This study is motivated by the numerous reforms to strengthen the efficacy of corporate boards and their oversight committees, in the wake of high profile corporate failures. The empirical question, however, is whether recent proposals would enhance board and their committee effectiveness and in this way, reduce the likelihood of firm`s failure. This study examines whether the composition, structure and functions of corporate boards and their interactions are related to the probability of corporate failure. Prior studies employ agency and resource dependency theories in isolation as theoretical lenses. This study, however, employs these aforementioned theories as theoretical lenses and argues that the board control and resource function affects the relationship between corporate board attributes and corporate failure. This study examines a sample of 358 UK listed firms, consisting of 95 failed firms and 263 non-failed firms during the period 1999-2011. This study also uses a unique hand-collected data set that measures the corporate governance attributes and functions of these 358 firms over a period of five years preceding failure or otherwise, resulting in 1748 firm-years observations. This study reveals that the probability of failure is lower in firms with large board size, former government officials, independent remuneration committee chairman and greater proportion of outside directors as well as effective audit and remuneration committees. This study also finds that the prospect of corporate failure is higher in firms with less than three independent NEDs on both the audit and nomination committees, without audit committee and where audit committee has no one with financial expertise. The results, however, suggest that the possibility of corporate failure is higher in firms whose boards have a female director and where the nomination committee meets often or where its membership is exclusively preserved for independent NEDs. On the interaction effects, the results show that frequency of board meetings as well as its interactions with presence of female directors, audit and remuneration committees effectiveness are positively related to the probability of corporate failure. The results also indicate that a number of interactions between corporate board attributes and functions are unrelated to the likelihood of corporate failure. These include the interactions between board composition measures (i.e. proportion of outside directors, presence of female directors and board size) and the board resource proxy (i.e. former government official). These associations, especially remuneration committee effectiveness, remuneration committee chairman independence, firm size and profitability, are not only statistically and economically significant but also robust to different specifications. Further, the Receiver Operating Curves indicate that the impact of corporate governance measures after controlling for firm size, liquidity, profitability, age, industry effects, and leverage is more profound in two years preceding failure. The implication of this is that corporate governance mechanisms alone are insufficient to rescue the firm on the verge of collapse. The findings are consistent with the idea that failing firms decline in size, managerial performance, corporate board attributes as well as their board`s ability to discharge it`s monitoring and resource roles. This study adds to the debate on the impact of corporate governance on corporate failure by developing, analysing and testing a robust UK corporate failure prediction model which is underpinned by a multi-theoretical framework: agency and resource dependency theories. This study also offers several recommendations for policy makers and firm-level corporate governance strategies in the mix of the numerous corporate governance reforms worldwide, this in particular makes this study unique.

Yes / This study investigates the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm survival during a financial crisis. Using a sample of FTSE 350 listed companies for the time period 2003–2010, our results show significant differences in the corporate governance mechanisms of firms that survived and those that failed during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. The findings indicate that compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code is negatively associated with the survival of firms when they experience exogenous shocks. However, the existence of insider CEOs and a higher number of board committees in organisations increase the chances of survival during an economic downturn. These findings have policy implications and show that non-compliance with a prescribed code of corporate governance does not necessarily lead to poor governance. Moreover, the establishment of extra board committees and CEO succession planning are shown as important dynamics in firms’ strategic decisions, as they have implications for the survival of firms during difficult economic conditions.

Cette thèse porte sur les déterminants et les enjeux de la diversité du genre dans la composition des instances de gouvernance d'entreprise. Elle a pour objectif de contribuer au débat sur la féminisation du conseil d'administration, mettant en perspective les discussions en cours sur les enjeux économiques de la diversité du genre. Au regard des réflexions théoriques, actuelles ou plus anciennes, sur le rôle et la composition du conseil d'administration dans le processus de création de valeur, la thèse explore les dimensions relatives aux apports de compétences, au processus d'apprentissage organisationnel et à la capacité d'innovation. Les recherches menées corroborent, en particulier, la plausibilité de la thèse du "business case". Les résultats montrent clairement que la féminisation des instances de gouvernance est porteuse d'enjeux économiques et managériaux. Ils soulignent que la féminisation apporte des compétences distinctives au conseil d'administration, qu'elle participe favorablement à la bonne gouvernance, porteuse d'avantages compétitifs, et que le marché financier encourage l'intégration des femmes au conseil d'administration des entreprises. Ainsi, la thèse conclut que les entreprises tirent un apport net à envisager des mesures de féminisation de leurs instances de gouvernance. Toutefois, la prudence s'impose dans le parti pris de systématiser le recours à la diversité du genre au conseil d'administration comme un moyen de performance incontournable. / This thesis investigates the determinants and issues of gender diversity in the composition of corporate governance structures. The thesis aims at contributing to the debate on the feminization of corporate governance structures. It puts into perspective the ongoing debates on the economic value-added of gender diversity in corporate board of directors. Under the current discussions on the role and composition of corporate board in value creation, this thesis focuses on aspects related to competencies, and learning and innovation capacity. The research shows, in particular, the plausibility of the business case theory. The results clearly show that the feminization of corporate governance structures involve economic and managerial concerns. They stress that feminization brings distinctive expertise to corporate board of directors. It participates positively in good governance and as a result, carries out a competitive advantage for companies. In addition, financial market encourages the integration of women in corporate Board of Directors. Although the results call for caution in imposing bias gender diversity in corporate boards as an essential means of performance, the thesis concludes that companies must consider measures of feminization of their governing structures.

