Bargaining is a process to decide how to divide shared resources between two or more players. And axiomatic bargaining specifies desirable and simple properties the outcome of the bargaining should satisfy and identifies the solution that produces this outcome. This approach was first developed by John Nash in his seminal work(Nash 1950). Since then, numerous studies have been done on bargaining problems with convex feasible set or with non-convex but comprehensive feasible set. There is, however, little work on finite bargaining problems. In this dissertation, we study finite bargaining problems systematically by extending the standard bargaining model to the one consisting of all finite bargaining problems. For our bargaining problems, we first propose the Nash, Maximin, Leximin, Maxiproportionalmin, Lexiproportianlmin solutions, which are the counterparts of those that have been studied extensively in both convex and non-convex but comprehensive problems. We then axiomatically characterize these solutions in our context. We next introduce two new solutions, the maximin-utilitarian solution and the utilitarian-maximin solution, each of which combines the maximin solution and utilitarian solution in different ways. The maximin-utilitarian solution selects the alternatives from the maximin solution that have the greatest sum of individuals’ utilities, and the utilitarian-maximin solution selects the maximin alternatives from the utilitarian solution. These two solutions attempt to combine two important but very different ethical principles to produce compromised solutions to bargaining problems. Finally, we discuss several variants of the egalitarian solution. The egalitarian solution in finite bargaining problems is more complicated than its counterpart in either convex or non-convex but comprehensive bargaining problems. Given its complexity in our context, we start our inquiry by investigating two-person, finite bargaining problems, and then extend some of the analysis to n-person, finite bargaining problems. Our analysis of finite bargaining problems and axiomatic characterizations of the extensions of various standard solutions of convex/non-convex but comprehensive bargaining problems to finite bargaining problems will shed new light on the behavior of these solutions. Our new solutions will expand our understanding of the bargaining theory and distributive justice from a different perspective.

Bargaining theory seeks to answer the question of how to divide a jointly generated surplus between multiple agents. John Nash proposed the Nash Bargaining Solution to answer this question for the special case of two agents. Kleinberg and Tardos extended this idea to network games, and introduced a model they call the Bargaining Game. They search for surplus divisions with a notion of fairness, defined as balanced solutions, that follow the Nash Bargaining Solution for all contracting agents. Unfortunately, many networks exist where no balanced solution can be found, which we call unstable. In this thesis, we explore methods of changing unstable network structures to find fair bargaining solutions. We define the concept of Blocking Sets, introduced by Biro, Kern and Paulusma, and use them to create stability. We show that by removing a blocking set from an unstable network, we can find a balanced bargaining division in polynomial time. This motivates the search for minimal blocking sets. Unfortunately this problem is NP-hard, and hence no known efficient algorithm exists for solving it. To overcome this hardness, we consider the problem when restricted to special graph classes. We introduce a O(1)-factor approximation algorithm for the problem on planar graphs with unit edge weights. We then provide an algorithm to solve the problem optimally in graphs of bounded treewidth, which generalize trees.

Current research in multi-agent systems (MAS) has advanced to the development of open MAS, which are characterized by the heterogeneity of agents, free exit/entry and decentralized control. Conflicts of interest among agents are inevitable, and hence automated negotiation to resolve them is one of the promising solutions. This thesis studies three modifications on alternating-offer bargaining protocols for automated negotiation in open MAS. The long-term goal of this research is to design negotiation protocols which can be easily used by intelligent agents in accommodating their need in resolving their conflicts. In particular, we propose three modifications: allowing non-monotonic offers during the bargaining (non-monotonic-offers bargaining protocol), allowing strategic delay (delay-based bargaining protocol), and allowing strategic ignorance to augment argumentation when the bargaining comprises argumentation (ignorance-based argumentation-based negotiation protocol). <p>Utility theory and decision-theoretic approaches are used in the theoretical analysis part, with an aim to prove the benefit of these three modifications in negotiation among myopic agents under uncertainty. Empirical studies by means of computer simulation are conducted in analyzing the cost and benefit of these modifications. Social agents, who use common human bargaining strategies, are the subjects of the simulation. <p>In general, we assume that agents are bounded rational with various degrees of belief and trust toward their opponents. In particular in the study of the non-monotonic-offers bargaining protocol, we assume that our agents have diminishing surplus. We further assume that our agents have increasing surplus in the study of delay-based bargaining protocol. And in the study of ignorance-based argumentation-based negotiation protocol, we assume that agents may have different knowledge and use different ontologies and reasoning engines. <p>Through theoretical analysis under various settings, we show the benefit of allowing these modifications in terms of agents expected surplus. And through simulation, we show the benefit of allowing these modifications in terms of social welfare (total surplus). Several implementation issues are then discussed, and their potential solutions in terms of some additional policies are proposed. Finally, we also suggest some future work which can potentially improve the reliability of these modifications.

