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Le couplage de données et la protection de la vie privée informationnelle sous l'article 8 de la Charte canadienne /Arès, Sébastien January 2005 (has links)
Data matching is the automated process permitting the comparison of significant amounts of personal data from two or more different databanks in order to produce new information. Its use by governments implicates many rights and freedoms, including the protection against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Canadian Charter. / In the author's opinion, a governmental data matching program will probably constitute a search or seizure under section 8 when a positive answer is given to two questions. First, is there a use or transfer of information which implicates constitutionally protected information? Generally, section 8 will only protect biographical personal information, as described in the Plant case. Second, one must determine if a reasonable expectation of privacy exists as to the purpose for which the information will be used. In other words, one must determine if the two governmental databanks are separate on the constitutional level. / However, a positive answer to both of theses questions does not mean that the matching program necessarily infringes section 8. It will not be considered unreasonable if it is authorised by law, if the law itself is reasonable, and if the execution of the program is reasonable. Presuming that the program is authorised by law, it is probable that a matching program aimed to detect individuals collecting illegally social benefits will not be considered unreasonable.
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The rights of official language minority communities in CanadaEastaugh, Érik Labelle January 2015 (has links)
This thesis explores the meaning and content of s. 41 of the Official Languages Act of Canada, which imposes certain duties on all federal institutions towards French- and English-language minority communities. While vitally important as a component of Canada's language rights archictecture, the nature and content of s. 41 as a legal norm remain woefully unclear. The immediate aim is to determine: (1) whether s. 41 confers a right to specific measures in particular cases; (2) whether such rights are individual or collective; and (3) if collective, what sort of interests are protected. Section 41 presents a number of interpretive challenges. First, it uses terminology which is undefined in the Act and yet has no self-evident meaning. Thus, the nature of the primary legal subject, 'linguistic minority communities' (LMCs), is unclear, as are the nature of the protected interests, 'vitality' and 'development'. Second, the interpretive principles developed by the case-law for official language rights rely on a conceptual framework that is vague and under-theorized. Key components of that framework, like the concept of a necessary link between language and culture, have yet to be fully explored, either in the case-law or in legal scholarship. This presents an acute problem in the case of s. 41, where the content of these concepts will likely prove dispositive. In order to grapple with these challenges, this thesis develops an account of language rights as collective rights. Drawing on the philosophical literature and existing case-law, I argue that LMCs should be conceived of as collectivities rather than mere aggregates of individuals, and that a number of language rights, such as s. 41 of the OLA, and ss. 16.1 and 23 of the Charter, aim to protect the collective interests of these collectivities. I then define some of these interests from both an empirical and a normative perspective. I conclude by arguing that s. 41 of the OLA protects an 'autonomy interest', which both prohibits federal institutions from interfering with existing LMC autonomy, and provides a basis for claiming enhancements to that autonomy, within the confines of the statutory mandate of the institution in question.
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The Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement : a constitutional analysisBorovan, Nicole A. January 2006 (has links)
No description available.
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La liberté de religion et les intérêts de l'enfant au CanadaLaliberté, Julie 12 1900 (has links)
"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LL.M. en droit option recherche" / Nous entamons notre étude par l'examen de cinq justifications avancées
au soutien de la liberté de religion: la tolérance, la rationalité,
l'utilitarisme, le perfectionnisme et la neutralité. Ensuite, nous exposons
de façon générale le droit relatif à liberté de religion tel qu'il est mis en
oeuvre au Canada. Ces deux étapes préliminaires nous amènent à
analyser de façon critique l'interaction entre la liberté de religion et les
droits et intérêts des enfants. La thèse générale que nous développons
est la suivante: lorsqu'une situation met en présence la liberté de religion
ainsi que les droits et intérêts fondamentaux d'un enfant qui n'est pas
assez mature et intellectuellement indépendant pour pouvoir faire des
choix éclairés, nous sommes d'avis que le test de proportionnalité n'est
pas appliqué par la Cour suprême et que généralement, il ne devrait pas
l'être. Nous concluons que l'intérêt et les droits fondamentaux de l'enfant
ont un poids prépondérant. / First, the author analyses five reasons that may be advanced to justify
freedom of religion: tolerance, rationality, utilitarianism, perfectionism and
neutrality. Then, the author generally sets out the mechanisms by which
freedom of religion is interpreted in Canada. These two preliminary steps
lead to a critical analysis of the interaction between freedom of religion
and children's rights and interests. The author submits that when a legal
situation involves freedom of religion and the fundamental interests or
rights of children that are not capable of autonomous choices, the
Supreme Court does not apply a proportionality test and, generally, courts
should not apply it. The author concludes that the fundamental rights and
interests of children are preponderant.
