巴塞爾銀行監督委員會(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BCBS) 於2010年發布巴塞爾資本協定三。為強化銀行流動性風險管理，新增兩項流動性風險量化衡量指標：流動性覆蓋比率(Liquidity Coverage Ratio, LCR)以及淨穩定資金比率(Net Stable Funding Ratio, NSFR)。我國於2015年開始將流動性覆蓋比率納入監管要求，亦將於2018年開始導入淨穩定資金比率。然而在提高銀行風險控管及標準的同時，銀行需考量其股東權益報酬。新規範的實施使銀行需要進行調整以符合法規，過往鮮少有研究針對本國銀行探討其資產配置調整與結構調整。本研究除探討個案銀行如何在巴塞爾資本協定三框架下調整其資產負債配置與結構，更進一步探討其各項調整對銀行之獲利能力以及各項法定比率之影響，希望能幫助銀行在未來調整結構之前能更了解其決策所帶來之影響。 本研究發現，在不提高資產負債表規模的情況下，可以透過銀行結構調整達到巴塞爾資本協定三於2019年之標準，同時提高銀行獲利能力；在適度提高資產負債表規模的情況之下，其獲利能力高於不提高資產負債表規模之情況。此外，本研究針對不同情境探討銀行應如何調整資產負債配置與銀行結構。風險趨避情境相較於風險偏好下，應在存放款方面，吸收更多長天期之存款、降低長期放款占比；資產配置方面則應增加政府公債占比。由於巴塞爾資本協定三採階段性實施，本研究針對個案銀行2015到2019 年之資產負債配置與銀行結構做研究，發現個案銀行隨著法規越趨嚴格，應提高公司債占比並同時降低權益類等相對風險較高之資產占比；另一方面為達到淨穩定資金比率要求，銀行應提高其長期存款占比。最後，本研究針對各項結構與資產負債配置調整做更深入的分析，探討其對於各項指標之敏感度，以實際的量化數字表示每項變動的影響，以利銀行在做決策時更了解其決策之利與弊。 / Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) released Basel III in 2010. In order to ensure the maintenance and stability of funding and liquidity profiles of banks’ balance sheets, two liquidity standards, Liquidity Coverage Ratio(LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio(NSFR), were introduced in Basel III. To in line with international norm, Taiwan government plans to implement LCR and NSFR in 2015 and 2018 respectively. However, there is a trade-off between return and risk. With the implement of new law, how to adjust banks’ asset allocation becomes a critical issue. In this study, we focus on business structure and ways to adjust A bank’s asset allocation. We found that A bank can meet government’s requirements and increase it’s return on equity without increasing balance sheet size by adjusting business structure; In the situation where balance sheet size is increased, A bank can meet the requirements with higher return on equity than where the balance sheet size isn’t increased. In three different scenarios: risk seeking, risk neutral and risk aversion, we found that A bank should increase more long-term deposits and decrease long-term loans in risk aversion scenario than in risk seeking scenario. In risk aversion scenario, A bank should also hold more government bonds than in risk seeking scenario. From 2015 to 2019, the requirements become stricter and stricter, A bank should hold more corporate bonds and less securities. At the same time, A bank should increase more long-term deposits to meet the NSFR requirement. The research also shows how business structure and asset allocation changes can affect A bank’s related required ratio and return on equity. Our findings can help A bank makes more precise decision by knowing actual quantitative influence before they implement the new policies.

The master thesis deals with the issue of the development of regulation and supervision of the financial systems in the US and the EU. The thesis is primarily focused on the regulatory and supervisory bodies and the area of capital adequacy in both, the US and the EU and changes in these areas in response to the global financial crisis. In order to meet the theses objectives the thesis is divided into three chapters, which are logically and chronologically connected. The first chapter covers the period before the financial crisis. This chapter analyzes American and European system of regulation and supervision in the period before the crisis, as well as Basel I and Basel II and the reaction of the US and the EU on these agreements. The second chapter focuses on the period of the financial crisis. Chapter analyzes the causes that led to this crisis and also its actual progress. Next section of the second chapter analyzes the US and the EU response to the crisis and the steps which the US and the EU have taken in an effort to save their financial systems. The last chapter covers the post-crisis period. This chapter is devoted mainly to the new concept Basel III and its implementation in the US and the EU. The conclusion of the thesis will be devoted to an overall summary and to comparison of obtained information.

