This thesis investigates blame avoidance behaviour in a debate between two Swedish parliamentary parties, the Social Democrats and the Moderates. By examining the debate, using R. Kent Weavers (1986) blame avoidance theory, we can better understand how political parties react to blame and what discursive strategies they apply to avoid it. Furthermore, by analyzing how political representatives avoid blame, its arguments and its language, we can gain a better picture of their incentives and what drives them to avoid blame. The thesis concludes that the Social Democrats and the Moderates use a combination of different types of blame avoidance strategies. Above all, they use strategies that Christopher Hood (2011) defines as presentational strategies and agency strategies, but they are also exploiting the 2015 refugee crisis to avoid blame. Boin et al (2009) defines this as 'crisis exploitation' and is used by the parties to shift focus from their own mistakes by framing the crisis as an external cause beyond their control. The thesis also concludes that the increased mediatization of politics has led to greater risks for parties of being exposed to blame. The parties have thus become more sensitive to exposure to blame, which in turn increases their incentives to adopt blame avoidance strategies. Finally, the thesis takes on a critical approach to blame avoidance. The practice of blame avoidance in public debate risks undermining the possibilities for an open, transparent, and genuine discussion about serious problems. Additionally, the rhetoric risks reinforcing an already polarized and antagonistic culture between parties and their voters.

Crises are an integral part of our modern world; they are breaking points that disturb our sense of normalcy. While some of them are treated as ‘normal incidents’ that are bound to occur in a vast and complex array of governmental activities, others spark a blaze of media attention, public emotions, and political upheaval. This thesis explores how political office-holders respond to incidents that are perceived as blameworthy and how crisis-induced accountability processes affect their political careers. In an attempt to determine this, a series of case studies containing elements of high-pressure crisis-induced accountability were examined. Strategies employed by top political actors in coping with accountability and blame are identified and discussed. Crises often trigger discussions on accountability and top political actors engage in a framing contest over defining the causes of the crisis and who or what should be held responsible. This is a staged and dynamic process in which key actors employ different strategies in several arenas for managing and ultimately assigning blame for the unwanted event. These processes are shaped in relation to issues regarding causality, agency, and responsibility. In addition to the fact that crises can be managed on different ‘levels’ and arenas, we can also see that certain contextual and situational factors (such as personal experience and the constitutional framework of the cabinet) can constrain or enable how blame is managed and ultimately what the consequences will be for the careers of top political office-holders.

No description available.