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Charte canadienne et droits linguistiques : frontières allégoriques et autres assertions consensuellesBérard, Frédéric 05 1900 (has links)
La frontière entre le politique et l'intellectualisme militant est, d'ordinaire, ténue. Tout univers politico-constitutionnel est ainsi susceptible de faire les frais d'un martèlement doctrinal qui, à maints égards, relève davantage du construit que du donné. Résultante directe d'une construction parfois intéressée, le récit identitaire, à force de répétition, s'installera confortablement sur les sièges de l'imaginaire populaire. Il accèdera, au fil du temps, au statut de mythe pur et simple. Ce dernier, politiquement parlant, revêt de puissants effets aphrodisiaques.
La présente thèse doctorale s'intéresse plus particulièrement aux mythes créés, depuis 1982, par un segment de la doctrine québécoise : en matière de droits linguistiques, objet principal de notre étude, Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et Cour suprême, toutes deux liguées contre le Québec, combineront leurs efforts afin d'assurer le recul du fait français dans la Belle Province. Quant aux francophones hors Québec, ceux-ci, depuis l'effritement du concept de nation canadienne-française, sont dorénavant exclus de l'équation, expurgés de l'échiquier constitutionnel. En fait, l'adoption d'un nationalisme méthodologique comme nouvelle orthodoxie politique et doctrinale rend ardue, en plusieurs sens, la conciliation de leur existence avec les paradigmes et épistémologie maintenant consacrés. Ainsi, et selon la logique du tiers exclu, une victoire francophone hors Québec signifiera, du fait d'une prétendue symétrie interprétative, un gain pour la communauté anglo-québécoise.
Cette thèse vise à discuter de la teneur de diverses allégories établies et, le cas échéant, à reconsidérer la portée réelle de la Charte canadienne en matière linguistique. Il sera alors démontré que plusieurs lieux communs formulés par les milieux intellectuels québécois échouent au moins partiellement, le test de l'analyse factuelle. Celui-ci certifiera de l'exclusion, par la doxa, de toute décision judiciaire ou autre vérité empirique ne pouvant cadrer à même les paramètres, voire les prismes, de l'orthodoxie suggérée. / The boundary between politics and intellectual activism is generally fluid. The whole universe of political-constitutional thought while banging the doctrinal drum is often merely a political construct rather than grounded in fact. Through constant repetition, the Quebecois national identity narrative has established itself firmly in the public’s imagination. Through the years, it has attained the status of an outright myth. Utilized in the political arena, this myth holds tremendous sway.
This doctoral thesis focuses on the different myths which have been created since 1982 by writers of a particular branch of Quebec doctrine: language rights, the primary focus of this study, where the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Supreme Court of Canada are considered to have joined forces to redress the French language’s gains in la Belle Province. Francophones outside Quebec, since the crumbling of the concept of a French Canadian nation, find themselves excluded from the equation and removed from the constitutional chessboard. In fact, the adoption of methodological nationalism as the new political and doctrinal orthodoxy makes it particularly difficult to reconcile the existence of a national identity narrative with the enshrined myths. Thus, and following the logic of the excluded third party theory, a Francophone victory outside of Quebec is considered according to the interpretative symmetry a win for the Quebec Anglophone community.
This thesis seeks to question the value of the different established myths, and if applicable, to revaluate the scope of the Canadian Charter with regard to language rights. It will demonstrate that many of the accepted theories by Quebec scholars and doctrinal writers fail, at least partially, a fact-based analytical test. This will confirm that these espoused theories purposely ignore judicial decisions and other empirical facts which do not adhere to the suggested orthodoxy.
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Autonomous aboriginal criminal justice and the Charter of RightsJohnston, William Wayne 05 1900 (has links)
The imminent recognition of an inherent Aboriginal right to selfgovernment
signals the beginning of the reversal of a colonization process
which threatened the cultural survival of a people. The Report of the Aboriginal
Justice Inquiry of Manitoba , hereinafter referred to as the Inquiry, advocates an
autonomous Aboriginal criminal justice system as a significant component of
this cultural revitalization. This Aboriginal criminal justice system would differ
markedly from the conventional system in giving priority to collective rights over
conflicting individual rights. The Inquiry rejects the Charter as alien to Aboriginal
values and advocates a “tailor-made” Aboriginal charter that would incorporate
“only those fundamental freedoms and civil liberties that do not violate the
beliefs and paramount collective rights of the Aboriginal peoples.”
