We present a study of conflict from an economic perspective. We start by reviewing the approach to conflict in the economic sciences. We model conflict as a process of allocation of resources into two main technologies, production and appropriation. Then we complement this framework by allowing participants to negotiate. We introduce models of bargaining with complete and incomplete information. We incorporate the cost of conflict and this ensures that negotiated settlements always produce a more efficient outcome. The possibility of conflict arises as a result of incomplete information, which takes the form of informational asymmetry about the cost of conflict. We find endogenous war equilibrium outcomes and compare the outcome of optimal resource equilibria with arbitrary non-equilibria allocations. We also present some empirical evidence in the literature supporting the choice of utility models of conflict and present new results showing support for our propositions.

Problem This thesis attempts to determine if the Canadian federal and provincial governments are increasing their assertion of the public interest in the collective bargaining process. The primary concern is to determine to what extent the government, through its new labour legislation will be able to affect the quality of collective agreements. The quality of collective agreements can be affected directly through arbitration or can be affected indirectly by influencing the power positions of the negotiating parties. Method of Investigation The first problem which is tackled is the definition of the public interest. The public interest is a term now being used in labour legislation, for which a precise definition is not easily derived. A literature analysis is undertaken to develop a conceptual framework of the public interest. Since this is an investigation of the changing role of the government, it is necessary to establish the traditional role of the government in the collective bargaining process. This is accomplished by examining less recent government legislation as well as case studies of the applications of the U.S. Taft-Hartley Act. The public employees of Canada and the United States are treated as a special case. Recent legislative developments in both countries have resulted in federal public servants to become active in collective bargaining. These recent developments consist in Canada of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, and in the United States of the Executive Order 10899. The new developments in provincial labour legislation consist of B.C.’s Bill 33, Saskatchewan’s Essential Services Emergency Act, and Ontario's Rand Royal Commission Report. These two Acts and the Royal Commission Report are analyzed critically for their potential effect upon the collective bargaining process. Conclusions The literature analysis of the public interest reveals that there is no universally acceptable definition of the public interest. The public interest can only be meaningfully used within a situational framework. In other words, the concept is capable of definition only within a specific situation. Despite the fact that the concept is not likely ever to be universally defined, it will undoubtedly continue to be widely used. The policy of the Canadian federal and provincial governments regarding collective bargaining has traditionally been to assist the parties to come to an agreement. The role of the government has not been one of interference. It has consisted solely of facilitating agreements by postponing work stoppages and by providing mediators. Although the effectiveness of these measures can be questioned, the intent is quite clear. The recent provincial legislation seems to reinforce the proposition that the strike is an undesirable form of social conflict. It is felt to be undesirable in the sense that the legislation encourages the parties to collective negotiations to settle their dispute without resorting to work stoppages. At the same time, it recognizes that the threat of a work stoppage is part of the collective bargaining process. The new legislation formalizes the concept that there are certain kinds of collective bargaining relationships which are heavily endowed with the public interest. Whereas government activity in these kinds of disputes had occurred on an ad hoc basis in the past, the Rand Report, B.C.'s Bill 33, and the Saskatchewan legislation established mechanisms which will provide for the assertion of the public interest in extraordinary labour disputes. In some cases, and where the parties cannot come to an agreement without resorting to a work stoppage, the new legislation will provide an agency or mechanism through which the government can submit the dispute to compulsory arbitration. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

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Recent research has led to a growing awareness that the dominant method of settling criminal cases in the United States involves disposition without trial. The overwhelming majority of criminal cases are settled by guilty pleas, and the majority of guilty plea dispositions involve some kind of bargain on the charge or sentence. The purpose of the present study was to examine and analyze the phenomenon of negotiating the guilty plea in terms of its relationship to the functional needs and ideal goals of the court system. A basic assumption of this study was that case disposition through a bargaining process provides for both functional needs and ideal goals which are not clearly provided for in the trial system. A detailed examination of felony case disposition without trial in one Pacific Northwest urban court system was undertaken to ascertain the precise nature of the bargaining process. Records regarding the nature and outcomes of felony dispositions in 1976 and 1977 were researched, along with information on the formal structure, procedures and pOlicies of the court organization. Interviews with prosecutors, public defenders and judges in the felony court system provided attitudinal data. Observations of guilty plea hearings and negotiation conferences allowed the researcher to record actual activities in the disposition process. The data indicated that the majority of cases were settled by guilty pleas and that the majority of guilty pleas involved some kind of bargain. Plea negotiation in this court system was routinized, formalized and highly structured. The bargaining process was prosecutor-dominated, in part due to the District Attorney Office policy which was noticeably inflexible in terms of bargaining criteria. The one commodity of power held by the defense attorney was strength of case. If the defense could find legal "loopholes" in the state's case, the chances of the defendant getting a good deal improved. This emphasis on legal factors appeared to strengthen the professional orientation as well as the adversary perspective of the opposing attorneys. Pleading guilty to a reduced charge resulted in the greatest likelihood of a defendant receiving a non-incarceration sentence. The majority of reductions were to offenses necessarily included in the initial charge. Conviction by trial resulted in the highest, proportion of incarceration sentences of all closing types. However, there was evidence that circumstances of the case and the defendant were influential regarding the likelihood of incarceration at the sentencing stage. A balancing factor aFpeared to be at work according to comparisons of the 1976 and 1977 data. Changes in the District Attorney Office policy instituted in 1977 expanded the list of non-reducible offenses. While the proportion of trial closings consequently increased for these non-reducible offenses, this increase was offset by a decrease in the proportion of trials for offenses not included in the non-reducible category. Generally, the findings supported the theoretical assumption that disposition by guilty plea negotiation could fulfill functional needs of the court system within a legalistic framework.

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