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Anxiety can be advantageous in terms of survival and well-being, yet atypically high levels may be maladaptive and result in the clinical diagnosis of an anxiety disorder. Several risk factors have been implicated in the manifestation of clinical anxiety, including cognitive biases. In recent years, a plethora of research has emerged demonstrating that anxious adults exhibit biases of attention for threatening stimuli, especially that which is biologically relevant (e.g., facial expressions). Specific components of attentional bias have also been identified, namely facilitated engagement, impaired disengagement, and avoidance. However, the majority of studies have focused on the spatial domain of attention. Furthermore, the area is under-researched in children, despite research demonstrating that symptoms relating to clinical and non-clinical anxiety follow a stable course from childhood through to adolescence and adulthood. Consequently, the aim of this thesis was to investigate how anxiety affects children’s visual attention for emotive, particularly angry, faces. In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding, the current research involved examining the role of temporal and spatial attention utilising rapid serial visual presentation with the attentional blink, and the visual probe paradigm, respectively. The main hypothesis was that high state and/or trait anxiety would be associated with an attentional bias for angry, relative to positive or neutral faces in both the temporal and spatial domains. In relation to the temporal domain, key findings demonstrated that high levels of trait anxiety were associated with facilitated engagement towards both angry and neutral faces. It was further found that all children rapidly disengaged attention away from angry faces. Findings related to the processing of angry faces accorded with the main hypothesis stated in this thesis, as well as research and theory in the area. The finding that anxious children preferentially processed neutral faces in an attentional blink investigation was unexpected. This was argued to potentially reflect this stimulus type being interpreted as threatening. Key findings regarding the spatial domain were that high trait anxious children displayed an early covert bias of attention away from happy faces and a later, overt bias of attention away from angry faces. The finding that high trait anxiety was linked to an attentional bias away from happy faces in a visual probe task was also unexpected. This was argued to potentially reflect smiling faces being interpreted as signifying social dominance, thus resulting in the viewer experiencing feelings of subordination and becoming avoidant and/or submissive. To conclude, this thesis has enhanced current knowledge of attentional bias in both the temporal and spatial domains for emotive stimuli in anxious children. It has demonstrated that higher levels of trait anxiety moderate children’s allocation of attentional resources to different stimulus types, whether these are threatening, positive, or neutral. This has important implications for evaluating past research in adults and children, and for further developing theoretical models of attentional bias and anxiety. It also offers important clinical implications, since attending towards or away from specific stimuli may affect the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders. Recently, a treatment that aims to modify attentional bias in anxious individuals has begun to be developed. In light of the present findings, it may be necessary to review this treatment so that anxious children are re-trained in the specific biases of attention demonstrated here.

People have always been fascinated by the extent to which belief or will may influence<p>behavior. Proverbs, like “we tend to get what we expect,” and concepts, such as optimistic<p>thinking or self-fulfilling prophecy, reflect this intuition of an important link between one’s<p>dispositions and subsequent behavior. In other words, one’s predictions directly or<p>indirectly cause them to become true. In a similar manner, every culture, country or<p>religion has their own words for ‘expectation,’ ‘belief,’ ‘disappointment,’ ‘surprise,’ and<p>generally all have the same meaning: under uncertainty, what one expects or believes is the<p>most likely to happen. This relation between what caused a reaction in the past will<p>probably cause it again in the future might not be realistic. If the expected outcome is not<p>confirmed, it may result in a personal ‘disappointment’, and if the outcome fits no<p>expectations, it will be a ‘surprise’. Our brain is hardwired with this heuristic capacity of<p>learning the cause-effect relationship and to project its probability as the basis for much of<p>our behavior, as well as cognitions. This experience-based expectation is a form of<p>learning that helps the brain to bypass an exhaustive search in finding a satisfactory<p>solution. Expectations may thus be considered an innate theory of causality; that is, a set of<p>factors (causes) generating a given phenomenon (effects) influence the way we treat<p>incoming information but also the way we retrieve the stored information. These<p>expectancy templates may well represent one of the basic rules of how the brain processes<p>information, affecting the way we perceive the world, direct our attention and deal with<p>conflicting information. In fact, expectations have been shown to influence our judgments<p>and social interactions, along with our volition to individually decide and commit to a<p>particular course of action. However, people’s expectations may elicit the anticipation of<p>their own automatic reactions to various situations and behaviors cues, and can explain that<p>expecting to feel an increase in alertness after coffee consumption leads to experiencing<p>the consequent physiologic and behavioral states. We call this behavior-response<p>expectancy. This non-volitional form of expectation has been shown to influence<p>cognitions such as memory, pain, visual awareness, implicit learning and attention, through<p>the mediation of phenomena like placebo effects and hypnotic behaviors. Importantly,when talking about expectations, placebo and hypnosis, it is important to note that we are<p>also talking about suggestion and its modulating capability. In other words, suggestion has<p>the power to create response expectancies that activate automatic responses, which will, in<p>turn, influence cognition and behavior so as to shape them congruently with the expected<p>outcome. Accordingly, hypnotic inductions are a systematic manipulation of expectancy,<p>similar to placebo, and therefore they both work in a similar way. Considering such<p>assumptions, the major question we address in this PhD thesis is to know if these<p>expectancy-based mechanisms are capable of modulating more high-level information<p>processing such as cognitive conflict resolution, as is present in the well-known Stroop<p>task. In fact, in a recent series of studies, reduction or elimination of Stroop congruency<p>effects was obtained through suggestion and hypnotic induction. In this PhD thesis, it is<p>asked whether a suggestion reinforced by placebos, operating through response-expectancy<p>mechanisms, is able to induce a top-down cognitive modulation to overcome cognitive<p>conflict in the Stroop task, similar to those results found using suggestion and hypnosis<p>manipulation. / Doctorat en Sciences Psychologiques et de l'éducation / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished