A typical problem with relationship management in a B2B environment is that implementing companies often see the relationship only from their own perspective. In other words, the supplier decides which customer is worth treating as a key customer, without involving the customer in this decision, or vice versa. As a result, even resource-consuming key account customers might move to competitors if they do not value the relationship in the same way as the supplier and see an opportunity to save costs by switching sources. This study develops a better understanding of value in B2B relationships. It investigates the segmentation methods currently used in relationship management and develops a new approach that brings the value perspectives from buyer and seller together. The major contribution of the research, however, is to test the proposition that congruency of the value expectations of buyer and seller will optimize the relationship strength.In the literature there seem two general approaches, the hard and the soft. This research combines these measures to form a single, cohesive measurement of congruency of relationship value, from the perspective of both partners in the relationship. There is a lacuna in the burgeoning literature on relationship management, where trust is often inadequately represented in the research, and where reciprocity of value between relationship partners is often omitted. This research addresses this critical, yet under-researched, issue. It also provides a useful, practical, guide to companies desirous of setting up strong relationships with other organizations by explaining the importance of soft value measures and focusing on shared value expectations in these relationships.The quantitative survey was conducted among buyers and sellers in small and medium sized companies in Germany that are operating on an international level. The empirical results strongly support the research thesis. Implications for theory and practice are provided as well as recommendations for further research.

This dissertation consists of two parts. The first part isabout“Managing buyer-supplier relationships in autoproduction chains ­ a case study of Volvo and its supplierrelationship management”. The second part is about“Managing buyer-supplier relationships in telecom supplychains ­ a case study of Ericsson and its supplierrelationship models in different business situations”. The scope of this study is restricted to supply chains inautomotive and telecommunication industries, where the successof supply processes is dependent on how well a company managesits supply chain with horizontal or vertical integration tofulfill customer demands. The research is carried out as a number of case studies ofbuyer-supplier relationship management in the auto and telecomsupply chains. The aim was to analyze how a company fulfillscustomer demand in the best way through different supplierrelationships, and how and why alternative relationship typesare used in reality. The study is based on the relationship between two focalcompanies and their suppliers. Case study methodology is used,and data is collected from selected cases through interviewsand observations. Analysis is carried out within and acrosscases. From the case interpretation and analysis, conclusionsare drawn as to which strategic level of buyer-supplierrelationship is appropriate for different situations. As a result and in conclusion, a static supplychain-reaction model is built at the end of the Part I. Thestatic model describes the importance of collaborativebuyer-supplier relationships in the product developmentprocess. Based on this model, it is concluded in Part II thatthe most suitable supplier relationship is different fordifferent products. For the same product, the most appropriatebuyer-supplier relationship varies with the product’s lifecycle timing. Therefore, two dynamic buyer-supplierrelationship models under different business conditions and indifferent product life-cycle periods are created in Part II.The models apply to dynamic processes, not to interactingcompany organizations in general. The study increases the knowledge regarding selection of themost appropriate supplier relationships in different businesssituations. Key words:buyer-supplier relationship, sourcingstrategy, supply chain management / <p>Qc 20130827</p>

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This thesis aims to describe how enterprises can approach and reach older citizens in order to sell new technology products. For that they need information about aspects affecting elderlies purchase decisions regarding these kind of products. The study is based on 13 qualitative interviews where we have applied semi structured interviews and observations of the elderlies behaviour towards an Ipad which we used as a study object during the interviews. The results of this study shows several aspects which affect the elderlies purchase decision regarding new technology but it all comes down to one matter, lack of knowledge. In order to overcome that obstacle, enterprises need to modify their communication strategy. They will be needing information about elderlies preferences and their self-image, meaning how they perceive themselves which is connected to how receptive they are towards new technology. They will also need to communicate information about the products area of use, the quality of the product, that the product is user-friendly and that there is impeccable support and education available. All these aspects have shown to have huge impact on the purchase decision. Enterprises need to assure the elderly segment that they will be able to use these products without complications. Since the social environment, especially the younger segment has shown to have an impact on the elderlies purchase decisions, enterprises must also turn the attention and start communicating this information towards them also.

