Forgiveness might be said to involve a certain kind of intellectual suffering: we forgive, and are forgiven, whilst a great many questions remain undecided, and while it is far from obvious that they are unimportant. This thesis explores the way in which the difficulties in submitting forgiveness to thought may be significant. Contemporary accounts of forgiveness are put into creative dialogue with the work of Simone Weil, Rene Girard and Jacques Derrida in an attempt to assess different forms of approach to the resistance forgiveness offers to thought. Utilising the work of Simone Weil in particular, and through a creative interpretation of some of the gospel sayings from which the modern notion of forgiveness originates, the argument is made that forgiveness can be seen to involve a process of transformation of understanding that is akin to spirituality of death and resurrection. On this account, forgiveness is paradoxical and resistant to thought not because it involves a simple suspension of, or opposition to reasoned forms of judgment, but because it involves a way of holding together attitudes, concerns and insights that do not easily cohere. As such it calls for a ‘posture’ that cultivates and waits with this tension, rather than a theory that allows the meaning and goodness of forgiveness to appear unambiguously. In this sense forgiveness is an expression of a love that both hopes all things and bears all things; a way of accepting the worst whilst desiring the best.

Particularism challenges the accepted idea of normative moral theory that morality can be reduced to a finite set of fundamental principles; it sees morality as quite capable of getting on without such principles. This thesis is concerned with asking what, if any, changes would be required in the practice of medical ethics if this is correct. It is proposed that current guidelines for professional clinicians and medical scientists constitute a “fleshed out” normative system which provides pro tanto rules for ethical practice. To investigate the implications of this in a particularist world, the idea of thin and thick moral concepts is extended to cover moral principles so that generalist professional guidance is seen as constituted of thick principles. This guidance aims to provide the required confidence for the doctor-patient relationship and in particular for the trust required between doctor and patient. Examples of the development of protocols for early phase clinical trials in cancer, and of resource allocation in a resource limited system are used to investigate the difference in decision making, and thus in the decisions themselves, between generalist and particularist professionals. In a generalist world trust is placed in the systems of trustworthiness (practice guidelines etc) and thus in the developers of such systems; in a particularist world moral decisions are made by the clinician and so trust is placed much more directly in that clinician. The implications of this analysis are that under particularism medical ethical training (initial and continuing) would focus more on the development of moral character of the various professionals and less of following guidelines. The complexity of modern medicine implies that such guidelines would still be required, but they would no longer represent pro tanto duties, but rather ceteris paribus advice.

This thesis is a qualitative study of infertility clinicians in the UK, exploring how they manage ethical issues: a study that uses empirical methods to explore ethical questions. I use a broadly Aristotelian conception of the relationship between theory and practice to develop a methodology for considering practical ethical issues. I then show how this approach, when allied with contemporary qualitative methodologies, can provide particularly valuable insights and produce practical recommendations. An important element of my approach is that a close attention to actual practice can also result in refining and developing our ethical theories and principles – practice informs theory just as theory can inform practice. This account of the ethical decision-making processes of infertility clinicians can not only highlight new ethical problems, but also develop more nuanced moral norms and ethical theories to deal with the conflicts and issues that arise in the clinical setting. Infertility treatment is a speciality that has attracted much attention from the public and bioethicists. The focus has been predominately on the dramatic aspects such as the status of the embryo or underlying issues such as the ethical boundaries of procreative liberty. Relatively little, however, is known about the everyday moral workings of infertility clinics: how clinicians approach ethical issues on a daily basis; what for them are troubling issues; and how they resolve ethical conflict. This study aims to gain insight into the way clinicians actually make ethical decisions. Moving on from this, it critically evaluates such processes and offers both an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the clinicians’ ethical decision-making and considers how this form of decision-making can be extended and supported in practice. The aims of this thesis are to contribute to the debate on both how ethical decision-making in the infertility clinic can be improved and, more generally, how bioethics can make a useful contribute to practical problems.