A partir d’une analyse du défaut des banques et de la régulation au travers des notations de crédits (et des agences de notation), des modèles portant sur les CDS, de Bâle III et du capital insurance, nous trouvons que les spécificités des CDS en font un bon candidat pour prévoir (et idéalement empêcher) les défauts potentiels des banques. En effet, grâce aux propriétés (financières et économiques) des CDS, ainsi qu’aux résultats d’études empiriques, nous montrons qu’ils reflètent correctement le comportement des risques des banques et qu’ils ont capté les changements informationnels plus rapidement que les notations de crédits qui sont restées relativement constantes durant 2007 et 2008.Ainsi, en utilisant un déclencheur ad hoc basé sur les CDS et l’action appropriée si le déclencheur venait à s’activer, nous pourrions empêcher le défaut d’une banque. Et la compréhension du mécanisme afférent au capital contingent est d’un grand intérêt pour atteindre cet objectif qui optimise le monitoring mis en oeuvre par les banques et les régulateurs. / Based on an analysis of the default of the banks and regulation through credit ratings (and rating agencies), CDS models, Basel III, bail-In and capital insurance, we find that the characteristics of CDS make them a good candidate to forecast (and ideally prevent) the potential defaults of the banks. Indeed, thanks to the economics of CDS and results of empirical studies, we show that they are a good proxy of bank risks and that they did capture information changes more quickly than the credit ratings which remained relatively constant during 2007 and 2008.So, using a specific trigger based on CDS and the appropriate action, should the trigger be activated, we could prevent the default of a bank. And the understanding of contingent capital mechanism is of great interest to reach this objective which optimizes the monitoring implemented by banks as well as regulators.

Questa tesi analizza un tema fondamentale e nello stesso tempo controverso: il rischio di liquidità che, dopo la crisi del 2007-2008, sta diventato sempre più importante. Le banche centrali forniscono la liquidità necessaria per ridurre la probabilità di un collasso del sistema finanziario, utilizzando una vasta gamma di strumenti. La tesi in oggetto propone un’analisi della politica quantitativa della Banca Centrale Europea: un’analisi in cui sono state considerate le condizioni di mercato e la loro coerenza con la domanda di liquidità da parte del sistema bancario. Il quadro normativo internazionale Basilea III ha introdotto nuove regole per la gestione del rischio di liquidità. Questo lavoro presenta una serie di azioni che possono essere applicate per migliorare le capacità di gestione del rischio di liquidità della banca stessa. Applicando al processo decisionale il metodo della simulazione, è stata utilizzata un'analisi di sensitività per determinare l'impatto delle decisioni manageriali sull’indice di liquidità. Questa tesi mette in evidenza l'importanza del rischio di liquidità e presenta l'analisi empirica che ha permesso l'indagine della relazione che intercorre tra il nuovo requisito introdotto dal Basilea in materia di liquidità (NSFR) e la stabilità del sistema bancario, i fattori macroeconomici e dei mercati finanziari, e le operazioni della banca centrale. / This thesis focuses on a crucial and controversial issue - liquidity risk. After the 2007-2008 crisis it became increasingly important. The Central Banks provide required liquidity to minimise the probability of a financial system meltdown by using a wide array of instruments. This thesis proposes an analyses of the European Central Bank quantitative policy, market conditions in which these measures have been taken, and their consistency with the demand for liquidity by the banking system. The Basel III international regulatory framework introduced new liquidity regulations for managing liquidity risk. This study introduces a number of actions that can be performed to improve a bank’s liquidity risk management capabilities. By applying the simulation-based approach to decision making, a sensitivity analysis was used to determine the impact of managerial rulings on liquidity ratio. The present work highlights the importance of the liquidity risk and presents the empirical analysis that allowed the exploration of the relationship between the Basel’s new liquidity requirement (NSFR) and banking stability, macroeconomic and financial markets factors, and central bank operations.