yes / This analysis of British Ostpolitik focuses on Margaret Thatcher’s diplomacy, exploring her quietly pragmatic efforts to bring about a gradual transformation of Eastern Europe at the cost of supporting selected communist regimes. The analysis reveals how a market-oriented economic experiment in Budapest first sparked the prime minister’s interest in Hungary and inspired her foreign policy in Eastern Europe. It documents the British search for a socialist transition ‘model’, which led to unprecedented diplomatic overtures towards a small enemy state on the brink of bankruptcy. Based on extensive archival research in Budapest and London, as well as on the personal recollections of three senior British diplomats, this case study challenges some of the common assumptions of the historical literature about Thatcher’s chosen method of combating communism and Britain’s long-term strategy towards the Eastern bloc. / Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Les positions diplomatiques du Quai d’Orsay et du Foreign Office dans la question de Palestine sont rarement abordées directement et sur une moyenne durée. En effet, si la mise en place de l’ordre mandataire après la Première Guerre mondiale et celle de l’établissement de l’État d’Israël après la Seconde Guerre mondiale font l’objet d’une importante production historiographique, il manquait une étude des attitudes et des intérêts des diplomaties française et britannique face à la question de Palestine de 1917 (date de la « déclaration Balfour ») jusqu’en 1948 (déclenchement de la première guerre israélo-arabe). L’analyse des archives diplomatiques permet d’établir les raisons du soutien apporté au sionisme par Paris et Londres, ainsi que leur compréhension limitée des objectifs du nationalisme juif. De fait, les puissances occidentales ont cru à tort qu’elles pouvaient façonner celui-ci pour accomplir leurs propres objectifs coloniaux au Proche-Orient. En essayant d’imposer ce projet aux populations arabes, majoritaires en Palestine, elles ont contribué à alimenter le conflit israélo-palestinien. / The diplomatic positions of the Quai d’Orsay and the Foreign Office on the Palestine question are rarely studied directly and on a long-term basis. If the establishment of the mandate system after World War I and the creation of Israel after World War II have been subjected to an intense historiographical production, a study of the attitudes and interests of the French and British diplomacies towards Palestine from 1917 (year of the Balfour declaration) to 1948 (year of the first Arab-Israeli war) was missing. The analysis of diplomatic documents allows to establish the reasons behind Paris and London’s support to Zionism, as well as their own understanding of the objectives of Jewish nationalism. Western powers had believed that they could shape Zionism and use it to achieve their colonial agendas in the Middle-East. By forcing their Zionist project on Arab populations, they contributed to fueling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the spring of 1924, the Baltic sea coast territory of Klaipėda, formerly a region of East Prussia became an autonomous area administrated by the Republic of Lithuania. Given the mixed nationalities of the population, during the interwar period, Germany and Lithuania both pressured citizens to prefer one or the other nationality, which contributed to gradual radicalization and growing nationalist tendencies. The key outcome was the Kaunas process at the turn of 1934/35. Under the Law for the Protection of the Republic, 87 members of the Klaipėda national-socialist organizations CSA and SOVOG were convicted of conspiracy to annex the territory to Germany. The convictions led to an economic blockade of Lithuania by Germany and a massive pro-German propaganda campaign. The United Kingdom tried to settle the situation by increasing its trade activity with Lithuania, accompanied by diplomatic pressure on Lithuania to ease its stance against Germany. After Lithuania agreed to grant amnesties to those convicted of conspiracy, in 1936/37, German-Lithuanian economic relations were restored. However, in the late 1930s, the Republic of Lithuania became an easily blackmailed and diplomatically isolated state, forced to grant numerous concessions to its German minority population. The Lithuanian government...

Cette recherche s’attache à l’étude d’une institution britannique, à son rôle et son organisation depuis la fusion, en 1968, du Commonwealth Office et du Foreign Office, jusqu’à l’année 1985.Il s’agit ainsi de voir comment le Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) fonctionne et comment il a su évoluer au gré du temps, du changement de la place de la Grande-Bretagne dans le monde, et des conflits internationaux. Ainsi, on peut se demander quelles influences le contexte a eu sur l’institution en elle-même. Dès lors, une place particulière est accordée à l’Europe, la ‘relation spéciale’ avec les États-Unis et la décolonisation.La politique étrangère britannique semble aujourd’hui être principalement dans les mains du pouvoir politique : du ministre des Affaires étrangères (Foreign Secretary), et du Premier ministre. Quelle place le FCO occupe-t-il alors, et quelles relations entretient-il avec le pouvoir politique ?Il s’agit ainsi de considérer la place du FCO au sein des différents acteurs internes et externes de la politique étrangère britannique en analysant trois cas concrets : une réorganisation interne de l’institution (la fusion de 1968), une gestion de crise (l’indépendance retardée de la Guyane britannique, 1953-1966), et une négociation d’accord en temps de paix (l’échec des négociations de la Convention des Nations unies sur le droit de la mer, 1973-1982).Ce travail de recherche tente ainsi d’offrir une interprétation allant au-delà du fonctionnement interne de l’institution. Il s’agit de mettre en relation le Foreign and Commonwealth Office et le pouvoir politique, et ainsi d’étudier les pouvoirs et influences du FCO tout en s’attachant à des périodes clés à l’orée de changements. / This research work is devoted to the study of a key British institution, its function and its organization, from the merger of the Commonwealth Office and the Foreign Office in 1968, until 1985.Of particular interest is the way the changing role of Britain in the world and international conflicts bear upon the functioning and the evolution of the FCO. The point is to assess to what extent the context influences the institution itself.British foreign policy seems to be mostly determined by the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister. It is therefore well worth gaging what the function of the FCO is, and its relationship with the holders of political power.The role of the FCO as one of the internal and external agents of British foreign policy is assessed here, through three cases: the internal reorganization of the service in 1968, the management of a crisis – the postponements of independence for Guiana from 1953 to 1966, and the failure of a negotiation in peacetime – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1973 to 1982.Beyond the internal functioning of the institution, this research work strives to offer an interpretation of the changes. The relationship between the FCO and the holders of political power, the real power and influence of the FCO are under consideration, in particular during key moments of particular significance for the institution.