify how the presence, proliferation, and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) negatively impact children in conflict and post-conflict societies. It examines the impact of these weapons on children's well-being, rights and development, drawing on primary research in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Colombia. It was prepared in the context of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in July 2001 and the UN Special Session on Children. Both are key opportunities to examine fully the impact of SALW on children at the international level and to agree global action to prevent and reduce the spread and misuse of the weapons that endanger the safety and undermine the potential of children. While UN agencies, international governmental organisations, human rights and development organisations have documented abuses committed against children, to date there has been no systematic analysis of the numerous ways in which SALW negatively affect the lives of children in conflict and post-conflict situations, let alone in societies at peace. However, the information that has been collected paints a terrible picture of devastation wrought by SALW. The use of small arms by and against children has both direct effects, which include death and injury, human rights abuses, displacement and psychosocial trauma, and indirect effects, which include insecurity, loss of health care, education and opportunities. These direct and indirect effects have both short and long-term impacts on the well-being, rights and development of children. This paper highlights these direct and indirect costs by drawing on the personal testimonies of youth affected by small arms in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Colombia - countries that have felt the devastating impacts of small arms and are currently at different phases of the recovery process. It is often extremely difficult to separate the impact of conflict from the impact of small arms on children but the human suffering caused by small arms is ultimately immeasurable. Indeed, the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has called small arms 'weapons of mass destruction' . These weapons often prolong and deepen the consequences of war and also impede post-conflict resolution and reconstruction. If many small arms remain behind after a conflict ends, they can promote insecurity, which in the extreme, may result in a return to conflict. Even in societies at peace, the presence of SALW can fuel crime and violence, and they can also be used by security forces for the facilitation of human rights violations against the civilian population. These weapons have several characteristics that make them ideal for contemporary conflicts and, in particular, the targeting and use of children in war. Many are so lightweight and simple that a child as young as eight can operate and repair them without difficulty. Equally, they can last over 40 years, meaning they can be exported from conflict to conflict through porous borders and lax national, regional, and international controls.

Yes / Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are recognised as increasing the lethality, duration and intensity of conflict with the effects of these weapons lasting for many years. The negative impacts of SALW are often greatest for the most vulnerable groups, including children. There is widespread international recognition of the negative effects of small arms on children, but efforts to control small arms and those to protect children have rarely been linked. The United Nations 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the UN Special Session on Children provide unique opportunities to examine the complex issues surrounding small arms and their impact on children, in particular, how the presence, proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons affect the lives of children.

yes / Historically, UN conferences have been criticised for resulting more in compromises than in commitments to real change, which is also a charge that has been levelled against the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN Small Arms Conference). The consensus-based approach adopted throughout the negotiations had the advantage of binding all participating States to all aspects of the agreed Programme of Action (PoA), but it also ensured that it would be difficult to achieve a sufficiently rigorous and comprehensive agreement on all of the measures required to tackle the trafficking, proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Therefore, in spite of the efforts of many governments and NGOs, the UN Small Arms Conference did not agree sufficiently robust agreements in several areas. Nonetheless, it was a valuable and productive process. The resulting PoA includes a reasonably comprehensive set of key principles and commitments, which provide a basis for taking forward action at national, regional and global levels. The PoAwas agreed by all of the participating States, amounting to more than 100, and each are politically bound to adopt and implement it. Given that the UN Small Arms Conference was the first of its kind, its achievement in generating political will and momentum for efforts to control SALW is important. Although many of the commitments are weaker and less comprehensive than hoped for by many governments and organisations, it is significant that the PoAcontains at least some important commitments in all but two of the `core¿ issue areas raised by States. The two exceptions relate to transfers to non-State actors and to civilian trade, possession and use of SALW, restrictions which were strongly opposed by the USA. Equally, human rights related issues were noteworthy by their absence in the PoA. Whilst the process of reaching agreement began with a far-reaching draft PoA in December 2000 (A/Conf.192/L.4), most of the comments that were tabled on this text during the second Preparatory Committee in January 2001 came from countries that sought to weaken its commitments. The subsequent draft (A/Conf.192/L.4/Rev.1) was therefore weaker, with the result that progressive States faced an uphill task in seeking to strengthen its provisions. The next draft PoA emerged at the UN Small Arms Conference itself in the form of a third draft (A/Conf.192/L.5). Although still limited in a number of key areas ¿ such as export criteria and transparency ¿ this document went further than L.4/Rev.1 in a number of respects and included specific international commitments, including on brokering and tracing lines of supply. This, however, proved too ambitious an agenda for a small group of States and in the end the document that was adopted by consensus (A/Conf.192/L.5/Rev.1) represented a lower-level compromise. Despite the difficulties of agreeing the consensus-based PoA, the process culminating in the agreement was perhaps as important as the agreement itself. UN Small Arms Conference represented the first time that all UN Member States had met to discuss the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects with a view to agreeing a comprehensive set of measures to address the problem. Although many of the commitments contained in the PoAare couched in equivocal language that will allow States to do as much or as little as they like, it is clear that the UN Small Arms Conference has contributed to a much better understanding, amongst all stakeholders, of the nature of the illicit trade in SALW and of the particular concerns and priorities of different countries and sub-regions. It is also clear that although the Programme of Action provides a set of minimum standards and commitments which all states should adopt, it also encourages further action from all States willing to adopt more stringent commitments and stronger programmes. There is a willingness among a number of States to build upon the PoAand take more concrete and far-reaching measures at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels, such as specific arrangements for tracing co-operation, or mechanisms to co-ordinate e fforts to improve stockpile security or weapons destruction. This briefing provides a critical assessment of key provisions in the UN Small Arms Conference PoA. Section 1 measures the overall outcomes of the conference against those that the Biting the Bullet (BtB) project proposed as optimal conclusions, and suggests ways to put the commitments contained in the PoA into practice. Section 2 assesses the implementation and follow-up commitments contained in the PoA, and identifies ways of promoting the implementation of Sections III and IV, as well as options for making the most of the Biennial Meetings of States and the Review Conference in 2006. Section 3 examines funding and resourcing possibilities for the PoA including identifying needs, mobilising resources and matching needs with resources. The final section of the briefing focuses on the way forward, and in particular on how implementation of the PoA could build on existing regional initiatives and develop common international approaches to controlling SALW proliferation, availability and misuse. It also examines how action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects can be taken forward at sub-regional and regional levels in conjunction with all major stakeholders, including civil society, in the period leading up to the first Review Conference.

