V Summary The question of quality of legislation in Modern Age is omnipresent in political, philosophical and in legal discourse. Especially in connection with structures which are different from classical national state concepts such as the European Union, it is very hard to set up conditions of good legislation. The main aim of this Thesis is analysis of today's state of affairs and to create a comprehensive structure of good legislation principles applied in the EU. The author is dealing with the fact that classical legal theory is usually applied on EU situation terms in their classical - Westphalian state - meanings. The purpose of this work is, therefore, to adapt these classical terms to a situation of EU and CJEU case law. For that reason, the author is critically assessing classical legal theorist's principle models as well as models created by experts in the field of legislation or European Union law. The outcome is supposed to be a merge between these models, which can provide the reader with deeper understanding of normative model of Union legislation. EU legislative style is a merge of the majority of legislative traditions of Member States, therefore, in certain circumstances it is hardly understandable for everybody. The main presumption here is MacCormmick's theory of interdependence of...

Der Aufsatz stellt den Stand der Institutionalisierung von Folgenabschätzungen im Prozess der Gesetzeserstellung in der Exekutive in Großbritannien dar. / The paper examines the practice of Impact Assessments in the legislative process in Great Britain.

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht das Potential und die Bedingungen alternativer Regulierungsformen vor dem Hintergrund von Better Regulation in Deutschland. Nahezu alle EU- und OECD-Staaten betreiben heute umfassende politische Reformprogramme zur Modernisierung der Regulierungsarchitekturen, die unter dem Label Better Regulation subsumiert werden. Die Zielsetzung dieser Programme besteht zum einen in der wirtschaftsfreundlichen Reduktion von Regulierungskosten und zum anderen in der Effektivitätssteigerung von Regulierung durch Vermeidung unintendierter Nebeneffekte. Better Regulation ist ein Toolkit verschiedener metaregulativer Policy-Instrumente, deren programmatische Zusammensetzung vom nationalen politischen Kontext abhängt. Im Rahmen der parallel verlaufenden Reformagenden werden überdies alternative Regulierungsformen von verschiedenen Advokaten besserer Regulierung thematisiert, und als Alternative zur rein staatlichen, hierarchischen Command-and-Control-Regulierung (CaC-Regulierung) promotet, jedoch weder näher auf deren Bedingungen noch deren Konsequenzen einzugehen. Den optimistischen Vorstellungen eines evidenzbasierten Regulatory Managements folgend, erfolgt die Prüfung und Analyse alternativer Regelungsformen im Zuge der Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung (GFA; Regulatory Impact Assessment RIA). Bisher fristen alternative Regulierungsformen allerdings ein Dasein im Schatten von Standardkosten-Modell, RIA und Co. und werden von den Policy-Makern nicht systematisch in Betracht gezogen oder eingesetzt. CaC-Regulierung ist und bleibt das dominante Steuerungsinstrument des Staates. Es existieren jedoch zahlreiche diskursive Anknüpfungspunkte einschließlich zahlreicher Kritiken an der hierarchisch-regulativen Steuerung, welche die Auseinandersetzung mit alternativen Regulierungsformen begründen. Ziel dieses Papieres ist es daher, die in der Kritik stehende CaC-Regulierung Modellen alternativer Regulierungsformen entgegenzustellen, wobei alternative Regulierung mit den Konzepten Selbstregulierung, Koregulierung und regulierter Selbstregulierung eng definiert wird, und nur jene Konstellationen betrachtet werden, die kooperativ zwischen Regierung und Wirtschaft operieren. Ebenso wird der Versuch unternommen, die mannigfaltigen Konzepte und Erscheinungsformen alternativer Regulierung zu definieren und zu kategorisieren. Im Anschluss an den theoretischen Part erfolgt im nächsten Schritt die Identifikation der Einsatz- und Erfolgsbedingungen alternativer Regulierung. Dies geschieht anhand zweier empirischer Fallbeispiele aus den Politikfeldern Berufsbildungspolitik („der Ausbildungspakt der deutschen Wirtschaft“) sowie Umweltpolitik („die Mehrwegquotenverpflichtung“), wobei gezielt ein erfolgreiches und gescheitertes Beispiel alternativer Regulierung verglichen werden und Erfolgsfaktoren abgeleitet werden. Das Ergebnis ist, dass alternative Regulierung gewisse Potentiale und Anreize für staatliche wie privatwirtschaftliche Akteure bietet, aber der Einsatz dieser Steuerungsformen höchst voraussetzungsvoll ist und nur in wenigen Politikfeldern möglich und zu empfehlen ist. So besteht das Potential alternativer Regulierungsformen vor allem in der ganzheitlichen Senkung von Regulierungskosten (Befolgungs- und Vollzugskosten) und in der Erhöhung der Steuerbarkeit der Adressaten. Allerdings sind die korporativen Akteure auf beiden Seiten zum einen nicht immer hinreichend auf diese Form indirekter Steuerung vorbereitet. Zum anderen wird alternative Regulierung durch die Fragmentierung und Schwäche von Wirtschaftsverbänden sowie durch Interessengegensätze unter den Regelungsadressaten gehindert, die in Trittbrettfahrertum und dem letztlichen Scheitern selbstregulativer Verpflichtungen münden. Als entscheidende, aber anspruchsvolle