v anglickém jazyce This theses deals with the nature of Islamic banks and their products in the context of the regulation of financial markets and banking. Islamic banking can be understood as a banking activity that is consistent with sharia - Islamic law. Despite considerable obstacles that Islamic banking has faced in the past, it now occupies a significant and growing portion of the global financial system. In the first part, I will introduce the principles of Islamic law, on which Islamic banking is built, along with the key principles of Islamic finance. Special attention is also paid to the recent history of Islamic banking. Following is a section dealing with selected banking products offered by Islamic banks, whose understanding is crucial for the comprehension of the specific challenges that Islamic banks are facing. The second part is devoted to the issues of regulation of Islamic banks. Firstly, an overview of international regulatory institutions operating in the field of Islamic finance is given and I further explore the question of the impact of Basel III measures on Islamic banks. Due to its nature, Islamic banks are in need of further internal and external audit which examines compliance of their activities with Islamic law. This work is carried out by Sharia Supervisory Boards...

The recent global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the subsequent recession have prompted renewed interest into how banking regulation and fluctuations in the financial sector impact the business cycle. Using three different model setups, this thesis promotes a further understanding and identification of the various transmission channels through which regulatory changes and volatility in the financial system link to the real economy. Chapter 1 examines the effects of bank capital requirements in a simple macroeconomic model with credit market frictions. A bank capital channel is introduced through a monitoring incentive effect of bank capital buffers on the repayment probability, which affects the loan rate behaviour via the risk premium. We also identify a collateral channel, which mitigates moral hazard behaviour by firms, and therefore raises their repayment probability. Basel I and Basel II regulatory regimes are then defined, with a distinction made between the Standardized and Foundation Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approaches of Basel II. We analyse the role of the bank capital and collateral channels in the transmission of supply shocks, and show that depending on the strength of these channels, the loan rate can either amplify or mitigate the effects of productivity shocks. Finally, the impact of the two channels also determines which of the regulatory regimes is most procyclical. Chapter 2 studies the interactions between bank capital regulation and the real business cycle in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework with financial frictions, along with endogenous risk of default at the firm and bank capital levels. We show that in a model which accounts for bank capital risk and regulatory requirements, the endogenous risk of default produces an accelerator effect and impacts the loan rate and the real economy through multiple channels. Furthermore, the simulations illustrate that a risk sensitive regulatory regime (Basel II) amplifies the response of macroeconomic and financial variables following supply, monetary and financial shocks, with the strength of the key transmission channels depending on the nature of the shock. The impact of higher regulatory requirements (as proposed under Basel III) is also examined and is shown to increase procyclicality in the financial system and real economy. Chapter 3 studies the interactions between loan loss provisions and business cycle fluctuations in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with credit market imperfections. With a backward-looking provisioning system, provisions are triggered by past due payments (or nonperforming loans), which, in turn, depend on current economic conditions and the loan loss reserves-loan ratio. With a forward-looking system, both past due payments and expected losses over the whole business cycle are accounted for, and provisions are smoothed over the cycle. Numerical experiments based on a parameterized version of the model show that holding more provisions can reduce the procyclicality of the financial system. However, a forward-looking provisioning regime can increase or lower procyclicality, depending on whether holding more loan loss reserves translates into a higher or lower fraction of nonperforming loans.