Despite a general consensus concerning the relevance of supply partnerships to agility, the literature reveals disagreements and contradictions regarding their characteristics and, in particular, their duration. This is, whether partnerships in an agile strategy should be long-term (strategic partnerships) or short-term (agile partnerships). The research joins this debate by investigating the types and characteristics of supply partnerships to achieve agility. The underlying premise of the work is that the type of supply partnership is contingent on the degree of turbulence an agile strategy is designed to face. The research was carried out in the fashion industry, given the relevance of agility in this industry. Specifically, the research focused the supply partnerships developed by the footwear companies in the Macerata-Fermo district, the largest footwear district in Italy. The focus on district companies allow the comparison of several companies sharing a very similar business context, allowing a better control of external variables and increasing the internal validity of the study. The field research consisted of a preliminary survey on agility drivers and agile capabilities in the Macerata-Fermo footwear district, followed by an in-depth investigation on supply partnerships using multiple embedded cases studies. Overall six medium-large footwear companies have been analysed in their supply relationships with respect to five key supply categories. For each supply category, the buyer view of the focal firms has been complemented with a view from the supplier side. In total the fieldwork is built upon 30 interviews with 22 informants from 18 companies for a total of more than 23 hours of interviews. In all cases, except two, the key informant was owner, CEO or general manager of the company, eventually supported by another company manager. In two cases, the interviews data have been strengthened by a longitudinal analysis of purchase orders over eight years. The fieldwork highlights that agility drivers and agile capabilities impact on the footwear companies’ decision of developing agile supply partnerships. Specifically footwear companies that are under the pressure of high-turbulence agility drivers (here represented by a high collection renewal rate) and that have developed strong agile capabilities (here represented by a local supply network and a purchase orders postponement) choose agile supply partnerships with respect to supply categories that are sensitive to the fashion trends and therefore difficult to be sourced in a stable way – season after season – from the same suppliers. The main contribution to theory is related to the characteristics of supply partnerships in an agile strategy and specifically to the apparent paradox of “high-involvement & short- term” relationships (i.e. agile supply partnerships). In spite of the presence of time compression diseconomies in building up partnership and of the loss of relational (non- redeployable) benefits in closing down partnerships, scenarios of high-turbulence can give companies an incentive to look for short-term partnerships. Such finding can support a wider claim that different levels of turbulence call for different agility strategies requiring different capabilities and practices. The main contribution to practice is related to the way agile partnerships are selected, started and ended. Given that many industries are facing an increase in market turbulence, it appears that many companies – even outside the fashion industry – might have to learn how to balance high-involvement supply relationships with respect to a shorter time horizon.

Chapter 1: Downstream Competition and the Effects of Buyer Power The first chapter examines the interaction between buyer power and competition intensity in the downstream market in affecting consumer and total welfare. We study a model where oligopolistic retailers compete in quantity in the downstream market and one of them is a large retailer that has its own exclusive supplier. Negotiation between this retailer and its supplier is modeled as a generalized Nash bargaining game. We demonstrate that an increase in the buyer power of the large retailer against its supplier leads to a fall in retail price and consequently an improvement in consumer surplus and this is true even in the extreme case where the downstream market is served by a monopoly. More interestingly, we find that the effects of buyer power are large when the intensity of downstream competition is low, with the effects being the largest in the case of downstream monopoly. This suggests that buyer power and downstream competition are substitutes. Chapter 2: Subsidy, Product Diversity and Buyer Power The objective of the second chapter is to analyze the effectiveness of government subsidies in promoting product diversity when the downstream firm (a retailer) has buyer power. We extend the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition and compare the effects of subsidies on equilibrium number of product varieties and social welfare in the case where products are sold directly to consumers and the case where they are sold through a monopoly retailer with buyer power. Two types of subsidies are considered, a subsidy on marginal cost and a subsidy on fixed cost. We find that while the two types of subsides have different effects on