Abstract in Zulu, English and Afrikaans / This study examined the consequences of Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance interactions within South Africa’s FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies from 2008 to 2016. The study’s objectives were to examine the prevalence of Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems, to ascertain potential costs of these problems, to establish their socio-economic consequences, and evaluate the effectiveness of the governance codes. The study is anchored in Principal-Agent theory. Mixed methods methodology was employed, specifically Concurrent and Exploratory Sequential Mixed Methods design logics. The main findings include that, 23.91% of sample companies experienced Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems- significantly exceeding the study’s expectations that negligible governance problems exist and reveals the pervasiveness of these problems; executive compensation plays a bigger role in exacerbating Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems than expected and often considered in governance mechanisms; multi-billion rands potential costs are ascribed to Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems incurred by principals; unjustifiable salary inequalities resulting in other inequalities that build social mistrust; and there is limited conviction that current governance codes are effective. This study’s contributions include; proposing an executive remuneration model that considers governance of the company in determining executive compensation; formulating a governance index calculated based on King III and King IV recommendations to standardise the measurement of the quality of governance in companies; the salary Gini was used to establish compensation gaps and red-flag potential Principal-Agent problems and flaws in governance systems; and used value at risk procedures to quantify potential Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance costs. The main theoretical implications of the study’s findings are; agency theory needs extension to capture socio-economic costs and not only focus on the principal; remuneration models should consider the executive’s company governance and social and economic egalitarianism; flexibility of ‘comply or explain’ should subordinate socio-economic consequences, suggesting a hybrid approach which makes certain governance code provisions compulsory; and finally, behavioural finance theories should be used in governance research for better insights. / Lolu cwaningo lwacubungula futhi lwahlolisisa imiphumela yokuxhumana phakathi kwesimo seNhloko ne-Ejenti, i-Principal-Agent, (lapho umuntu eqoka omunye ukuba athathe izinqumo kanye/noma izinyathelo egameni lakhe) nokuPhathwa nokuLawulwa Kwenkampani, ezinkampanini ezingama-40 ebezikleliswe phezulu ohlwini lwe-FTSE/JSE eNingizimu Afrika kusukela ngowezi-2008 kuya kowezi-2016. Izinhloso zalolu cwaningo kwabe kuwukubheka ukuthi zivamise kangakanani futhi zisabalele kangakanani izinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani ukuze kutholakale ukuthi zingakanani izindleko ezibangelwa yilezi zinkinga, nokuthola umthelela walokhu kwinhlalomnotho, kanye nokuhlola ukuthi zisebenza kahle kangakanani izinkambiso zokuphathwa nokulawulwa kwezinkampani. Lolu cwaningo lwakhelwe phezu kwethiyori yeNhloko ne-Ejenti. Kwasetshenziswa izindlela zocwaningo ezixubile, ikakhulukazi izindlela ezixubile zokuhlola kusetshenziswa izinyathelo ezenziwa kanyekanye noma ngesikhathi esisodwa kanye nezinyathelo ezilandelanayo. Okusemqoka okwatholakala ocwaningweni kubandakanya nokuthi izinkampani okwenziwa kuzona ucwaningo ezingama-23.91% zahlangabezana nezinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani – okuyinani elingaphezulu kakhulu kwalokho obekulindelekile ocwaningweni, ngoba phela kwakulindeleke ukuthi zibe yingcosana kakhulu izinkinga ezikhona eziphathelene nalokhu, kepha-ke ucwaningo lwaveza ukuthi lezi zinkinga zixhaphakile impela; imiholo yabaphathi abakhulu bezinkampani idlala indima enkulu ekubhebhethekiseni izinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani kunalokho obekulindelekile futhi esikhathini esiningi lokhu akuyona neze into evamise ukubhekisiswa uma kwenziwa izinqubo zokuphatha nokulawula; zibalelwa kwizigidigidi zamarandi izindleko ezingena kuzona izinhloko zezinkampani okucatshangwa ukuthi zibangelwa yizinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani; ukungalingani ngokwemiholo, ngaphandle kwesizathu esizwakalayo salokhu, okuyinto eholela kokunye futhi ukungalingani, okudala ukungathembani emphakathini; futhi kuncane kakhulu ukuqiniseka nokukholelwa ekutheni zisebenza kahle izinkambiso zokuphatha nokulawula ezikhona njengamanje. Igalelo lalolu cwaningo libandakanya isiphakamiso semodeli yemiholo yabaphathi abakhulu ebhekisisa nodaba lokuphathwa nokulawulwa kwenkampani ngenkathi kucutshungulwa udaba lwemiholo yabaphathi abakhulu; ukuhlanganiswa kwenkomba yokuphathwa