After providing an overview of the context of the study, initially arguments are presented as to why adopting a character based, as opposed to rules or consequences based moral theory is preferential for investigations into the Internet. The ensuing empirical research involves an in-depth and systematic survey undertaken in two sequential phases; phase one comprised a questionnaire chiefly aimed at providing a statistical exploration of the key issues identified in the literature review and phase two involved semi-structured group interviews which were designed to provide additional qualitative data on one particular moral issue - cyber-bullying. This evidence shows that the Internet presents both risks and opportunities for the development of character virtues; in particular, the moral virtues of honesty and compassion. The research demonstrates that it is the character virtues of Internet users, as well as the features of the technology itself, that ultimately determines online behaviour. These findings have implications for those tasked with developing strategies for dealing with online moral issues, and attest to an urgent need for the development of new interventions that will help educate the next generation as virtuous digital citizens.

The continued presence and importance of Christian moral values in our daily lives, coupled with the fact that faith in Christianity is in continual decline, raises the question as to why having lost faith in Christianity, we have also not lost faith in our Christian moral values. This question is also indicative of a more pressing phenomenon: not only have we maintained our faith in Christian values, we fail to see that the widespread collapse of Christianity should affect this faith. To tackle this latter phenomenon, I claim, we have to pose the Nietzschean question of the value of our moral values, so as to see that this value can be a possible object of questioning. In chapter one, I consider different approaches found in the history of moral philosophy that look like potential candidates for this task. I argue that, ultimately, the task requires simultaneously taking our familiarity with Christian moral values as both sui generis and a questionable phenomenon. In chapter two, I articulate in detail the sui generis nature of this familiarity with moral values,in terms of the phenomena of habituation and sedimentation. In chapter three, I consider the possibility of estrangement that is built into our familiarity with moral values, by focusing on the role of cognition. I demonstrate how cognition, in the form of self-consciousness, can disrupt the sedimented, habituated nature of our moral values through a form of ironic disruption. In chapter four, I develop this account by considering the possibility of an appeal to an alternative moral outlook. To do so, I draw upon the structural isomorphism that is present between the process of estrangement and a rite of passage.

This study explores the mental health nurse’s experience of ethical reasoning while overriding the choices of mental health service users within an acute mental health context. When working with service users in acute mental distress a mental health nurse’s clinical decisions will have a controlling element, which can lead to the service user’s freedoms being restricted. This power to restrict freedoms also known as coercion can be explicit, it follows the rule of law, and implicit; ways of controlling that are ‘hidden’. The ethical use of this power requires the nurse to be an effective ethical reasoner who understands both the explicit and implicit nature of this power. Coercive power, which is explicit, has been thoroughly explored; however, there is limited work exploring the use of this power within an ethical context and as a ‘real-time’ practice issue. In addition, there is little work exploring implicit power as a practice issue or as an ethical issue. To examine this knowledge gap this study adopts an interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) approach to engender an understanding of the mental health nurse’s personal meaning and experience of using both explicit and implicit coercive power. This approach affords the researcher the opportunity to tease out the personal ‘ethical’ meaning of the participants’ experiences by facilitating an in-depth and sensitive dialogue, which focuses on stimulating conscious ethical reflection. IPA is an idiographic mode of inquiry where sample purposiveness and analytical depth is more important than sample size. On this basis, six qualified mental health nurses were recruited who have used coercive strategies while nursing service users in acute mental distress. The semi-structured interviews were thematically and interpretively analysed, the five superordinate themes that were generated are; the nurse as a practitioner, their values, their practice, their use of coercion, and their ethics. In addition, the results of the study highlighted that coercive strategies are a key part of a mental health nurse’s daily practice both explicitly and implicitly. These strategies can be beneficent; however, this is dependent on the ethical reasoning ability of the nurse and the professional support they receive in practice. Being an effective ethical reasoner requires the nurse to acquire ‘good habits’, a basis for enabling the nurse to work through an ethical challenge in ‘quick time’. Furthermore, to enhance these good habits they also need to have an ‘ethical imagination’. Considering these points, this study recommends mental health nurses when using coercive power use a multi-faceted ethical reasoning approach. This approach should aim to create good ethical habits through continually rehearsing good responses to common practice issues. In addition, this approach should not neglect the need for the nurse to use their ethical imagination and to feel for an ethical solution where required. As a future area for research, this study recognises the skilled use of ethical imagination in the field of mental health nursing requires further exploration.