Christine Korsgaard has attempted to defend a distinct approach to metaethics – Neo-Kantian Constructivism. Not only does she present a positive case for her own view, she also attacks existing metaethical positions and even the disctinctions that metaethics has traditionally relied on. This thesis is a sustained examination of this position. I consider whether Korsgaard can legitimately claim to be offering a metaethical position at all, providing her with some defence against the scepticism of some metaethicists. I also examine her attacks on traditional metaethical positions (in particular moral realism and expressivism). I argue that her attack on moral realism can be avoided if the realism on offer takes a particular form. In the case of expressivism I claim that Korsgaard’s attack, though not fully developed in her work, motivates an examination of contemporary hybrid-expressivist theories. I argue that these are, as of yet, no advance over their non-hybrid cousins. Finally I examine Korsgaard’s own position, attempting to make it clearer by combining her claims with a framework developed by Crispin Wright for judgement-dependent qualities. This gives Korsgaard her best chance of a distinctive metaethical position. Ultimately, though, the Neo-Kantian approach to morality fails.

The Nobis Project is an innovative creative process approach to service-learning and global citizenship education aiming to teach secondary school students six dimensions of civic engagement: values, knowledge, skills, efficacy, commitment, and empathy. It guides students to comprehend current affairs and to devise ways to respond to local, national or global issues without direct contact with service recipients. This thesis examines the claims of the Nobis Project program using data collected from a series of five case studies each with an international focus. It analyzes how far the Nobis Project (1) realizes the goals of service-learning to teach civic engagement, and (2) teaches the civic goals of global citizenship. This thesis argues that the Nobis Project, refined in the light of this research, represents a significant contribution to the practice of service-learning in secondary schools. Its method incorporates an original creative-process model, a practice not usually found in service-learning. As a program, it redefines the scope of service-learning by including international service recipients, thus contributing to a recognized need of global citizenship education, opportunity for action.

Talents play a central role in the way that we live our lives, and it is widely assumed that identifying and developing one’s talents is valuable, both for oneself and for others. Despite this, the philosophical literature is seriously lacking in its discussion of the nature and value of talent; the objective goodness of talent and its development is often assumed without an analysis of what a talent is, and the value that we place on it. This dissertation aims to provide such an analysis, offering a philosophical account of the nature and value of talent, and an account of why we value its development. In doing so, I demonstrate how this can inform and help us assess the debates and arguments that are made in the existing philosophical literature on talent. I do not aim to provide an exhaustive overview of all the philosophical issues that could be raised in relation to the value of talent and talent development, but instead I focus on three central issues that arise when analysing the nature of talents and the role that they play in our lives. The first issue is the nature of talent itself. Here I offer an account of talent, understood as a high level of potential for a particular skill which is expressed and manifested in the excellent acquisition of that skill. The second issue is whether or not we have good prudential reasons or a moral obligation to develop our talents. I begin by objecting to Kant’s claim that there is a moral duty to develop one’s talents; I will argue that if there is such a duty, it will not be generated by the commitments of Kant’s moral theory. I then argue that whether or not talent development is morally required, or prudentially good, is conditional on one’s endorsement of the commitments that are required to bring about the development of one’s talent. Finally, I turn my focus to the relationship between talents and equality. Given the fact that some people are more talented than others, and the way in which this disrupts levels of social equality, I examine how we ought to counteract the injustice caused by unequal levels of talent. I argue that we ought to adopt the luck egalitarian neutralisation approach, as this most plausibly frames the way in which unequal talents disrupt levels of equality, and why any arising inequalities count as unjust.