This dissertation explores regulation’s influence on risk management and management control systems (MCS) in banks. The dissertation comprises of an introductory chapter, two published book chapters, one of which is an extensive literature review, and two working papers, presented at several European conferences. The overall objective of this dissertation is to explore how banks are responding to banking regulation in light of the 2007-08 financial crisis and what the implications of those responses are, particularly in relation to risk management and MCS, and their interactions. The overall research question is therefore: what influence does regulation have on risk management and management control systems in banks over time? The intended ambition is to contribute to existing knowledge on the relationship between bank regulation, risk management, and MCS by providing several practical and theoretical contributions. The dissertation employs an adapted theoretical framework and uses institutional theory and contingency theory to expose tensions between, the demands for uniformity residing in banking regulation, and the demands for uniqueness residing inside banks themselves as they seek to maintain control over the design and use of their organizational controls. The empirical material used in the longitudinal case study is gathered from a large European bank. The main findings of the dissertation are as follows. In Paper I, the findings show that banking regulation’s influence on risk management and management control is mixed, which in turn can influence risk management’s integration with MCS. The paper also finds that very little knowledge exists about regulation’s influence on risk management and MCS. In Paper II, the findings show that while regulatory influence in IT control has increased over time, banks continue to exercise significant influence over regulatory demands. In Paper III, the findings show how regulation’s influence varies considerably over time and that increased regulatory pressure can lead to a higher degree of integration between risk management and MCS across the three dimensions of integration. In Paper IV, the findings show how regulation’s influence is shaping the mental processes of management and employees, and can vary significantly based on several identified factors.

The theory of bank regulation is based on several principles. The prime one percieves bank as specific subject in economy. Bank differs in pattern of its activities, structure of its assets and debts, spectrum of undergone risks, etc. Efficient regulation is achieved by establishing generally binding rules, most often legal rules. These rules define enviroment of banks' business. When evaluating legal settings in the Czech Republic, differences between the settings and theoretical solutions must be involved. Conclutions relevant to the efficiency of bank regulation system may be set on the basis of this comparision.

This thesis deals with the management of credit risk in the Czech banking sector. It consists of four separate chapters. The first three chapters provide a theoretical basis for important knowledge concerning the issue. The first chapter provides general background information about the bank, the importance of bank regulation and supervision, and all types of banking risks, with emphasis on credit risk. The second chapter deals with the system of credit risk management in banks, which includes the identification, quantification, monitoring and reducing of credit risk. The capital adequacy and rules for its determination under Basel II are contained in the third chapter. The last chapter provides an analysis of selected indicators of the Czech banking sector and assessment of credit risk management in the two largest Czech banks, on the basis of specific fair value of their annual reports.

In reaction on the financial crisis 2007-2009 was introduced by the European Union a concept of banking union that should prevent similar destabilization of financial markets and readjust supervisory and regulatory mechanisms to reality of the European banking sector. The aim of the master thesis was to assess the concept of banking union as a suitable reaction on current state of the financial sector. The thesis includes historical discourse on banking regulation with an emphasis on institutional framework and requirements on banks. It introduces individual pillars of banking union -- Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single Resolution Mechanism and Single-rule Book. The comparative analysis of selected indicators of each individual Eurozone banking sector proved significant disparities. Based on the proven heterogeneity of banking sectors and institutional shortcomings of the banking union the conclusion was reached, that operation of single supervision and regulation can lead to adverse effects either on banking markets or on economies of member states and therefore it is rendered as an unsuitable reaction on current developments of the European financial markets.

This work focuses on new regulatory proposals, primarily Basel III accords and analyzes its ability to create a buffer for recurrent credit bubbles. This paper follows a research made by Lis, Pagés and Saurina [2000]. Their paper has illustrated the cyclicality of loan growth and GDP growth for Spain. This cyclicality is supported by cyclical Basel II regulation. In this paper is examined the ability of new regulatory proposals such as Basel III, statistical provisions and change in the approach to the probability of default, to cope with recurrent credit bubbles. According to my critical assessment, Basel III may not be able to create sufficient capital buffer for exceptional credit bubbles such as the current one. This buffer suggested by Basel III has several drawbacks which may decrease its functionality. Statistical provision is not an appropriate measure either, because it could weaken the fair and true view of financial statements principle. Change in approach to probability of default seems to be rational and effective. The only issue may relate to its recovery mechanisms. It doesn't support economic growth in time of economic recession. The author's proposal of new countercyclical buffer, which would be based on credit-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth to loan growth gap is introduced at the end of this work. Although this measure may have negative impact on GDP growth, it may create an appropriate buffer to systematic credit risk.