The conventional justice system’s paramount concern for individual
rights is premised on the potential of punishment. The Inquiry’s starkly
contrasting paramount emphasis on collective rights is premised on an
Aboriginal view of justice which this thesis refers to as the “harmony ethos”:
The underlying philosophy in Aboriginal societies in
dealing with crime was the resolution of disputes, the
healing of wounds and the restoration of social
harmony… Atonement and restoration of harmony
were the goals - not punishment.
The tension between individual and collective rights apparent in the
proposal of the Inquiry is the specific focus of this thesis. The colonization
process may justify a separate Aboriginal justice system. However, the harmony
ethos premise, while appropriate to the mediation-reconciliation communitarian
model of justice advocated by the Inquiry, blinds the Inquiry to the additional,
and crucially different, adjudicative-rights imperatives of the contemporary
Aboriginal society.
Actually existing Indianism reveals conflict-generating fault lines in the
harmony premise which challenge the sufficiency of the Inquiry’s group-based justice paradigm and indicate a need and desire for an adjudication justice
component and concomitant Charter values.
This adjudication hiatus in the Inquiry position is a reflection of a similar
void in historical Aboriginal justice which challenges the asserted rationale of
cultural survival for the paramountcy of collective rights in the contemporary
Aboriginal justice system. This historical adjudication hiatus does not preclude
a separate Aboriginal justice system, but favours the inclusion of Charter values
to strengthen an adjudication cultural foundation which is frail relative to its
reconciliation-mediation strength.
This thesis is a modest attempt to address the interface between two
systems; one mature, but in need of change, the other, fledging and in need of
assistance. The Charter provides a ready and flexible framework to join the
Aboriginal community both to the larger society and to the unlanded Aboriginal
diaspora by principled standards of justice. These fundamental indicia of
fairness, recognized by all civilized self-governing units, constitute no significant
threat to the cultural survival of the Aboriginal mediation justice heritage, while
buttressing its inherent adjudication frailty.
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La liberté de religion et les intérêts de l'enfant au CanadaLaliberté, Julie 12 1900 (has links)
Nous entamons notre étude par l'examen de cinq justifications avancées
au soutien de la liberté de religion: la tolérance, la rationalité,
l'utilitarisme, le perfectionnisme et la neutralité. Ensuite, nous exposons
de façon générale le droit relatif à liberté de religion tel qu'il est mis en
oeuvre au Canada. Ces deux étapes préliminaires nous amènent à
analyser de façon critique l'interaction entre la liberté de religion et les
droits et intérêts des enfants. La thèse générale que nous développons
est la suivante: lorsqu'une situation met en présence la liberté de religion
ainsi que les droits et intérêts fondamentaux d'un enfant qui n'est pas
assez mature et intellectuellement indépendant pour pouvoir faire des
choix éclairés, nous sommes d'avis que le test de proportionnalité n'est
pas appliqué par la Cour suprême et que généralement, il ne devrait pas
l'être. Nous concluons que l'intérêt et les droits fondamentaux de l'enfant
ont un poids prépondérant. / First, the author analyses five reasons that may be advanced to justify
freedom of religion: tolerance, rationality, utilitarianism, perfectionism and
neutrality. Then, the author generally sets out the mechanisms by which
freedom of religion is interpreted in Canada. These two preliminary steps
lead to a critical analysis of the interaction between freedom of religion
and children's rights and interests. The author submits that when a legal
situation involves freedom of religion and the fundamental interests or
rights of children that are not capable of autonomous choices, the
Supreme Court does not apply a proportionality test and, generally, courts
should not apply it. The author concludes that the fundamental rights and
interests of children are preponderant. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LL.M. en droit option recherche"
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Religion Drag: The Relevance of “Critical Religion” and Queer Theory to Canadian Law and Religious FreedomDesmarais, Gabrielle 15 January 2014 (has links)
This dissertation analyses the use of the word “religion” in Canadian law and theorises the consequences of its use for the legal protection of religious movements in Canada. Chapter One establishes the problems of the word “religion” in academic discourse by providing an overview of work in the field of critical religion. This dissertation considers whether the critiques of the term “religion” by scholars working within critical religion are equally relevant when considering the role of religion in human rights law. Chapter Two turns an investigative eye toward Canadian case law using the word “religion”, from Chaput v Romain (1959) to Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony (2009). The analysis highlights how the use of “religion” in Canadian law does indeed reflect academic concerns. Chapter Three uses queer theory to speculate the consequences of an unstable concept of religion for the protection of religious freedom, especially as it pertains to new religious movements. Judith Butler’s notions of performativity and drag are applied to theorise the performance of “religion” and its outcomes. Some suggestions for how to proceed conclude the dissertation.
