Esta dissertação analisa a trajetória política e intelectual do marxista brasileiro Jacob Gorender (1923-2013). O recorte temporal adotado detém-se no ano de sua prisão, em 1970, por motivo de suas atividades políticas, não obstante Gorender tenha uma rica militância e, especialmente, uma produção teórica muito vasta nos anos posteriores à sua experiência prisional. Esta escolha analítica decorre do fato deste período permitir acompanhar o seu itinerário militante em duas organizações políticas, o Partido Comunista do Brasil, renomeado em 1961 Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), e o Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário (PCBR). Por meio deste procedimento o objetivo foi compreender o processo de desenvolvimento do marxismo no Brasil, com as continuidades e rupturas que o caracterizaram, entre as décadas de 1940 e 1970, a partir de uma abordagem biográfica. / This thesis is on the political and intellectual trajectory of the Brazilian Marxist Jacob Gorender (1923-2013). The adopted time frame is held until his prison, in 1970, due to his political activities, regardless Gorender had a rich militancy and, specially, theoretical production in the years after his prison experience. This analytical choice results that this period allows to follow his militant itinerary in two political organizations, Communist Party of Brazil, renamed in 1961 Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), and Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party (PCBR). Through this procedure the goal was to understand the development process of Marxism in Brazil, with the continuities and raptures that characterized it, between the 1940s and the 1970s, from a biographical approach.

Esta dissertação analisa a trajetória política e intelectual do marxista brasileiro Jacob Gorender (1923-2013). O recorte temporal adotado detém-se no ano de sua prisão, em 1970, por motivo de suas atividades políticas, não obstante Gorender tenha uma rica militância e, especialmente, uma produção teórica muito vasta nos anos posteriores à sua experiência prisional. Esta escolha analítica decorre do fato deste período permitir acompanhar o seu itinerário militante em duas organizações políticas, o Partido Comunista do Brasil, renomeado em 1961 Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), e o Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário (PCBR). Por meio deste procedimento o objetivo foi compreender o processo de desenvolvimento do marxismo no Brasil, com as continuidades e rupturas que o caracterizaram, entre as décadas de 1940 e 1970, a partir de uma abordagem biográfica. / This thesis is on the political and intellectual trajectory of the Brazilian Marxist Jacob Gorender (1923-2013). The adopted time frame is held until his prison, in 1970, due to his political activities, regardless Gorender had a rich militancy and, specially, theoretical production in the years after his prison experience. This analytical choice results that this period allows to follow his militant itinerary in two political organizations, Communist Party of Brazil, renamed in 1961 Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), and Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party (PCBR). Through this procedure the goal was to understand the development process of Marxism in Brazil, with the continuities and raptures that characterized it, between the 1940s and the 1970s, from a biographical approach.