nokulawulwa kwenkampani ebalwa ngokususela kwizincomo ze-King III kanye ne-King IV zokusetshenziswa kwesikali esifanayo sokukala ikhwalithi yokuphathwa nokulawulwa kwezinkampani; isikali semiholo se-Gini sasetshenziswa ukuhlonza amagebe akhona phakathi kwemiholo kanye nokuxwayisa ngezinkinga ezingahle zivele eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani kanye namaphutha nobuthakathaka obukhona ezinhlelweni zokuphatha nokulawula; futhi kwasetshenziswa izinqubo zezikali zobungozi bokulahlekelwa kwenkampani ukubala inani lezindleko okungenzeka kungenwe kuzona ngenxa yezinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani. Imibonongqangi evele kulokho okutholakale ocwaningweni yilena elandelayo; ithiyori echaza ubudlelwano phakathi kwenhloko ne-ejenti kumele yelulwe ukuze ifake phakathi nezindleko eziphathelene nenhlalomnotho futhi lokhu kungagcini nje kuphela kwinhloko; amamodeli omholo kumele abhekisise nendlela ephethwe ngayo inkampani ngabaphathi abakhulu kanye nemfundiso yokulingana kwabantu bonke ngokwenhlalo nangokomnotho; ukuguquguquka ‘kokuthobela umthetho noma ukuchaza’ (‘comply or explain’) kumele kube ngaphansi uma kuqhathaniswa nemiphumela yenhlalomnotho, ukuze kuqhanyukwe nendlela exubile ephoqelela ukusetshenziswa kwezinkambiso zokuphatha nokulawula ezithile; kanti futhi, okokugcina, ocwaningweni lokuphatha nokulawula kumele kusetshenziswe amathiyori aphathelene nesimo somqondo sabaphathi ngenkathi bethatha izinqumo nezinyathelo eziphathelene nokuphathwa nokusetshenziswa kwezimali ukuze kuqondakale kangcono konke okuphathelene nalokhu. / Hierdie studie het van 2008 tot 2016 die gevolge van die wisselwerking tussen hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering in Suid-Afrikaanse FTSE/JSE Top 40- genoteerde maatskappye bestudeer. Die oogmerke was om die voorkoms van probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering te ondersoek; die moontlike koste en die sosio-ekonomiese gevolge daarvan te bepaal; en die doeltreffendheid van die regeerkodes te evalueer. Hierdie studie berus op die hoofagentteorie. Gemengde metodes is as metodologie gebruik, in die besonder gelyklopende en verkennende, opeenvolgende metodes. Die belangrikste bevindings is dat 23,91% van steekproefmaatskappye probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering ondervind. Dit is beduidend hoër as die persentasie wat verwag is, en ʼn aanduiding van hoe diepgaande hierdie probleme is. Die vergoeding van uitvoerende beamptes is ʼn groter oorsaak van die probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering as wat verwag is en waarvoor in regeermeganismes voorsiening gemaak word. Die potensiële koste, wat miljarde rande beloop, word gewyt aan die probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering wat prinsipale hulle op die hals haal. Onregverdigbare salarisverskille lei tot ongelykheid wat sosiale wantroue wek. Hierbenewens is daar bedenkinge oor die doeltreffendheid van die huidige regeerkodes. Die bydrae van hierdie studie behels ʼn vergoedingsmodel vir uitvoerende beamptes wat korporatiewe regering in ag neem. Hierdie studie formuleer ʼn regeerindeks wat op King III- en King IV-aanbevelings berus, en die meting van die gehalte van korporatiewe regering standaardiseer. Verskille in vergoeding, potensiële rooivlag-hoofagentprobleme en gebreke in regeerstelsels is met behulp van die salaris-gini bepaal. Waarde-op-risikoprosedures is gebruik om die potensiële koste van hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering te kwantifiseer. Die belangrikste teoretiese implikasie van die bevindings is dat die agentskapsteorie uitgebrei moet word sodat die sosio-ekonomiese koste vasgestel word, en daar nie alleen op die hoofsom gekonsentreer word nie. Afgesien hiervan moet vergoedingsmodelle rekening hou met ʼn uitvoerende beampte se korporatiewe regering en met maatskaplike en ekonomiese egalitarisme. Voorts moet die sosio-ekonomiese gevolge ondergeskik wees aan die buigsaamheid van “voldoen of verduidelik”. Dit impliseer ʼn hibridiese benadering wat die bepalings van sekere regeerkodes verpligtend maak. Ten slotte behoort finansieringsgedragteorieë in regeernavorsing aangewend te word om groter insig te verkry. / Business Management / D. Phil. (Management Studies (Finance))

