No description available.

陳偉昌. / 論文(哲學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部, 1996. / 參考文献 : leaf 44. / Chen Weichang. / 論文撮要 --- p.i / 本論文中援引的奧斯丁著作的縮寫 --- p.ii / 導論 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章 --- 從實際的話語開始 --- p.4 / Chapter 第二章 --- 在約定與事實之間 --- p.18 / Chapter 第三章 --- 「意義」的蔓衍 --- p.31 / 本論文所涉及的關鍵術語的英漢對照 --- p.43 / 參考書目 --- p.44

The thesis presents a development of J. L. Austin's analysis of truth and its accompanying analysis of sentence structure. This involves a discussion and refinement of Austin's notions of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions of language and of the demonstrative and descriptive devices of sentences. The main point of the thesis is that ordinary language must be treated as an historical phenomenon: one that has evolved its more complex features through a long series of variations upon a small number of rudimentary conventions and locutions. The utility of Austin's analysis is shown to lie in the description that it provides of the functions of these rudimentary conventions and locutions. The analysis is used to illuminate a number of problematic sentences and expressions of ordinary language, including identity sentences, definite descriptions, existential sentences, and conditionals.

This work's main thesis is that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework than a theory of language for furthering the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts. The main purpose of that conception was the elucidation of the species of language-use that is exemplified by illocutionary acts and is distinct from those species exemplified by locutionary and perlocutionary acts. Austin's conception of locutionary acts isolates those features of a speech act situation which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language. This conception is expounded, developed and defended in Chapter One. The orthodox "reject-and-replace" view of the relationship between Austin's performative-constative distinction and his distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts threatens several of Austin's insights concerning the type of theory appropriate for developing his conception of speech acts. In Chapter Two the performative-constative distinction is expounded, the "reject-and-replace" is shown to be false, and an alternative view, which retrieves the threatened insights, is advanced. Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and his parallel distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force, are also established in the course of defending them against objections. The terms in which Austin drew the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - those of a conventional act distinct from its non-conventional outcomes indicate the theoretical framework required for a development of his conception. In Chapter Three this distinction is expounded and a partial analysis is made of the concepts of some outcomes of acts, viz., effects, consequences and results. Illocutionary acts are not constituted in toto by agents' bodily movements - a point captured in Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts. In Chapter Pour the interpretation customarily imposed on that thesis is discussed and shown to be unfaithful. An alternative interpretation is constructed from points in Austin's own lectures. The solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts provided by this interpretation is that such acts are constituted by the conventional procedures as part of which locutionary acts are performed. Some other suggested solutions are canvassed. In Chapter Five an account is given of the conventional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts. In Chapter Six the claim embodied in the main thesis of this work is defended against the counter-claims implicit in Schiffer's, Strawson's and Searle's work. In the Appendix Austin's performative-constative distinction and his later views on truth are defended. An analytical table of contents is included.

