Crimes against humanity have become a global concern, garnering widespread media coverage over the past decade. Boko Haram's actions pose a threat to both domestic and international security, with frequent attacks on civilians, churches, security forces, and even international organizations like the United Nations. The group's impact is felt across all 36 states of Nigeria, impacting the country's socio-political and economic development. The absence of agreement on whether non-state actors can be held responsible for crimes against humanity in the same way as states, can create a potential risk of serious crimes going unpunished. As non-state actors are increasingly gaining influence and have the capacity to plan and execute widespread atrocities, it is crucial to address this issue. This research project aims to investigate whether there is an Organizational Policy behind Boko Haram’s atrocities and how it can be categorized as committing crimes against humanity under Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.

La violence au nom de Dieu et de la religion gagne du terrain en Afrique de l’Ouest, en particulier au Nigéria, au Mali et au Burkina Faso. Face à cette situation terrorisante et angoissante, certains lecteurs situés incriminent la Bible en la considérant comme un livre de sang et comme une source d’inspiration des terroristes islamistes actuels. Pour porter un regard objectif sur cette problématique, nous avons décidé d’entreprendre une analyse narrative du récit de la bataille de Jéricho (Jos 6), inspirée par l’analyse de la réponse du lecteur, et de la comparer avec le discours de la bataille de Baga au Nigéria par Boko Haram. Cette étude comparative a pour but fondamental de vérifier s’il existe un lien entre ce récit de guerre biblique et les tueries de masses perpétrées par les groupes terroristes, en particulier Boko Haram, lors de la bataille de Baga, au Nigéria, le 3 janvier 2015. Pour ce faire, nous avons retenu comme cadre théorique, la méthode d’analyse narrative. Suivant cette méthode, il appert que la violence rapportée dans le récit de Jos 6 obéit avant tout à un genre littéraire particulier : l’étiologie. De ce fait, l’application de la loi de l’interdit qui légitime l’extermination de toute la population de Jéricho, ainsi que tous les animaux, n’est qu’un fait liturgique et imaginaire qui a servi à la création de l’épopée panisraélite de la conquête du pays de Canaan. Selon notre interprétation pacifiste de texte, il s’agit d’un récit qui prône la non-violence, la coexistence pacifique, l’inclusion des autres nations au sein du peuple juif, l’amour de Dieu pour toute l’humanité et le salut de Dieu pour l’Homme. En revanche, la violence que produit le groupe terroriste Boko Haram est réelle. Les massacres aveugles des populations locales, la destruction des symboles de l’État et l’expansion de la terreur dans tous les esprits, sont autant de facteurs qui caractérisent ce groupe terroriste salafiste djihadiste, au grand mépris des conventions internationales qui ont été mises en place au fil des ans et qui régissent aujourd’hui les guerres dites conventionnelles. Concernant les effets, il existe une similitude apparente entre les deux batailles (Jéricho et Baga) qui offusquent certains lecteurs non avertis et les amènent à vouloir les confondre. Mais les effets du récit de Jos 6 et du discours sur la bataille de Baga sont diamétralement opposées. Le récit de Jos 6 est un discours religieux qui met en scène une tuerie de masse, et Boko Haram justifie sa tuerie de masse par un discours religieux. Ce qui nous a amené à conclure que la violence rapportée dans le récit de Jos 6 n’est pas du terrorisme comme nous l’entendons aujourd’hui. Boko Haram, par contre, s’inscrit dans le terrorisme international et étend ses actes terroristes jusqu’au Burkina Faso en passant par le Mali. Actuellement, le groupe Ansarul Islam, alliés idéologique, stratégique et militaire de Boko Haram, menace et attaque l’Église Protestante des Assemblées de Dieu (AD) du Burkina Faso. Pour aider cette communauté chrétienne qui subit présentement la persécution sanglante des terroristes djihadistes, nous avons exploité les résultats de notre analyse pour lui proposer quelques recommandations. Nous espérons qu’une mise en application de celles-ci l’aidera à gérer la problématique terroriste en évitant tout recours à la violence et en menant une éthique biblique et sociale responsable. / Violence in the name of God and of religion is gaining ground in West Africa, particularly in Nigeria, Mali and Burkina Faso. Before this terrifying and agonizing situation, some voices raise to incriminate the Bible by considering it as a blood book and a source of inspiration for the current Islamist terrorists. To take an objective look at this issue, we have decided to undertake a narrative analysis of the battle of Jericho (Jos 6), inspired by the reader- response criticism, and to compare it with the speech of the battle of Baga in Nigeria made by Boko Haram. The main purpose of this comparative study is to ascertain whether there is a connection between this biblical story of war and the mass killing perpetrated by terrorist groups, particularly Boko Haram, during the Battle of Baga, in Nigeria, on January 3, 2015. To complete this study, we have adopted the method of narrative analysis as a theoretical framework. This reading method combines narrative analysis with sociological analysis. According to this method, it’s apparent that the violence reported in Jos 6’s story is above all a particular literary genre: etiology. Therefore, the application of the law of the prohibition, which legitimizes the extermination of the whole population of Jericho, and all the animals, is only a liturgical and imaginary construct that served to create the pan-Israelite epic of the conquest of Canaan. According to our pacifist interpretation of the text, it is a story that advocates non-violence, peaceful coexistence and the inclusion of other nations in the Jewish people. In contrast, the violence produced by the terrorist group Boko Haram is real. This Salafist jihadist terrorist group, in contempt of humanitarian laws, massacres civil populations, destroys the symbols of the State and spread terror. Based on the effects, one can find an apparent similarity between the two battles (Jericho and Baga). Such a similarity offends some uninformed readers and lead them to confuse the two speeches. But the effects are concerned the two narratives are diametrically opposed. The story of Jos 6 is a religious speech that staged a mass killing, and Boko Haram justifies his mass killing by a religious speech. Therefore, the violence reported in Jos 6's story is not terrorism as understood today. Boko Haram, in contrast, is part of the international terrorism and extends its terrorist acts to Burkina Faso via Mali. Currently, the group Ansarul Islam which is an ideological, strategic and military ally of Boko Haram, threatens and attacks the Protestant Church of the Assemblies of God (AG) of Burkina Faso. To help this Christian community undergoing the bloody persecution of jihadist terrorists, we present some recommendations drawn from our analysis. If implemented, they may help to manage the terrorist problem, avoiding the trap of a violent response to violence and embracing a social ethics informed by biblical values.

