This thesis examines the impacts of four major negotiating elements in the 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement. This first entails considering the financial impacts of the Collective Bargaining Agreement through adjustments to the salary cap and changes in the rookie pay scale in conjunction with the increase of the veteran minimum salary. Veteran players sought to improve their earnings potential through the creation of the rookie pay scale and increases in the veteran minimum salary, but research has shown that these policies may not have actually accomplished the goal. Next, I inspect the changes in preseason training rules, which were intended to keep players safer and fresher during the offseason. This also may not have had the anticipated result, since the incidences of players with conditioning related injuries has increased since the implementation of the new rules. Finally, the impact of increased punitive powers for Commissioner Goodell on the NFL presents one of the most interesting debates for the upcoming negotiations. While players strongly dislike Goodell’s level of influence over league discipline, they must be willing to sacrifice something significant in the next round of negotiations to initiate change. After careful consideration, it is evident that the players were the worst off from the 2011 Collective Bargaining negotiations because they were unable to accurately anticipate the impacts of their new policies.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 199-203).

War is an inefficient outcome and therefore states ought to prefer to bargain over areas of conflict instead of fighting. However, in the anarchy of international relations there is no actor with a monopoly of power to enforce contracts between states. States then face a commitment problem when bargaining to prevent war. This dissertation explores three models where this commitment problem can lead to war. The first chapter presents a model that allows for shifts in the distribution of power which play out over an arbitrary number of time periods. This leads to a sufficient condition that implies war under a broader set of conditions than previously shown in the literature. This condition implies that preventive war may be caused by relatively slow, but persistent shifts in the distribution of power. As theorized in power transition theory, differential rates of economic growth can potentially cause war under this mechanism. Relaxing the unitary actor assumption of the first chapter, the second chapter analyzes how the domestic institutional structure of countries affects the likelihood of war. We model institutional divergence by comparing an infinitely lived dictatorship to a democracy with a replaceable leader and allow a range of leader incentives within these institutional frameworks. We show that dictators, even welfare maximizing ones, may lead to war if the initial distribution of resources is highly imbalanced whereas a democracy with a forward looking electorate is always peaceful. Yet when a democratic electorate is myopic, preventive war may result. Political parties act as a mechanism to prevent this outcome. In the third chapter, I investigate adding a third actor to the bargaining model of war. In a static setting, the model uses a notion of cooperative stability to predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior in alliance formation. When extended to a dynamic setting, changes to the system that result in alliance shifting may cause war. Additionally, alliance formation need not correspond to the static solutions, suggesting that the dynamics of power are as important as the distribution of power in alliance formation. / text

The purpose of the study was to develop a human relations systems model for professional personnel in higher education. The model developed provided a mechanism for systematically analyzing bargaining alternatives.A review of selected literature on alternative approaches for collective bargaining and creative or innovative alternatives within collective bargaining was made. Models for bargaining in higher education, selected management strategies, union strategies, and union-management cooperation efforts were summarized. In addition, strikes, impasse procedures, state statutes involving impasse procedures, as well as proposals for federal legislation were reported. Among the strategies selected were Boulwarism, cost package bargaining, multi-employer bargaining, joint bargaining, coalition bargaining, profit and progress sharing plans, and union-management cooperation. Impasse procedures included strikes, arbitration, mediation, and fact-finding. The impasse procedures of the New York, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania bargaining statutes were examined. The review consisted of an explanation of each alternative, and an evaluation in terms of the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. A review of selectedliterature on systems theory, and models and systems in labor re-. lations was also made.A human relations systems analysis model, designed from the literature review pertaining to models and systems of labor relations, was presented. The model provided a means of analyzing alternatives and generating tailor made approaches to bargaining, and spawned new hypotheses.Practical utilization of the model by analyzing alternatives in hypothetical settings and generating tailor made approaches to bargaining was demonstrated. Important factors favoring or not favoring an alternative were reported. The efficacy of an approach was entirely dependent upon the unique educational setting.The majority of alternatives examined were judged as possessing potential for application in higher education. Of the alternatives studied all could be expected to be associated with operational difficulties in higher education institutions. Alternatives were seen as requiring varying degrees of modification before being implemented in higher education in order to minimize such difficulties. Most of the alternatives examined should not be used as the sole approach, or method in an approach, to human relations taken by an institution; but rather, should be included as part of a more comprehensive approach to human relations. Most constructive changes in collective bargaining for education were judged as being derived from strategies, mechanisms, methods, and procedures.All management strategies studied were judged to be applicable for higher education collective bargaining. Joint bargaining by unions was anticipated in states where funding for higher education was represented by a single line item in the state budget. Union-management cooperation was the alternative closest to the concept of integrative bargaining, and represented the approach most writers in the field were suggesting be pursued. Profit and progress sharing plans were thought to have limited application as principal approaches to faculty-administration relations.Many alternatives studied were best characterized as attempts to avoid or circumvent the strike. A major problem facing the education relations system appeared to be in finding an acceptable substitute for the strike in the public sector. At present no single impasse procedure appeared to be as effective as the strike in resolving labor disputes. The most viable impasse procedures were identified as procedures in which the government official responsible for settling such disputes was provided with as many alternatives as possible, including non-intervention, and was given complete freedom in making a choice of which procedure or combination of procedures were to be used in an intervention into a labor dispute. Separate legislation as well as federal legislation for education labor relations appeared inadvisable.Implications of the study were identified. Recommendations to improve bargaining, and recommendations for additional research were offered.

Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1990. / Also available in print.

The majority of criminal cases are disposed by the mechanism of plea negotiation in the federal jurisdiction of the United States. This procedure has replaced adversarial trial tradition of the U.S. criminal justice system for decades. Since 2014, China has initiated plea negotiation in the criminal justice system. Following the efforts of legislation and judiciary, China has formulated a Sinicized concessional criminal justice system. Up to now, over 86% criminal cases in China are handled with the plea negotiation system without appeals. Motivated by the same goals of procedural economy and systematic efficiency, these two nations have developed the plea negotiation system into the core driver of criminal justice dynamics. This ubiquity has led the similarities appearing in the adversarial system of the US and the inquisitorial system of China substantially and procedurally. In the light of the costs and benefits analysis, it raises research questions as follows: what needs to be ensured where a defendant posits in a plea negotiation process? What are the costs and benefits of defendant’s decision making? Whether this cost-saving procedure achieves systemic efficiency and fairness? What can be rebuilt for improving the current system? This article is aimed to propose some new practical ideas that may improve the transparency and the fairness of plea negotiation process, and finally earn trust from the criminal defendants and the public at large. Through a comparative study, this article outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the plea negotiation systems in the U.S. and China. Thereafter, this article channels the practical measures to rebuild the plea negotiation system in these two nations. It is also aimed to contribute some insights to other nations’ re-consideration of reforming the negotiated criminal justice system in the near future. / Temple University. James E. Beasley School of Law / Law

The problem with which this study is concerned was that of developing an understanding of teacher attitudes toward collective bargaining. The investigation was initiated so that members of school boards, administrators, and those associated with professional organizations could have the needed knowledge to permit them to deal realistically with employer-employee relations. There were two purposes for conducting this study. First, an effort was made to determine the specific attitudes these teachers possess toward collective bargaining. The second purpose was to analyze the teachers' background characteristics to determine whether classifications such as sex, academic degree, experience, assignment level, professional memberships, or age have an impact on these attitudes.

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