Many philosophers hold that moral agency is defined by an agent’s capacity for rational reflection and self-governance. It is only through the exercise of such capacities, these philosophers contend, that one’s actions can be judged to be of distinctively moral value. The moral phenomenology of the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905-1981), currently enjoying a revival of interest amongst Anglo-American moral philosophers, is an exception to this view. Under the auspices of his signature theory of the ‘sovereign expressions of life,’ Løgstrup provides a rich moral phenomenology aimed at establishing the ethical value of ‘spontaneous,’ non-deliberative actions, such as those exemplified in the showing of trust and acts of mercy. In this thesis, my aim is to investigate what mode of moral agency, if any, is compatible with Løgstrup’s phenomenology of the sovereign expressions of life. I argue that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is compatible with a distinctive medio-passive mode of agency. According to this conception of moral agency, the subject’s agency is constituted not through her capacity to stand back and make a judgment on how to act, but rather in the way the subject comports herself in relation to situations and encounters that are experienced first-personally as overwhelming and encompassing. I will proceed by providing detailed analyses of the core aspects of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology and his theory of the sovereign expressions of life. In the process, I will elucidate the decisive influence that thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther and Søren Kierkegaard had on Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics. Thus, in this thesis my aim is to contribute both to Løgstrup scholarship and to central on-going debates in moral philosophy and the philosophy of action.

This thesis is situated across the fields of contemporary political philosophy, critical theory and feminist/gender studies. It argues that the notion of an ‘ana-aesthetic’ is required in order to provide a fuller sense of the conceptual nuances regarding pornography. The ‘ana-aesthetic’ is suggested as the ground and surface economy for this ‘unsayable something’ that is so much a part of the everyday common senses of contemporary life and art. Distinct from the ‘anti-aesthetic’, the ‘ana-aesthetic’ utilises a discursive methodology, and in sidestepping the usual moral entanglements found in attempts to analyse sexually explicit and often misogynistic pornographies, this thesis shows how the ‘ana-aesthetic’ surface of ‘the pornographical’ generates a mimetic and bodily ethics. ‘The pornographical’ is discussed in terms of its techne of comic humour, as a way of creating substance without lapsing into abyssal logics of lack; and the manner in which sexual meaning of fantasy is pleasurable, forming compressed data. The comic is suggested as something found, a cultural ‘ready-made’ gesture, of pleasure, produced through an economic expenditure of ideational mimetics (upon cathexis). This thesis suggests that through the comic, ‘the pornographical’ creates mimetic economies of witnessing. ‘The pornographical’ occupies a strange cultural position in its relationship to both the body and to technology. It is this relationship that gives ‘the pornographical’ its paradoxical ‘ana-linguistic’/’a-radical’ (without a ‘root’) structure, that generates a way of thinking that is related to and also embodies and mediates the body, without positing sexuality as an essentialism.

This research focuses on the punishment and sanctions awarded to student cases of plagiarism within a Higher Education (HE) setting. More specifically, this research investigated two key aspects: the extent and nature of consensus amongst those who work and study within HE; and whether penalties could be applied consistently. Consensus and consistency should be evident in any punishment system if it is going to be viewed as fair by the community who use it, and by those who receive a penalty as a consequence of it. Hence, this research is important if the HE community is to develop a shared understanding of this very complex and sensitive topic area, and develop fair and just practices when punishing student cases. The research used a mixed methods approach and consisted of an initial exploratory study of interviews followed by two main studies: the first using a survey and interviews in order to explore the nature and extent of consensus, and the difficulties in achieving consistency; the second developed a new tool in order to measure and quantify inconsistent decision making, and to explore whether some penalty systems achieved a greater or lesser level of consistency when punishing student cases of plagiarism. Educational theories (Engestrom's (1987) Activity Theory and Wenger's (1998) Communities of Practice), along with literature from assessment marking (where fairness, consensus and consistency are also important principles), were used to help provide context and understanding for the findings of this research. It was found that consensus does not exist within or between communities which work and study within HE: there was evidence of diverse opinions regarding appropriate sanctions for cases of student plagiarism. It is probable, therefore, that some individuals would view a penalty outcome unfair even if the penalty regulations have been strictly adhered to. This thesis also found that consistency of penalty award can be difficult to achieve if the system is highly flexible and non-prescriptive, even when those applying it are compliant. However, non-compliance, due to a disagreement with the penalty system, is also of concern and this thesis has shown that this would result in inconsistent penalties being awarded. It would appear that the HE community must negotiate meaning (as described by Wenger (1998)) more clearly and/or develop an agreement and better understanding of the tool and object (as described by Engestrom (1987)) before it will be possible to develop a penalty system for the punishment of student plagiarism which would be viewed as fair by all those working and studying in HE. Hence, it is suggested that developments should focus more strongly on the learning and teaching aspects of academic integrity, such as appropriate research skills, acknowledgement and citation, and also assessment design in order to reduce the need for punishment resulting from plagiarism.

