This research is the result of the author’s quest to answer the question whether Corporate Governance is effective in Emerging Markets. Literature on Corporate Governance in the emerging markets of Latin America is limited mostly due to the relatively slower development of capital markets and the late adoption of corporate governance principles. Corporate Governance laws, which largely follow Sarbanes Oxley guidelines, were published and implemented in the mid 00´s and no research has checked their impact on corporate value in Latin America. This research reports compromises two empirical projects. The first project focused on the relationship between boards of directors attributes such size and composition, Corporate Governance law and firm value for Colombia. The second project focused on another Corporate Governance variable, CEO Duality and tested whether it has had any impact in Mexico. This second project also studied whether board attributes such as size and composition and Corporate Governance law were related to firm value. Based on the listed companies from Colombia and Mexico for the years 2001 to 2012 the author found no relationship between board size or composition and firm value. Results from Mexico, where CEO duality is allowed showed that it has no relationship with firm value. These results do not support or contradict either Agency theory or stewardship theory. Results on the impact of the adoption of a Corporate Governance law in firm value are mixed. Results for Colombia contradict previous literature by reporting a positive relationship between Corporate Governance laws and firm results while results from Mexico support previous research by reporting no relationship between these variables. This research is valuable for regulators and policy makers in their quest to assess the impact of the adoption of Corporate Governance laws in emerging markets. . Since effective Corporate Governance is important in easier access to financing it is important for shareholders to know which Corporate Governance mechanisms are positively related to firm value. Similarly, it is also important for investors (both foreign and local) in assessing the risk for equity investments in Colombia and Mexico.

This dissertation includes two related chapters that investigate corporate governance. In the first chapter, we examine the effectiveness of board monitoring on CEOs. It is widely believed that outsider boards are better monitors. In fact, regulations now require that the board of directors of publicly traded firms be composed of a majority of independent directors (or outsiders). However, this paper documents that an insider-dominated board can monitor the CEO just as well as an outsider board can when the firm's CEO is hired from outside. The results suggest that what matters is not so much as the structure of the board, but the "independence" between the board and the CEO it monitors. Specifically, we find that insider boards monitor more of their firms' CEOs if the CEO is hired from outside than from within. In addition, outsider boards monitor both inside and outside CEOs the same way. We also find little difference between insider and outsider boards when they monitor outside CEOs. The main contribution of this paper is to show that an insider board can be an effective monitor as long as it is independent of the CEO. In other words, what is important is board independence, not board structure per se. In chapter two, we examine the relation between the change in a firm's value and its CEO selection sources: internal promotion versus external hire in both high and low product competition environments. Our results show that firms will be better off hiring an outside CEO (external hire) when the firms operate in a low product competition industry. Specifically, the evidence shows that hiring an outside CEO for a firm in a low product competition industry will increase the firm's value by about 3% for the entire tenure of the CEO. The main contribution of this paper is to show that product market competition is an important factor in CEO selection.

The number of multinational corporations (MNCs) has increased tremendously since the 1990s, as companies have started to act in a more global environment. This has resulted in more integration between economies, where companies have to adjust to this changing environment. In this paper, we study the impact of internationalization on nationality diversity in boards of Swedish MNCs during the period 1994-2012. Our propositions suggest that board size, a company’s degree of internationalization and country of origin are contributing factors that affect how a board is composed. Our findings concluded that companies with a high degree of internationalization often are more nationality diverse and that Swedish companies have gradually increased the number of non-Swedes in their boards over time.

While the European Union is striving towards harmonization among the member countries, interlocks (connections) are a social phenomenon that has an implication on the Corporate Code but it is more implicitly pointed out with words like “other relevant information” or ”other significant board positions” that might affect the individual board member’s independence and ability to fully commit to the company. Although the board often is referred to as one single entity, it consists of many board members that individually can have an agenda that might deviate from all stakeholders’ goal. Every single director has a business network of social contacts, especially if they are elected to more than one company’s board. These individual directors create interlocks (links) between the firms they work for, and form a social network on company level, while the Code only recommends the companies to provide independence information and other significant assignments one by one as if they operate in solitude.   This exploratory study captures the corporate governance perspective about independence and the social networks of directors on supervisory corporate boards in Denmark, Finland and Sweden by investigating the interconnectedness of the directors and companies, and combines this data with the independence disclosure by companies.   We employed deductive approach and a quantitative archival research strategy based on secondary data from annual reports and corporate governance documents in a total of 150 companies to gather a sufficient database about the independence disclosure and the corporate networks.   We identified the most central companies and individuals in corporate framework, and found concentration of power to be evident. Identifying the director networks enabled us to focus on the structural aspects of the networks and what implications this has on the independence of the boards. Furthermore, this research analysed the disclosure independence by the companies and assessed, whether the current requirements on disclosure are adequate for their purpose.   We also found, contrary to our expectations, that the independence disclosure is not harmonized between the studied countries and therefore we assessed the disclosure by using insider-outsider theory. This showed that the current corporate codes do not capture the independence very accurately, and that harmonization of the codes in addition to insider-outsider theory would help the relevant stakeholders to get a “truer and fairer view” of the directors’ independence.   This study has been written especially the legislators in mind and suggests the use of insider-outsider -theory approach to the legislators for providing a more comprehensive and accurate view of the independence.