Cette thèse a pour objectif principal d’apporter une contribution à la littérature concernant la structure et l’efficacité du conseil d’administration (CA). Elle s’articule autour de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre est une revue de la littérature, tandis que les trois autres portent sur des questions de recherche distinctes. La première étude présentée dans le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier les déterminants de la taille du CA, de l'indépendance de ses membres et de la dualité des fonctions de direction et de présidence du CA. Les principaux apports de cette étude peuvent être résumés comme suit : tout d'abord, nos résultats sont fondés sur l'analyse d'un des plus grands échantillons utilisés dans ce domaine, avec à peu près 16000 observations (entreprises-années) pour près de 2300 entreprises américaines observées de 1997 à 2010. De plus, sur le plan méthodologique, une batterie de tests statistiques a été réalisée afin de vérifier la robustesse de nos résultats, notamment des tests tenant compte des biais d'hétérogénéité et de simultanéité. Enfin, cette étude est probablement la première à démontrer que le passage de la loi SOX a limité la capacité des dirigeants à influencer la composition du CA. La deuxième étude s’attache à analyser les deux principales fonctions du CA, qui sont le conseil au chef d'entreprise et le contrôle de ses activités. Ainsi, comprendre la capacité du CA à remplir ces fonctions est une question fondamentale que nous nous proposons d’approfondir. Cette étude vient enrichir la littérature émergente sur la fonction consultative du CA en fournissant de nouveaux éléments de preuves sur l'importance de cette fonction dans la création de valeur de l'entreprise. Ces résultats apportent également des éclairages sur le conflit potentiel existant entre les deux principales fonctions du CA. Enfin, cette étude s'inscrit dans le courant de pensée qui cherche à évaluer l'impact des caractéristiques des entreprises sur l'efficacité de leurs structures de gouvernance. Le principal objectif de la troisième étude présentée dans le dernier chapitre de cette thèse est de déterminer si la rémunération à base d’actions des administrateurs peut affecter les décisions futures en matière d'acquisition, et le cas échéant, comment. Les résultats de cette étude apportent un nouvel éclairage concernant la rémunération des administrateurs. Cette étude met en exergue l'importance des pratiques de rémunération incitative sous forme d’actions et d’options pour les membres du CA. Par ailleurs, bien que de nombreuses études aient été réalisées afin d'analyser la relation existante entre les mesures incitatives à destination des administrateurs et la performance de l'entreprise, notre étude est l'une des premières à explorer les mécanismes à travers lesquels ces mesures peuvent influencer la valeur de l'entreprise. / This thesis aims at providing contributions to the existing literature on the structure and effectiveness of corporate boards. It comprises three essays that address distinct research questions. The first study examines the trends and determinants of corporate board structure using a panel data sample. This study extends the existing literature on the determinants of board structure in three important ways. First, our results are based on one of the largest samples used in this area, with almost 16,000 firm-year observations for nearly 2,300 firms observed from 1997 to 2010. Second, in terms of methodology, a set of statistical tests was performed in order to check the robustness of our findings, including tests that account for heterogeneity and simultaneity. Finally, this is probably the first study to show that the enactment of SOX has reduced the ability of CEOs in influencing board composition. Specifically, while SOX does not fundamentally alter the economic determinants of board structure, our results show that the documented negative impact of well performing CEOs on board independence in the pre-SOX era is no longer significant post-SOX. In the second study, the principal objective is to investigate the effects of advisory directors' presence on the board and monitoring intensity on the board's overall effectiveness in value creation. This study makes some significant contributions to the literature. First, it complements and extends the growing literature on the board's advisory function by providing strong new evidence on the importance of this board function in value creation. Second, it also provides some evidence on the potential conflict between the two primary functions of corporate boards. Finally, this study adds to the literature that attempts to assess the impact of firm and industry characteristics on the effectiveness of specific governance structures. The last study has as main objective to examine the relation between director compensation structure and shareholder interests in the context of acquisitions. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the recent but burgeoning literature that deals with the determinants of director compensation. Guided by theoretical work in this area, we show that director compensation is mainly consistent with firm's needs for monitoring and advising. Second, we extend the body of research that highlights the importance of equity-based compensation by providing evidence that the use of incentive-based compensation schemes to reward directors also matters. Finally, although many studies have examined the relation between directors' incentives and firm performance, this work is one of the first to examine the channels through which directors' equity-based pay affects shareholders' value.