<p>Chapter One of this thesis focuses on critiques of modernity and capitalism, both of which are deeply implicated in the advent of the Anthropocene. Drawing from Bruno Latour, Anna L. Tsing, Caroline Levine, and Adam Seligman, I examine the sincere drive to ?purify? the world of its entangled networks. I then consider Francois Jullien?s critique of the Western ?cult of action,? discussing it alongside Latour?s critique of modern temporality and Tsing?s critique of progress. Finally, I read David Mitchell?s novel, Ghostwritten, in the context of this discussion. In the second chapter I discuss how Latour, Tsing, and Jullien ask us to turn our attention to the entangled world, rather than striving to purify it. I present a metaphor of fermentation in order to consider how we rely on natural processes to bring about change rather than individual will. This alternate form of action relies on the propensity for transformation already latent in an assemblage. I end with a discussion of Ursula Le Guin?s Earthsea Cycle, arguing that the Immanent Grove and the Master Patterner illustrate this amodern form of action.

Faced with global challenges, like environmental degradation, poverty, social injustice, and discrimination against marginalized societal groups, it is important to develop strategies that promote concern for the well-being of others and encourage prosocial action. Engaging in prosocial behaviors can contribute to positive social change through reducing discrimination, improving the situation and well-being of those in need, and fostering more sustainable personal lifestyles. One important factor that limits human prosociality is our ‘finite pool of worry’, the fact that humans have only finite resources, physiologically, cognitively, and socially (Linville & Fischer, 1991; Weber, 2006). Effortful and costly prosociality (Dovidio, 1984; Gneezy, Imas, Brown, Nelson, & Norton, 2012; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Simpson & Willer, 2008), especially towards distant and unknown others, stigmatized groups, or the natural environment, may not receive preference in the allocation of resources over self-related goals and the fulfillment of crucial personal needs. One of the most fundamental human needs is establishing and maintaining a positive self-image (Epstein, 1973; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). This dissertation investigates two strategies for motivating prosocial behavior that leverage this need for a positive self-image and the fact that humans are motivated to fulfill it. Paper I explores anticipated emotions in the context of pro-environmental decision making. It assess the effects of inducing people to consider their future feelings with a certain decision they are about to take. Results show that inducing people to anticipate pride from prosocial action versus guilt from inaction is relatively more effective at instilling pro-environmental motivation. Furthermore, exploratory findings point toward potential reactance to attempts to solicit prosocial behavior by prompting anticipated guilt. Papers II and III explore the potential of a values affirmation intervention to motivate prosocial behavior. Starting from self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), paper II hypothesizes that the act of affirming one’s values may increase positive self-directed emotions (‘positive self-regard’) which can translate into downstream prosociality. It proposes a potential explanation for this effect, such that a heightened positive sense of self, stemming from engaging in the affirmation intervention, may reduce worry about the self, thus freeing up cognitive and emotional resources to engage in behaviors directed towards others. Results show that a values affirmation intervention can successfully promote prosocial behavior towards unknown and distant others in the form of volunteering time and donating real money to charity. As hypothesized, positive self-regard mediates the effect of the affirmation intervention on prosociality. Paper III extends the scope of the work to situations in which the beneficiaries of the prosocial action are members of marginalized and stigmatized societal groups, such as ex-prisoners. It tests the generalizability of the hypothesized affirmation effects in two countries, Nigeria and the United States. Results show that engaging members of the public in a values affirmation intervention can reduce discriminatory tendencies and promote prosociality towards ex-prisoners in both countries under investigation. Implications and recommendations for policy and practice are discussed in each paper. This dissertation is of high theoretical as well as applied relevance and makes important contributions to scholarship and practice. It contributes to the advancement of psychological theory as well as its application potential to help foster social change in an endeavor to address some of the most pressing and challenging social issues nations around the world face.