Nessa dissertação, realizou-se um estudo sobre a história organizativa e política do Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), de 1922 a 1935. Durante o período analisado, o Partido passou por duas mudanças no conjunto tático adotado. No entanto, passou por quatro linhas estratégicas diferentes. De 1922 a 1929, adotou um conjunto tático de estilo subcultural. Buscou se tornar o representante máximo do proletariado e das massas trabalhadoras, adotando formas de lutas pacíficas. De 1930 a 1934, o PCB passou por um período de luta interna acirrado, abandonando o estilo subcultural. Ao final de 1934 e até o início de 1936, foi adotado pela organização o estilo da luta direta pelo poder. No entanto, de 1922 a 1925, o PCB teve como linha estratégica a autoconstrução como ferramenta de luta. Era mais importante organizar o Partido do que combater um inimigo específico. De 1926 a 1929, foi adotada a linha estratégica de Frente Única, mas negando-se a realização de coalisões. De 1930 a 1933, foi adotada a linha denominada classe contra classe, que negava a possibilidade de qualquer aliança com a pequena burguesia radicalizada. De 1934 a 1935, foi adotada a linha da Frente Popular, que significou a atuação através da Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL). Durante os treze anos que vão de 1922 a 1935, houve debilidade na capacidade organizativa. Os membros do partido eram frequentemente presos e as direções nacionais sempre tiveram dificuldades em manter contatos com as direções regionais e essas com os órgãos de base. Na prática, tratou-se de uma organização que não possuía quadros revolucionários formados. A ausência de quadros é o que explica a incapacidade de formular táticas eficazes. E mesmo as táticas formuladas eram, em geral, mal aplicadas, como observavam os próprios militantes à época. / In this dissertation, it was carried out a study on the organizational and political history of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), 1922-1935. During the analyzed period, the Party went through two tactical changes. However, it went through four different strategic lines. From 1922 to 1929, it adopted the subcultural tactical style. It sought to become the highest representative of the proletariat and the working masses, adopting forms of peaceful struggle. From 1930 to 1934, the PCB has gone through a period of internal fighting, abandoning the subcultural style. At the end of 1934 and by early 1936, it adopted the style of direct struggle. However, from 1922 to 1925, the PCB had as a strategic line the self-construction. It was more important to organize the party then to fight a specific enemy. From 1926 to 1929, it adopted the strategic line of the United Front, but denying the realization of coalitions. From 1930 to 1933, it adopted the line \"class against class\", which denied the possibility of any alliance with the radicalized small bourgeoisie. From 1934 to 1935, it adopted the line of the Popular Front, which meant acting through the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL). During the thirteen years from 1922 to 1935, there were problems at its leaderships have always had difficulty maintaining contact with regional leaderships and militants. In practice, it was an organization that had no revolutionary cadres formed. The absence of revolutionary cadres is what explains the inability to build effective tactics. And even if the tactics were formulated, it was generally misapplied.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the announcement by the leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), Achille Occhetto, that the time had come to shed its communist name and identity inaugurated a decade of uncertainty and change for the party. As the Party of the Democratic Left (PDS), it faced the challenge of developing its post-communist identity amid the upheaval in the Italian political system that followed the Tangentopoli (Bribesville) scandal. The transition to the 'Second Republic', spurred by widespread anti-party sentiment, brought new electoral systems and forms of coalition-making, a changed array of allies and opponents, a personalisation of certain political roles, and changed relationships between the national and local dimensions of politics. In 2000, now called the Left Democrats (DS), the party was the largest component in the nationally governing coalition and even provided the prime minister. Yet the rise to the pinnacle of power had been accompanied by decreasing electoral support. In over ten years of post-communist life, the party had failed to achieve the real breakthrough hoped for by Occhetto: to unite the Italian left in a single party that dominated government or opposition, as in other Western European countries. The primary aim of this thesis is to contribute to understanding the party's fortunes through a case study of the way the turbulent years from 1989 to 2000 were experienced in the Venetian provincial federation. This decade of change has so far not been examined from a local perspective, yet local studies were particularly fruitful in the analysis of the PCI, as they allowed exploration of the ways party debates were perceived, and decisions made at national level were implemented, 'on the ground' in specific contexts. I have not chosen the Venetian federation as a microcosm of the experience in the periphery as a whole but as an interesting and relevant component of the full picture. The Venetian party enjoyed greatly increased responsibilities in government at sub-national levels in the second half of the 1990s, due to successful alliance strategies, but decreasing electoral support. I seek to explain the local party's electoral and power outcomes in terms of a combination of external and internal factors: on one hand, the opportunities and constraints presented by the changing environment; and, on the other, internal dynamics that hampered the party in responding to those challenges. In particular I stress the significance of the crisis precipitated by Occhetto's proposal to transform the party in 1989 and the constraints on the local party's legitimacy and visibility in the competitive environment that developed in the Second Republic. I attribute these constraints to the mixed electoral systems operating at sub-national levels, intra-coalition rivalry, and a striking case of an individual enjoying personal power and influence in the local political system. As a secondary theme, I analyse change in the party type that accompanied these outcomes, in light of theories on general trends in party transformations in Western Europe. I identify rapid changes in the local party's aims, functions and organisational roles and relationships, and in its relationship with the national leadership. I argue that this process of change, consistent with the transformation of a mass party into an electorally focused party, was accelerated at local level by the changing competitive environment and the sudden increase in government responsibilities. The introduction in chapter 1 sets the party's story in context and outlines the aims and argument of the thesis. Chapter 2 introduces the local case study in light of existing analyses of the party's development, the tradition of local studies of the PCI, and theories on party types and transformations. The central chapters are dedicated to the case study, which is based largely on interviews with members of the federation's leadership groups in various periods. The organisation of the material reflects my division of the federation's story into distinct phases, each reflecting a stage in the development of both the party's alliance strategy and the local political system. In the concluding chapter, I discuss the implications of the case study findings for the party as a whole and make a claim for the continuing validity of local studies of Italian political parties.

