Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Maria Rasmussen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-71). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--Oregon State University, 2010. / Printout. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 57-59). Also available on the World Wide Web.

Knowledge can be dangerous. As neuroscience delves more deeply into our organ of thought and its complex soup of neurotransmitters - could it also be exploited for malign purposes? Is the brain the next target of terrorism? Pharmaceutically enhanced soldiers, chemical torture, incapacitants, neurological weaponry... The possibilities are frightening and progress rapid. Two leading researchers into biological weapons present their concerns, and argue scientists need to take action now. But are we at risk of paranoia?

This dissertation is comprised of two manuscripts that explore various contestations and representations of knowledge about the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1virus. In the first manuscript, I explore three narratives that have been produced to describe the 20-year journey of the virus. The journey begins in 1996 when the virus was a singular localized animal virus but then over the next 20 years multiplied its ontological status through a (de)stabilized global network of science and politics that promoted both fears of contagion and politics of otherness. Written by and for powerful actors and institutions in the global North, the narratives focused on technical solutions and outbreak fears. In doing so, the narratives produced policies and practices of biopower that obscured alternative considerations for equity, social justice, and wellbeing for the marginalized groups most directly affected by the H5N1 virus. The second manuscript explores a unique aspect of the H5N1 virus's journey as an emerging infectious disease -- its representation as a potential weapon for bioterrorists. The US government's recent attempt to secure what constitutes H5N1 knowledge produced a global debate between scientists and policy makers over how to balance the nation-state's desire for security with the life science's tradition of openly shared research. Known as the dual-use dilemma, this debate set up binaries of impossible reconciliation between the two groups. This dissertation argues that the dual-use dilemma obscures larger questions of justice. I propose a new concept of justice, knowledge justice, as an alternate more globally inclusive framework for exploring ways out of the dilemma. The concept is premised on the assertion that if knowledge is framed to obscure justice issues, then the justice questions of owning that knowledge can be used as a way out of the dual-use dilemma. Thus, knowledge becomes a question of justice that should be as important to policy makers as more traditional justice considerations of inequities in distribution, recognition, representation, and fairness. / Ph. D.

Catastrophic event emergency planning has emerged as one of the most important operations management areas. Much of the successes of a response plan rely on the ability to maintain an operating transportation infrastructure. In recent years urban areas have become susceptible to biological terrorist attacks due to their size and demographics. To mitigate the devastating effects of an attack, a comprehensive catastrophic event response plan is devised. The characteristics of the disease (dormant periods, signs/symptoms), daily traffic operations and trip distributions, patient-choice hospital modeling and emergency center corridor optimization are all elements of an effective response plan. Simulation and optimization modeling of this plan becomes a faster-than-real-time tool in replicating urban area degradation. Therefore, allowing planners to identify "worst case scenarios" within the network and implement Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTA) techniques and a non-linear departure time slot allocation mathematical model ensuring infected populations receive treatment and/or vaccinations efficiently. / by William C. Degnan. / Thesis (M.S.C.S.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2010. / Includes bibliography. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / System requirements: Adobe Reader.

CHDS State/Local / Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / As the United States improves its collective awareness and emergency preparedness in the face of increased terrorist activity, more efforts are being made to create and enhance community readiness for catastrophic events. There have been substantial efforts to improve the nation's bioterrorism preparedness. Better planning, equipment, training, surveillance, and pharmaceutical caches have elevated the nation's readiness for biological attacks. In order to effectively meet the challenges created by a bioterrorism attack, its first lines of defense, the first responders, must be rapidly prophylaxed to allow the continuance of their mission. Many states and localities have tackled the gigantic undertaking of mass prophylaxis plans to provide chemoprophylaxis to civilians should the need arise. Many cities have developed and tested their plans to provide general public mass prophylaxis. It is assumed, or briefly mentioned, that the mass prophylaxis of first responders will occur, but few plans have been developed. The primary objective of this research is to develop, test, and make recommendations for a straightforward, adaptable mass prophylaxis plan to meet the prophylactic requirements of local first responders in the event of a biological attack. / Paramedic and Disaster Coordinator, Anaheim Memorial Medical Center, CA

This thesis provides a capabilities-based approach to assessing the bioterrorism threat from non-state actors. Through comparative case study, prior bioterrorism attacks are analyzed to assess capability in the three areas necessary to complete a biological weapons attack: obtaining or isolating a pathogen, weaponizing the agent, and employing or disseminating the weapon. The three cases are the Rajneeshee cult in 1984, the Aum Shinrikyo cult in the early 1990's, and the United States Postal System anthrax attacks of 2001. In contrast to current wisdom that employing biological weapons is too difficult for non-state actors, this thesis reveals a broad spectrum of capability in all studies in the areas necessary to culminate an attack. Applications of these findings must be used to assess risk generally rather than against specific groups because capability is deemed to be exptremely difficult to track. The these finds that a significant threat exists but not large enough to be over-hyped above other national security concerns. In light of this, recommendations are provided for U.S. biodefense policy emphasis in the areas of the nonproliferation regime, attribution capabilities, and defending against the changing nature of future attacks with a particular emphasis on the public health system.

