A Justiça como Imparcialidade de Brian Barry propõe uma teoria de justiça imparcial como única solução legítima para uma sociedade encontrar princípios com os quais todos possam consentir. Essa concepção de justiça não pode impor aos indivíduos um comportamento de primeira-ordem. Ao contrário, deve se referir unicamente às instituições e estas devem acomodar as diversas concepções de Bem da sociedade. Se a sociedade for capaz de encontrar tais princípios, então será possível a vida em sociedade com tolerância mútua. Esta dissertação explora as razões de Barry para escolha dessa abordagem e aponta possíveis desafios não resolvidos por sua teoria. / Brian Barrys Justice as Impartiality conceives a theory of impartial justice as the only legitimated solution to a society who wants to find principles according to those everybody might consent. This theory should not impose a first-order behavior to individuals. Moreover, such concept of justice must be impartial in regard to individuals conceptions of good. This dissertation explores the reasons that led Barry to choose this approach, and suggests possible challenges unsolved by his theory.

A Justiça como Imparcialidade de Brian Barry propõe uma teoria de justiça imparcial como única solução legítima para uma sociedade encontrar princípios com os quais todos possam consentir. Essa concepção de justiça não pode impor aos indivíduos um comportamento de primeira-ordem. Ao contrário, deve se referir unicamente às instituições e estas devem acomodar as diversas concepções de Bem da sociedade. Se a sociedade for capaz de encontrar tais princípios, então será possível a vida em sociedade com tolerância mútua. Esta dissertação explora as razões de Barry para escolha dessa abordagem e aponta possíveis desafios não resolvidos por sua teoria. / Brian Barrys Justice as Impartiality conceives a theory of impartial justice as the only legitimated solution to a society who wants to find principles according to those everybody might consent. This theory should not impose a first-order behavior to individuals. Moreover, such concept of justice must be impartial in regard to individuals conceptions of good. This dissertation explores the reasons that led Barry to choose this approach, and suggests possible challenges unsolved by his theory.

The content of the diploma thesis entails proving of compatibility between liberal variant of multiculturalism and liberalism. Critique by Brian Barry this compatibility denies and understands liberal multiculturalism, which it personifies in Will Kymlicka, as illiberal. This critical view is related to the liberal-communitarian debate, through which are interpreted Brian Barrys critique as well as new conceptual elements in Will Kymlickas liberal multiculturalism that make it an update of modern liberalism. The thesis legitimizes this update, as well as firm attachment between liberal multiculturalism and liberalism through interpretation of Kymlickas postulates that is based on Rawls theory of justice and through establishing connection between those postulates and the wider postulates of liberalism.

This thesis demonstrates a comparative and analytic discussion of citizenship idea based on two distinct liberal doctrines of two contemporary political philosophers: Brian Barry and William Galston. Barry's egalitarian liberalism argues for 'common citizenship' notion in order to promote liberty and equal treatment of all individuals irrespective of any social differences. On the other hand, 'liberal pluralist citizenship' of William Galston's signifies his liberal pluralism to mitigate cultural and religious conflicts of liberal democratic society. The fundamental disagreements among these liberal approaches over the issues of public recognition of group rights and restricted state authority are analysed in this study. Finally, by analysing both the liberal positions under the challenge of multicultural issues the author defends Galston's liberal idea and judges it as more convincing than Barry's liberal approach.

May the state, from a liberal point of view, operate laws and institutions that impede the mobile lifestyle of nomadic Roma and Travellers, or should the state take steps to accommodate their nomadic way of life? This is the essence of the problem of Roma and Traveller itinerancy and the question that is at the heart of this three-partite dissertation. The first part of the dissertation looks at public policy in France and the United Kingdom and describes the six public policy problems that constitute the problem of Roma and Traveller itinerancy. These problems concern the education of children, the French travel permits system, the legal conditions for voter registration and for GP registration, the housing benefits system, and the public provision of halting sites. The second part looks at liberal political theory. It suggests that contemporary liberalism divides into two strands that take different views on the entitlements of cultural and religious minorities, and it provides a detailed outline of the prime articulations of each approach, namely the multiculturalist liberalism of Kymlicka and the classic neutrality liberalism of Barry. The third part investigates what the two said liberalisms imply for the six policy problems from part 1. These analyses suggest that the two liberalisms have slightly diverging implications for the halting sites problem, the housing benefits problem and the problem of GP registration. They suggest furthermore that the two accounts converge on the question of voter registration and agree that the voter registration system must accommodate nomads, and may not make the possession of a fixed residence an absolute condition for voter registration. And the analyses suggest finally that the two liberalisms also converge over the education question and the travel permits question, but here support polices that are potentially inimical to Roma and Traveller itinerancy. The broader implications of these findings are that liberalism is potentially, but not necessarily and not intrinsically, inimical to Roma and Traveller nomadism, and that the disagreement between classic neutrality liberalism and multiculturalist liberalism is weak insofar as public policy is concerned.