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Exemplars or exceptions: imagining constitutional courts in a religiously diverse society.Conrad, Geoffrey Baines 02 February 2012 (has links)
Despite being similarly concerned with the legitimacy of law under conditions of diversity, political and legal theorists currently seem to differ significantly in the role they would reserve for religious reasons in public decision-making processes. Religious arguments that would generally be considered inappropriate if not inadmissible in a courtroom are increasingly viewed as acceptable and even desirable contributions to debate in the political public sphere. The author argues that the existence of this disconnect can be explained by the special challenges that religion poses for constitutional adjudication which in turn should inform our understanding of the judicial decision-making function. Constraints inherent to constitutional courts that make them effective institutions for concrete dispute resolution significantly limit their ability to engage seriously with the normative challenges posed by religious diversity. We should thus properly understand the role of constitutional adjudication as peripheral in matters of public policy that intersect with questions of religious difference. / Graduate
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Autonomous aboriginal criminal justice and the Charter of RightsJohnston, William Wayne 05 1900 (has links)
The imminent recognition of an inherent Aboriginal right to selfgovernment
signals the beginning of the reversal of a colonization process
which threatened the cultural survival of a people. The Report of the Aboriginal
Justice Inquiry of Manitoba , hereinafter referred to as the Inquiry, advocates an
autonomous Aboriginal criminal justice system as a significant component of
this cultural revitalization. This Aboriginal criminal justice system would differ
markedly from the conventional system in giving priority to collective rights over
conflicting individual rights. The Inquiry rejects the Charter as alien to Aboriginal
values and advocates a “tailor-made” Aboriginal charter that would incorporate
“only those fundamental freedoms and civil liberties that do not violate the
beliefs and paramount collective rights of the Aboriginal peoples.”
The conventional justice system’s paramount concern for individual
rights is premised on the potential of punishment. The Inquiry’s starkly
contrasting paramount emphasis on collective rights is premised on an
Aboriginal view of justice which this thesis refers to as the “harmony ethos”:
The underlying philosophy in Aboriginal societies in
dealing with crime was the resolution of disputes, the
healing of wounds and the restoration of social
harmony… Atonement and restoration of harmony
were the goals - not punishment.
The tension between individual and collective rights apparent in the
proposal of the Inquiry is the specific focus of this thesis. The colonization
process may justify a separate Aboriginal justice system. However, the harmony
ethos premise, while appropriate to the mediation-reconciliation communitarian
model of justice advocated by the Inquiry, blinds the Inquiry to the additional,
and crucially different, adjudicative-rights imperatives of the contemporary
Aboriginal society.
Actually existing Indianism reveals conflict-generating fault lines in the
harmony premise which challenge the sufficiency of the Inquiry’s group-based justice paradigm and indicate a need and desire for an adjudication justice
component and concomitant Charter values.
This adjudication hiatus in the Inquiry position is a reflection of a similar
void in historical Aboriginal justice which challenges the asserted rationale of
cultural survival for the paramountcy of collective rights in the contemporary
Aboriginal justice system. This historical adjudication hiatus does not preclude
a separate Aboriginal justice system, but favours the inclusion of Charter values
to strengthen an adjudication cultural foundation which is frail relative to its
reconciliation-mediation strength.
This thesis is a modest attempt to address the interface between two
systems; one mature, but in need of change, the other, fledging and in need of
assistance. The Charter provides a ready and flexible framework to join the
Aboriginal community both to the larger society and to the unlanded Aboriginal
diaspora by principled standards of justice. These fundamental indicia of
fairness, recognized by all civilized self-governing units, constitute no significant
threat to the cultural survival of the Aboriginal mediation justice heritage, while
buttressing its inherent adjudication frailty. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate
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