This research explores the impact of proscription on non-state groups' behaviour, specifically regarding their use of violence. Recognizing that counterterrorism measures influence the behaviour of targeted groups, this thesis builds on existing literature that identifies proscription as a critical tool used by governments. Utilizing Social Identity Theory (SIT) and the naming and shaming principle to explain group behaviour, the analysis focuses on the shaming mechanism associated with terrorist designation. The developed theory posits that groups perceive their terrorist designation as an existential threat, prompting increased violence as a defensive strategy. A within-case comparison of Boko Haram before and after proscription reveals inconsistent shaming effects but shows changes in the group's narrative and identity. These findings challenge the proposed theory, suggesting that terrorist labels may bolster group identity. The study underscores the complex dynamics of labelling and its potential to increase violence and civilian casualties.

With the rise of global transnational terrorist networks (GTTNs), there has been an increase in scholarly output on the subject. While many scholars have focused on the ways in which these networks enable terrorist organizations to achieve their goals, few have studied the transformative impact that GTTNs have on group cohesion. In order to fill this gap, I seek to answer the question how, if at all, GTTNs affect the likelihood of armed groups experiencing fragmentation. In doing so, I propose three ways in which GTTNs can influence cohesion among their members and explore these in the cases of al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, while using the Taliban as a counterfactual. Although I find that both GTTN members and non-members experience fragmentation, the ways in which fragmentation manifests itself differs. Whereas the Taliban experienced fragmentation following key events, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram experienced splits as a result of long-term processes. Thus, GTTN membership ostensibly reinforces internal processes that may cause factions to split from the organization, thereby increasing the risk of fragmentation. However, more research is required on the different ways through which GTTNs exert influence over their members and the effect this has on the risk of fragmentation.