In this thesis, I use the work of Friedrich Nietzsche to offer a detailed account of existential sin. I show that existential sin as a form of self-understanding is deeply embedded in the Christian theological tradition, and that Nietzsche’s account of existential sin should be understood as part of this same tradition. In my reading of On the Genealogy of Morality I show that we need to place sin in close relation to bad conscience, guilt and the genealogical method itself. However, despite being grounded in Christian thought and dependent upon the figure of the Christian God in its origin and emergence, I follow Nietzsche in positing that existential sin continues to exist after the death of God. It is by considering sin as not only a form of self-understanding, but also as a cultural memory, that we can make sense of this claim. For Nietzsche existential sin is at its root a mistaken understanding of human nature that has taken hold of us through Christianity. However, I argue that we need to consider existential sin as a socio-historical answer to the ontological problem of meaningless suffering. Existential sin responds to a fundamental experience of the human condition. With this in mind, in the final chapter of the thesis I examine possible avenues of redemption from post-Christian sin. What options are open to the person suffering from post-Christian sin-consciousness if she cannot turn to religious narratives? I argue that Nietzsche’s redemptive method of genealogy is not sufficient, and that life-affirmation is too demanding. However, a weaker version of life-affirmation in which meaningless suffering is affirmed as necessary, but not desired, does provide a promising alternative answer to the problem of meaningless suffering.

In this thesis I explore, both philosophically and empirically, the moral significance of genetic relatedness within the father/child relationship. In doing so I utilise a novel ‘empirical bioethics’ approach, in which I use specifically gathered qualitative data to inform the philosophical debate. I present qualitative data, gathered over 12 focus groups, which explores men’s normative constructions of fatherhood. The data suggests that fatherhood is essentially a social relationship, constructed within a narrative of responsibility, and that there is a distinction between being a ‘father’ and being a ‘progenitor, both of which give rise to different kinds of responsibilities and rights. I go on to construct a normative framework of paternal rights and responsibilities, which is informed by the qualitative data. I make a distinction between ‘material’ and ‘paternal’ responsibility, and in doing so I argue that a man can cause a child to exist, and be fiscally responsible for a child, without being a father. I argue that a man becomes a father (in a valuable sense), and earns paternal rights, when he accepts paternal responsibility and forms a paternal relationship with a child.

This Thesis reconsiders the prospects for an approach to global justice centring on the proposal that every human being should possess a certain bundle of goods, which would include certain members of a distinctive category: the category of capabilities. My overall aim is to present a clarified and well-developed framework, within which such claims can be made. To do this, I visit a number of regions of normative and metanormative theorising. I begin by introducing the motivations for the capability approach, and clarifying some of its most distinctive features. Next, I focus on Martha Nussbaum's version of the approach, and identify several problems therein. The most important concerns epistemology, and especially the challenges that constructivist theories pose. The middle part of the Thesis presents an alternative, based on the work of John McDowell, which I argue has superior prospects. Then, I turn to two further problems: that of making sense of the universalistic aspirations of cosmopolitanism, and that of integrating the microscopic prescriptions of ethics with the macroscopic analyses of political philosophy. Using the Aristotelian interpretation of its core framework that I have developed, I conclude that the capability approach can provide compelling answers to important questions about global justice.

The theologically-inspired Jubilee 2000 campaign was highly successful but much theological reflection on the sovereign debt owed by the poorest nations has been overly polemical. Our study indicates that nonetheless a post-liberal, dialogical approach to the issue of international debt can be realised, and traces some of its key observations and themes. The origins and development of Jubilee 2000 are traced both in Britain and internationally, with particular reference to the campaign in Zambia. Key arguments and factors critical to the success of Jubilee 2000 are discussed and analysed. In performing this analysis we draw on the work of Atherton, whose approach offers criteria for establishing the adequacy of theological engagement in a plural and globalised context. Analysis of the themes of jubilee, grace and forgiveness, and usury reveal that despite their limitations, they offer valuable and distinctive contributions on issues of power and money, in their insights into the human condition, and into obligations across generations. Future theological engagement on debt will also require greater attention to the role that money performs, and a new synthesis of visionary and realistic elements.