278 f. / Submitted by Suelen Reis (suziy.ellen@gmail.com) on 2013-05-06T15:56:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rita Celia Torreao_Tese.pdf: 4098206 bytes, checksum: b874c6fd5dfcb67e42e669888ba74d97 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Auxiliadora Lopes(silopes@ufba.br) on 2013-06-10T19:24:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Rita Celia Torreao_Tese.pdf: 4098206 bytes, checksum: b874c6fd5dfcb67e42e669888ba74d97 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-06-10T19:24:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rita Celia Torreao_Tese.pdf: 4098206 bytes, checksum: b874c6fd5dfcb67e42e669888ba74d97 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Esta é uma tese de doutoramento em educação do Programa de Pesquisa e Pósgraduação da Faculdade de Educação (FACED/UFBA). Apesar de ser fundamentada na filosofia bergsoniana, ela não se constitui como um recorte nas obras nem no pensamento de Henri Bergson, isso porque se sua filosofia é uma filosofia da vida e seu pensamento algo vivo, não poderia ser repartido sem matá-lo ou torcê-lo; logo, ele precisa ser inteiro, intuído, absolutamente. Como esta não é uma tese em filosofia, mas em filosofia da educação, não pretendo fazer interpretações do pensamento de Bergson, sendo que às vezes isso foi inevitável. Então, ela é um transbordamento do pensamento de Bergson para dar subsídio a uma filosofia da educação que considere a duração. Partindo da diferenciação que Bergson faz entre o que é vivo e o construído, realizei uma viragem interna; por isso a tese foi antes intuída, e depois construída. Para Bergson, o construído vai da periferia para o centro e o vivo do centro para a periferia, essa diferença é muito importante no meu trabalho, pelo fato do construído permitir uma ação de análise da inteligência, já que tudo que ele possui veio de fora, e ao reparti-lo encontraremos esses componentes, mas o vivo explode de um centro para a periferia, criando, e não se submete à analise da inteligência, a não ser deformando-o. O vivo é inteiro e só pode ser apreendido de um só golpe. Juntando a isso o entendimento de que consciência é algo vivo, foi preciso refazer tudo que entendia sobre Educação. Outra ideia fundamental para esta tese é a de tempo real como duração; em Bergson o tempo é qualidade pura, contínuo e heterogêneo, não pode ser contado; assim, o que importa não são as horas vividas mas o que se viveu nessas horas. Isso revoluciona os conceitos de currículo, carga horária e hora-aula. Também foi de grande utilidade para mim a ideia de Henri Bergson de que construímos nossa personalidade a partir de nossas escolhas, essa idéia destrói as mentalidades tribais, os grupos sociais, culturais, sexuais ou étnicos como pressuposto para uma Educação bergsoniana. Foi feito um esforço para utilizar a intuição como método, pois a inteligência possui o hábito da analise e de espacializar e quantificar, além da própria linguagem ser uma espacialização do pensamento. De início, segui os conselhos de Bergson, colocando na perspectiva temporal os entes educativos: o aluno, o professor, a escola e a atividade de ensinar e aprender. Desse esforço resultou um novo entendimento desses entes e a compreensão de que a educação se dá individualmente e de maneira irrepetível, ela é mudança contínua e heterogênea; mudança vital que resulta das escolhas e da vocação. Mostramos o desmoronamento da escola em todos os seus sentidos, estrutura física, pensamento pedagógicos e teorias educacionais. Verificamos o papel central do professor como ente privilegiado do encontro do educar, pois ele não desmorona com o tempo, ele devém, ele cria. Esse movimento em direção ao pensamento de Bergson levou-me à intimidade, ao indizível do eu profundo. Isso impôs a utilização de linguagens para além do discurso filosófico-científico, e foi preciso recorrer à poesia e a conceitos da teologia para tentar dizer o indizível. Assim, após uma reconceituação dos entes educativos, conforme a metafísica de Bergson, cheguei aos últimos capítulos através da obra As duas fontes da moral e da religião ao ensinamento do moral e da ética, realizando um passeio pelo misticismo bergsoniano e suas relações com a educação e a moral. / Salvador

Why do we defend the social conditions responsible for our injustice and exploitation? We are confused when disadvantaged women of color cite personal shortcomings rather than the social system as the source of their precarity. Yet, when social philosophers take up these questions by appealing to the concept of ideology, they turn to structural accounts and dismiss theories of false consciousness outright. Accounts of false consciousness, often understood as an epistemic failing to recognize some features of our inadequate social world, meet with a host of objections. Some argue that ascriptions of false consciousness involve authoritarianism, while others criticize the concept for commitments to an implausible correspondence picture of truth. Meanwhile, dismissal of false consciousness accounts of ideology have led to the neglect of an important feature of how ideology works: in and through our own agency. Without an account of false consciousness, critics fail to account for the fact that social structures are the result of our collective consent. They also fail to address how social structures are not analyzable without turning to the self-understandings of the participants in these very institutions. This dissertation addresses issues in ideology critique that account for our agency. By preserving what is still alive in a theory of false consciousness while addressing the long-standing concerns about authoritarianism and correspondence, this project reconstructs the notion of false consciousness. It closely engages with figures in critical social theory such as Marx, Lukacs, Habermas, Haslanger, Honneth, and Jaeggi, while widening the terms of the debate to consider the relevance, for instance, of object relations psychoanalysis for social philosophers. Beyond this, this dissertation shows that false consciousness is a damaged way of relating to ourselves, to each other, and to the social world. It is characterized, I propose, by affective investment. This move helps us clarify both the phenomenology of false consciousness and what a viable form of critique could look like. Psychoanalysis offers us a new way of understanding ideology critique by directing us beyond the model of critique as judgment as part of overcoming false consciousness.