In our era, digital technology is one of the fastest-changing areas. It impacts our private life, well-being, economics, politics and warfare. This essay intends to answer how digital transformation affects combats and state and non-state actors and also how these digitalised combats compromise social sustainability. The findings include social media and online platforms, dark web and cyberterrorism, cryptocurrency, remote sensing and surveillance, machine learning and AI, and digitally enabled strategies. The analysis was done by the Centre of Gravity model, social sustainability and securitisation theory. The thesis follows a comparative case study approach about Kenya and Nigeria therefore the essay address al-Shabaab and Boko Haram as the two prominent terrorist groups and the empirical data are related specifically to these countries and these diasporas.

This study investigates the use of violence by Salafi-Oriented Movement Organisations. Drawing mostly from Social Movement Theory’s “political opportunity” and “resource mobilisation” thesis, it uses the Northern Nigerian-born Boko Haram (BH) to study how such organisation evolved and used different forms of violent activisms for goal attainment. On that basis, three main research questions were formulated: (1) What socio-political structures enabled the evolution of the organisation in Northern Nigeria? (2) Under what conditions did BH begin to use armed violence against the Nigerian State? (3) What specific forms of armed violence did BH use and how were such forms of strategy sustained within the organisation? In answering these questions, the study relied on data collected through one-on-one semi-structured interviews from religious leaders in Northern Nigeria (particularly those within the Salafi networks); selected politicians in the areas where the group operates; some Nigerian security personnel, and on focus group interviews from victims of BH violence. In addition, the study also drew from other documentary sources (videos and audio recordings from different leaders in the group), and from internal correspondence between BH leaders and those of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Along the primary data, these documentary sources showed a striking historical continuity about the emergence and activities of BH from inception, up until they began using violence as a means for goal attainment. The data showed that while the emergence of the group was dependent on specific Northern Nigerian socio-political and mobilisatory structures, the adoption and sustenance of different forms of violence in the group were re-enforced by the interactions between the group’s leadership and the Borno state government; the violent response of the Nigerian government to the group's initial anti-state rhetoric; the mobilisation of different material resources (accruing from the organisation’s interactions and collaborations with similar international Salafi networks) and the internal dynamics in the group (competition between the different factions in the organisation). These inter-related conditions provided the windows of opportunity upon which both the establishment of the group, as well as the internal logic for the development and justification of different forms of violence were sustained within the organisation. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

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The question of how armed group ideology influences its behaviour has been tentatively explored in the past decade. However, which role distinct ideological commitments play in civilian targeting has not been satisfactorily discussed thus far. This thesis turns to research on genocide and mass violence and incorporates the concepts of ‘exclusionary ideologies’ and ‘threat perceptions’ to fill this research gap. It addresses the following question: to what extent do exclusionary ideologies of armed groups influence their use of violence against civilians during civil conflicts? When revolutionary armed groups pursue their goals, threat perceptions determine which groups are considered legitimate targets for attack. Therefore, it is hypothesized that exclusionary groups will employ more violence against civilians than inclusionary groups because the former have a more expanded understanding of legitimate targeting than the latter. Through a structured focused comparison, discourse analysis and process tracing applied to the cases of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, moderate support for this hypothesis is found. It is shown that both armed groups to varying extents invoke threat perceptions regarding certain out-groups to legitimize and rationalise their patterns of violence. Nonetheless, a descent into indiscriminate violence by Boko Haram and data shortage of Al-Shabaab attacks warrant caution.