Erfolgskomponente erweisen sich die politische Kommunikation und die Durchsetzbarkeit staatlicher Sanktionen sowie die Erfolgskontrolle, um die Regelungseinhaltung durch die Wirtschaft zu gewährleisten. Generell ist zu konstatieren, dass alternative Regulierungsformen dort zustande kommen, wo sich konzentrierter Widerstand auf Seiten der Adressaten gegen geplante, autoritative Steuerung abzeichnet, eine gewisse Pfadabhängigkeit bzw. eine Historie sektoraler Selbstregulierung vorliegt und eine Win-Win-Situation bei der Kooperation für Politik und Wirtschaft ersichtlich ist. In der Konsequenz zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass alternative Regulierung nicht nach einem synoptisch-rationalen Modell politischer Prozesse entsteht, sondern ein ursprünglich nicht intendiertes Produkt Garbage Can-artiger Verhandlungen mit einem hohen Konfliktniveau darstellt. Folglich ist das Resultat für die Vorstellung einer „Rational Regulatory Choice“ induzierenden Better Regulation-Agenda desillusionierend. / This paper analyses the potentials and the preconditions of alternative forms of regulation against the background of Better Regulation in Germany. Today, almost every OECD- and EU-country runs extensive regulatory reform programs to modernize its regulatory governance structures, which are summarized under the label Better Regulation. The goal of this type of agenda can be regarded, firstly, as the business-friendly reduction of overall regulatory costs and secondly as the increase of regulatory efficiency by removing unintended side-effects. Better Regulation is a toolkit consisting of several meta-regulatory instruments, whose programmatic composition and use varies with the national political context. Moreover, within these parallel proceeding reform agendas alternative forms of regulation are constantly promoted by advocates of Better Regulation and portrayed as alternative to purely governmental command-and-control approaches (CaC), though neither responding to their preconditions nor addressing their consequences. According to the optimistic notion of an evidence-based regulatory management, the examination and analysis of regulatory alternatives is supposed to be carried out within regulatory impact assessments (RIA). However, hitherto alternative forms of regulations exist unnoted in the shadow of the standard cost model, RIA and co. and they are not systematically considered and applied by policy-makers. CaC-regulation is and remains the dominant and favoured policy-instrument of the state. Yet, there are several discursive connections including broad criticism on hierarchical-regulative steering, which give reason to the deeper analysis of alternative forms of regulation. Therefore the aim of this paper is to contrast alternative regulation with the criticized CaC-technique, whereas alternative regulation is defined narrowly as the concepts of self-regulation, co-regulation and regulated self-regulation which operate as cooperative substitutes of CaC between government and business. Moreover, this paper attempts to define and to categorize the diverse concepts and natures of alternative regulation. Subsequent to the theoretical part the preconditions and critical success factors for alternative regulation are identified in the next section. For this purpose two empirical case studies from two different policies, under which one is successful and the other has failed, are examined and compared to deduce success factors. The case studies are from vocational training policy (“The Training Pact of the German Business”) and waste policy (“refill quota for beverage containers”). The result is that alternative forms of regulation offer several potential und incentives for state and business actors, but that the use of these policy instruments is highly demanding and in addition only possible and recommendable in few policies. Undoubtedly its potential lies in the holistic reduction of regulatory costs (compliance and enforcement costs) and in the enhancement of the governability of the regulated business. However, the corporate actors on both sides are not always adequately prepared for this indirect mode of steering. Furthermore, alternative regulation is hindered by the fragmentation and weakness of business associations and opposing interests among the regulated sectors and companies, which may lead to free-riding and could result in the final failure of alternative regulation. The political communication and assertiveness of public sanctions as well as the measurement of success, which ensure self-regulatory compliance, turned out to be decisive, but very demanding constituents of success. Generally speaking, alternative forms of regulation emerge in those cases and policy areas, where concentrated resistance against planned CaC-measures becomes apparent, where a certain path dependency or history of sectoral self-regulation exists, and where a win-win-situation becomes obvious for politicians and business. To sum up, this paper argues that alternative regulations don’t emerge by a synoptic-ration model of policy process, but that they present an unintended product of garbage can like policy processes, further characterized by a high level of conflict. Consequentially, this paper’s findings disillusion the (exaggeratedly) optimistic notion of a rational regulatory choice inducing Better Regulation agenda.