the quantity and retail price of each variety, they both raise the number of product varieties and the social welfare. Moreover, a combination of the two types of subsidies is able to achieve the social optimum. These results are true even when products are distributed through a downstream monopoly retailer who has all the bargaining power, but the mechanism through which a subsidy increases product varieties is different. In comparison with the case where products are distributed directly to consumers, retailer buyer power reduces product variety and social welfare. Furthermore subsidies become less effective in the presence of buyer power. To be more specific, retailer buyer power has both a level effect and a marginal effect on product diversity. At any given subsidy rate, the equilibrium number of varieties is smaller and a marginal increase in subsidy leads to a smaller increase in the number of varieties. Chapter 3: Subsidy on Complementary Products in a Model of Monopolistic Competition The third chapter seeks to re-examine the market provision of product diversity under monopolistic competition and the effects of an infinitesimal subsidy on product variety and social welfare in the case of complementary products. This examination builds on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition but assumes an alternative demand linkage. The results show that, different from the case of substitutable products, demand complementarity leads to multiple equilibriums and the number of product varieties could be higher or lower than the constrained optimum depending on the level of the fixed cost of production. When the fixed costs are small, the market yields too many products and an infinitesimal subsidy exacerbates the problem leading to an over-supply of product varieties. On the other hand, when the fixed costs are large, there are too few products and in some cases the complementary goods industry becomes non-existent. A subsidy that induces a switch of equilibriums enhances product variety and improves social welfare.

Reliability of products is becoming increasingly important due to rapid technological development and tough competition in the product market. One effective way to ensure reliability of sold product/asset is to consider after sales services linked to warranty and service contract. One of the major decision variables in designing a warranty is the warranty period. A longer warranty term signals better reliability and provides higher customer/user peace of mind. The warranty period offered by the manufacturer/dealer has been progressively increasing since the beginning of the 20th Century. Currently, a large number of products are being sold with long term warranties in the form of extended warranty, warranty for used product, long term service contracts, and lifetime warranty. Lifetime warranties and service contracts are becoming more and more popular as these types of warranties provide assurance to consumer for a long reliable service and protecting consumers against poor quality and the potential high cost of failure occurring during the long uncertain life of product. The study of lifetime warranty and service contracts is important to both manufacturers and the consumers. Offering a lifetime warranty and long term service contracts incur costs to the manufacturers/service provider over the useful life of the product/contract period. This cost needs to be factored into the price/premium. Otherwise the manufacturer/ dealer will incur loss instead of profit. On the other hand, buyer/user needs to model the cost of maintaining it over the useful life and needs to decide whether these policies/service contracts are worth purchasing or not. The analysis of warranty policies and costs models associated with short-term or fixed term policies have received a lot of attention. A significant amount of academic research has been conducted in modelling policies and costs for extended warranties and warranty for used products. In contrast, lifetime warranty policies and longer term service contracts have not been studied as extensively. There are complexities in developing failure and cost models for these policies due to the uncertainties of useful life, usage pattern, maintenance actions and cost of rectifications over longer period. This thesis defines product's lifetime based on current practices. Since there is no acceptable definition of lifetime or the useful life of product in existing academic literatures, different manufacturer/dealers are using different conditions of life measures of period of coverage and it is often difficult to tell whose life measures are applicable to the period of coverage (The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 1975). Lifetime or the useful life is defined in this thesis provides a transparency for the useful life of products to both manufacturers/service provider and the customers. Followed by the formulation of an acceptable definition of lifetime, a taxonomy of lifetime warranty policies is developed which includes eight different one dimensional and two dimensional lifetime warranty policies and are grouped into three major categories, A. Free rectification lifetime warranty policies (FRLTW), B. Cost Sharing Lifetime Warranty policies (CSLTW), and C. Trade in policies (TLTW). Mathematical models for predicting failures and expected