Biological weapons have the ability to inflict mass casualties while keeping existing infrastructure intact. They are inexpensive to manufacture, difficult to detect, and have a low signature for attribution. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union began amassing the largest stockpile of biological weapons worldwide. The U.S. Intelligence community repeatedly failed to detect the scope and character of this large-scale Soviet development effort despite implausible explanations for outbreaks of unexplained disease, credible ground reports from informants, and strange behavior patterns viewed through reconnaissance efforts. Toward the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Intelligence realized its grave error. Unfortunately, the majority of these weapons are unaccounted for today. By examining the reasons the Soviet Unionâ s biological weapons program went undetected, the United States may gain a better advantage for future assessments and prevent the large-scale stockpiling and development of biological weapons.

CHDS State/Local / Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / A potentially serious gap exists in the preparedness of the public health system to respond to terrorism: risk communication. Unless this system is better structured to provide American citizens with a clear understanding of the potential risks and hazards associated with a terrorist event -- particularly a bio-terrorism event -- citizens not only run the risk of taking inappropriate protective actions, but also of experiencing increased (and potentially debilitating) levels of fear. In a survey I conducted of public health officials in an eleven state region (which includes my own state, Colorado) I found that significant opportunities for improvement exist in their emergency preparedness planning. Of particular concern, there was limited risk communication planning. Nonetheless, there was a high level of confidence in the states' perceived level of preparedness to respond and communicate risks during a potential bio-terrorism event. / Civilian, Manager - Emergency Management Program, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment

Le virus de la vaccine (VACV) est un grand virus à ADN, modèle du genre orthopoxvirus, et partage plus de 97% d'identité de séquence avec le virus de la variole (VARV), un pathogène humain majeur éradiqué en 1977 grâce au programme de vaccination mondial avec le VACV. Celle-ci ayant été stoppée dans les années 80, un pourcentage significatif de la population mondiale est aujourd'hui considérée comme immunologiquement naïf vis à vis du virus de la variole, ce qui fait de lui un agent bioterroriste potentiel. De plus, la vaccination implique un grand nombre de complications, particulièrement graves chez les personnes immunodéprimées ; et les antiviraux disponibles sont peu développés, ce qui souligne le besoin de nouvelles molécules. Le complexe de réplication apparait comme étant une cible privilégiée, de par son importance dans le cycle viral mais aussi par sa localisation cytoplasmique qui le rend plus accessible aux molécules antivirales. Nous nous sommes intéressés à 4 protéines essentielles de ce complexe : l'ADN polymérase E9, le facteur de processivité composé de la protéine A20 et de l'uracile ADN glycosylase D4 et l'hélicase-primase D5. Nous avons pu exprimer ces protéines de manière recombinante, seules ou en complexe ainsi que les caractériser biochimiquement et biophysiquement. Nous avons finalement abouti à une reconstruction strcuturale du complexe A20D4E9 à basse résolution grâce à la technique de SAXS, ce qui nous a permis de proposer le premier modèle structural de la fourche de réplication du virus de la vaccine. / Vaccinia virus (VACV) is a large DNA virus, prototypic virus of the orthopoxvirus genus, and shows over 97% amino acid sequence identity with the variola virus (VARV), a major human pathogene eradicated in 1977 thanks to the universal vaccination program with VACV. As this vaccination was halted in the 1980s, a significant percentage of the world population is now immunologically naïve, which makes the VARV a potent bioterrorist agent. Vaccination against smallpox may result in a variety of complications, particularly in immunologically depressed patients, and the available antiviral therapeutics are rare, which enhance the need of new molecules. The replication complex appears as an ideal target because of its importance in the viral cycle and its cytoplasmic localization, more accessible for the molecules. We have focused our study on 4 essential proteins of this complex: the DNA polymerase E9, the processivity factor composed by the A20 protein and the uracil DNA glycosylase D4 and the helicase-primase D5. We could express these recombinant proteins, alone and in complex, and characterize them biochemically and biophysically. Using the SAXS technic, we finally reached a low resolution model of the A20D4E9 complex which allow us to propose the first structural model of the vaccinia virus replication fork.