1997年亞洲發生金融風暴後，國內亦發生多起企業舞弊案件，再加上2001年底美國大型公司會計醜聞案，公司所揭露的資訊是否仍為投資人所相信，似乎存有許多問號，加強公司治理機制應是一個較佳的解決方案，也逐漸為世界各國所重視。本研究以董監事會特性做為衡量公司治理機制良窳的代理變數，探討其與財務預測準確性之關聯性為何。 本研究以曾發佈民國九十年及九十一年強制性財務預測之上市公司為樣本，實證結果發現，當公司控制股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈高、次大股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈低、次大股東佔全體監察人席次之比例愈低、董事及監察人異動之比例愈高、公司有參與管理的情形、公司沒有獨立監察人的存在以及總經理發生異動時，公司所發佈之財務預測愈不準確，且其更新幅度愈大。 / Since the Asia financial crisis in 1997, there were much fraudulence of the listed companies in Taiwan. Then in the United States, Enron and Xerox were suffered from scandals in 2001. Do investors still believe the information companies disclose? We never know. But one way to recover the belief of investors is to reinforce the corporate governance mechanism and many countries have placed importance on it. Using the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors as the proxy of corporate governance mechanism, this paper examines the relationship between the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors and the financial forecast accuracy. The research data are collected from listed companies that have released the financial forecast in 2001 and 2002. The empirical result suggests the larger proportion of board seats the controlling shareholders hold, the smaller proportion of board seats and supervisor seats the secondary major shareholders hold, the higher rate of changes of directors and supervisors, participation in management, no independent supervisor and the change of CEO would lead the financial forecast less accurate and the range of renewal larger.

董監事會為公司治理之核心，本研究以民國87年至民國91年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司探討董監事會特性與權益資金成本之關聯性，而不同於以往國內有關估計權益資金成本的方法，本研究以Ohlson模型來設算權益資金成本。實證結果顯示： 1.董監事會成員持股比率與企業權益資金成本率之關係並不顯著，若觀測兩者間是否存有非線性關係，本研究亦未發現兩者間的不顯著關係是由非線性因素所造成。 2.複迴歸分析顯示，董監事會持股質押比與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，若進一步區分全體樣本為正、負盈餘樣本，則發現在負盈餘樣本中，董監事會持股質押比與企業權益資金成本呈現顯著正向關係；另外，若以Panel Data分析，本研究則發現在電子業中董監事持股質押比與權益資金成本始呈現正相關。 3.公司是否聘任獨立董監與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，且不論是在有聘任或無聘任獨立董監之樣本間，或是在自願性聘任與強制性聘任獨立董監之樣本間，其權益資金成本並無明顯的差異。 / This study examines the relations between characteristic of board of directors and supervisors and cost of equity capital. It is unlike previous research to use capital assets pricing model（CAPM）, this research adopts an alternative technique for estimating the cost of equity capital. Specifically, we use Ohlson (1995) model to generate a market implied cost of capital. Our samples consist of all public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate over 5 years period 1998-2002. The empirical results are as follows: 1.There is no significant negative relation between the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. Moreover, we don’t find this relation caused by nonlinear specification. 2.There is no significant positive relation between the pledged share ratio of the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. When the entire samples are divided into the sub-samples of firms experiencing losses and others, the existence of the positive relationship is found only in the firms experiencing losses. In addition, the relation is further proved in the electronic industry when adopting panel data analysis. 3.There is no significant reverse relation between the independent directors and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. And there is also no significant difference in the cost of equity capital between companies with implementing the independent directors and supervisors and those without implementing the regulation.

本研究依據Ohlson and Juettner(2005)所提出新的衡量權益資金成本方式，異常盈餘成長評價模型(Abnormal Earnings Growth Valuation Model)，探討其是否適合台灣企業作為有效衡量權益資金成本方式之一。並進一步研究已實現報酬與OJ模型估計之權益資金成本關聯性，OJ模型估計之權益資金成本可否作為投資人選擇投資標的時之參考資訊，所得之結論可作為企業管理者與投資人之重要參考依據。最後本研究將OJ模型估計之權益資金成本應用於公司治理之角度，探討權益資金成本與董事會特性關聯性。 實證發現，蒐集台灣企業資料，推算OJ模型估計之權益資金成本與過去研究認為影響權益資金成本的重要風險因子，皆有顯著相關性存在。因此認為OJ模型適用於台灣企業權益資金成本之估計，亦為有效的估計權益資金成本之方式一。另外，利用三因子模型進行複迴歸分析發現，已實現報酬與OJ模型估計之權益資金成本呈顯著正相關，顯示OJ模型估計之權益資金成本愈大的公司，其股票報酬愈高。且以迴歸之局部判定係數分析，於加入ROJ解釋變數後，模型的解釋力增加了，顯示OJ模型估計之權益資金成本對已實現報酬率具有增額之解釋能力，故OJ模型估計之權益資金成本具有解釋股票報酬波動之能力。最後，在權益資金成本與董事會特性之關聯性方面，實證發現權益資金成本與董監事股票質押比率、控制股東掌握之董監事席次比率和現金流量權比率的偏離程度呈顯著正相關。 / In this study, we use Ohlson-Juettner model to generate a market implied cost of capital. We then examine the correlation of cost of capital and risk factors, and the correlation of cost of capital and ex post returns. Additionally, we would like to discuss the relationship between the cost of capital and characteristics of the board of directors and supervisors. Our empirical results show that cost of capital has expected correlation with risk factors, so the cost of capital estimated through Ohlson-Juettner model can be a effective method to estimate cost of capital in Taiwan. The cost of capital also has expected an economically significant association with ex post returns. Additionally, we find that the percentage of shareholding pledged by board members and supervisors is significantly positively associated with cost of capital. The deviation between the percentage of directors and supervisors controlled by controlled stockholder and cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder is also significantly positively associated with cost of capital.