Since its implementation in 2002, the Better Regulation agenda for improved policy-making aimed at closing the gap in the policy cycle in the European Union. The gap in the policy cycle is said to be due to a lack of compliance with evaluations of existing regulations through ex-post evaluations before starting new policy processes with impact assessments. With a point of departure in the effect of the external shock from Covid-19 on the EU policy process, the thesis analyzes if and how the usage of ex-post evaluation in impact assessments has differed before and during Covid-19. This comparative case study focuses on the qualitative use of ex-post evaluations in impact assessments during crises, the study contributes with a new crisis-oriented focus on the research on Better Regulation as well as new data on the cyclical policy process in the EU. The analysis tests two explanatory theories for non-compliance by linking ex-post evaluations with impact assessments under Better Regulation. The theory of regulatory reactivity can explain non-compliance tied to the external shock of Covid-19 and the inherent variation in DG capacity to produce cyclical and evidence-based impact assessments in line with the Better Regulation guidelines can explain if the non-compliance is systematic. The results contradict the somewhat pessimistic picture from previous research and the theoretical expectations of compliance with Better Regulation. A stronger compliance over time with Better Regulation was found which was not visibly impacted by the external shock from Covid-19 nor connected to the variation in DG capacity.

After the initial excitement about the Internet as a space outside of governmental control has evaporated and courts in several states have applied national laws to ‘Cyberspace’, there is now a consensus among scholars that regulators have in principle the authority and capacity to regulate the Internet. Nevertheless, the application of the established tools of regulation - legislation and adjudication - to the current challenges to copyright regulation posed by the Internet has proven to be ineffective and produced undesirable side effects. Although market self-regulation has been suggested as a more efficacious approach to regulating the Internet and has proven effective in content regulation and Internet governance, the market has so far been unsuccessful in providing an effective and efficient remedy to the challenges to copyright regulation. The purpose of this thesis is to examine a novel approach to regulation and analyse its benefits and limitations. The novel approach defies the conceptualisation as co- and self-regulation, but introduces the solution from outside the regulated environment through entrepreneurship and innovation, and relies on the forces of the market to become effective. In this thesis, I analyse the regulatory systems implemented by two private organisations, Noank Media and Creative Commons, in China’s reportedly ineffective copyright law environment and find that their market-based and innovative approach to regulation can be understood as a form of social entrepreneurship. Social enterprises have been claimed to deliver social goods more effectively and efficiently than governmental intervention, because they are said to rely on local knowledge, to be driven by the demand of the stakeholders, and to be focused on social value creation. Based on quantitative and qualitative fieldwork with Noank Media’s and Creative Common’s stakeholders in China I analyse to what extent these two enterprises managed to successfully leverage the assets of social entrepreneurship. I conclude that while the novel approach has demonstrated the potential to produce more effective and more efficient regulation, it does not automatically result in Better Regulation. Further efforts are required to ensure participation, transparency, and public accountability, and to avoid regulatory fragmentation.

This research describes and compares different approaches of the Better Regulation implementation in Danish Ministry of Industry & Trade and Lithuanian Ministry of Economics. These two ministries have been facing many common management problems relatively at the same time period, along with the ever-changing economic challenges and EU requirements. While the Danish ministry is being one of the most effectively restructured and de-burocratized into a project organization in EU, the Lithuanian Ministry of Economics remains at quite a low level of reformation. Even though both of these ministries had common goals, their reform purposes were completely different: the Danish reform was about to increase the Ministry’s capacity in developing new policy initiatives, to increase flexibility in resource allocation, and to make the organization an attractive working place for future graduates from universities; while the purposes of Lithuanian reform are still more about general compatibility with EU requirements.

