Bakgrund: Aktieägarnas förtroende för revisionen och de finansiella rapporterna har påverkats negativt på grund av de revisionsskandaler som har varit aktuella under senare tid. Skandalerna har lett till att pålitligheten i revisionen har ifrågasatts av de finansiella rapporternas användare. En av skandalerna som har varit aktuell under 2000-talet är skandalen med HQ-Bank, där revisorn hade misskött sitt arbete och bedragit aktieägare och kunder. På grund av skandaler som denna har krav på hårdare lagstiftning efterfrågats. Till följd av detta har det tagits fram åtgärder i form av ett revisionspaket. Det har dock funnits delade meningar om åtgärdernas effekt när det kommer till att åtgärda problemet. Det faktiska och det synliga oberoendet har haft en stor roll i diskussionen när det kommer till att återuppbygga och stärka förtroendet.Syfte: Studien syftar till att fördjupa diskussionen i frågan om de förtroendestärkande åtgärderna och undersöker hur aktieägarnas förtroende till revisionen kommer att påverkas av åtgärderna i revisionspaketet.Metod: Frågeställningen besvaras genom kvalitativa intervjuer och lämpliga teorier för att skapa en korrekt bild över forskningsområdet. Teorierna som är utvalda för studien ligger till grund för analysen av det insamlade datamaterialet.Resultat: Studien tyder på att revisionspaketets effekt inte kommer att bli särskilt märkvärd, och frågan är om det är rätt åtgärd att vidta. Orsaken till det negativa utfallet tycks bero på osunda relationer som bygger på sociala mekanismer. Utifrån detta kan regleringen ses som att den endast fyller en social funktion eftersom sociala mekanismer kan anses svårreglerade.Det kan vidare uppfattas som att det synliga oberoendet har fått en större roll än det faktiska oberoendet när det kommer till att etablera förtroende. Studien finner ytterligare problem i att det råder ett förväntningsgap i samhället som visar på kunskapsluckor gällande revisorns ansvar, något som revisionspaketet inte kommer åt. En utjämning av förväntningsgapet skulle kunna mildra problemet varför fokus kanske borde ligga på att reducera gapet.Orginalitet/värde: Studien har bidragit till diskussionen kring förtroendestärkande åtgärder inom revisionen och revisionspaketets effekt när det gäller att påverka aktieägarnas förtroende. / Background: The shareholders trust in the auditing process has been affected negatively due to the recent audit scandals. The reliability of the audit has been questioned by the users of the financial statements due to the audit scandals. One of the main scandals during the 2000s is the scandal of HQ- Bank, where the auditor had mismanaged his work and defrauded shareholders and customers. Demands for stricter legislation has been requested because of the scandals. As a result of this, new arrangements in terms of a reform of the EU statutory audit market has been developed. However, there has been disagreements regarding the effectiveness when it comes to fixing the problem. The independence in fact and the independence in appearance has had a major role in this context when it comes to rebuilding strengthen the trust.Purpose: This study aims to deepen the discussion in trust-building actions and examines how the shareholders trust in the audit will be affected by the measures in the reform of the audit market.Methodology: The question is answered through qualitative interviews and appropriate theories to create an accurate picture of the research area. The theories that are selected for the study are the basis for the analysis of the collected dataFindings: The study indicates that the effect of the reform of the audit market will not be obvious, and the question is if it is the right move. The reason for the negative outcome appears to be due to unhealthy relationships based on social mechanisms. Based on this the regulation can be seen as only fulfilling a social function since social mechanisms can be difficult to regulate. It can further be seen as the independence in appearance has played a bigger role than the independence in fact when it comes to establishing the trust. The study finds further problems in the expectation gap in society that shows knowledge gaps regarding the auditor's responsibilities, which the reform of audit market cannot reach. A smoothing of the expectation gap might alleviate the problem as to why the focus should probably be on reducing the gap.Orginality/value: The study has contributed to the discussion regarding trust-building actions within the audit and the reform of the audit markets effect when it comes to influencing the shareholders trust.This thesis will continue in Swedish.