Orientador: Kanavillil Rajagopalan / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-21T02:52:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Santos_KarlaCristinados_D.pdf: 926752 bytes, checksum: a71d12758b5675d00b8f1fd019a6c1fc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: Quando se trata de combater as ações preconceituosas ou discriminatórias realizadas por meio da linguagem, a lei brasileira estabelece dois tipos de condutas que são consideradas crimes: a injúria qualificada e o crime de preconceito ou discriminação. A injúria qualificada, segundo a definição do Código Penal Brasileiro, é um tipo de insulto que utiliza elementos referentes à raça, cor, etnia, religião, origem ou à condição da pessoa idosa ou portadora de deficiência. Já o crime de preconceito ou discriminação consiste em praticar, induzir ou incitar a discriminação ou o preconceito com base em raça, cor, etnia, religião ou procedência nacional. Nesse caso, "praticar" inclui não apenas atos físicos ou materiais (como negar um emprego, por exemplo), mas também significa qualquer conduta capaz de expressar preconceito ou discriminação, incluindo manifestações simbólicas, como gestos, sinais, além da linguagem falada e escrita. Embora os dois crimes possam ser realizados por meios linguísticos, o sistema judicial estabelece uma diferença fundamental entre eles: o crime de preconceito ou discriminação é uma ofensa direcionada a um grupo racial, étnico, religioso (ofensa coletiva), enquanto a injúria qualificada é um a ofensa direcionada a uma pessoa específica (ofensa individual). No entanto, essa distinção é bastante controversa. Nesta tese, comparo as formas como o sistema judicial brasileiro e os movimentos sociais interpretam a relação entre insultar e discriminar, que está na base dessa distinção entre injúria e crime de preconceito ou discriminação. Essa comparação é baseada num levantamento de dados sobre casos de injúria qualificada no Brasil e em duas entrevistas com militantes de movimentos negros brasileiros. A partir da abordagem dos atos de fala proposta por J. L. Austin, reflito sobre duas tensões básicas do conceito de performativo, a relação entre dizer e fazer e o conflito entre convenções e atos individuais, ou seja, entre o ato de insultar alguém individualmente e a história de discriminação que certos insultos podem invocar, estendendo os efeitos ofensivos para além do indivíduo. Em geral, os militantes entrevistados defendem que qualquer injúria relacionada à raça, cor, etnia etc. deve ser considerada crime de discriminação. No entanto, as decisões judiciais raramente acatam esse argumento, porque entendem que a injúria, mesmo quando faz referência à raça, por exemplo, é um dizer direcionado a uma pessoa em particular e não à raça como um todo. Analisando alguns dos critérios linguísticos usados pelo sistema judicial, tais como a referência do enunciado, a situação e o efeito pretendido pelo falante, demonstro que esses critérios possibilitam uma interpretação final (um veredito), mas não resolvem todos os conflitos de interpretação relativos às decisões sobre linguagem injuriosa e discriminatória. Alguns desses conflitos são relacionados ao problema dos limites do ato de fala (onde ele começa e onde ele termina) / Abstract: When it comes to combat biased or discriminatory language, Brazilian law establishes two types of behaviors that are considered crimes: the aggravated verbal injury and the crime of prejudice or discrimination. The aggravated verbal injury is a type of insult that makes use of words or phrases pertaining to race, color, ethnicity, religion, origin or to the condition of the elderly or disabled person. The crime of prejudice or discrimination consists in practicing, inducing or inciting discrimination or prejudice based on race, color, ethnicity, religion or national origin. In this case, "practicing" includes not only physical or material acts (such as denying a job, for example), but also means any conduct capable of expressing prejudice or discrimination, including, for example, gestures, signs, expressions, and spoken and written words. Although the two crimes may be performed by linguistic means they have a very different legal definition within Brazilian law: the crime of prejudice or discrimination is an offense directed against a racial, ethnic or religious group (collective), and the aggravated verbal injury is an offense aimed at a particular person (individual). Yet this difference is very controversial. In this thesis, I compare how the Brazilian judicial system and social movements interpret the relationship between insulting and discriminating, which underlines the distinction between the aggravated verbal injury and the crime of prejudice or discrimination. This comparison is based on a survey of data on legal cases of aggravated verbal injury and on interviews with two Brazilian black movements' activists. Following the Austinian approach to speech acts, I reflect on two basic problems of the performative. The first is the intricate relationship between saying and doing and the second is the conflict between conventions and individual acts, viz., between the act of insulting someone individually and the history of discrimination and prejudice that some insults can invoke, spreading the offensive effects beyond the individual. In general, the activists interviewed support that all verbal injury related to race, color, religion, etc. must be considered crimes of discrimination. However, the judicial decisions seldom accept this argument, because they understand that verbal injury, even when related to race, for example, is a saying addressed to a singular person and not to the race as a whole. Analyzing some of the linguistic criteria used by the judicial system, such as the reference of the utterance, the situation and the effect intended by the speaker, I demonstrate that these criteria allow for a final interpretation (a verdict), but do not resolve all the conflicts of interpretation concerning the decisions about offensive and discriminatory language. Some of these conflicts are related to the problem of the limits of the speech act (where it begins and where it ends) / Doutorado / Linguistica / Doutora em Linguística