Occupational Therapists (OTs) who recommend housing adaptations for people with disabilities, funded through public finance, must satisfy professional codes of practice and the employing local authority requirement to allocate finite resources effectively and fairly. At the same time they must also meet service user expectations. Ethical reasoning will be required to balance these demands whilst practising to a personally acceptable professional standard. This study investigates how OTs understand themselves to develop a sense of fairness and how they use their community of practice in developing professional ethical practice. This was a 2 part methodology. Firstly, OTs from 2 community services were invited to participate in small discussion groups. 3 group sessions, of different sizes ranging from 2-6 participants and duration of 2-3 hours, were recorded in which OTs discussed cases which posed ethical challenges with respect to fairness. All participants were female. Secondly, 4 individual interviews with volunteers from the groups were recorded to collect OT narratives of personal ethical development. Transcripts were analysed using a literary-critical approach focussing for transcripts of group sessions on dialogue in community of practice and ethical approaches used; focussing for interview transcripts on the process of ethical development. OTs were shown developing professional practice dialogically within their own community of practice groups. This finding confirms the importance for professional development of encouraging opportunities for dialogical interaction between OTs. Practical reasoning about justice as theorised by Sen (2009) better characterised OT ethical reasoning practices than biomedical-ethical approach applying universal, abstract ethical principles. OT narratives of ethical development fitted the Aristotelian model of growth in virtue as a whole, across both professional and personal aspects of life. Empathy was tentatively categorised as a virtue rather than a technical skill in this context. Empathy contributed to OT clinical reasoning processes as well as ethical reasoning.

The work presented here is a sociological and bioethical analysis of the medical condition known as Syndrome X/Metabolic Syndrome. The term is a recent name given to a group of cardiac/diabetic risk factors that include high cholesterol, insulin resistance, obesity, high blood pressure and high fat levels in the blood (Garber 2004). Interest in the topic was reawakened by Reaven (1988) who first coined the term ‘Syndrome X’ to describe a cluster of risk factors that he believed was linked to insulin resistance. In recent years the number of ‘new’ diseases that have been detected and identified by medicine has increased rapidly, with examples such as clinical obesity and infertility. Commentators have speculated as to why this may be happening and one suggestion is that our lives are becoming ever more medicalised (Moynihan and Smith 2002). The thesis consists of three main strands. The first strand is a sociological analysis of the Metabolic Syndrome concept and how it came to be constructed as a medical condition, with particular emphasis on whether the syndrome represents an example of the medicalisation of obesity. The second strand looks at the relationship between sociology and bioethics, and whether research from the former can help inform the ethical debate in the other. In this regard, I hope to show in this thesis that it is possible to conduct social and bioethical analyses side by side, and that these can be complementary and give you a richer understanding of a topic. The third strand is a discussion of the main ethical issues surrounding this ‘new’ diagnosis, with particular emphasis on the issue of blame and responsibility in relation to this condition.

This thesis investigates how researchers can take advantage of the rapid adoption of mobile technology that has brought with it transformations in social and cultural practice; the expectations of what computers are, what they can do, and the role of digital objects in everyday life. In particular this thesis presents and discuses the use of new App Store style software distribution methods to reduce the cost, in terms of researcher time and hardware, of recruiting a large group of participants for a trial ‘in the wild’ while increasing the potential diversity of users is becoming an attractive option for researchers pursuing the ubicomp vision. It examines the procedures for running large scale trials with the deployment of three applications released to a combined user base of over 135,000 in such a way as to keep the qualitative detail necessary to inform design while gain- ing the diversity of users for claims of generalisability. More generally, it discusses the results that can be expected from this ‘mass participation’ approach, and the ethical responsibilities they place upon researchers. The contributions of this thesis for mobile HCI show that in large-scale trials, relatively rich qualitative data can be collected along with substantial quantitative data, and that a hybrid trial methodology combining a large- scale deployment with a local trial can be a powerful tool in addressing shortcomings of trials that are either solely local or solely global. This thesis also contributes guidelines for researchers running large-scale user trials that give consideration to the established research norms and practices, in an attempt to strike a new balance between invasiveness and utility.

This thesis is a contribution to the contemporary reassessment of Karl Barth's social philosophy. A close reading of the English translation of the text of a series of posthumously published lectures on ethics which Barth gave in the universities of Münster and Bonn between 1929 and 1933 is the basis of the work. Previous literature includes no discussion of the lectures. The thesis argues that the lectures show the foundation of Barth's thinking both of theology as a science and of ethics as a part of dogmatics, and that his subsequent work developed these ideas. Barth's intellectual debt to Hegel is recognised by showing that he returns to the fundamental theological questions of the relationship between faith and reason, and truth and method in the form in which Hegel discussed them at the end of the nineteenth century. The thesis acknowledges the influence of Barth's helper, Charlotte von Kirschbaum, and contrary to other opinions claims that the impact of Wilhelm Herrmann's thinking on Barth remained until 1933. Although principally about material from the period 1918 to 1933, later work by Barth is included in the study to give evidence for the proposals that his ethical thinking helped shape his dogmatics, and that his later ethics show development, not stages and breaks. A discussion of criticisms of his ethics highlights the problem of choosing a method of enquiry that is appropriate to the object studied. A dialogue with two other ethical projects helps focus attention on his insistence on a proper foundation for Christian social ethics. The thesis argues that Barth's work is a theological ethic, because his social philosophy gives a method for asking appropriate questions and creates a way of considering these questions from a Christian perspective.