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-12-03T18:33:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo_de_Oliveira_Cardoso.pdf: 1815960 bytes, checksum: 47794692be2e0d4e60f97e2abafffbd7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-05-08 / This Objective of this study is to investigate challenges in the determination of the Required Referential Net Equity, of financial institutions, with the entry into force of the new Central Bank regulations that meet the recommendations of the Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III. The application of standards subject to the Resolution 3897/2010 revoked by Resolution 4194/2013 will address the implementation and management of liquidity risk, the new methodology of calculating the Reference Equity and the introduction of additional core capital, among other issues. Changes brought by the withdrawal of tax credits for purposes of computing the capital and changes in the form of acceptance of subordinated debt will have a strong impact on all financial institutions, with repercussions on the levels of capitalization and leverage. In this Risk management in banking and capital management with emphasis on the determination of the reference net equity required. The results suggest the need to strengthen the management of new sources of capital and line-of-business and customers, as circular 3644, especially for the average banks / O objetivo desse estudo ?? investigar as principais mudan??as na determina????o do Patrim??nio de Refer??ncia Exigido das institui????es financeiras, com a entrada em vigor das novas regulamenta????es do Banco Central, que atendem as recomenda????es do Comit?? de Supervis??o Banc??ria de Basileia III. A aplica????o das normas que s??o objeto da Resolu????o 3897/2010 revogada pela Resolu????o 4194/2013 tratar??o da implementa????o e do gerenciamento do risco de liquidez e Cr??dito, da nova metodologia de apura????o do patrim??nio de refer??ncia e da introdu????o do adicional de capital principal, entre outras quest??es. Mudan??as como a dedu????o gradativa do saldo dos cr??ditos tribut??rios diretamente do Capital e altera????es na forma de aceita????o das d??vidas subordinadas t??m forte impacto sobre todas as institui????es financeiras, com repercuss??o nos seus n??veis de capitaliza????o e alavancagem. Nesse contexto, foi realizado revis??o da literatura sobre os assuntos: Basileia I, II e III, riscos na gest??o banc??ria e gerenciamento de capital com ??nfase na determina????o do Patrim??nio de Refer??ncia Exigido. Os resultados encontrados sugerem a necessidade de refor??ar a gest??o de novas fontes de capital e de linhas de neg??cios e clientes, conforme circular 3644, sobretudo para os bancos m??dios

金融海嘯提供我們一個深刻的教訓，因為危機前信貸過度增長伴隨著大量的系統風險，最後導致景氣反轉時銀行業龐大損失。而這些損失將動搖整個金融體系，並引發了一連串的惡性循環(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision , BCBS ,2010a, 2010b)；若依循過往個別審慎監理((Microprudential regulation)原則，將無法察覺背後隱藏的系統風險。因此目前趨勢是將以個別(Micro)與總體審慎監理原則(macro)並重，針對能夠影響整體市場金融穩定風險來源而詳加監管，同時透過規範與監理措施適度的降低系統風險，最終達到金融穩定的目的。IMF、BIS以及FSB(2009)針對G20制定的金融機構、市場與工具的指導文件(Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments)中，認為有效控制系統風險是現階段政策監理最重要的主軸之一。所謂系統風險是指能影響金融機構所持有的部位以及對於實體經濟存在嚴重負面影響的風險來源；此總體風險將存在負外部性而非個別審慎監理的風險因子。 因此本文由兩篇宏觀審慎監管框架文章所構成的研究，分別針對市場流動性風險和信用風險的因子。透過非流動性賣權與逆景氣資本緩衝（CCB）買權來分析和評價兩種新的監管框架。第一篇論文的主要概念是討論市場流動性風險因子，雖然當前銀行監管的重點是資金流動性風險，如新巴塞爾協議三 (Basel III)的流動性風險覆蓋率（LCR）和淨穩定資金比率（NSFR），但金融機構實際上也同時面臨資金和市場流動性之間的高度順週期效應，導致流動性螺旋，並威脅到金融穩定。因此，本文提出一個市場流動性，系統性風險和宏觀審慎監理分析框架來填補這一空白。 與Drehmann和Juselius（2013B）的實證研究結果比較，我們發現利用6個月歷史波動度建構的非流動性選擇權是最有效的提前預警指標（EWIS），且符合穩定政策結構和最小監管成本。此外在三個子樣本和嚴重危機時期亦能同樣保持預警的穩健性。因此如果金融機構能透過預警減少金融機構投資種類、行業、交易對手與大額暴險的集中度時，將可以由危機發生後被動式轉變成危機發生前主動式的風險管理，將符合總體審慎監理定義：能影響所有而非單一的金融機構，以及有效控制破壞總體市場產生的系統風險。 在第二篇文章中，我們專注於信用風險監管框架的避險，即Basel III的逆景氣資本緩衝(CCB)。這個新穎的監理視角將鼓勵銀行在危機前的信貸繁榮時期增加資本緩衝，而非在危機後接受援助或者增加昂貴的資本。據美國聯邦存款保險公司（FDIC）統計，2014年第1季全美的存款機構風險加權資產為10.27兆美金；如果最高的逆景氣資本緩衝被應用到這些銀行，將有2570億美金的資本不得不額外注資。