The present study is intended as an alternative to the experimental game approach to the investigation of conflict. It explores a particular real-world conflict situation, the labor-management bargaining relationship, and is viewed as a transitional step between laboratory experimentation and research in natural settings. Subjects were 34 male adults, 19 representing "Management" and 15 representing "Labor", all with formal bargaining experience in labor-management negotiations. A total of ten 3-hour sessions were conducted in which representatives of both parties participated in 3- and 4-person groups. The study was designed to provide information concerning ways in which representatives of each party (1) perceive the labor-management relationship, and (ii) approach negotiations. Perceptual information was obtained by means of an opinion questionnaire which dealt with specific aspects of labor relations, and semantic differential-type scales. In addition to the descriptive information provided by these tools, it was found that: (1) labor representatives perceived more differences of opinion between "Labor" and "Management" than did management representatives; (2) the personal opinions of management representatives differed from the opinions they perceived "Management" in general to hold more frequently than the personal opinions of labor representatives differed from the opinions they perceived "Labor" in general to hold; (3) the personal opinions of labor representatives differed from the opinions they perceived "Management" in general to hold:, more frequently than the personal opinions of management representatives differed from the opinions they perceived "Labor" in general to hold; (4) no differences existed between the labor sample and the management sample in terms of homogeneity of perception or in terms of homogeneity of personal opinion. The first finding is considered to reflect different values placed upon tension and conflict by "Labor" and "Management", while the second and third findings suggest a greater tendency for "Labor" to hold personal opinions which resemble a perceived "party line". An implication of the fourth finding is that if exogeneous "party lines" do exist, the "party line" adopted by "Labor" is no more well defined for labor representatives than any "Management party line" is for management representatives. A potentially important observation involving misperceptions was the tendency for both labor and management representatives to think the other party perceived them in a less favorable manner than it actually did. This is regarded as one consequence of the roles prescribed for two parties in a conflict relationship. Negotiating information was obtained from a formal analysis of the verbal content of simulated bargaining sessions. The bargaining problem employed in this study cast management representatives in the role of business partners and labor representatives as the elected officials representing employees of the business. The two parties were required to negotiate a wage settlement for the coming year on the basis of a projected wage and profit analysis adapted from the model of Sawyer's bargaining board. Findings are outlined in terms of the ways in which Labor and Management presented the position of their party on the wage issue, questioned the position taken by the other party, and dealt with questions and arguments from the other party. Those aspects of verbal behavior reported Include the relative emphasis given particular bargaining positions, the kinds of arguments presented and degree of determination with which supportive statements were expressed, the types of information exchanged, and the nature of threats and attacks made by each party. In addition to categorizing verbal statements made during "negotiations", emphasis was placed upon the relative frequency with which a particular kind of statement was made by Labor and Management. Implications of the findings of this exploratory study and suggestions for future research are discussed. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

This thesis examines on a conceptual level whether, in Canada, government induced centralization of the bargaining structure is apt to contribute to a stabilization of industrial relations measured in terms of a reduction in strike/lockout frequency. A micro-model of strike causation, viewing the outbreak of industrial action as the result of a deliberate gamble of the bargaining parties, forms the core of the conceptual framework developed in this paper. According to this model centralization lowers strike/lockout frequency if it (1) raises the relative costs of industrial action (2) induces the bargaining parties to integrate macro-goals into their goal portfolio (3) modifies collectivity internal interest aggregation in favor of its moderate segments and (4) successfully internalizes intra-group conflict. On the basis of theoretical considerations and existing evidence, the paper then seeks to establish whether centralization can be expected to fulfill these conditions. The study suggests that the impact of centralization upon vertical interest aggregation takes the desired direction. Because of the design of the analysis a general prediction of the effect of centralization upon horizontal interest aggregation can not be made. The relative costs of industrial action in the 'average bargaining unit' are diagnosed to remain unaffected by centralization. While centralization of the bargaining structure appears to be a necessary condition for unions and employers to integrate macro-goals into their goal portfolio, the analysis can not show that it is a sufficient condition. Finally, contingent on the readiness of the government to actively back the rule of the majority, centralization is expected to internalize intra-group conflict successfully. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis reports theory development and explorative field observation of potential effects of conflict occurring within a collective bargaining team. From the theoretical bases of Walton and McKersie's (1965) intraorganizational conflict (IOC) concept and Pondy's (1967) process model of conflict, a model of bargaining team IOC is developed. The model partitions bargaining team IOC into functional and dysfunctional subsets. Seven propositions related to the effects of dysfunctional IOC are developed from conflict and decision making literature. These propositions are concerned with the effects of dysfunctional IOC on participation of team members, rule breaking behavior, time delays, and decision styles. Operational definitions and tests for dysfunctional IOC are developed using Filley's (1975) five item definition of conflict and seven item win-lose, lose-lose, conflict responses. A participant/observer quasi-case analysis of an actual collective bargaining team experience is the basis for data generation. Many of the propositions are supported iii the observed bargaining team environment. While the single case methodology prevents generalized conclusions regarding the effects of dysfunctional IOC, the findings tentatively suggest there may be considerable practical payoffs for extending this research area. The field experience provides some additional research insights regarding the dynamic variable of dysfunctional IOC. In this study, dysfunctional bargaining team IOC is observed as a few recurring issue-related problems flowing throughout the bargaining team interactions. Implications of this study regarding future research on IOC in a bargaining team are suggested. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the types of appeals made to employees by employers and labor organizations for the purpose of influencing the employees' decision with respect to accepting or rejecting collective bargaining, and classifying, as near as possible, the types of appeals.