Because of recent corporate scandals, auditor independence and turnover have become the focus of much debate. For strengthening auditor independence , American government compulsorily stipulate that the firm has to replace its auditor every five years in Sarbanes-Oxley Act that was passed in 2002 to ensure that the increasing tenure can¡¦t lead to an bad audit quality. However, not every scholar all supports the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In order to analyze these issues, we try to find out the relation between the length of auditor tenure and behavior of corporate income tax evasion and auditor independence by using game theory and bargaining model. Our main results are as follows. In our model, we suppose the auditor bargaining ability is positively related to tenure. Manager will gain lower benefits of tax evasion with increasing auditor bargaining ability, implying that increasing tenure reduces managerial collusion incentives. Finally, manager decides to report higher income. In contrast, auditor will gain higher benefits of tax evasion with increasing auditor bargaining ability. But for the auditor, the precondition of making company to be willing to collude with auditor is to possess the evidence of corporate income tax evasion. Because of that, auditor will increase the level of auditing efforts and choose to help company to make an incorrect attestation. So increasing tenure will influence auditor independence and audit quality.

None

Nowadays, the competitions in industry transfer from selling campaign tracing operational efficiency and producing oriented to marketing battle chasing after effect, developing strategy, touching end users, and satisfying their real needs. In accordance with corporate strategy, there are several ways for companies to choose. How to make a decision in such choices, especially in developing brand and channels. It depends on the product characteristics. Brand and channels, the traditional bargaining issue, this research tried to find what resources suppliers own, could increase their bargaining power, and what resources distributors own, could increase their bargaining power, finally, identify the spectacular resources in their bargaining process. In the process which roles end users play indeed? This research will find how could both of suppliers and distributors affect the bargaining conclusion through end users¡¦ preference and customs. This research selected consumer goods and hypermarkets to represent the relation between upstream and downstream.

none

Bargaining is a frequent activity in the shopping process, and it becomes a trend in electronic trading. In order to facilitate the on-line automatic bargaining activity, we develop three algorithms on the multi-agent system in this thesis. The first algorithm is the pattern generalization algorithm used for generalizing common patterns from transaction records. The second one is the pattern matching algorithm used on-line for identifying possible bargaining patterns from the pattern bases. To deal with the situation that there is no matched pattern, we design the dynamic price issuing algorithm using the utility theory to determine the seller¡¦s price and the timing a deal should be closed. We conducted a series of field experiments to evaluate the proposed algorithms on different seller¡¦s risk perspectives and compared the performance with conventional bargaining methods. The results show that the proposed methods obtain encouraging performance. The major contribution of this research is the initiation efforts on developing data mining algorithms for facilitating the price bargaining process for e-commerce.

In daily negotiation, decision maker often affected to change the evalution of negotiation results by the offers which the opponent brought up in either positive or negative description. This is what the negotiation researcher callled ¡§framing effect¡¨. Framing theory first poposed by Kahneman & Tversky (1982) and researchers found there are many framing types and the framing effects proofed in many negotiation areas. On the other hand, the development of electronic bargainging is ofthen based on the assumption that human decision making is rational behavior, and there is no research applying framing theory on internet. Therefore this research would like to discuss whether framing could change electronic bargaining results. This research adopts attribute framing and goal framing proposed by Levin et al. (1998) and apply it with negotiation model to develop a virtual bargin store, then we play a role as seller to do field experiment. After collecting the experiment data and analyze them, we found framing do affect electronic bargining. Framing match concession will influence the seller¡¦s gain. General speaking, attribute framing effect is better than goal framing, and the difference between positive and negative attribute framing effect looms larger when it corporates with concession. However the difference between positive and negative goal framing looms less when it ties up with concession.

Abstract This paper shows that collusive behavior of firms in production with lump-sum payment licensing may occur in an infinitely repeated duopoly if both firms adopt a two-period strategy to interact with each other. It is profitable for the patent-holding firm with non-drastic cost-reducing innovation to use licensing as a strategic means to induce the opponent to cooperate in pursuit of joint profit. It is proved that there exists a Pareto dominant two-period strategy profile, which is an equilibrium in both equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium paths. Furthermore, it is shown that the duration of punishment while two firms are in the out-of-equilibrium is endogenously determined.