costs for different one dimensional lifetime warranty policies are developed at system level and analysed by capturing the uncertainties of lifetime coverage period and the uncertainties of rectification costs over the lifetime. Failures and costs are modelled using stochastic techniques. These are illustrated by numerical examples for estimating costs to manufacturer and buyers. Various rectification policies were proposed and analysed over the lifetime. Manufacturer's and buyer's risk attitude towards a lifetime warranty price are modelled based on the assumption of time dependent failure intensity, constant repair costs and concave utility function through the use of the manufacturer's utility function for profit and the buyer's utility function for cost. Sensitivity of the optimal warranty prices are analysed with numerical examples with respect to the factors such as the buyer's and the manufacturer/dealer's risk preferences, buyer's anticipated and manufacturer's estimated product failure intensity, the buyer's loyalty to the original manufacturer/dealer in repairing failed product and the buyer's repair costs for unwarranted products. Three new service contract policies and cost models for those policies are developed considering both corrective maintenance and planned preventive maintenance as the servicing strategies during the contract period. Finally, a case study is presented for estimating the costs of outsourcing maintenance of rails through service contracts. Rail failure/break data were collected from the Swedish rail and analysed for predicting failures. Models developed in this research can be used for managerial decisions in purchasing life time warranty policies and long term service contracts or outsourcing maintenance. This thesis concludes with a brief summary of the contributions that it makes to this field and suggestions and recommendations for future research for lifetime warranties and service contracts.

A typical problem with relationship management in a B2B environment is that implementing companies often see the relationship only from their own perspective. In other words, the supplier decides which customer is worth treating as a key customer, without involving the customer in this decision, or vice versa. As a result, even resource-consuming key account customers might move to competitors if they do not value the relationship in the same way as the supplier and see an opportunity to save costs by switching sources. This study develops a better understanding of value in B2B relationships. It investigates the segmentation methods currently used in relationship management and develops a new approach that brings the value perspectives from buyer and seller together. The major contribution of the research, however, is to test the proposition that congruency of the value expectations of buyer and seller will optimize the relationship strength.In the literature there seem two general approaches, the hard and the soft. This research combines these measures to form a single, cohesive measurement of congruency of relationship value, from the perspective of both partners in the relationship. There is a lacuna in the burgeoning literature on relationship management, where trust is often inadequately represented in the research, and where reciprocity of value between relationship partners is often omitted. This research addresses this critical, yet under-researched, issue. It also provides a useful, practical, guide to companies desirous of setting up strong relationships with other organizations by explaining the importance of soft value measures and focusing on shared value expectations in these relationships.The quantitative survey was conducted among buyers and sellers in small and medium sized companies in Germany that are operating on an international level. The empirical results strongly support the research thesis. Implications for theory and practice are provided as well as recommendations for further research.

Apresentada atualmente como fundamental para a vantagem competitiva das empresas, a desintegração vertical de processos é uma ação geral que, uma vez adotada, leva a novas formas de relacionamento com fornecedores. Estas novas formas de relacionamento de empresas com fornecedores fazem com que cadeias de suprimento passem a ser estruturadas por meio de vínculos de cooperação contratual, em contraposição à estruturação vertical por meio de vínculos de cooperação hegemônica. Nesta dissertação estabelecem-se primeiramente os conceitos de cadeia de suprimento e de desintegração vertical de processos; analisam-se em seguida as várias formas de relacionamento contratual que uma empresa pode estabelecer com fornecedores e daí deduzem-se critérios de escolha de fornecedores em coerência com o relacionamento que a empresa irá estabelecer com os fornecedores escolhidos. Para submeter a teste esta dedução, realizou-se uma pesquisa em duas empresas do ramo químico, por meio da qual se identificaram os critérios que estas empresas adotam para escolher fornecedores e estabelecer com eles vínculos de relacionamento contratual. Os resultados da pesquisa levam à conclusão de que as empresas pesquisadas estabelecem com seus fornecedores os relacionamentos mais adequados conforme as circunstâncias, mas não ‘o relacionamento ideal’. A dissertação se encerra com proposta de um programa