因此本文設計了一個新的買權來符合CCB的監管框架，建立提前資本防禦措施來減輕系統性風險和整體銀行業不穩定。首先發現這款買權將能在順境時注入資本，即更低的潛在違約風險與信貸寬鬆時期，進而抵禦未來發生的金融危機。我們的建議也符合Basel III的目標，在危機前2至5年協助銀行取得資本保護。最重要的是，CCB買權可以透過提前取得資本形成一個“減震器”，舒緩隨後而來經濟衰退的壓力達到降低銀行資本順週期性目標；此外還提供了一個對於銀行過度冒險行為的抗衡力量，成為一個“自動穩定器”來達到宏觀審慎監理目標。 / Financial tsunami offered a profound lesson as the pre-crisis excessive credit growth was accompanied by huge systemic risks that ultimately led to the reversal of economy and huge losses of the banking sector. Such losses will shake the entire financial system and trigger a series of vicious cycles (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BCBS, 2010a , 2010b ); the hidden systemic risk may not be observed if we follow the previous principles of micro prudential regulation. The guidance formulated by G20 to assess the systemic importance of financial institutions, markets and instruments (IMF, BIS, and FSB, 2009) analyzes that the main issue of prior micro prudential regulation is that every financial institution’s incentive is to manage its own return-risk tradeoff but not necessarily manage the stability for the financial system as a whole. Consequently, the macroprudential regulation focusing on shocks originating outside the financial system can control the negative externalities of systemic risk rather than micro prudential regulation. This dissertation consists of two essays on the macro prudential framework of market liquidity risk and credit risk factor. We introduce, analyze, and value two new regulation frameworks via an illiquidity put option and a CCB call option respectively. The main concept of first essay is to discuss the macro prudential framework of market liquidity risk factor. Although the current banking regulation focuses on systemic funding liquidity risk such as Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) of Basel III, financial institutions would actually have highly procyclical effects between funding and market liquidity at the same time, leading to liquidity spirals and threatening to financial stability. We therefore propose a market liquidity, systemic risk and macroregulation analysis framework in Taiwan's capital market to fill this gap. Comparison with the Drehmann and Juselius' empirical study (2013b), we find that illiquidity options by using 6-month historical volatility and forecasting short-term stock declines are effective early warning indicators (EWIs) having most stable policy structures and minimal regulation costs. Applying AUC macroregulation criteria, we show this illiquidity measure is also maintained fairly robustness in different intervals, e.g. during three sub-samples and serious crisis periods. If financial institutions can diversify the concentration of portfolios varieties, industries, and counterparty before crises by using EWIs, the passive risk taking can be converted into the active risk management. It is necessary to prepare the market liquidity and macroregulation framework in advance. In the second essay, we focus the hedging product for credit risk factors, i.e. countercyclical capital buffer (CCB). This purpose of countercyclical capital buffer standards is to encourage banks to increase capital buffers in credit good times that can be used in the future stress. According to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the risk-weighted assets of U.S. depository institutions were $10.27trillion dollars in 2014:Q1. If the maximum CCB is applied to these banks, an additional US$257 billion of equity capital will have to be raised. Hence, we design a new option to establish the capital defenses meeting CCB framework and then mitigating systemic risk and banking instability in advance. We show this product injects capital in good times i.e., lower credit risk and more credit expansion, to weather the future financial crisis. Our proposal also complies with the goal of Basel III to obtain capital in 2 to 5 years prior to crises. Most importantly, the CCB option can provide protection with additional capital to act as a "shock absorber" reducing a procyclicality problem in the subsequent downturn. Besides, this type of option also offers a countervailing force to excessive risk-taking behaviors to act as an "automatic stabilizer" for reaching macroprudential goals.

