This dissertation is, first, an examination of the coherence and consistency of Michel Foucault’s work with respect to its development and an examination of his ethos, a product of conscious self-construction. Second, this work is an exploration of ethical techniques. The goal of the dissertation is to discover an ethos that takes into account the best contemporary critical attitudes and techniques of ethical selfconstruction. The first chapter begins with a discussion of the development of Foucault’s archaeological method. Discussion of some problems with structuralism, his genealogical method, and finally his movement towards an ethical program follows. The method for the dissertation will be exploratory and critical. The second chapter develops a line of thinking about the development of freedom in Kant and Foucault. Power relations are a persistent context in which selfconstruction takes place. Resistance to power relations marks the beginning of freedom, which requires testing and moving beyond the limits of socially constructed selves. The Quakers display a model of structured resistance to enclosing authorities. John Woolman provides an example of ethical self-construction. The third chapter explores Foucault’s ethical project by examining ancient Greco-Roman and Christian technologies of the self, and relates those projects to ethical self-construction through writing. This exploration shows continuity in the product of writing from Ancient through modern writers. The fourth chapter develops a postmodern ethos through an examination of weak ontology. James Rachels’ ethical programme is a model for a postmodern technology of the self. The resulting technique offered provides a vulnerability to facticity while retaining the best ethical principles and critical reasoning. This is illustrated in Miroslav Volf’s The End of Memory. Foucault’s ethos is a clear precursor to modern technologies of the self that take the exploration of knowledge with humility into account.

This dissertation explores how and to what extent rationality can provide guidance for human action – individual and collective, private and public; particularly under the conditions of modernity. The theme is approached through an examination of Habermas' various pertinent contributions. In both the pre-communicative and the communicative phases of his work, Habermas has been concerned to show the one-sided and distorted nature of modern, instrumental rationalisation, and to invigorate the unfinished project of enlightenment. Thus he has endeavoured to develop and philosophically justify a complementary, communicative practical rationality. Communicative rationality would be employed for rationalising social interaction, whereas instrumental rationality would be restricted to human beings' interchange with nature, concerned with securing their means of material reproduction. One exception to this supposed exhaustive dichotomy is the case of human interaction entwined so closely with the means of material reproduction that if it were conducted communicatively, rather than instrumentally, it would be so inefficient as to threaten material reproduction itself. Fields of social interaction that, for the sake of material reproductive efficiency, need to be coordinated instrumentally are the economy and state administration. This study identifies and mainly concentrates on a lacuna common to Habermas' pre-communicative and communicative conceptual frameworks, one that results in an effective veto on the possibility that human agents can communicatively pursue their own ends by means of other agents. In this way, the vast range of social interactions in which the ends of human beings must inevitably be satisfied through the active involvement or consent of other human beings are a priori ceded to strategic action, contrary to Habermas' own intentions. To remedy this, my study sets out to develop philosophical justification for a revised conception of practical rationality centred on the notion of communicative negotiation.

This dissertation is a defence of metaphysical ethical naturalism according to which there is a moral reality which is part of the natural world. The implication of this view is that moral properties, such as moral goodness, justice, compassion and so forth are part of the natural world, and inquiries concerning these moral entities are conducted in similar empirical ways of reasoning to that in which scientific inquiries are conducted. I defend metaphysical ethical naturalism by a variety of explanationist argument in the tradition of Cornell realism. I examine preceding proposals for this argument, and focus on one version of it, which I call ‘the abductive argument for moral realism’. Although there was a suggestion about the abductive argument, the argument has not been discussed enough in the literature. This dissertation is a defence and discussion about the abductive argument which has not been properly examined. The defence of the argument requires the examination of how first-order ethical theory can be developed in the similar empirical ways scientific theories are developed. This will be an attempt to show the analogy between scientific inquiries and ethical inquiries. Describing the analogy between science and ethics, I will argue that the analogy can be best explained in terms of the approximate truth of normative theory which implies the existence of mind-independent natural moral properties.

This thesis has three parts. In the first part, the author defends the coherence of Cartesian scepticism about the external world. In particular, the author contends that such scepticism survives attacks from Descartes himself, as well as from W.V.O. Quine, Robert Nozick, Alvin Goldman, and David Armstrong. It follows that Cartesian scepticism remains intact. In the second part of this thesis, the author contends that the semantic or content externalisms of Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge do not refute Cartesian scepticism about the external world. In particular, he argues that Putnam and Burge do not make good their respective externalist cases against scepticism, and that they beg the question against that position. The author concludes that semantic or content externalism is important against such scepticism. In the third part of this thesis, the author addresses the mind, and suggests that Descartes, by offering his cogito argument, also offers a theory of thought content, which he then supports with his substance dualism. He suggests that Descartes does not succeed with any of his arguments here, although his theory of thought content is still plausible. To remedy this, the author discusses the versions of narrow meaning or content offered by Jerry Fodor and Colin McGinn, and defends a version of such meaning or content that presupposes that semantic or content externalism is false. The author lastly follows Donald Davidson, and argues for a version anomalous monism, which he contends is a theory that shows how semantic or content internalism might be true.