Boko Haram est un groupe terroriste dont l’épicentre se situe au nord du Nigéria. Ce groupe qui avait au départ comme activité la dénonciation des tares de la société nigériane a plongé dans actions de terrorisme à partir de 2009 suite à la répression militaire de l’armée nigériane. Face à la difficulté du Nigéria de contenir Boko Haram, ce groupe s’est régionalisé, faisant ainsi ressortir les problèmes de coopération sécuritaire régionale dans le Bassin du Lac Tchad et au-delà. Malgré l’application de ces mécanismes régionaux de sécurité, Boko Haram a continué ses activités avec un bilan lourd : plus de 30 000 morts en sept années de conflit armé, plus 1.5 million de réfugiés et déplacés, 4.2 millions de personnes en situation d’insécurité alimentaire et sanitaire. Ceci nous amène à qualifier Boko Haram comme étant un des groupes terroristes islamistes les plus féroces des temps contemporains. En s’appuyant sur des ressources documentaires, ce mémoire vise à expliquer pourquoi les mécanismes régionaux de sécurité n’ont pas permis d’endiguer la menace Boko Haram. Ma démonstration se base sur deux arguments : tout d’abord, l’absence de leadership dans la lutte contre Boko Haram, manifesté par l’attitude du Nigéria au niveau régional et le manque d’intérêt du Tchad, a causé une difficulté d’alliance régionale. Le second argument stipule que la multiplication des organisations régionales dans le Bassin du Lac Tchad a créé des difficultés de coordination entre elles et des problèmes de monopole institutionnel empêchant à ces organisations d’agir efficacement contre le groupe terroriste Boko Haram. / Boko Haram is a terrorist group from northern Nigeria. This group promoting the application of Sharia in northern Nigeria, became a terrorist group in 2009 after military repression by the Nigerian state. With the inability of the Nigerian army to contain this terrorist threat, Boko Haram increased its activities around the Lake Chad Basin and beyond. During several years of Boko Haram's atrocities, one of the most important problems comes from the failure of regional security mechanisms to stem this group. Despite the implementation of these regional security mechanisms, Boko Haram remains a serious threat that has taken a heavy toll: more than 20,000 deaths in seven years of armed conflict, more than 1.5 million refugees and displaced persons, 4.2 million facing health problems and food insecurity. This leads us to consider Boko Haram one of the most ferocious Islamist terrorist groups in modern times. Using resources such as books, scientific articles, newspapers, governments and NGO reports and documents published by international organizations, this thesis seeks to explain why the regional security mechanisms failed to contain Boko Haram. I focus on two arguments: first, the lack of leadership in the fight against Boko Haram, manifested by Nigeria's regional attitude and the lack of interest of Chad, led to the failure of collective action against the Boko Haram phenomenon. Then, the second argument states that the multiplication of regional organizations in the Lake Chad Basin created difficulties of coordination between them and problems of institutional monopoly, preventing these organizations from acting effectively against the terrorist group Boko Haram.

Créé à la fin des années 90, Boko Haram est passé, en l’espace de dix ans, du stade de secte islamiste à celui de mouvement terroriste capable de défier l’État fédéral nigérian (première puissance militaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) et de mener des incursions dans des pays limitrophes (Cameroun, Tchad, Niger). Les objectifs, les méthodes et les cibles du groupe ont considérablement varié au cours de son évolution, ce qui obère toute tentative de catégorisation de la violence qu’il revendique. Les recherches existantes sur Boko Haram l’analysent en fonction de sa radicalisation à la fin des années 2000 et voient dans l’explosion de la violence au Nord du Nigeria une résultante du terrorisme international et transnational qui affecte le Sahel et plusieurs pays de la sous-région ouest-africaine. Or, la violence politique sur fond de revendications ethniques, économiques et religieuses fait partie de l’histoire politique du Nigeria, et Boko Haram est loin d’être une génération spontanée dans le pays qui abrite la plus forte population musulmane du continent africain. À partir d’un niveau d’analyse intraétatique, cette recherche propose une lecture sociohistorique et politique du contexte structurel à partir duquel Boko Haram a émergé au Nord du Nigeria. Puis, à partir d’une conception relationnelle du rôle de la violence politique, elle utilise l’approche de la violence instrumentale de Martha Crenshaw pour conceptualiser l’évolution des confrontations entre Boko Haram et l’État nigérian. Par rejet d’un système fédéral qu’il considère comme une survivance de l’administration coloniale, Boko Haram revendique effectivement la création d’un État islamique à l’image du Califat de Sokoto [1800-1903] dont les limites géographiques couvraient aussi bien le Nord du Nigeria que certaines parties du Niger, du Cameroun et du Tchad.