Bakgrund Små familjeägda aktiebolags styrelsesammansättning brukar kännetecknas av en överlappning mellan familjen och företaget. Små företag har ofta inte råd med det antal kompetenta styrelseledamöter som de har behov av och kan därmed gå miste om viktig information, kompetens och erfarenheter som en extern styrelseledamot kan bidra med. Vidare har tidigare forskning visat att externa styrelseledamöter kan tillföra ett främmande inslag i familjeföretaget vilket kan ge en känsla som innebär förlust av kontroll. Slutligen kan det anses finnas brister i tidigare forskning då små företag har undersökts i mindre utsträckning. Forskningsfrågor Vad är det som avgör varför små familjeföretag väljer att tillsätta externa styrelseledamöter eller inte? Syfte Syftet är att genom kvalitativa intervjuer förklara små familjeföretags tillsättande av externa styrelseledamöter. Metod Studien har byggts på en kvalitativ metod med semistrukturerade intervjuer som genomförts med tio VD:ar i tio små svenska familjeägda aktiebolag. Teoretisk referensrams Den teoretiska referensramen bygger på en trecirkelmodell som beskriver familjeföretags överlappande system. Avslutningsvis ges en överblick av styrelser samt beskrivs agentteorin och stewardshipsteorins förhållande till externa styrelseledamöter. Empiri De tio genomförda intervjuernas resultat presenteras under fyra teman och tabeller. Analys Analyskapitlet har genomförts med stöd av den teoretiska referensramens olika delar. Slutsats 0Vår slutsats är att den viktigaste egenskapen hos en extern styrelseledamot är dess kompetens och erfarenhet. En annan viktig faktor som avgör valet är för att få en s.k. input, en extern syn på verksamheten och någon att bolla idéer med. I och med tillsättandet har många av företagens styrelsearbeten övergått från passivt till aktivt styrelsearbete och de intervjuade företagarna ser endast positivt på tillsättandet. / Background Small family-owned limited liability company board composition is usually characterized by an overlap between the family and the company. Small businesses often can’t afford the number of qualified board members that they have in need and can thus miss important information, expertise and experience as an external board member can contribute. Furthermore, previous research has shown that outside directors can bring a foreign element in the family business which can give a sense involving loss of control. Finally, it is considered to be flaws in previous research when small companies have been investigated to a lesser extent. Research questions What is it that determines why small family businesses choose to appoint outside directors, or not? Purpose The purpose is that through qualitative interviews explain small family companies appointment of external board members. Method The study has been built on a qualitative approach with semistructured interviews conducted with ten CEOs of ten small, familyowned companies. Theory The theoretical framework is based on a threecircelmodel that describs the overlapping systems in family business. Finally it is an overwiev of boards and a explanation about the agency theory's and stewardship theory’s relation to the external board members. Empiricism The ten completed interview results are presented under four themes and tables. Analysis The analysis chapter has been implemented with the support of the theoretical framework different parts Conclusion Our conclusion is that the main feature of an external director is its expertise and experience. Another important factor that determines the choice is to get a so-called input, an external view of the business and someone to bounce ideas with. After the appointment many boards have worked in shift from passive to active and the interviwed businessowners only look positive on the appointment.

Agency theory proposes that the role of the board of directors is to control management (Fama & Jensen 1983). A structurally independent board, one with a high percentage of non-executive directors and a chairperson who is not the CEO, has been used as a proxy for the control role. Therefore, agency theory predicts a positive relationship between independent board structure and firm performance. These predictions have not been confirmed by meta-analytic reviews (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson 1998; Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy 2000). This thesis applies structural contingency theory to provide an alternative explanation for the relationship between board structure and firm performance. Structural contingency theory (Donaldson 2001) proposes that the relationship between an organization???s structure and its performance is moderated by contingencies. In this study the contingency is the salience of the board???s control role. I argue that structural independence of the board has a beneficial effect on performance only if it is in fit with control salience. For example, a firm with an independently structured board that gives high prominence to the control role will perform well. On the other hand, another firm with a less independently structured board that does not see its main role as controlling management will also prosper. Survey data were analyzed to measure the control salience for 98 Australian listed companies. Archival data provided measures of board structure and firm performance. Consistent with the meta-analytic reviews, there was no association between independent board structure and firm performance. There was some evidence that high control salience resulted in high performance, but this effect was evident chiefly when performance was measured by total shareholder returns. This may indicate that the share market was responding to the symbolism of high control salience. In contrast to the symbolic main effect of control salience, the fit between the control salience and the independent structure of the board caused increased return on equity. This reflects the board???s objective effect on profit when its structure is in fit with control salience.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--UCLA, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 202-209).

Thesis (Ed. D.)--Illinois State University, 1980. / Title from title page screen, viewed Mar. 1, 2005. Dissertation Committee: Ned Lovell (chair), John McCarthy, Charles Sherman, David Eaton, Ben Hubbard. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-92) and abstract. Also available in print.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--Illinois State University, 2001. / Title from title page screen, viewed April 20, 2006. Dissertation Committee: Richard Wiggall (chair), Darryl Pifer, Albert Azinger, Robert Hall. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 169-180) and abstract. Also available in print.

The problem of this study is that of discerning the board positions, the roles, and the perceptions of Black elected public school board members in Mississippi as perceptions relate to racial discrimination, interpersonal relationships, and primary education interests. Major problems in education as perceived ranged from "racism" to "finances." Major contributions to education in Mississippi in the last five years as perceived ranged from "court decisions" to "election of Blacks to education positions." General conclusions are that less racial discrimination exists in school systems with Blacks represented on school boards; however, some racism is still perceived by Black board members.