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The evolution of the birth control movement in the United States is the focus of this dissertation. The period of emphasis is 1873 to the present, though earlier history is briefly dealt with. The research method used was an extensive library search of the literature, followed by categorization and analysis of the data. The birth control movement was found to adapt to the sociological model of social movements and was discussed within this context. Two parallel movements were found to be of importance: the birth control movement itself and the population control movement. The orientations and relationships between these two movements are analyzed, as is the effect on government and public attitudes. Other components of the birth control movement are also delineated and dealt with in this dissertation. These components include social and political attitudes, economic issues, the role of the judiciary, the religious influence, and the development of a funding base. The major findings of this research are related to birth control as a social movement. First, until the 1970s it was found that the birth control movement, advocating individual rights, held the dominant emphasis. However, it appears that the population control movement is gaining influence as public awareness and concern increases. This is due in part to the gradual institutionalization of the birth control movement, that is, it has been absorbed into the societal structure as a necessary and functional part of society. Second, is the transition of birth control from the shadow of illegality it experienced at the turn of the century to the legal and respectable position of the 1970s. Third, the research also revealed the pattern of change regarding federal funding. This pattern indicated essentially no federal funds before the 1960s, a sharp increase and plateau during that decade, and finally decline in funds in the 1970s. The major conclusion of this thesis is that the birth control movement has been a dynamic and important part of the twentieth century. It has had a notable impact on this society and it portends more social change and impact for the future.

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Part I. While births provide researchers with a natural dichotomy, fertility intentions are not inherently dichotomous. Intentions are predictions about the future and, as such, are couched in considerable uncertainty. Ignoring this uncertainty hides much of what could be learned from data on fertility intentions. This paper presents a model which allows analysis of the full range of intentions. After selecting a sample of women in the later stages of childbearing (women who intend less than two additional children) from the 1965 and 1970 National Fertility Studies, I show that: (1) substantial portions of women at this stage of the reproductive life cycle are indeed uncertain of their parity specific intention, (2) this uncertainty, like more firm intentions, varies by age and parity as my model predicts, and (3) there were significant shifts in the level of certainty between 1965 and 1970. Specifically, while intentions for third, fourth, and fifth births declined, more women "didn't know" if they intended to have another child or not. Among those not intending another child, more seemed uncertain of this intention in 1970 than did comparable women in 1965. In contrast, those intending another child seemed more certain in 1970. These changes in intentions and uncertainty suggest a need for caution in forecasting a decline in intended family size since this pool of uncertain women has the potential to increase the birth rate substantially. Part II. Adolescence brings into play forces which aid and hinder the intergenerational transmission of religious behavior. First, there is identification with parents and the inertia of childhood religious training. Secondly, a countervailing force is rebellious and assertive, and is aided by the American normative context of religious freedom. This analysis focuses on a net result of these forces--the correspondence between the prayerfulness of Catholic parents and their offspring in the period 1963 to 1974. Results indicate that parents strongly influence the frequency of their offspring's prayer. But the strength of the effect does vary significantly by the parent's sex, the adolescent's sex, and the nature of the parent's behavior (i.e. whether parents pray frequently, infrequently, or with moderate frequency). Over this period, however, there was great stability in the structure of religious socialization within the Catholic family. Observed marginal change indicates that the frequency of mothers' and daughters' prayer declined, and to a lesser extent, so did fathers' and sons' prayer. Importantly, the decline in adolescents' prayer does not indicate a lesser parental influence. Instead, parents seem less religious due, I argue, to the impact of the birth control encylical, Human Vitae. The adolescents' decline in prayer is evidence of an "echo" in the following generation. Part III. The modernization process and America's unique historical development caused changes in both the structure and function of American religion. The trend has been toward more individualized beliefs and "privatized" religious behaviors. The structure of this "privatized religion" seems capable of performing important functions in post-industrial society. Firm beliefs provide a sense of meaning and belonging in everyday life and allows answers to "ultimate questions". These beliefs can provide support in times of crisis. Finally, private religious behaviors can provide rewarding experiences in and of themselves. Using frequency of prayer as a measure of the intensity of "privatized" religious beliefs, I find that prayer is associated with greater happiness or psychological well-being. This effect is pervasive with respect to the respondent's sex and the Protestant-Catholic distinction. However, prayer most affects the happiness of those under 30 years of age and those over 50. This variation by age suggests that prayer is most important where institutional ties and support are weakest.

Traces the inter-related histories of the eugenics movement and birth control, with an emphasis on abortion. Discusses Sarah Weddington's arguments and the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v Wade. Straws the eugenic influences in the case and asserts that these influences caused the decision to be less than decisive.

Many religious leaders in the early 1900s were afraid of the immoral associations and repercussions of birth control. The Catholic Church and some Protestants never accepted contraception, or accepted it much later, but many mainline Protestants leaders did change their tune dramatically between the years of 1920 and 1931. This investigation seeks to understand how Margaret Sanger was able to use her rhetoric to move her reform from the leftist outskirts and decadent, sexual connotations into the mainstream of family-friendly, morally virtuous, and even conservative religious approval. Securing the approval of religious leaders subsequently provided the impetus for legal and medical acceptance by the late-1930s. Margaret Sanger used conferences, speeches, articles, her magazine (Birth Control Review), and several books to reinforce her message as she pragmatically shifted from the radical left closer to the center and conservatives. She knew the power of the churches to influence their members, and since the United States population had undeniably a Judeo-Christian base, this power could be harnessed in order to achieve success for the birth control movement, among the conservative medical and political communities and the public at large. Despite the clear consensus against birth control by all mainline Christian churches in 1920, including Roman Catholics and Protestants alike, the decade that followed would bring about a great divide that would continue to widen in successive decades. Sanger put forward many arguments in her works, but the ones which ultimately brought along the relatively conservative religious leaders were those that presented birth control not as a gender equity issue, but rather as a morally constructive reform that had the power to save and strengthen marriages; lessen prostitution and promiscuity; protect the health of women; reduce abortions, infanticide, and infant mortality; and improve the quality of life for children and families. Initially, many conservatives and religious leaders associated the birth control movement with radicals, feminists, prostitutes, and promiscuous youth, and feared contraception would lead to immorality and the deterioration of the family. Without the threat of pregnancy, conservatives feared that youth and even married adults would seize the opportunity to have sex outside of marriage. Others worried the decreasing size of families was a sign of growing selfishness and materialism. In response, Sanger promoted the movement as a way for conservatives to stop the rising divorce rates by strengthening and increasing marriages, and to improve the lives of families by humanely increasing the health and standard of living, for women and children especially. In short, she argued that birth control would not lead to deleterious consequences, but would actually improve family moral values and become an effective humanitarian reform. She recognized that both liberals and conservatives were united in hoping to strengthen the family, and so she emphasized those virtues and actively courted those same conservative religious leaders that had previously shunned birth control and the movement. Throughout the 1920s, she emphasized the ways in which birth control could strengthen marriages and improve the quality of life of women and children, and she effectively won over the relatively conservative religious leaders that she needed to bring about the movement’s public, medical, and political progress.