Notre thèse développe une nouvelle méthode pour analyser les capitaux propres des banques, basée sur la distinction entre capital actionnarial (dit ‘shareholder equity’) et capital de l’entité bancaire (dit ‘entity equity’). Cette nouvelle mesure –du capital actionnarial permet de distinguer les capitaux propres bancaires effectivement apportés par les actionnaires. Cette mesure s’avère pertinente pour interpréter les transformations récentes de la relation entre actionnaires et entités bancaires. Elle identifie et comptabilise les transactions entre les entités bancaires et leurs actionnaires, en permettant ainsi : l'analyse des origines du capital bancaire et de son évolution ; l’impact des stratégies d'entreprise financiarisées qui cherchent à économiser l’apport en capital actionnarial ; une mesure améliorée du capital actionnarial prudentiel qui est censé apporter une protection contre les risques encourus et les pertes éventuelles. De nos jours, une tension fondamentale pèse sur les capitaux propres bancaires, entre les actionnaires demandant des politiques de distribution généreuses, et l’intérêt général qui nécessite d’un système bancaire stable et résilient. Cette tension entre les exigences des actionnaires et la constitution d’un capital actionnarial suffisant est documenté par notre analyse dans la période avant et après la crise financière globale. Nous analysons les capitaux propres de neuf banques européennes entre 2001 et 2015. Ces cas montrent des distributions importantes en faveur des actionnaires et au détriment des objectifs de solvabilité financière.Les apports des actionnaires aux capitaux propres de l'entité bancaire ainsi qu'au capital prudentiel ont été limités avant la crise, et ne s’améliorent que modestement après celle-là,malgré des injections nouvelles importantes. Nos résultats suggèrent que, à l'ère des stratégies d'entreprise financiarisées, des niveaux suffisants de capital bancaire de haute qualité sont essentiels pour protéger l'intérêt général et empêcher les banques de devenir des véhicules d'investissement financiarisés pour certains actionnaires. Cela amène à repenser les capitaux propres des banques dans la recherche d’un arrangement plus durable et soutenable avec leurs actionnaires. / The thesis introduces a new accounting method based upon the distinction between shareholder equity and the residual entity equity. Shareholder equity presents the actual contributions of shareholders to the bank entity. It allows for the analysis of bank’s equity position in light of a transformed idea of shareholding as experienced in recent years. The measure identifies and visualises equity transactions of banks relating to shareholders; and with it, allows for the analysis of the two main shaping forces of bank equity: financialized corporate strategy which seeks to economize the bank equity position; and regulatory capita lwhich provides a risk buffer to absorb eventual losses. Addressees of these two forces are shareholders who pressure banks to follow generous distribution policies and society at largewhich demands a safe and sound banking system. This trade-off between return to shareholders and a sufficient equity base is well documented in the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. Our analysis of shareholder equity position applies to nine European banks between 2001 and 2015. It reveals substantial distributions at the detriment of financial solvency concerns. Shareholder contributions to the bank entity as well as to regulatory capital werelimited in the pre-crisis period, with rather modest improvements in the post-crisis perioddespite substantial capital injections. Findings suggest that, in an era of financialized corporate strategy, sufficient levels of high quality capital are essential to safeguard general interest and prevent banks to become financial investment vehicles for their shareholders.