Submitted by Julia de Lamare (ju_delamare@hotmail.com) on 2016-03-10T14:23:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Julia de Lamare - versão final 10.03.2016.pdf: 1781385 bytes, checksum: 5e0a14bc6abef953bdd67e2359263eaf (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2016-03-16T13:15:30Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Julia de Lamare - versão final 10.03.2016.pdf: 1781385 bytes, checksum: 5e0a14bc6abef953bdd67e2359263eaf (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2016-03-18T13:37:12Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Julia de Lamare - versão final 10.03.2016.pdf: 1781385 bytes, checksum: 5e0a14bc6abef953bdd67e2359263eaf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-18T13:37:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Julia de Lamare - versão final 10.03.2016.pdf: 1781385 bytes, checksum: 5e0a14bc6abef953bdd67e2359263eaf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-15 / Environmental regulation lacks transparency. Agencies responsible for environmental protection, in most of the cases, only publish the final versions of the regulatory measures adopted, without further details on supporting, technical justifications, alternatives considered and possible contributions from social participation, among other issues. As a consequence, the environmental management faces accountability issues. To overcome this scenario, the regulatory impact analysis is presented as an instrument able to add clarity, objectivity and efficiency to environmental decision making. The incorporation of the tool, however, should be performed with particular caution, in view of three major peculiarities of Environmental Law. Firstly, the sector not only handles with risk, but also with uncertainty, in which due to the absence of information, it is impossible to make probability calculation about possible outcomes. Secondly, environmental regulation deals with non-tradable assets to which traditional cost-benefit analysis is not easily applicable. Finally, the environmental regulatory authority is shared by various agencies at all levels of government, increasing the odds of technical failures. / A regulação ambiental carece de maior transparência. Os órgãos de proteção do meio ambiente, em regra, apenas publicam as versões finais das medidas elaboradas, sem explicitar as justificativas técnicas que as embasaram, as alternativas consideradas e as possíveis contribuições decorrentes de participação social, entre outras questões. Em consequência, tem-se um cenário desfavorável à realização de controle pelos mais diversos atores. Para superá-lo, a análise de impacto regulatório é apresentada como instrumento apto a agregar clareza, objetividade e eficiência ao processo decisório ambiental. A incorporação da ferramenta, no entanto, deve ser realizada com cuidado especial, tendo em vista a existência de três principais peculiaridades do direito do meio ambiente. Primeiro, o setor lida não só com situações de risco, mas também com casos de incerteza, em que a ausência de informação impossibilita o cálculo de probabilidade de ocorrência de possíveis resultados. Em segundo lugar, a regulação ambiental recai sobre bens não transacionados em mercados, o que dificulta a obtenção de seu valor de troca, aspecto relevante para a análise de custo-benefício como tradicionalmente conhecida. Por fim, o meio ambiente apresenta desenho regulatório absolutamente fragmentado, composto por variados órgãos normatizadores, deliberativos e fiscalizadores em todos os níveis da federação, o que eleva o risco de deficiências na formação técnica das autoridades reguladoras.