The main rationale of prudential bank regulation and supervision of banks has traditionally been to ensure the safety and soundness of banks and protection of depositors. However, best practice standards in bank supervision acknowledge that it is impossible to completely prevent bank failures. Therefore, it is crucial to have regulatory measures in place to deal with banks that fail. Banks are core players in the financial system as the intermediaries between savers and users of capital. In addition, banks provide critical services to consumers, small and medium-sized businesses, large corporate entities and governments who rely on them to conduct their daily business, both at domestic and international level. Banks also fulfil a sui generis role that sets them apart from other financial institutions that are role players in the financial system because, inter alia, they hold “highly” liquid liabilities in the form of deposits that are repayable on demand; they extend long-term loans that may be difficult to sell or borrow against on short notice; they are the back-up source of liquidity to all other institutions (financial and non-financial); and, are also the transmission belt for monetary policy. Unlike other players in the financial system, banks are vulnerable to loss of public confidence and to liquidity risk. Liquidity risk being the risk that a bank will not have sufficient cash to meet short term obligations and the fact that a "run on the bank" by depositors can result in devastating liquidity drainage. Because banks play a special role in the economy and their failure may have a significant impact on financial stability, they need a special approach when they become insolvent or are likely to become insolvent. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”) demonstrated the importance of special resolution regimes for banks; and the need to balance the interests of shareholders, creditors and depositors, while promoting financial stability objectives. Given the critical role of banks in the economy the need is clear for a special resolution regime for banks that provides a legal framework for regulators that avails to them a suite of resolution tools which they can apply to resolve the bank in an orderly manner; to rescue those parts of the bank that may still be viable and to liquidate those parts that are not whilst avoiding a drain on public funds. In order to deal with bank failures in Zimbabwe, the Banking Act [Chapter 24:20] has provided for the mechanism of curatorship since 2000, as a rescue measure aimed at restoring failing banks to economic viability. Curatorship has over the years been applied with mixed success; consequently, Zimbabwe has undertaken a number of reforms which include the enactment of the Troubled Financial Institutions (Resolution) Act in 2005; and the introduction of the problem bank regime via the Banking Amendment Act of 2015. Throughout these reforms, Zimbabwe has elected to retain curatorship, which was once a standalone process in banking legislation to enable bank rescue; and assimilated it into a broader bank resolution framework. This study seeks to determine whether Zimbabwe’s resolution regime requires to be strengthened and if so, to recommend reforms that will align the resolution regime in Zimbabwe with international best practice. For such purpose it will draw upon the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regime as international best practice benchmark. It will further also consider guidance yielded by a comparative study of the resolution regimes in the United Kingdom and South Africa. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2021. / Mercantile Law / LLD / Unrestricted

