This thesis explicates and critically considers the various roles played by moral psychology within the work of John Rawls throughout his career. In the second half of the 20th Century, Rawls’s development of a sophisticated theory of justice in the social contract tradition played a significant part in reviving the study of normative political philosophy in the western world. Rawls argued that any theory of justice must be closely integrated with our best contemporary understanding of human psychology. Moral psychology is hence widely recognised to play an important role in Rawls’s overall theory. But the precise role played has not been adequately examined. In this thesis, I identify six roles which moral psychology plays within the structure of Rawls’s theory. Moral psychology must defend the idea that the model for a just society which Rawls proposes is realisable and stable (role #1). Moral psychology is also employed to explain how persons now have acquired what sense of justice they have (role #2). By showing that Rawls’s just society can be realised and is stable, moral psychology is then subsequently used in the justification of Rawls’s theory of justice – first by showing that such a society is not futile (role #3), and second by showing that the society is comparatively more stable than leading rivals (role #4). The account of the psychological capacities of the moral person is used to place the limit on the scope of justice (role #5). And moral psychological facts are also likely to be, in some sense, constitutive of the nature of morality for Rawls (role #6). These roles are discussed throughout various chapters. What alterations occur to the overall place of moral psychology following Rawls’s later embrace of political liberalism is also discussed. The overall aim of the thesis is to produce an accurate exegesis on these matters, and in doing so indicate just how important moral psychology is within Rawls’s theory, but also to indicate, clearly and starkly, just how much more psychological and sociological investigation needs to be done in if the theory is to be substantiated, given Rawls’s own criteria.

The overarching aim of this thesis was to contribute to the understanding of specific moral-cognitive processes and mechanisms and their association with aggressive behaviour across age groups and across two cultures. A review of the literature identified the key questions for present research. There is extensive evidence that the normative acceptability of aggression is associated with aggressive behaviour. However the acceptability for retaliation in specific situations and discernment between justified and unjustified retaliation has not been thoroughly researched. Secondly the role of self-censure and self-reflection 'in the regulation of aggressive behaviour needs to be examined further. Finally hostility between groups and its association with beliefs has not been investigated in Muslim samples. Eight empirical studies addressed these specific questions. Study one investigated the component structure of Normative Beliefs about aggression Scale using samples from Pakistan and the UK. Beliefs about equal retaliation, excessive retaliation and beliefs about general aggression were found to be distinct components, were endorsed differentially and had different level of association with aggressive behaviour across both countries. Study two established the discriminant validity of this distinction by comparing a group of violent adolescents with a matched group of non-violent adolescents on acceptability of these types of retaliation. Study 3 examined the association of self-censure with aggressive behaviour and normative beliefs about aggression and retaliation. Self-censure was negatively associated with aggressive behaviour as well as with beliefs indicating that higher the endorsement of aggression, lower would be the expected self-censure as a result of aggression. Study four using retrospective accounts of real aggressive episodes found that private self-consciousness predicted self-censure as well as thinking about one's own aggressive actions. Both thinking and self-censure were negatively associated with frequency of aggressive acts. The beliefs about direct and indirect aggression among Pakistani adolescents were tested in Study five and a reliable measure was developed and found to have convergent validity. Study six examined moral reasoning among children and explored at a preliminary level a possible intervention for changing beliefs about victimization in school. Study seven and eight extended investigation of beliefs to intergroup context (anti-Semitic beliefs) and found that extreme beliefs were related to hostile intentions. An educational intervention was carried out which showed that beliefs could be influenced through creating empathy and stressing intergroup similarity.

Ten studies are presented which show how and why individual differences in gratitude are related to well-being, with six key conclusions. Grateful people view the help they receive in everyday life as more costly, valuable, and altruistically intended. Cross-sectional (n=253), multi-level process (n=113), and experimental (n=200) studies showed these attributional biases explain why trait and state levels of gratitude are linked. Trait gratitude involves the habitual focusing on the positive in the world, suggesting why gratitude is linked to well-being. Two studies (n=206 and n=389) presented exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis showing that each of the existing measure of gratitude and appreciation (the GQ-6, GRAT, and Appreciation Scale) assess the same latent construct. Two studies (n=389) and (n=201) show gratitude is uniquely linked to subjective well-being (satisfaction with life) and psychological well-being (personal growth, positive relationships with others, purpose in life, and self-acceptance), after controlling for the 30 facets of the Five Factor Model. Two longitudinal studies (n=156 and n=87) showed that during a life transition, gratitude led to lower stress and depression, and higher perceived social support. Structural equation modelling disproved other models of causality. Grateful people were shown to use more adaptive coping strategies, characterised by seeking help from others and actively coping rather than avoiding the problem. Across two samples (n=236) these adaptive coping strategies were shown to partially explain why grateful people feel lower level of stress in life. In a large community sample (n=401, 40% with clinically impaired sleep) grateful people had a better quality of sleep. Together, the ten studies show that individual differences in gratitude (1) are related to specific information processing biases, (2) involved a habitual orientation towards noticing and appreciating the positive in life, (3) uniquely predict well-being, (4) lead to well-being over time, (5) are related to positive coping, and (6) predict better sleeping quality.