A presente dissertação versa sobre o estudo da regulação financeira sistêmica brasileira e está dividida em quatro capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, descreve-se a essência das atividades financeiras e narra-se a trajetória histórica que deu ensejo à criação de Bancos Centrais e o surgimento da regulação bancária no mundo. Em seguida, discorre-se sobre o processo de expansão do sistema financeiro e sua internacionalização face à globalização financeira dos mercados. Após a exposição de razões políticas, comportamentais, econômicas e técnicas consideradas determinantes para a consumação da última crise financeira mundial (caso subprime), demonstra-se que uma regulação financeira sistêmica adequada constitui um processo complexo, dinâmico e contínuo de gestão pública com vistas a evitar ou atenuar os efeitos de crises sistêmicas. Nesse sentido, são expostos os motivos por que o Brasil enfrentou bem tal crise, através da apresentação da evolução dos processos regulatórios domésticos nos últimos anos. No segundo capítulo, utilizado o marco político-filosófico de John Rawls, sustenta-se a ideia de que a estabilidade financeira sustentável ao longo do tempo é uma questão de justiça básica que deve influenciar o desenho político-institucional em sociedades democráticas constitucionais. Nesse sentido, afirma-se a possibilidade de geração de um consenso sobreposto, segundo o ideal de razão pública, quanto à necessidade de estabelecimento de instituições, relativamente descoladas dos ciclos político-eleitorais e dotadas de especialização técnica, responsáveis pelo planejamento e acompanhamento público e transparente da sustentabilidade da execução da política monetária e da regulação financeira sistêmica propriamente dita no longo prazo. Adicionalmente, em razão da globalização financeira dos mercados, discorre-se sobre os limites e possibilidades do ideal de razão pública nos organismos financeiros internacionais (redes globais de governo), instituídos para definir padrões de regulação financeira sistêmica, e são feitos comentários acerca da existência de um Direito Administrativo Global. No terceiro capítulo, defende-se a ideia de razão prática regulatória como a diretriz adequada de atuação sustentável do Estado na economia com foco em resultados, a fim de estimular o progresso nos processos regulatórios, mediante o uso do better regulation como paradigma de análise de custos e benefícios. Após, expõe-se a noção de juridicidade administrativa como a mais compatível com a Constituição, além de defender-se a legitimidade democrática e o poder normativo das agências reguladoras financeiras. Por fim, com fundamento nas características do desenho institucional da estrutura regulatória brasileira, são formuladas propostas de aprimoramento institucional. No último capítulo, são feitos comentários sobre as vantagens, limites e riscos de judicialização dos processos regulatórios financeiros em democracias constitucionais, o que motiva a construção de parâmetros institucionais e materiais de atuação judicial, posteriormente analisados em precedentes importantes julgados no Brasil nos últimos anos. / This dissertation deals with the study of systemic financial regulation in Brazil and is divided into four chapters. The first chapter describes the essence of the financial activities and narrates the historical trajectory that gave rise to the creation of Central Banks and the emergence of banking regulation in the world. Afterwards, it exposes the expansion process of the financial system and its internationalization due to globalization of financial markets. Then, it presents political, behavioral, economic and technical reasons considered crucial to the consummation of the last global financial crisis (subprime case) and concludes that an adequate systemic financial regulation is a complex, dynamic and continuous public management process in order to prevent or mitigate the effects of systemic crises. In this sense, it shows why Brazil faced the last crisis well, through the exposure of the evolution of the domestic regulatory processes in recent years. In the second chapter, based on the John Rawlss political liberalism framework, it holds up the idea that sustainable financial stability over time is a matter of basic fairness that should influence the design of political institutions in democratic constitutional societies. In this sense, it states the possibility of generating overlapping consensus, according to the ideal of public reason, on the need to establish institutions, relatively detached from electoral cycles and endowed with technical expertise, responsible for planning and monitoring the long run sustainability implementation of accountable monetary policy and systemic financial regulation as well. Additionally, due to the globalization, it discusses the limits and possibilities of the ideal of public reason in the international financial organizations (global networks of government), established to set systemic financial regulatory standards, as well as comments are made about a Global Administrative Law. In the third chapter, it argues the idea of regulatory practice reason as the appropriate guideline for sustainable state performance in the economy with a focus on results, in order to stimulate progress in regulatory processes through the use of better regulation as a paradigm of cost-benefit analysis. After, it exposes the notion of constitutional legality and it defends the democratic legitimacy and the normative power of the financial regulatory agencies. Finally, based on the characteristics of the institutional design of the regulatory framework in Brazil, proposals for institutional improvement are formulated. In the last chapter, it comments the advantages, limitations and risks involved in judicialization of financial regulatory processes in constitutional democracies, which motivates the construction of institutional and material parameters of judicial action, subsequently analyzed in important cases judged in Brazilian courts.