The focus of this essay is the interaction between the male characters in the play Arms and the Man by George Bernard Shaw and how those characters position themselves according to R.W. Connell’s theories on hegemonic masculinity. Connell’s theories can be productively applied to Shaw’s play, highlighting many similarities and exposing interesting patterns. The most striking example of this is the fact that Captain Bluntschli, the character that finally reaches the top of the hierarchical ladder of hegemonic masculinity, does that by repudiating conventional masculine ideals where patriotism, soldiering and violence are core ingredients. Bluntschli’s ascendance within the hierarchy is built upon consent from the other male characters in the play, which is in line with what Connell argues about complicity being one of the most important factors of hegemonic masculinity. The other male characters jointly give way to Bluntschli, thus accepting his general critique of what they used to consider self-evident masculine values and ideals that they have felt compelled to live up to. For Major Sergius Saranoff the new way to look upon masculinity implies great relief. He can finally give in to his true self and let down his guard against the people around him, and he also dares follow his heart and marry below his class.    My conclusion is that Shaw, apart from satirizing love, war and heroism, wanted Arms and the Man to convey a message that there are alternative ways for men to gain respect and be considered highly masculine than through violence, economic power and oppression. If Shaw had been presented with Connell’s theories on hegemonic masculinity he would probably have felt even more inspired in his mission to argue against destructive masculine ideals as expressed in patriotism and war.

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 25-28, 1999 / Riviera Hotel and Convention Center, Las Vegas, Nevada / The arms control verification activity is executed between countries, so various telemetry data will be remote-transmitted in the public signal channel and can be easily tampered. In order to secure this data’s authenticity and integrality, the paper has established a Multi-layer Data Authentication Protocol (MDAP) in which the key cryptographic technologies are digital signature and authentication. Meanwhile, overall evaluations of MDAP have been presented. We proved the MDAP is secure.

