The introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has affected many elements of the constitutional system in Canada. This dissertation explores the Charter's relationship with liberal constitutionalism and Canadian federalism, and considers whether judicial review on Charter grounds has seen a progression, or a regression, from parliamentary to constitutional to judicial supremacy. Further, this dissertation considers whether Charter review has reduced provincial autonomy by imposing national values in provincial areas of jurisdiction when Charter review nullifies provincial statutes. Through a complex process referred to as the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism, this study argues that a changed Charter jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Canada and a changed policy process within the administrative state at the federal level have reduced the negative implications of Charter review for liberal constitutionalism and Canadian federalism. To advance this argument, the concept of Charter activism is introduced to demonstrate that the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism is the product of the shifting equilibrium within two distinct elements that comprise Charter activism---judicial activism and bureaucratic activism. This study pursues three themes to demonstrate that the decline of judicial activism and the emergence of bureaucratic activism now converge at a point within Charter politics that facilitate the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism and ensure that Charter review advances constitutional and not judicial supremacy. The first theme investigates the Supreme Court of Canada as a policy actor during Charter review, and analyzes Charter decisions between 1982 and 1997. The second theme considers the impact of Charter review on Canadian federalism and whether the Charter has centralized Canadian federalism and reduced provincial autonomy. The final theme investigates bureaucratic activism and the changes within the policy process at the fe

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The courts in Canada have often been cast, by both courts and legal scholars, as 'umpires' or 'arbiters' of the federal-provincial division of powers - umpires or arbiters that have the exclusive, or at least decisive, authority to clarify and enforce, and resolve disputes about, 'who does what' in the federal system. However, the image conveyed by these metaphors underestimates the role that the federal and provincial political branches play in the federal system, by working out their own solutions, in the intergovernmental arena, both directly and indirectly, where questions and disputes arise about how jurisdiction is and should be allocated. The image conveyed by the umpire or arbiter metaphors also sits uncomfortably with the facilitative role that the Supreme Court of Canada has carved out for itself in its recent division of powers decisions, a role that casts the courts as facilitators of these instances of intergovernmental dialogue. This doctoral dissertation challenges, and moves beyond, the umpire and arbiter metaphors. It examines the political safeguards available to the provinces in Canada to prevent, or limit, perceived federal encroachments on provincial jurisdiction, in the process highlighting the role that the political branches play in Canada in working out their own allocations of jurisdiction, outside of the courts. It describes, and critically evaluates, the facilitative role carved out by the Court in its recent division of powers decisions, identifying various reasons to be skeptical of a facilitative role that casts the courts as facilitators of intergovernmental dialogue. Finally, and with an eye to future research, it briefly outlines an alternative facilitative role that focuses on facilitating deliberation about the division of powers implications of particular initiatives, arguing that it would be premature to dismiss facilitative approaches to judicial review altogether.

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Universities have traditionally stood as bastions of academic freedom and forums for open discourse and free expression. In recent years, however, this role has been questioned in instances where university administrators have, either directly or complicity, denied students the opportunity to express certain viewpoints they deem “controversial”. This research paper explores whether a university, or its delegates, should be allowed to deny students access to campus facilities and resources solely on the basis of ideological viewpoint. The relevance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, statutory human rights provisions, and common law doctrines to the student-university relationship are explored in turn. It is argued that, notwithstanding the fact that universities may be “private” actors to whom the Charter does not directly apply, they are institutions invested with a public interest, and as such ought to be subject to special duties of non-discrimination.

This paper examines the Attorney General’s obligation, in Canada and New Zealand, to report on inconsistencies in proposed legislation with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Although the obligations are similar, the Canadian and New Zealand Attorneys General have developed very different reporting cultures. The Canadian Attorney General has never issued a report; the New Zealand Attorney General has issued many. This paper’s thesis is that the different reporting cultures are attributable to the different constitutional structure in each jurisdiction and different understandings of the independence of the Attorney General. Under this analysis, the usefulness of comparative analysis between the two jurisdictions is limited: constitutional differences cannot be ignored. The paper evaluates proposed changes to the reporting obligation in each jurisdiction in light of this analysis.

This paper examines the Attorney General’s obligation, in Canada and New Zealand, to report on inconsistencies in proposed legislation with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Although the obligations are similar, the Canadian and New Zealand Attorneys General have developed very different reporting cultures. The Canadian Attorney General has never issued a report; the New Zealand Attorney General has issued many. This paper’s thesis is that the different reporting cultures are attributable to the different constitutional structure in each jurisdiction and different understandings of the independence of the Attorney General. Under this analysis, the usefulness of comparative analysis between the two jurisdictions is limited: constitutional differences cannot be ignored. The paper evaluates proposed changes to the reporting obligation in each jurisdiction in light of this analysis.

Universities have traditionally stood as bastions of academic freedom and forums for open discourse and free expression. In recent years, however, this role has been questioned in instances where university administrators have, either directly or complicity, denied students the opportunity to express certain viewpoints they deem “controversial”. This research paper explores whether a university, or its delegates, should be allowed to deny students access to campus facilities and resources solely on the basis of ideological viewpoint. The relevance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, statutory human rights provisions, and common law doctrines to the student-university relationship are explored in turn. It is argued that, notwithstanding the fact that universities may be “private” actors to whom the Charter does not directly apply, they are institutions invested with a public interest, and as such ought to be subject to special duties of non-discrimination.

In this thesis I address the question of sympathetic action - action by one group of workers designed to aid another group of workers in their struggle with an employer, manifested most obviously through refusals by workers to cross a picket line - through the lens of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As the law currently stands in Canada, undertaking sympathetic action collectively is invariably illegal as it is considered an illegal "strike" under Canadian labour legislation. Further, workers who undertake sympathetic action - whether collectively or individually - can be subject to discipline or discharge by their employer. I argue that workers who undertake sympathetic action can have numerous motivations, ranging from economic self-interest to deeply-held political or moral beliefs (the latter manifested through the concept of "solidarity"), and that when those motivations include expressive or conscientious interests, sympathetic action should be entitled to protection by the fundamental freedoms of conscience, expression, and association found in section 2 of the Charter. I further argue that a each of these freedoms represents a different aspect of the inherent dignity and worth of an individual, and that a right to sympathetic action promotes both those freedoms and Charter values. Finally, I argue that a constitutional right to sympathetic action is a free-standing right that can exist even in the absence of a constitutional right to strike. This thesis reviews the current and historical state of Canadian law (in both the statutory labour relations regimes and in common law) regarding sympathetic action, the potential application of the Charter freedoms of conscience, expression, and association to sympathetic action, and finally options for reform that reduce or eliminate restrictions on sympathetic action and therefore make our labour relations system more in keeping with Charter values.

This thesis examines the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States from the perspective of Canada's obligations vis-a-vis asylum seekers under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Safe Third Country Agreement requires asylum seekers to lodge their refugee claims in the first country of arrival, as between Canada and the United States. Asylum seekers on the United States side of the border who are seeking to enter Canada for the purpose of claiming refugee status will be deflected to the United States to lodge their claims there. By deflecting asylum seekers in this manner, Canada effectively conscripts the United States to carry out its obligations under the Charter to furnish procedural and substantive protections to asylum seekers. This thesis examines certain features of the United States asylum system to which asylum seekers deflected under the Safe Third Country Agreement would be subjected, in order to determine whether, according to relevant Charter jurisprudence, deflection constitutes a deprivation of security of the person under section 7 of the Charter and whether such deprivation can be justified under section 1.