In this thesis I analyse the notion of temporal passage (the passage of time), our (alleged) experience of it, and whether we can come to know anything about temporal passage through experience. The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part concerns the metaphysics of temporal passage. I argue that temporal passage is a logically coherent notion, as long as it is understood as a change in what exists (exists simpliciter) within a presentist framework. A core element of part one is my reconstruction of McTaggart’s (1908; 1927) infamous argument against temporal passage as a special case of the problem of change. I argue that McTaggart’s argument requires a view of time according to which all times exist (A-eternalism), and temporal passage as a qualitative change of terms in the time-series with regards to pastness, presentness and futurity (A-properties). I provide a limited defence of the paradox within McTaggart’s framework, where I interpret it as a regress of mutually dependent, merely relational changes. The regress I say is vicious, due to the dependencies between its different stages: every change in terms of A-properties involves the instantiation of mutually exclusive A-properties and must thus be qualified to different times, which must undergo the same kind of change. To maintain the dynamic of time while avoiding contradiction, none of these relational changes can occur without the next, where on each level of the regress the solution to the initial problem recreates the very same kind of problem. I then argue that temporal passage, understood as change in what exists simpliciter, or absolute becoming, avoids the paradox. This view is best accommodated by presentism, the view that only the present exists. The conclusion of part one is that temporal passage should be understood as absolute becoming of times within a presentist framework. In the second part of the thesis I argue against a frequently found (but rarely explicitly analysed) argument, which states that we can infer that time passes from experience because the fact that time passes is the best explanation for having experiences of temporal passage. I argue that the argument fails because we either cannot experience temporal passage at all, or not in a way that allows us to infer that time passes from experience. I begin by discussing different types of experiences that are commonly mistaken for experiences of temporal passage: experiences of qualitative change and successive experiences of events as occurring now. I then argue that the only experience that could be best explained by the fact that time passes would be a perceptual experience of events undergoing absolute becoming. Whether we can perceptually represent the absolute becoming of events, or ‘A-change’, is then assessed in the light of three major accounts of temporal perception: the memory theory, the retentional theory and the extensional theory. None of those theories, I argue, can account for the required experience, at least not in the right way. The memory theory does not allow for experiences of A-change because it denies that we can have perceptual experiences of change in general. The retentional theory does not allow for experiences of A-change as A-change. The extensional theory proves to be incompatible with presentism and therefore with absolute becoming. I explore two non-standard forms of presentism that take the metaphysical present to be temporally extended (in different ways) and that are, for this reason, prima facie compatible with the extensional theory. One of these views turns out to be incoherent. Combined with the extensional theory, the other one does not allow us to perceptually represent absolute becoming either. Given all major theories of temporal perception, we cannot infer that time passes from experience. In the last section I defend my argument against two objections, one involving ‘high level properties’, and one involving ‘present-as-absent’ representation in experience. I conclude that we cannot infer from experience whether time passes or not.