Cette thèse a pour objectif de prendre part à la réflexion menée sur la mise en place d'une réglementation efficace pour l'industrie bancaire. Pour cela, ce travail contribue à la littérature existante à travers plusieurs aspects. Tout d'abord, nous tenons compte de l'impact des nouvelles contraintes en capital suggérées par les accords dits de Bâle III sur l'offre de crédit des banques en plus de la stabilité bancaire. Par ailleurs, cette thèse prend également en compte la disparité entre régulateurs bancaires concernant leurs capacités à auditer les banques et les sanctionner si besoin est. De manière plus générale, cette hétérogénéité des régulateurs bancaires nous amène également à repenser la réglementation existante, en étudiant sous quelles conditions une régulation centrale devient plus efficace qu'un ensemble de régulations locales. La prise en compte de chacun de ces éléments permet alors d'aborder la régulation bancaire à travers une perspective nouvelle. Dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse, nous construisons un modèle théorique analysant l'impact de l'ajout d'un ratio de levier à la Bâle III en plus d'un ratio de capital pondéré du risque à la Bâle II sur le bien-être du régulateur. Nous mettons en évidence que ce ratio de levier conduit à une baisse de l'offre de crédit des banques. En contrepartie, le ratio de levier peut réduire l'instabilité bancaire mais uniquement si le régulateur souffre d'un faible pouvoir de supervision : pour les régulateurs bénéficiant d'un fort pouvoir de supervision, le ratio de levier entraine une détérioration du bien-être. Le but du second chapitre est de tester empiriquement les résultats de cette approche théorique. Nous utilisons pour cela les données disponibles depuis la mise en place effective du ratio de levier proposé par le Comité de Bâle. Nous mettons en évidence que la mise en place de ce ratio de levier conduit à une baisse significative de l'offre de crédit bancaire, ainsi qu'à une hausse du risque de crédit. Ces deux effets sont amplifiés lorsque le pouvoir de supervision est élevé. Le troisième chapitre se consacre à l'élaboration d'un schéma réglementaire capable d'internaliser les externalités existantes lorsque plusieurs régulateurs locaux avec des objectifs différents doivent cohabiter. Nous montrons que cela est rendu possible par la mise en place d'un régulateur central déléguant les tâches liées à la supervision aux régulateurs locaux. Cette régulation centrale est d'autant plus efficace si les régulateurs locaux souffrent d'une forte capture de la part des banques et si les effets de contagion entre pays sont élevés. / The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the current debate on the implementation of an efficient regulatory framework in the banking industry. To this end, we extend the existing literature in many aspects. First, we consider the impact of capital requirements recently suggested by the Third Basel Accord on credit supply as well as banking stability. Second, we take into account the disparity between the regulators' authority to audit and sanction banks. Besides, we analyze how a central regulation can lead to a more efficient framework compared to a combination of local regulations. Overall, the consideration of this set of dimensions brings a new perspective for the banking regulation approach. In the first chapter, we investigate how the implementation of a leverage ratio in addition to a risk-weighted capital ratio affects the regulator's welfare. We show that such a capital regulation leads to a reduction in credit supply. On the other hand, a leverage ratio restriction can improve the banking stability when the regulator suffers from a low supervisory power. On the contrary, the welfare of regulators enjoying a high supervisory power is decreased by the application of a leverage ratio. The second chapter tests results of this first theoretical approach. In order to do so, this second chapter is based on data available since the effective application of the leverage ratio suggested by the Basel Committee. We find that the implementation of such a capital ratio decreases credit supply while increasing credit risk. Furthermore, we show that a strong supervisory power accentuates these effects. In the third chapter, we analyze how a regulatory scheme could internalize the externalities produced by the presence of several local regulators with different aims. We establish that the optimal framework is the set up of a central regulator delegating supervisory tasks to local regulators. This central regulation is more efficient when spillover effects across countries are important and when local regulators suffer from a high capture from banks.

This dissertation consists of three chapters related to macroeconomic implications of financial frictions, along with an application of macro-finance models to the Chinese economy. The first two chapters focus on government guarantees on business loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a typical practice of the Chinese government. Chapter 1 embeds partial loan guarantees into the loan contracting problem, built upon the costly state verification framework. A larger degree of guarantees dampens the sensitivity of the loan rate to a change in leverage, which incentivizes entrepreneurs to lever up. Also, greater guarantees reduce entrepreneurs' exposures to credit risks, hence altering their choices of investment and leverage in response to an exogenous risk shock. Chapter 2 proceeds to develop a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and investigates the effect of government guarantees on capital misallocation and business cycle fluctuations in China. On one hand, government guarantees mitigate the influence of the financial accelerator mechanism on investment and production of both SOEs and private-owned enterprises (POEs). On the other hand, by inducing a time-varying dispersion in returns on capital across SOEs and POEs, government guarantees exert a negative impact on the allocative efficiency of resources and thus cause further losses on total factor productivity (TFP) and output during recessions. Quantitative analyses show that partial loan guarantees to SOEs are counterproductive in moderating the reaction of GDP to both risk and technology shocks. Chapter 3 develops a DSGE model with financial constraints on entrepreneurs and banks, featuring a risk-based bank capital requirement, and discusses the role of Basel II in reinforcing procyclical tendencies of the credit market and the real economy. I study impulse responses of the calibrated model to various shocks. Quantitative results show that the direction and magnitude of cyclical effects arising from Basel II strongly depend on the nature of macroeconomic shocks that hit the economy: only a risk shock can generate noticeable procyclical effect, while the procyclicality under a TFP shock and the countercyclicality under a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) are quantitatively insignificant.