The idea that each of us owns our physical selves is one that has largely failed to achieve prominence in contemporary political theory, despite its sound philosophical basis, largely due to its association with a strong formulation of right-wing libertarianism best expressed in the work of Robert Nozick. In this thesis I argue that the idea as expressed in Nozick's most infamous work, Anarchy, State and Utopia, is not taken to its full conclusion and that there is in fact a way of unpacking self-ownership, necessary under proper consideration of its underlying premises, that would imply far less of a connection with right-libertarianism. Fundamentally, Nozick considered self-ownership as a base value in itself, informing all of his subsequent political and ethical values. Through analysis of various important contemporary attempts to improve on and undermine self-ownership, points made respectively by libertarians who wish to modify it and non-libertarians who wish to do away with it, I argue that self-ownership must in fact be a structure which is itself derivative of a more basic and fundamental value. Conceding the argument held in common by all of the major theorists proposing modifications to self-ownership, that self-ownership is a self-defeating theory when we consider the operability and usefulness of the rights it bestows upon those who have no original resources to trade, I seek to enquire exactly what it is about rights-holders that self-ownership rights were designed to protect and promote, using evidence gleaned from the work of Nozick. I conclude from this that the basic value of agency must underlie the Nozickian supposition of self-ownership. Making agency the primary value subsequently means that self-ownership needs a further derivative principle, something approximating a redistributive system which enables all agents to have self-ownership rights which are of comparably equal usefulness to them.

This thesis aims to set out parameters within which Christian ethical reappropriations of Old Testament Narratives can take place. Chapter One sets out the philosophical foundations for the project making special use of the work of Paul Ricoeur. It is argued that the notion of a narrative-self is crucial to understanding how it is that story can ethically shape its audience. Four specific ways in which it does this are set out. Chapter Two argues that story is far more important in OT ethics than has usually been appreciated. It moves' on to defend a hermeneutical model suggested by N. T. Wright for Christian interpretation of the OT. Having set forth the hermeneutical method in the first two chapters, Chapters Three to Five attempt to apply it to a case study. Chapter Three overviews the ethical use that has been made of Genesis 34 in the history of interpretation, whilst Chapter Four proposes an interpretation. Chapter Five is an attempt to interpret Genesis 34 within the context of the biblical metanarrative. It is argued that this sheds new light on appropriate and inappropriate Christian ethical uses of the chapter.

The central thesis defended here is that we can have truth and objectivity in accounting. We do not contend that this potential is presently realized: On the contrary, we argue that certain contradictions immanent to capitalism give rise in late modernity to crisis tendencies in financial accounting as a way of knowing - epistemological crisis. We do contend that accounting's tendencies to epistemological crises can, at least in theory, be overcome. We begin to defend this view by considering accounting as an essentially descriptive activity. The account given by the philosopher Donald Davidson of the very possibility of knowledge is used to justify the view that intersubjectivity is all the foundation we need, or can have, for objectivity, and to defend out claim that we can have accounting knowledge, that is, true accounts/descriptions of an objective and intersubjectively accessible public world. The defence here is against those theorists, including those inspired by certain strands of the phenomenological, (post)structuralist and hermeneutic traditions, who would deny the possibility of any such objectivity in accounting. Using an analysis of the history and debate surrounding the issue of accounting for deferred tax in the United Kingdom (UK), we endeavour to locate accounting in terms of the dichotomy the philosopher Bernard Williams draws between science and ethics. We find that the descriptive and normative are inextricably entangled in accounting concepts in much the same way as they are entangled in thick ethical concepts such as 'chastity' or 'courage'. We recognise that the descriptive aspect of accounting can not be neatly distinguished from the normative and dealt with separately. Furthermore, following Williams, we argue that difficulties associated with the objective validation of the normative dimension of thick accounting concepts renders knowledge held under them vulnerable to destruction by reflection.