A presente dissertação versa sobre o estudo da regulação financeira sistêmica brasileira e está dividida em quatro capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, descreve-se a essência das atividades financeiras e narra-se a trajetória histórica que deu ensejo à criação de Bancos Centrais e o surgimento da regulação bancária no mundo. Em seguida, discorre-se sobre o processo de expansão do sistema financeiro e sua internacionalização face à globalização financeira dos mercados. Após a exposição de razões políticas, comportamentais, econômicas e técnicas consideradas determinantes para a consumação da última crise financeira mundial (caso subprime), demonstra-se que uma regulação financeira sistêmica adequada constitui um processo complexo, dinâmico e contínuo de gestão pública com vistas a evitar ou atenuar os efeitos de crises sistêmicas. Nesse sentido, são expostos os motivos por que o Brasil enfrentou bem tal crise, através da apresentação da evolução dos processos regulatórios domésticos nos últimos anos. No segundo capítulo, utilizado o marco político-filosófico de John Rawls, sustenta-se a ideia de que a estabilidade financeira sustentável ao longo do tempo é uma questão de justiça básica que deve influenciar o desenho político-institucional em sociedades democráticas constitucionais. Nesse sentido, afirma-se a possibilidade de geração de um consenso sobreposto, segundo o ideal de razão pública, quanto à necessidade de estabelecimento de instituições, relativamente descoladas dos ciclos político-eleitorais e dotadas de especialização técnica, responsáveis pelo planejamento e acompanhamento público e transparente da sustentabilidade da execução da política monetária e da regulação financeira sistêmica propriamente dita no longo prazo. Adicionalmente, em razão da globalização financeira dos mercados, discorre-se sobre os limites e possibilidades do ideal de razão pública nos organismos financeiros internacionais (redes globais de governo), instituídos para definir padrões de regulação financeira sistêmica, e são feitos comentários acerca da existência de um Direito Administrativo Global. No terceiro capítulo, defende-se a ideia de razão prática regulatória como a diretriz adequada de atuação sustentável do Estado na economia com foco em resultados, a fim de estimular o progresso nos processos regulatórios, mediante o uso do better regulation como paradigma de análise de custos e benefícios. Após, expõe-se a noção de juridicidade administrativa como a mais compatível com a Constituição, além de defender-se a legitimidade democrática e o poder normativo das agências reguladoras financeiras. Por fim, com fundamento nas características do desenho institucional da estrutura regulatória brasileira, são formuladas propostas de aprimoramento institucional. No último capítulo, são feitos comentários sobre as vantagens, limites e riscos de judicialização dos processos regulatórios financeiros em democracias constitucionais, o que motiva a construção de parâmetros institucionais e materiais de atuação judicial, posteriormente analisados em precedentes importantes julgados no Brasil nos últimos anos. / This dissertation deals with the study of systemic financial regulation in Brazil and is divided into four chapters. The first chapter describes the essence of the financial activities and narrates the historical trajectory that gave rise to the creation of Central Banks and the emergence of banking regulation in the world. Afterwards, it exposes the expansion process of the financial system and its internationalization due to globalization of financial markets. Then, it presents political, behavioral, economic and technical reasons considered crucial to the consummation of the last global financial crisis (subprime case) and concludes that an adequate systemic financial regulation is a complex, dynamic and continuous public management process in order to prevent or mitigate the effects of systemic crises. In this sense, it shows why Brazil faced the last crisis well, through the exposure of the evolution of the domestic regulatory processes in recent years. In the second chapter, based on the John Rawlss political liberalism framework, it holds up the idea that sustainable financial stability over time is a matter of basic fairness that should influence the design of political institutions in democratic constitutional societies. In this sense, it states the possibility of generating overlapping consensus, according to the ideal of public reason, on the need to establish institutions, relatively detached from electoral cycles and endowed with technical expertise, responsible for planning and monitoring the long run sustainability implementation of accountable monetary policy and systemic financial regulation as well. Additionally, due to the globalization, it discusses the limits and possibilities of the ideal of public reason in the international financial organizations (global networks of government), established to set systemic financial regulatory standards, as well as comments are made about a Global Administrative Law. In the third chapter, it argues the idea of regulatory practice reason as the appropriate guideline for sustainable state performance in the economy with a focus on results, in order to stimulate progress in regulatory processes through the use of better regulation as a paradigm of cost-benefit analysis. After, it exposes the notion of constitutional legality and it defends the democratic legitimacy and the normative power of the financial regulatory agencies. Finally, based on the characteristics of the institutional design of the regulatory framework in Brazil, proposals for institutional improvement are formulated. In the last chapter, it comments the advantages, limitations and risks involved in judicialization of financial regulatory processes in constitutional democracies, which motivates the construction of institutional and material parameters of judicial action, subsequently analyzed in important cases judged in Brazilian courts.