From 1947 to 1959 the late Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin lectured on several of the main philosophical problems of sense-perception. After his death, his former student, Mr. G.J. Warnock, working from Austin's lecture notes, published Austin's views on the philosophy of perception in a book entitled Sense and Sensibilia. Austin's purposes in lecturing on the philosophical problems of perception were entirely negative; his aim was to undermine a whole tradition in the philosophy of perception, namely that of sense-datum analysis. His method was that of careful and detailed piecemeal analysis of what he regarded as the chief doctrines, methods, assumptions, and implications inherent in and necessary to any sense-datum analysis. He is widely reputed to have succeeded in his aims, and his analysis of particular aspects of sense datum philosophy are highly regarded as models of philosophical analysis. The purpose of this thesis is to examine critically several of the most important parts of Austin's critique of sense-datum philosophy, especially his analysis of the sense-datist use of the Argument from Illusion, his analysis of perceptual locutions such as "looks," "seems," and "appears," and his analysis of the meaning of "real'' Austin's work is examined in the light of three critical questions, viz. (l) When it looks as if Austin is engaged in careful exposition of an opponent's position, is he fair to his opponent or does he distort it?, (2) Are the assumptions and implications of sense-datum theory which Austin tries to expose really what he says they are?, and (3) Even if Austin's analysis against a particular opponent is sound, is it relevant against sense-datum theory in general? The argument of the thesis seeks to establish four main points: (1) Many of Austin's criticisms of the sense-datist use of the Argument from Illusion rest upon misstatements of the sense-datist position, and thus miss their mark. Morover, even when Austin's criticisms have considerable merit, they are not decisive, but merely require some revision or reformulation of the sense-datists' arguments. (2) Austin's analysis of "looked," "seems," and "appears," while correct as far as it goes, is incomplete; it fails to tell the whole story as regards the uses of these locutions. Supplemented and completed, it is consistent with the sense-datum analysis of the meanings of these expressions. (3) Austin's analysis of "real" is partly correct and partly incorrect. Where correct, it is consistent with a sense-datum analysis of "real." Where wrong, Austin's analysis can be corrected in a manner which is consistent both with the correct parts of Austin's analysis of "real" and the sense-datum analysis. (4) Austin's analysis of "looks," "seems," and "appears" and of "real" are inconsistent with each other as they stand in the text. Supplemented and corrected, they are consistent with each other and with sense-datum theory. In the interstices of criticisms of Austin, many positive suggestions are made pointing to further development of sense-datum theory. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