Going beyond the biological and physiological limitations imposed on us by the human body is something which the human race has strived to do throughout its history. There is something about our human nature that compels us to strive for improvement and enhancement in our physical and mental performance, and to stretch ever further the boundaries of human accomplishment. Nowhere can a stronger desire for enhanced performance be found than in the realm of competitive sport and, it is certainly arguable that, there are very few sports that can rival the competitiveness, endurance and physical exertion involved in the sport of boxing. Transhumanism is borne of this desire for continuous improvement and the refusal to resign ourselves to the restrictions placed on us by our natural biological constitution and environment, enhancing human capabilities and capacities by way of new and emergent technologies. With regard to sport, transhumanism could provide us with the ability to train longer, run, swim or cycle faster, jump higher, throw further and, in the case of boxing, punch harder. However, it is not restricted or confined to the enhancement of our physical powers, but could equally-well serve to improve our psychological capacities and alter the way in which we perceive and experience the world. In this way transhumanism could be employed to change the content of experience.

In the following thesis I outline Schopenhauer’s ethics in its metaphysical context and in contrast to ethics based on egoism. I look at criticisms of Schopenhauer’s philosophy which have emerged quite recently, and some of which (if valid) would undermine Schopenhauer’s compassion-based moral theory. I have explained these criticisms and offered a defence of Schopenhauer. In order to take up Schopenhauer’s claim of affinity with Buddhist philosophy, I outline first of all early Buddhist then Mahāyāna ethics focusing on the latter’s central idea of compassion. It has been suggested by some scholars that there are specific problems in Buddhist ethics which undermine the idea of compassion and I explain, then attempt to counter, these claims with specific reference to Śāntideva and his rejection of egoism as a means of acting in a moral way or of finding liberation from suffering. I then address recent criticisms of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, especially the idea that the specific role of compassion in his ethics and its soteriological role are illogical – an idea which I argue against. Finally I compare the core ideas of Schopenhauer’s solution to the problem of suffering with what seems similar in Śāntideva. In doing this, I examine whether or not Schopenhauer is right in claiming convergence between Buddhism and his own philosophy, especially in the area of soteriology as it relates to ethics.

This thesis is concerned with the parabolic relationship between evil and salvation. In this thesis I argue that only through recognising evil as inescapably woven into the fabric of our lives, can we construct a theology of hope. I further argue that this identification of evil in the individual is always necessarily something that is achieved through the workings of the apophatic, and can therefore only be realised through the address that reaches exclusively the individual through the unsayable in language. This study centres upon the Parable of the Grand Inquisitor in an inter-textual, literary context and the apophatic tradition. The context in which my discussion of this parabolic relationship operates is the literary environment that allows for the parabolic and the paradoxical. My primary concern is therefore not with the question of theodicy, but with what happens when, through the intellectual struggle, we encounter the boundaries of our understanding in the beginnings of learned ignorance. In the first chapter I have set out to establish the narrative of the thesis, starting with Ivan Karamazov’s articulation of the problem. In this conversation with Alyosha he problematizes the fact that when we accept God’s world, we ought, at the same time to acknowledge the suffering in that world. In this way he exposes the paradox that is inherent in reconciliation itself. However, in the middle of this exchange with Alyosha, Ivan tells the story of the Grand Inquisitor, where the question of reconciliation is addressed in the kiss; suddenly possible in the literary space of the parable. In the chapter that follows I explore our relationship with evil within the space of a literary context. Starting with the fall as the moment at which the human being has put on self-awareness; separating the inner from outer part of the person. With Milton in Paradise Lost, and Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov and The Idiot as my main conversational partners, I offer a reading of the story of the fall in Genesis as a narrative about our alienation from the divine. I argue that this alienation has also become an estrangement from ourselves where the spirit can no longer get to know itself through the body and the body can no longer know itself through the spirit. I argue that this inability to recognise what is other closes off the possibility of a hermeneutical encounter with the Other. The third chapter examines the relationship between the inability to recognise what is Other and responsibility; in conversation with Kafka in The Trial and Kierkegaard’s discussion of Abraham in Fear and Trembling. I argue that Joseph K's inability to engage hermeneutically with the world is the reason why he cannot recognise his own guilt. Abraham is in that respect his opposite; he embodies the parabolic and the asymmetrical, and so becomes a fully responsible individual. In the last chapter I discuss the relationship between the unsayable in language and the coincidentia oppositorum. Here my main conversational partners are Meister Eckhart, Thomas Altizer in The Descent into Hell, and Nicolas of Cusa. I argue that the language of the unsayable is what addresses us in the detached self, as Christ addresses the Grand Inquisitor in his detached self. The kiss, as the climax, is the instant of initiation when the inner and the outer self again become one. At the same time this is the moment of betrayal when all command of our identity seems lost. This disintegration of the self is the descent into hell, and simultaneously the moment of salvation. It is also fundamentally apolitical and through its unsayability can address only the individual.

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