de estudos transdisciplinares sobre a gestão de suprimentos em geral e os relacionamentos cliente-fornecedor em especial. / Put nowadays as basic for the competitive advantage of companies, vertical disintegration of processes is a wide action that, once adopted, gives rise to new forms of relationships with suppliers. These new forms of relationships between firms and their suppliers draw to the structuring of supply chains according to links of contractual co-operation, in contrast to their vertical structuring according to links of hegemonic co-operation. In this dissertation the concepts of supply chain and of vertical disintegration of processes are settled first; following it the various forms of contractual relationship that a firm can set up with its suppliers are scrutinized and then criteria for supplier selection are inferred, consistently with the relationship the firm will set in agreement with the chosen suppliers. In order to submit this inference to a trial, a research was undertaken at two companies that carry business in the chemical branch undertaken, identifying the criteria these companies adopt for supplier selection and for setting up with the chosen ones links of contractual co-operation. The results of the research draw to the conclusion that the researched companies set up with their suppliers the most suitable relationships according to circumstances, but not ‘the ideal relationship’. The dissertation ends with the proposal of a program for transdisciplinary studies concerning supply management broadly and customer-supplier relationships in special.

Chapter 1: Downstream Competition and the Effects of Buyer Power The first chapter examines the interaction between buyer power and competition intensity in the downstream market in affecting consumer and total welfare. We study a model where oligopolistic retailers compete in quantity in the downstream market and one of them is a large retailer that has its own exclusive supplier. Negotiation between this retailer and its supplier is modeled as a generalized Nash bargaining game. We demonstrate that an increase in the buyer power of the large retailer against its supplier leads to a fall in retail price and consequently an improvement in consumer surplus and this is true even in the extreme case where the downstream market is served by a monopoly. More interestingly, we find that the effects of buyer power are large when the intensity of downstream competition is low, with the effects being the largest in the case of downstream monopoly. This suggests that buyer power and downstream competition are substitutes. Chapter 2: Subsidy, Product Diversity and Buyer Power The objective of the second chapter is to analyze the effectiveness of government subsidies in promoting product diversity when the downstream firm (a retailer) has buyer power. We extend the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition and compare the effects of subsidies on equilibrium number of product varieties and social welfare in the case where products are sold directly to consumers and the case where they are sold through a monopoly retailer with buyer power. Two types of subsidies are considered, a subsidy on marginal cost and a subsidy on fixed cost. We find that while the two types of subsides have different effects on the quantity and retail price of each variety, they both raise the number of product varieties and the social welfare. Moreover, a combination of the two types of subsidies is able to achieve the social optimum. These results are true even when products are distributed through a downstream monopoly retailer who has all the bargaining power, but the mechanism through which a subsidy increases product varieties is different. In comparison with the case where products are distributed directly to consumers, retailer buyer power reduces product variety and social welfare. Furthermore subsidies become less effective in the presence of buyer power. To be more specific, retailer buyer power has both a level effect and a marginal effect on product diversity. At any given subsidy rate, the equilibrium number of varieties is smaller and a marginal increase in subsidy leads to a smaller increase in the number of varieties. Chapter 3: Subsidy on Complementary Products in a Model of Monopolistic Competition The third chapter seeks to re-examine the market provision of product diversity under monopolistic competition and the effects of an infinitesimal subsidy on product variety and social welfare in the case of complementary products. This examination builds on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition but assumes an alternative demand linkage. The results show that, different from the case of substitutable products, demand complementarity leads to multiple equilibriums and the number of product varieties could be higher or lower than the constrained optimum depending on the level of the fixed cost of production. When the fixed costs are small, the market yields too many products and an infinitesimal subsidy exacerbates the problem leading to an over-supply of product varieties. On the other hand, when the fixed costs are large, there are too few products and in some cases the complementary goods industry becomes non-existent. A subsidy that induces a switch of equilibriums enhances product variety and improves social welfare.