As the primary interface between the runner and the road, athletic footwear has a potentially important role to play in the reduction/management of chronic injuries and enhancement of performance. Over the past thirty years the running shoe has changed considerably. However, despite significant advances in footwear technology, the incidence of injury in distance runners has not altered meaningfully. It has been postulated that poor footwear selection is the mechanism behind this, whereby running shoes are incorrectly selected/inappropriate for the populations and situations in which they are worn. The investigations and results obtained from this thesis aim to attenuate this, and provide runners and footwear manuafacturers with new knowledge regarding the application of footwear to different populations and conditions in order to improve both injury occurence and performance. In addition to a significant amount of developmental analyses, four principal examinations were conducted as part of this thesis. Study 1 aimed to determine the kinetic and 3-D kinematic differences between treadmill and overground running, in order to determine whether the treadmill replicates overground running and whether different footwear is necessary during treadmill running. It was observed specifically that treadmill running was associated with significant increases in eversion and tibial internal rotation whilst overground runners exhibited greater peak tibial accelerations. It was concluded that treadmill runners are likely to require footwear with additional medial stability properties, aimed at reducing rearfoot eversion whilst overground runners should consider footwear with more advanced midsole cushioning properties designed to reduce the magnitude of impact transients. Study 2 examined the gender differences in the kinetics and 3-D kinematics of running in order to determine whether females require running shoes specifically tailored to their running mechanics. Females were associated with significant increases in eversion and tibial internal rotation; reaffirming the notion that they are more susceptible to overuse injuries than males. It is reccommended that females select running footwear with design characteristics aimed towards the reduction of rearfoot eversion in order to reduce the incidence of injury. Study 3 investigated the kinetics and 3-D kinematics of running: barefoot, in conventional running shoes and in barefoot inspired footwear in order to determine the efficacy of barefoot running in comparison to shod and also the ability of barefoot inspired footwear to closely mimic the 3-D kinematics of barefoot running. Barefoot running was associated with significant increases in impact parameters. It was also observed that barefoot inspired footwear does not closely mimic the 3-D kinematics of barefoot running. This leads to the final conclusion that barefoot running may not serve to reduce the incidence of injury. Study 4 aimed to examine the influence of footwear with different shock attenuating properties on the energy requirments of distance running and to investigate the biomechanical parameters which have the stongest association with running economy using regression analyses. Whilst footwear with different shock attenuating properties did not influence running economy, it was observed that a significant proportion of the variance in running economy could be explained by kinematic and EMG parameters. The thesis has provided information not previously available regarding the injury prevention and performance aspects of running footwear. It is clear that footwear cannot be universally prescribed and that the population and circumstances in which different shoes are used are key when selecting and designing appropriate running footwear.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

This thesis pursues two closely related lines of argument. In the first half, I explore the Bataillean notion of man through his complex relationship with Hegel and Nietzsche. The Janus-like conception that will be dis-covered results from Bataille’s unwillingness to grant priority either to Hegel’s insights concerning the structure of consciousness or to Nietzsche’s claim, contra Hegel, that those putative insights ‘involve a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization’ (The Gay Science) Bataille acknowledges the heuristic value of both thinkers’ work but ultimately refuses to let either become the dominant force within his thought. In the end Bataille’s human being remains caught between the ‘ex-cess’ of Nietzschean Will and the ‘restriction’ of Hegelian consciousness. He sees human existence, much like Freud, as moving with a ‘vacillating rhythm’ (Beyond the Pleasure Principle) between ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ activity. This recognition leads him to conclude that there exists a fundamental ambiguity to human existence – the Impossible – which resists reduction or assimilation to any kind of formal discourse. The second half proceeds to explore this ambiguity in more detail by first teasing out the relationship be-tween the traumatic experiences at the heart of two of Bataille’s novels against the Freudian notion of Trauma (repetition automatism) and its relation to the creation of Identity. This ultimately proves insuffi-cient when it comes to interpreting the actions of Bataille’s fictional characters. However it opens a space within which other methodologies of interpretation, namely those of Lacan, Girard, and Derrida, can be in-vestigated as potential sources of insight into those characters’ psychological structures and motivation. Here they are explored in relation to each other and in order to describe and explain more adequately the ‘impossible’ ambiguity at the heart of Bataille’s novels and conception of the human.

Few people would dispute that today’s world is highly technological. But what do we mean when we talk of ‘technology’, and is it possible to quantify its effect on human beings? This thesis considers the relationship between technology and humanity as being one of symbiosis - we shape our tools and in turn, our tools shape us. The nature of this relationship is described by ‘essentialist’ critics of technology as narrowing the focus of human endeavour towards a technological value-set dominated by efficiency, to the detriment of other values important to the human animal. Sport provides an excellent framework for examining the impact of technology defined in this way, as it is a ubiquitous and highly technological arena. If it can be plausibly argued that an increasingly technological and performance-centred approach to sport is detrimental to an holistic understanding of sport’s potential to benefit both the individual and society as a whole, it may be the case that sport provides accessible and irrefutable evidence for the truth of the essentialists’ claims regarding the impact on society of technology writ large. This thesis presents such an argument. Furthermore, if we grant the essentialist critics their contention and admit the impossibility of returning to an ‘untechnological’ world, we have to find some way of restoring and maintaining an holistic existence in the face of the restricted value-set imposed by our technology and our interactions with it. To this end, the latter part of this thesis promotes ‘metaphysical’ sporting values (freedom, self-affirmation and beautiful, harmonious action) as a way to counter-balance the impact of technology in sport and suggest ways to solve the ‘technological problem’ more generally.