Thesis (Ph.D.)--Ohio University, August, 2005. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 124-139)

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Rhode Island, 2009. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 128-151).

Applications of theories of interpersonal blame to consumer behavior have largely focused on understanding when consumers blame companies for their misbehavior. The current research moves beyond past work by shedding new light on the processes underlying consumer blame. In Essay 1, a pilot study and five experiments—in contexts of both fictitious and actual high-profile product failures—show that blame may be incorrectly directed toward the victim. The findings show that (1) consumers exaggerate blame for a victim possessing negative (especially immoral) dispositional traits because (2) that individual is seen as deserving of suffering in general and, as a result, (3) consumers are less likely to take punitive action against the company. The experiments support a “moral dominance” effect whereby victim blame is driven more heavily by perceived differences in the victim’s morality than sociability (or competence), because only morality leads consumers to judge the victim as deserving of suffering in general. In Essay 2, a new line of inquiry is proposed pertaining to consumer inferences of company blame and attitudes when the company engages in cause marketing. By engaging in socially responsible behavior, consumers may infer that the company is signaling a (1) negative attitude, (2) moral judgement, and (3) blame judgement toward the perpetrator of that harm. Each predicts the amount of praise the company receives—depending on consumers’ own attitudes, judgments, and blame toward the perpetrator—but blame inferences predict praise most strongly. This is because blame provides a unique signal about the company’s stance on an issue. Two studies support these blame inference predictions.

Raters' response toward victim and perpetrators in the context of rape is examined. More blame is attributed to a female than a male victim by all raters, particularly if the female victim is described only as being raped. Detailed description of different forms of injury resulting from the rape tends to act as a mediating factor in the amount of blame assigned to victims. Whereas the delineation of injury tends to decrease the amount of blame assigned to the female victim, this pattern is reversed for the male. Raters also claim a physically injured rape victim would require a substantially longer recuperation time than one whose injuries are psychological or unspecified.

This study investigated the impact of victim provocativeness and rape history upon male and female subjects' perceptions of attribution of blame toward the rape victim. One hundred and forty-four subjects (a) read one of 12 fictional case reports of a rape incident from a sexual abuse center which systematically varied level of victim provocativeness and rape history and (b) completed a nine-item Rape Questionnaire (RQ). Data were analyzed by a 2 (subject's sex) x 3 (level of provocativeness) x 2 (rape history) analysis of variance on the Rape Questionnaire total score. An ancillary multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) was also performed on the nine Rape Questionnaire items to check for potential masking of individual item differences from the Rape Questionnaire score. In addition, the data were reanalyzed in the 2 x 3 x 2 design by substituting high versus low scorers on the Attitudes Towards Women Scale (AWS) based upon median splits of the AWS for subject sex. The 2 (subject sex) x 3 (provocativeness) x 2 (rape history) MANOVA resulted in a sex by provocativeness interaction with males, relative to females, attributing more blame as the victim's level of provocativeness increased. In addition, significant differences emerged for provocativeness, rape history, and sex of subject. In general, subjects attributed more blame as the victim's provocativeness increased. Similarly, victims with rape histories were assigned more blame than victims without rape histories. The 2 (AWS) x 3 (provocativeness) x 2 (rape history) MANOVA resulted in a main effect for all three independent variables. In general subjects attributed more blame as the victim's provocativeness increased. Also victims with rape histories were assigned more blame than victims without rape histories. Finally, profeminist individuals attributed less blame to the victim than did traditional individuals. Implications for training of professional counselors and other service-providers are discussed. Future research directions are also noted.

Background: Victims of sexual assault have been reported to blame themselves for the incident. They see themselves as having somehow contributed to the situation. Self-blame associated with a sexual assault is argued to be socially constructed, influenced by culture’s perception of sexual crimes. A specific behaviour that appears to contribute to victim’s self-blame is alcohol use during the sexual assault incident. Approximately half of sexual assaults are associated with alcohol consumption by one or both parties. Victims who consume alcohol during the incident are more likely to blame themselves for the event. Self-blame has been linked to a decreased likelihood of reporting a sexual assault to authorities, as victims predict that others will disapprove their behaviour and blame them for their victimization. Limited research has been conducted on attribution of blame to the female victims who have been under the influence of alcohol during the sexual assault incident. Objective: To examine the association between a female’s level of intoxication and the level of blame attributed to her, and how this is modified by initiation and severity of the event, in a hypothetical date-rape scenario. Methods: Secondary data analyses of 1004 quantitative telephone surveys completed in Sweden by randomly selected young adults aged 16-24. Date-rape vignettes were used and male’s and female’s levels of intoxication, severity of the outcome and the person initiating the sexual contact (perpetrator or victim) were manipulated. The depended variable was the amount of blame assigned to the female in the hypothetical date-rape scenario. The attribution of blame to the female was analysed using factorial ANOVA in SAS. Results: For female respondents, the level of blame attributed to the female in the hypothetical date-rape scenario depended on a three-way interaction between the inebriation level, initiation, and severity, controlling for female respondents’ living situation in the last 12 months, their frequency of drinking five or more drinks in the past 12 months, and their expectancy that ‘alcohol makes people more sexual’. For male respondents, however, the level of blame attributed only depended on the severity of the situation, controlling for male respondents’ mean number of standard drinks to feel the effects of alcohol and their attitude that ‘alcohol lessons control’. Conclusion: The inebriation level of the female in the date-rape scenario has been illustrated to impact the amount of blame attributed to her, by female respondents. This has implications for reporting rates of sexual crimes, and thus should be addressed by future policies and programs.

This thesis investigates the relationship between our rational capacities and the norms that govern our practice of blame. The conclusion it reaches is rather shocking: it is impossible to satisfy the conditions of blameworthiness. The argument that reaches this conclusion is what I call an internal criticism. Unlike other skeptical arguments about moral responsibility, the one advanced in this thesis does not depend on any metaphysical theses external to the theory of blame. The thesis begins by looking at a position I call rational capacity compatibilism (RCC). My interest in RCC concerns the fact that it has done more than any other theory of responsibility to set out the relationship between our rational capacities and the practice of blame. I use the most well developed RCC view—that of R. Jay Wallace—as the backdrop for the skeptical argument that follows I next defend a recent argument advanced by Gideon Rosen according to which an agent cannot be blameworthy for a given act if akrasia does not occur somewhere in the act's etiology. This serves as the first major premise in my skeptical argument. Next, I turn to the second major premise of my argument, which is comprised of two controversial claims. The first is that akrasia results from a failure in one's rational capacities. The second is that an agent cannot be blameworthy for committing any act that results from a failure in his or her rational capacities. Together, these two claims produce the following premise: when an agent acts akratically she cannot be blameworthy for that act. Now, for any given act, either akrasia occurs in that act's etiology or it does not. If it does not, then the agent in question is not blameworthy (first premise); but if akrasia does occur in the act's etiology, then the agent in question is still not blameworthy (second premise). It follows that for any given act, the agent who performs that act cannot be blameworthy for so acting. I end with a brief discussion of what I call "the moral up-shot" of my skeptical argument: what does a world without blame look like? I suggest, contra the main party line (often associated with P.F. Strawson), that blame is not a requirement for significant and meaningful interpersonal relationships, nor is it a necessary component of morality.

Title from title page of PDF (University of Missouri--St. Louis, viewed March 2, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 55).

your words your words / The Classics

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