Submitted by Luiz Henrique Moraes da Silva (luiz.henrique1046@gmail.com) on 2018-08-24T16:12:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_lhms_2.pdf: 1496435 bytes, checksum: 256777f511b36a71d178ad1980b4f101 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2018-08-24T17:42:34Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_lhms_2.pdf: 1496435 bytes, checksum: 256777f511b36a71d178ad1980b4f101 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Isabele Garcia (isabele.garcia@fgv.br) on 2018-08-27T13:33:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_lhms_2.pdf: 1496435 bytes, checksum: 256777f511b36a71d178ad1980b4f101 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T13:33:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_lhms_2.pdf: 1496435 bytes, checksum: 256777f511b36a71d178ad1980b4f101 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-07-31 / O presente estudo propõe um modelo de simulação que combina o modelo multifatorial de Heath, Jarrow e Morton e distribuições de probabilidade empíricas condicionais para simular curvas de juros e ativos do mercado financeiro. Em seguida, utilizamos o modelo proposto para simular a evolução do Dólar, da estrutura a termo das taxas de juros do Brasil obtida a partir dos contratos de DI futuro e da curva de Cupom Cambial de Dólar Sujo de maneira integrada, sendo os resultados das simulações utilizados para realizar o apreçamento de ativos. Também aplicamos os resultados obtidos em um problema de otimização de portfólios, que busca maximizar o lucro de um participante sujeito às restrições regulatórias impostas pelas resoluções de Basiléia III, empregando novamente o conceito de distribuições empíricas condicionais. / This work proposes a simulation model that combines the multifactor Heath, Jarrow and Morton model with empirical conditional probability distributions to simulate interest rate curves and securities from the financial market. The work then utilizes the proposed model to simulate the USD/BRL exchange rate, the interest rate term structure obtained from the DI Future contracts and the Cupom Cambial de D´olar Sujo interest rate curve in an integrated way, using the obtained results to price securities. In addition, we apply the results obtained in a portoflio optimation problem, which seeks to maximize the profit of a market partcipant subject to the regulatory constraints imposed by the Basel III resolutions, utilizing once again the concept of empirical conditional distributions.

The diploma thesis focuses on the regulatory framework of the BASEL III in coherence with risk management and measurement of market and credit risks. The accent is focused upon methodology of calculation and determination of the capital requirements of above mentioned risks. In the introductory part of the thesis are mentioned basic procedures regarding risk management as well as theoretical methodology and development of calculation of the capital requirements in coherence with current standard BASEL III. In the practical part of the thesis are presented capital management policies with regards to BASEL III in Deutsche Bank AG, globally presented institution and Komerční banka, a.s., operating on the Czech market. Accented are mainly the expositions of the institutions and the size of the capital required by the regulatory framework.

Par rapport au système financier conventionnel qui a vécu ces dernières années des épisodes de forte instabilité liés en partie à une mauvaise gouvernance, le système financier islamique a montré des signes de robustesse et de pérennité. Sa capacité à surmonter les événements défavorables a incité plusieurs parties prenantes à proposer la finance islamique comme solutionaux déficits financiers et substitut potentiel au système bancaire actuel. Les partisans de cette finance ont fait valoir que la récente crise financière aurait pu être évitée si la finance islamique avec une bonne gouvernance et un cadre réglementaire solide avait été introduite au lieu de la finance conventionnelle. Pour ces raisons, l’objectif de cette thèse est d’une part d’examiner si la finance islamique pourrait garantir la stabilité en période de crise et être une alternative au système financier traditionnel, et d’autre part d’évaluer l’effet des mécanismes internes et externes de gouvernance bancaire sur le risque des banques islamiques par rapport à leurs homologues conventionnelles. Pour y arriver, nous avons élaboré trois chapitres avec desévidences empiriques en utilisant un échantillon de 95 banques islamiques et 130 banques conventionnelles (38 banques dont 14 banques islamiques sont exclues dans le dernier chapitre) dans 18 pays des régions MENAP et Asie du Sud-Est, durant la période 2006-2013. Le premier chapitre porte sur les spécificités et le risque de la banque dans un système financier islamiquepar rapport au système conventionnel. Les résultats trouvés indiquent que la taille et le capital de la banque ainsi que la croissance du PIB sont des facteurs clés de la solidité des deux systèmes bancaires de tous les pays étudiés, notamment des pays du Golfe. Cependant, d’autres résultats ne sont pas assez robustes pour savoir si les banques islamiques sont plus ou moins risquées que les banques conventionnelles. Par conséquent, nous concluons que le système bancaire islamique ne peut pas se substituer au système traditionnel, mais il est plutôt un complément financier qui a ses propres