The United States and China have been conducting extensive operational-level engagement on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues for more than three decades. Many policy-makers and analysts are wondering whether such engagement has contributed to more trust in the two countries' nuclear relationship. The core question that this research seeks to address is: does operational-level engagement between the United States and China increase China's trust towards the United States in their nuclear relationship? And if so, why is this the case and how does this take place? This research distinguishes strategic trust from moralistic trust and examines the impact of operational-level engagement on helping states recognize common interests and/or common moral principles. It fills the gap in existing international relations research that does not answer the question of whether and how trust arises between states that do not imagine or understand there to be common interests or shared moral principles at the inception of engagement. The research uses three cases in the U.S.-Chinese nuclear engagement to show that interaction at the operational-level brings about convergence of perception about common interests at the top-level through building of epistemic community and enhancing bottom-up communication. However, such engagement encourages realpolitik thinking in Chinese nuclear community and therefore undermines moralistic trust between the two countries.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Are U.S. nuclear weapons still needed in Europe now that the threat that brought them there is gone? This thesis examines whether basing theater nuclear weapons in Europe is useful, irrelevant or counterproductive for maintaining European security. U.S. and NATO policymakers adhere to political and military utility arguments, while others argue TNWs in Europe are irrelevant-their utility has been supplanted by political, cultural and economic interdependence, modern conventional capabilities and the existential deterrent of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation and arms control advocates argue TNWs are counterproductive because they enhance, rather than deter proliferation, undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and impede cooperation in the NATO-Russia security relationship. This thesis demonstrates how economic and political ties, including widespread participation in nuclear planning, the increasing importance of the nuclear taboo, prospects for conventional deterrence and the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella render TNWs in Europe irrelevant. Emphasizing their utility provides incentive for others to join the "nuclear club," degrades the nonproliferation regime, and creates a roadblock for NATO-Russian arms control and counterproliferation efforts. This thesis recommends withdrawing U.S. theater nuclear weapons from Europe, relying instead on a strategy of conventional deterrence and reassurance while maintaining general nuclear deterrence via strategic forces. / Major, United States Air Force

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / Despite decades of energetic international control efforts, nuclear weapons technology continues to spread worldwide. To understand how these complex weapons programs can be developed, we assume the role of a nation seeking to build a first fission weapon, and the ability to continue to build more. We introduce a large-scale project management model that includes alternate development paths to achieve certain key technical milestones. We show how such a project can be optimally accelerated by expe-diting critical tasks. Next, we present a new analysis tool to detect vulnerabilities in such a development program: we seek optimal actions to impede, set back and/or otherwise frustrate completion of a first weapon, even if the proliferator knows what we are doing to delay things. This two-sided project evaluation tool is implemented with a combination of off-the-shelf project management software, optimization software and custom code. An illustrative case study of a first fission weapon program shows how this new analysis tool can be used. Our methods also apply to chemical, biological and/or radiological dispersion weapons, as well as to more conventional strategic industrial and commercial activities. / Lieutenant, Supply Corps, United States Navy

Resumo: Este trabalho trata da geração e otimização de trajetórias de um manipulador robótico planar (2D) de três graus de liberdade, num ambiente livre de obstáculos. Visto que a cinemática inversa de braços robóticos é um problema complexo que, em geral, geram múltiplas soluções, otimizam-se, aqui, estas soluções através de algoritmos genéticos (AGs). A função de avaliação do AG tem caráter multi-objetivo, de forma a minimizar os deslocamentos angulares e obter de forma precisa a posição da garra, usando funções desenvolvidas para o ambiente Matlab, tais como, GAOT e PLANMANT, devido a sua facilidade de programação e geração de gráficos. A seguir, foram obtidos resultados através de programa desenvolvido em linguagem C, utilizando a biblioteca GAUL, e tem-se avaliado o desempenho computacional de processamento. E finalmente, para a validação experimental deste estudo, tem-se implementado este procedimento em um manipulador robótico Robix RCS-6 de configuração similar ao modelo simulado. Os resultados mostram que o método implementado é eficiente, computacionalmente rápido e viável em aplicações reais. / Abstract: This work treats of the generation and optimization of trajectories for a planar robotic manipulator (2D) of three degrees of freedom, in free environment obstacles. Since the inverse kinematics of robotic arms are a complex problem that, generally, generate multiple solutions, here are optimized these solutions through genetic algorithms (AGs). The evaluation function of the AG has multi-objective character which minimize the angular displacements and the positional errors, being used functions developed for the Matlab environment, such as, GAOT and PLANMANT, due its compliance of programming and graphics generation. Immediately, results were obtained through program developed in language C, using the GAUL library. The computational processing performance has been evaluated. And finally, for the experimental validation of this study, has been implemented this procedure in a robotic manipulator Robix RCS-6 of similar configuration to the simulated model. The results show that the implemented method is efficient, and computationally fast and viable in real applications. KEYWORDS: Robotic manipulator, Optimal trajectory, Inverse kinematics, Genetic algorithm. / Orientador: Victor Orlando Gamarra Rosado / Coorientador: Francisco José Grandinetti / Banca: Mauro Pedro Peres / Banca: Luiz Octavio Mattos dos Reis / Banca: José Rui Camargo / Banca: Carlos Alberto Chavez / Doutor