This dissertation examines the role of negotiations in different institutional settings. In chapter one, I study how voluntary disclosure of information affects outcomes in plea bargaining. A prosecutor negotiates a sentence with a defendant who is privately informed about whether he is guilty or innocent. During negotiations, the prosecutor can investigate for evidence regarding the defendant’s type. If prosecutor and defendant do not reach an agreement, they go to trial and obtain payoffs that depend on the prosecutor’s evidence. Voluntary disclosure gives rise to endogenous second-order belief uncertainty. A purely sentence-motivated prosecutor might disclose exculpatory evidence. Voluntary disclosure leads to inefficient outcomes as parties might fail to reach an agreement. Mandatory disclosure is socially preferable: there is always agreement, and the defendant is better off if he is innocent and worse off if he is guilty. Furthermore, the prosecutor is better off under mandatory disclosure. In chapter two, I study how bargaining power affects bargaining outcomes between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist who provides funds. Entrepreneur and venture capitalist openly disagree about noncontractible future decisions. The contract specifies control rights and cash-flow rights for each party. Noncontractible decisions are made by the party with control rights. When the entrepreneur has greater bargaining power and the investment value is large, she optimally relinquishes control rights. When the venture capitalist has more bargaining power, she always retains control rights. In general, greater disagreement makes the entrepreneur less likely to retain control rights. In chapter three, I study a bilateral bargaining model with endogenous recognition probabilities and endogenous surplus. At each period, players exert two types of costly effort: productive effort, which increases the surplus size, and unproductive effort, which affects the probability of being recognized as the proposer. I characterize how differences in the cost of exerting efforts affects outcomes. Advantages in unproductive effort affect the provision of both types of effort, but advantages in productive effort only affect the provision of that effort. Differences in time preferences only affect productive efforts when the probability of recognition is not persistent.

Scholars have identified four primary types of justice: distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational. These four types of justice correspond, respectively, to the perceived fairness of one’s outcomes, to the perceived fairness of the procedures used to determine one’s outcomes, to the degree to which people are treated with politeness, dignity, and respect by decision makers, and to whether individuals receive complete, truthful, and timely explanations of procedures and decisions. A significant amount of research has examined how perceptions of justice affect individuals’ attitudes and behavior (Denver, 2011). For example, research has examined how district attorneys shape victims’ and offenders’ perceptions of justice (Patterson-Badali, Care, & Broeking, 2007). Less is known, however, about district attorneys’ own perceptions of justice. Understanding how district attorneys view justice gives us insight into their decisions they make. These decisions include how to dispose of cases, what charges to bring against defendants, what sentence to recommend, and even how victims should be treated throughout the court process. With respect to how cases are handled in the criminal justice system, jury trials are often considered the epitome of justice. Proponents of jury trials argue that limiting or abolishing jury trials would undermine the public’s faith in the criminal justice system (Roberts & Hough, 2011). Nevertheless, the court system has confirmed the existence of “the vanishing trial,” a term used to describe the steadily declining role of trials (civil and criminal) in the American legal system (Frampton, 2012). The current study examines the court and county factors that affect district attorney’s perceptions of four types of justice: distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational. This research was based on data from a telephone and email survey conducted by the Social Science Research Center at Mississippi State University and county data from the United States Census Bureau and the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).

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