Orientador: Kanavillil Rajagopalan / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-05T21:00:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nogueira_Claudiana_D.pdf: 8055525 bytes, checksum: 0d52e5c03f6bf121feaf9c874a6ae0a7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 / Resumo: Nesta tese, decidi estudar a estrutura retórica dos discursos teóricos sobre a linguagem para refletir sobre a prática discursiva na produção do conhecimento lingüístico questionando-lhe o discurso cientificista, o qual postula a adoção de determinados conceitos e determinado método de formalização como pressuposto de qualificação desse conhecimento. A partir de uma perspectiva teórica integracionista (Harris, 1981, 1998), cuja concepção de linguagem, de inspiração wittgensteiniana, permite questionar os mitos da lingüística e valorizar as ações integralizadoras na situação comunicacional, escolhi como objeto de investigação a tradicional interpretação da teoria dos atos de fala de J. Austin pelo filósofo J. Searle, através da análise da estrutura retórica da obra Speech Acts- An Essqy in the Philosophy of Language(1969). Partindo da idéia de que a reformulação teórica de Austin por Searle, sua aceitação e repercussões na lingüística e na filosofia são frutos do mito da linguagem, analisei os processos de produção, interpretação e distribuição do texto de Searle e concluí que as concepções tradicionais do discurso cientificista e positivista, bem como a sua retórica da formalização, configuram - se numa ordem do discurso específica aos estudos da linguagem que, neste trabalho, denomino medo da morte.Para efetuar esta análise, discuti o lugar da retórica numa teoria do discurso, promovendo uma revisão teórico-metodológica do método proposto por Margutti Pinto (1998) em sua análise dos procedimentos argumentativos de Wittgenstein. Desse modo, elaborei, através do estudo da retórica de Searle interpretando Austin, uma proposta de análise retórica através de uma abordagem crítico-discursiva (Fairclough, 2001) condizente com o programa integracionista que inclui em seus objetivos uma tomada de consciência do caráter integral de nossas ações como lingüistas e acadêmicos, originadas da natureza política, interativa, e social de nossa experiência lingüística / Abstract: In this thesis I decided to study the rhetorical structure of theoretical studies of language, aiming to reflect upon the discursive practice involved in the production of linguistic knowledge. In doing so, I have questioned the cientificist discourse that postulates the adoption of certain concepts and a certain method of formalization as a precondition for the characterization of knowledge. Based on an integrationist theoretical perspective (Harris, 1981,1998) centred on a concept of language inspired on Wittgenstein which enables us to question the founding myths of linguistics as well as to emphasise the actions of integration in communication, I have chosen as an object of research the traditional interpretation of J. Austin's theory of speech acts carried out by the philosopher J. Searle, through the analysis of the rhetorical structure of the text "Speech Acts -An Essay in the Philosophy of Language"(1969). Starting from the idea that the theoretical reformulation of Austin done by Searle together with its acceptance and resulting repercussions on linguistics and philosophy are the result of language myth, I analysed the processes of production, interpretation and distribution of Searle's text and concluded that the traditional conceptions of the cientificist and positivist discourse as well as its formal rhetoric configure an order of discourse which is specific to the studies of language which, in this work, I call 'fear of death'. In order to carry out this analysis, I discussed the place of rhetoric in a theory of discourse, promoting a theoretical/methodological revision of the method proposed by Margutti Pinto (1998) in his analysis of the argumentative procedures of Wittgenstein. Thus I elaborated, by studying the rhetoric Searle used when interpreting Austin, a proposal of rhetorical analysis by a criticaldiscursive approach (Fairclough, 2001) which is in tine with the integrationist program which includes amongst its objectives a conscious realisation of the integral character of our actions as linguists and academics, originating in the political, interactive and social natures of our linguistic experience / Doutorado / Doutor em Linguística

As a historically racialized utterance, nigger has been a contested and despised word since the late 17th Century. Now, in the 21st Century, nigga is still considered one of the most impactful words in the English lexicon. This dissertation provides one situated and contingent analysis of nigga as a moment of excess in the Higher Education classroom. I wed Judith Butler’s theorizing of ex-citable speech via her analyses of J.L. Austin’s influential conceptualizations of speech acts and Louis Althusser’s interpellation to Henry Louis Gates’ theory of Signifyin(g) in order to interrogate the multitudinous articulations and appropriations of nigga as a Signifyin(g) performative. Through my theorizing of nigger-nigga as a Signifyin(g) performative, I interrogate the continuity and discontinuity of use specific to the English Composition and Literature classroom, as well as within multiple Higher Education classrooms and discussions. I interrogate use through the methodology of what I classify as Foucauldian-lite Discourse Analysis, in order to examine nigger and nigga as ex-citable speech. My intention is to interrogate how these utterances inflect and influence constructions of multiply conflicting and complimentary histories, identities, subjectivities and power relationships of professors and students in visible and invisible ways. The Untitled Supplemental Image is a metaphor for my methodology. The image is of my mother’s hands, which a woven throughout the dissertation, symbolically represents my memory of the first time I heard the utterance nigger.