Auditing has an important role in the corporate governance process and is essential in ensuring confidence in the reliability of financial information. It is important to understand the reasons why, given the costs involved, companies change their auditor and choose a particular level of audit assurance. To date, however, only a limited number of studies on auditor choice issues are available, especially in the UK setting. Further, since the downfall of Andersen, the audit market environment has changed significantly, creating a new audit environment to be researched. In light of these recent developments, the objectives of this thesis are to address both concentration and auditor choice issues. It is divided into two separate but interrelated parts. The first part of this thesis provides evidence on audit market concentration in the UK domestic listed company market from 1998 to 2003. The effect of Andersen’s demise on both audit market concentration and audit fees is examined. Using four different size measures (number of audits, audit fees, clients’ total assets and sales), three measures of concentration are calculated. Results show that the UK audit market has now clearly surpassed the tight oligopoly threshold and, despite auditing significantly fewer clients in 2003 than in 1998, the B5/4 managed to increase their fee dominance. In particular, the decline in B5/4 ‘number of clients’ market share was mainly due to their lower share of the newly-listed companies audit market. On the other hand, the slight increase in B5/4 audit fee market share was due to the net impact of leavers concentrating the B5/4 share and joiners diluting it. Voluntary switches to/from the B5/4 had a relatively small impact on B5/4 market share for both measures. Following Andersen’s acquisition by Deloitte & Touche, market levels of audit fee and audit fee rate (audit fee scaled by total assets) have increased markedly, suggesting that more audit effort is being expended as a way to restore confidence about audit quality after the damage caused by Andersen’s alleged misconduct. The acquisition has also contributed to a further increase in ‘audit fee’ market concentration for the 4-firm concentration ratio (CR4) and in the overall Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measure. Although, Deloitte & Touche gained significant market share in terms of both audit fees and number of audits through its acquisition of Andersen, it is PricewaterhouseCoopers that continues to hold the largest market share. Deloitte & Touche retained 93 former Andersen clients (74%), 21 (17%) moved to another B5/4 auditor and 11 (9%) chose a non-B5/4 firm. While former Andersen clients paid higher audit fees, in aggregate, the increase was, perhaps surprisingly, less than for the market as a whole. At the industry level, the B4 firms dominated all sectors, the highest non-B5/4 market share in any industry being just 8%. In 2003, PricewaterhouseCoopers was the leader in 18 out of 34 sectors. The second part of the thesis is divided into two separate studies – auditor change determinants and new auditor selection determinants. These studies use a sample of non financial auditor change companies to test logistic regression models of the determinants of auditor change and new auditor selection. The determinant variables include auditee, auditor and audit characteristics. This part also examines the sensitivity of results to alternative functional forms of the basic model specification. Two definitions of auditor quality – brand name auditor and specialism, are employed. Internal governance issues such as audit committee independence, the duality of chairman/CEO as well as the size/quality of the incumbent auditor were found to be significant determinants of auditor change. Expected future growth in the company, rather than past growth, and audit fee reduction were positively related to audit change probability. Result also suggests that companies changed auditor to improve the perception of auditor independence. By contrast, in the new auditor selection models, corporate governance variables did not appear to be important in determining a different quality (brand-name) auditor. Only the chairman/CEO duality variable was weakly and negatively significant, suggesting that duality is associated with a change to a lower quality auditor. Growing companies are more likely to change to a brand name auditor, consistent with the inability of smaller firms to provide services across an international market. Contrary to agency theory predictions, the results show that a company experiencing increased leverage is less likely to choose a B5/4 auditor, suggesting that B5/4 auditors are being selective in avoiding risky clients. Higher audit fees are paid to new auditors by companies that changed from non-B5/4 to B5/4, reflecting a B5/4 fee premium. However, the higher NAS fee result is contrary to initial expectations. Typically, far fewer variables were significant in the models with audit quality proxied by industry specialism. For the specialism models based on audit fee market share, there is counter-intuitive evidence that a company with a large number of subsidiaries is less likely to move to a specialist auditor from a non-specialist. New specialist auditors were more likely to be preferred when a company experienced an increase in current accruals or a reduction in leverage. In general, the results for these models were less strong and were dependent upon the specialist definition adopted. Finally, the thesis provides evidence that the choice of time variant model (ex-ante, contemporaneous or ex-post) made no significant difference to the overall results. The one exception concerns the ‘growth’ variable, where companies are found to change auditor in anticipation of future growth, rather than as a response to past growth. Further, the use of alternative proxy variables does not greatly influence the regression results. One important exception to this general observation concerns the brand name proxy. When brand name was defined as tier12 (to include Grant Thornton and BDO) the significance level was improved in all models. This suggests that, to some degree, Grant Thornton and BDO are viewed as quality service providers closer in quality to B5/4 than to other smaller audit firms.

The diploma work summarizes in the first section the common knowledge in the audit field of information systems and technologies theory as well as common state of knowledge in the field of marketing in small and medium-sized enterprises and market research as well. In the second section, the tools summarized in the first part are used for designing marketing research project on "The audit of information systems and technology in smaller businesses." The aim of the research was to seek the experience and customer feedback from the segment of smaller businesses to audit information systems. The research was designed as a qualitative one. As technique implementation of research was elected a research interview with looser structure. The work is divided to three parts -- designing of marketing research methodology, as well as conducting this research and it's evaluation.