Agricultural support levels are at a crossroad with reduced distortions in OECD countries and increasing support for agricultural producers in emerging economies over the last decades. This paper studies the determinants of distortions in the agricultural markets by putting a specific focus on the role of trade policy. Applying various different dynamic panel data estimators and explicitly accounting for potential endogeneity of trade policy agreements, we find that an increase in the number of bilateral free trade agreements exhibits significant short- and long-run distortion reducing effects. By contrast, WTO's Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture has not been able to systematically contribute to a reduction in agriculture trade distortions. From a policy point of view our findings thus point to a lack of effectiveness of multilateral trade negotiations. / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

This study investigates the influence of bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs) on the international expansion of developing-country multinational enterprises (MNEs). The study includes ten case studies of Thai MNEs in the food industry. The study explores the responses of these firms to three of Thailand’s bilateral FTAs (Thailand–Australia FTA, Thailand–New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership and Thailand–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement). All the case firms regard these Agreements favourably. The findings offer insight into the role of bilateral FTAs in Thai MNEs’ internationalisation. The Agreements help firms to internationalise, at the same time influencing the corporate adjustments they have to make. The firms in this study share a number of common responses, which include adjustments in product strategy and the development of new business networks. The findings also suggest differences among firms in their internal adjustments in response to FTAs. First, some firms respond much more vigorously than others. Second, in order to reap the full benefit of the FTAs and internationalise successfully, some have to develop new strengths; for example, the ability to coordinate and integrate activities more closely. The analysis of the research findings of this study suggests some modification of the inherited theoretical framework, by means of which the impact and role of government trade policy in the internationalisation of firms is assessed. The overall impact of bilateral FTAs on Thai MNEs in the food sector is positive but modest. Directly, FTAs influence the development of firms’ internal strategies, capabilities and resources. Further studies are recommended to test if FTAs impact on other types of firms, other sectors of business, and other countries in the same ways. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1383228 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Business School, 2010

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

Die Organisation von Handelsstrukturen bringt seit je her weitreichende soziale, politische sowie ökonomische Implikationen mit sich. Da die zugrundeliegenden Dynamiken von Handelssystemen a priori unbekannt sind bieten Konzepte aus der Theorie komplexer Systeme nützliche Werkzeuge, um neue Muster zu entdecken, sowie neue Hypothesen zu den Vorgängen innerhalb der Handelssysteme zu entwickeln. Einen nützlichen Ansatz stellen dabei komplexe Netzwerke dar, da Handelsströme zwischen ökonomischen Einheiten sinnvoll als Knoten und Verbindungen im Netzwerk darstellbar sind. In dieser Arbeit erweitern wir spezielle Methoden auf komplexen Netzwerken, um die Netzwerk-Topologie des Handels auf globaler und auf nationaler Ebene zu untersuchen. Auf dem Level einzelner Industriesektoren erhalten wir neue Einblicke in die topologische Struktur des internationalen Handelsnetzwerks. Dazu führen wir neue Netzwerkmaße ein, welche die Funktion von Knoten in Subgraphen unter dem Blickwinkel, dass das Gesamtsystem durch ein Netzwerk aus mehreren Subnetzwerken dargestellt wird, beschreiben. Im Zuge der Globalisierung gewinnen bilaterale Handelsabkommen bei Entscheidungsträgern an Aufmerksamkeit und werden in zunehmender Zahl verhandelt. Wir entwickeln in dieser Arbeit einen neuen Ansatz, um die Auswirkungen dieser Abkommen auf die beteiligten Ökonomien zu analysieren und zu quantifizieren. Weiterhin behandeln wir die Fragestellung, in welchem Maß Handel als ein Übermittler von Nachfrage- und Angebotsveränderungen auf andere Industrien angesehen werden kann. Schließlich betrachten wir Handelsnetzwerke auf der Ebene von einzelnen Firmen und beschreiben die Funktion von einzelnen Knoten, insbesondere deren Rolle innerhalb von 3er-Motiven. Obwohl alle Methoden und Maße, die wir im Zuge dieser Arbeit einführen, aus Fragen im Kontext des Handels motiviert sind, sind die methodischen Konzepte auf komplexe Netzwerke in anderen Forschungsrichtungen anwendbar. / The organization of trade and its patterns and structures have always had far reaching implications among social, political and economic dimensions. The underlying dynamics of trade systems are often a priori unknown and concepts from complex system theory provide useful tools to discover new patterns and to develop new hypotheses on the mechanisms of the system. Complex networks offer a particularly useful approach to trade systems, as trade flows between economic entities can be intuitively and meaningfully represented as nodes and links in a network. In this thesis, we extend specific methods of complex networks with a focus on the relations between different subnetworks to investigate the network topology of trade on both the global and national scale. On an aggregation level considering individual industries as nodes, we obtain new insights about the topological structure of the international trade network by introducing new network measures that characterize the roles of nodes in subnetworks from a network of networks perspective. During the process of globalization bilateral trade agreements have received rising attention among policy makers and have been negotiated at an increasing pace. Here, we develop a framework to analyze and quantify impacts of these agreements on the involved economies. A further question that we address is to what extent trade can be regarded as a mediator of demand and supply spillovers to other industries. Finally, we look into trade networks at the scale of individual business firms and describe the role of nodes with a focus on 3-node motifs. Although all new methods and measures introduced in this thesis are motivated by questions in the context of trade, the methodological concepts are widely applicable to complex networks of other research disciplines.