limites. Le deuxième chapitre examine l’effet des mécanismes internes de gouvernance bancaire, à savoir le conseil d’administration et le conseilde surveillance de la charia comme un organe de contrôle spécifique, sur le risque des banques conventionnelles par rapport aux banques islamiques. Les résultats ne montrent pas de différence significative entre les deux groupes bancaires,sauf pour les banques islamiques des pays du Golfe qui font preuve d’une plus grande solidité financière, grâce notamment auxcompétences de spécialistes en finance et en droit islamique, et au recrutement des administrateurs étrangers. En outre, nous trouvons que, dans les pays du Golfe en particulier, l'effet indésirable d'une taille importante du conseil d'administration et celui de la dualité des fonctions sur les risques des banques conventionnelles, disparaissent avec la présence d'un nombre élevé d’administrateurs indépendants. En traitant la question de la dimension externe de gouvernance bancaire dans le dernier chapitre, l’accent est mis sur l’effet probable des récentes réformes bancaires relatives aux banques conventionnelles et aux banques islamiques, à la lumière de Bâle III et du CSFI-12/15, sur le risque de ces banques. Les résultats trouvés montrent que si les exigences réglementaires de ces deux normes internationales de solvabilité avaient été appliquées durant notre période d'étude, elles auraient probablement amélioré la stabilité des deux systèmes bancaires des pays étudiés. Cependant, cet effet n’est pas uniforme pour toutes les banques, en particulier pour les banques conventionnelles des pays d’Asie du Sud-Est qui semblent moins stables et plus exposées au risque de crédit que le reste des banques.L’ensemble de ces résultats apporte une nouvelle dimension de la recherche en gouvernance dans une perspective islamique ... / Compared to the conventional financial system, which has experienced periods of high volatility in recent years partly due to poor governance, the Islamic financial system has shown signs of robustness and sustainability. Its ability to overcome the unfavorable events has encouraged several stakeholders to propose Islamic finance as a solution to financial deficits and as a potential alternative to the current banking system. The supporters of this finance argued that the recent financial crisis could have been avoided if Islamic finance with good governance and a solid regulatory framework had been introduced instead of conventional finance. For these reasons, the purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, we examine whether Islamic finance could guarantee stability in times of crisis and be a substitute for the traditional financial system. Second, we assess the effect of internal and external mechanisms of banking governance on the risk of Islamic banks compared to their conventional counterparts. To this end, we have developed three chapters with empirical evidence using a sample of 95 Islamic banks and 130 conventional banks (38 banks including 14 Islamic banks are excluded at the last chapter) in 18 MENAP and Southeast Asian countries, during the period 2006-2013. The first chapter analyzes the specificities and the risk of the bank in an Islamic financial system compared to conventional system. The results indicate that the size and capital of the bank as well as the GDP growth are crucial factors for the soundness of the two banking systems of all surveyed countries, especially of the Gulf region. However, other results are not strong enough to answer whether Islamic banks are more or less risky than their conventional counterparts. We therefore conclude that the Islamic banking system cannot replace the traditional system, but is, rather, a financial supplement that has its own limitations. The second chapter examines the effect of internal mechanisms of banking governance, such as the board of directors and the sharia supervisory board as a control organ specific to Islamic banks, on the risk of conventional banks compared to their Islamic counterparts. The findings show no significant difference between the two banking systems, except for the Islamic banks of Gulf countries, which demonstrate greater financial solidity thanks particularly to the skills of the specialists in finance and Islamic law, and the recruitment of foreign directors. In addition, we find especiallyin Gulf countries that the harmful effect of a large board size and dual functions on the risks of conventional banks disappear with the presence of a significant number of independent directors. In investigating the issue of the external dimension of banking governance, the focus is on the probable effect of recent banking reforms relating to conventional and Islamic banks, in light of Basel III and IFSB-12/15, on the risk of the two banking systems. Our findings support that if the regulatory requirements of these two international solvency standards had been applied during our sampling period, they would probably have improved the stability of the two banking systems of the surveyed countries. However, this effect is not uniform for all banks. In particular, conventional banks of Southeast Asian countries seem less stable and more exposed to credit risk than the other ones. All of these results bring a new dimension of governance research from an Islamic perspective, which could be a valuable source ofknowledge for both bankers and regulators in the banking sector.