Falun Gong protesters, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the spy plane incident and a series of mine accidents are just some of the events over the past decade that involved the Internet. In each incident the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was caught off guard by the circumvention of informational flows as a consequence of the Internet. This is in some ways indicative of the impact the medium is having on the ability of the CCP to manage political discourse within the confines of the country. This thesis examines the way that political discourse in contemporary China is managed in response to the development of the Internet, using the concepts of time and space as conceived by Harold A. Innis. This historical study considers the strategies used in the management of time and space in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) across a broad range of ways in which the medium is used by particular groups, such as online gamers, bloggers, hackers, and activists. I have also looked at the way information flows are managed during a crisis or disaster using critical textual analysis of Internet sources, and specific examples. These sources are both official and unofficial including Chinese government sites, journalistic sources both Chinese and Western and Chinese legal databases that appear on the World Wide Web (WWW). The study finds that there is an emerging shift from propaganda based media manipulation and suppression to a style of stage managed spin. The CCP have used three strategies to contain and maintain their hold over central power, including the rule of law, investment in the development of content and technological means. The development of the Internet in China is marked by a dialect of desire for the technology for economic purposes and the perceived need to control the technology for political purposes. The Internet has also enabled the central government in Beijing to reassert its position as a central authority over local and provincial governments. This study contributes to the existing knowledge about Chinese media policy and the Internet, and will shed light on the ways in which the tehcnology influences the production and consumption of media and the impact that the development of this medium has upon media policy in China. Furthermore, this study will contribute to a greater understanding of CCP's ability to manage information and the impact that this medium will have on the operations of Chinese politics within the space of the Internet, as well as the impact of the technology on politics, and China's interaction with the international community.

This thesis explores one particular facet of contemporary state-society relationship in China, i.e. state-student relationship. By arguing against the popular observation that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) retreated from Chinese universities as a way of winning students’ support, this thesis claims that the party-state has adopted a “bird cage” strategy in post-Tiananmen university governance. That is to say, the party-state has not only re-established and strengthened its control institutions in universities, but at same time expanded its zone of tolerance and created new outlets for students’ political enthusiasm and participation. A four-city, seven-university field survey was conducted, the result of which supports the view that the CCP’s post-Tiananmen governance strategy has been effective. Respondents agree that party’s governing institutions are resilient and play important roles in students’ life. They also seem to be in agreement with, at least as the survey results indicate, important political ideas promoted by the party-state.

This thesis explores one particular facet of contemporary state-society relationship in China, i.e. state-student relationship. By arguing against the popular observation that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) retreated from Chinese universities as a way of winning students’ support, this thesis claims that the party-state has adopted a “bird cage” strategy in post-Tiananmen university governance. That is to say, the party-state has not only re-established and strengthened its control institutions in universities, but at same time expanded its zone of tolerance and created new outlets for students’ political enthusiasm and participation. A four-city, seven-university field survey was conducted, the result of which supports the view that the CCP’s post-Tiananmen governance strategy has been effective. Respondents agree that party’s governing institutions are resilient and play important roles in students’ life. They also seem to be in agreement with, at least as the survey results indicate, important political ideas promoted by the party-state.

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Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät--Bonn--Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 2000. / Bibliogr. p. 316-329. Index.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of New Brunswick, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references.