Zugl.: Frankfurt am Main, Univ., Diss., 2006

Inaug.-Diss.--Uppsala. / Thesis statement on special t.p. inserted. Bibliography: p. [188]-192.

This dissertation inaugurates a study on the connections between the philosophies of Aristotle and Charles S. Peirce. It discusses, first, Peirce's reading of Aristotle's works and philosophy, with an emphasis on three studies by Peirce of a translation of Aristotle's Categories, a study on Aristotle's notion of priority, and a study on the current situation of the Corpus Aristotelicum. Secondly, this dissertation deals with logic, particularly induction, abduction, and analogy. In the case of induction, Peirce claimed that Aristotle stated perfectly the form of induction in Prior Analytics II 23. However, Aristotle's concept of induction is not univocal, but, I argue, it stands for six different notions. Peirce seemed to neglect such diversity in Aristotle's concept of induction, even though his own concept of induction is also diverse. Aristotle's six concepts of induction and Peirce's kinds of induction do not match each other, and therefore, the chapter on induction closes with a comparison between these notions in order to determine to what extent they resemble or differ from each other. With regard to abduction, Peirce claimed that it originated in Prior Analytics II, 25. I argue that Peirce was mistaken in focusing on this passage. This does not mean that Aristotle did not have an idea of abduction. As I will show, there are other passages in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, neglected by Peirce, in which it is possible to find such an analysis of this kind of reasoning. In the case of analogy, both philosophers have a similar and clear account of it as a compound or composite. However, whereas Aristotle claimed it to be composed of induction and deduction, Peirce included abduction too. Thirdly, I explore and compare their theories of cognition. Peirce did not feel indebted to Aristotle and, on the contrary, criticized the positions of the Greek philosopher. However, I will argue that their theories of cognition agree in their general features, namely, empiricism, realism, and synechism. Peirce's critiques of Aristotle are in part due to a misinterpretation of Aristotle's philosophy that took Aristotle to be, in modern terms, a dualist and a rationalist. In sum, I aim to show through these three features, the ways in which Peirce's philosophy is ‒and is not‒ aligned with that of Aristotle.

The main thesis of this project is that Peirce’s theory of the categories can be applied in order to better explain and inform a robust theory of creative freedom. I defend the claim that those three categories are: Peirce’s idea of God, understood as his idea of an evolving cosmos open to growth, as firstness; self-control and our capacity to deliberate in order to make choices as secondness; and the idea of community as thirdness. However, the concept of God, what I consider the first category of freedom, is not the main focus of this project, since I have dealt with it at some length in my master thesis. In this dissertation, I provide a general overview of the context and the scholarly tradition of Peirce’s studies on ethics in order to show and justify my position in it. Moreover I explore the second category of freedom, i.e. self-control. First, I show the development of this idea under the context of the philosophical tradition that influenced Peirce; second, I deal with a reconstruction of the concept of self-control under Peirce’s theory of semeiotics; third, I attempt to explain self-control according to the three categories based on Edward Petry’s formulations; and fourth I explore the conception of the summum bonum, not only from the perspective of its development in Peirce’s theory but also in its function as the aesthetic value that directs and guides the manner in which self-control and its categories work out under the frame of a theory of creative freedom. Finally, I analyze the role of community in enabling and making freedom possible from the perspective of education, more specifically, its role of promoting truth, goodness, and beauty according to the normative sciences. The application of Peirce’s theory of the categories to a theory of creative freedom provides some advantages over other kind of approaches. If the three Peircean categories can be applied to the way in which we experience freedom, then the possible theories of ethics can be reduced to seven in the same way that Peirce’s model of classification catalogues all possible systems of metaphysics. Furthermore, it means that all other systems of ethics that neglect one of these conditions would be for Peirce degenerate in some respect. Although I do not explore this account in greater detail here, as I see it, this proposal provides a very useful framework. Thus, I hope to provide a robust perspective on freedom as creativity, where positive freedom (not just the negative freedom emphasized by North American cultures) plays an important role in acknowledging that a community acquires a responsibility for the well being and flourishing of its people, and therefore, the role of education, and community become also crucial.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This thesis develops a general theory of patterns on the basis of the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce. The main questions with which this thesis is concerned are: what is the ontological status of patterns? In what does their reality consist in? Why does exhibiting patternhood seem to be a necessary condition for the very possibility of cognition? The development of the theory is motivated by a discussion of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), a theory that has recently been gaining attention in analytic philosophy of science, especially in philosophy of physics. The central claim of OSR is that only patterns (structures) are real; individual objects are not real, or have only a “thin” being in some sense. In this thesis I deal mainly with the version of OSR developed by James Ladyman and Don Ross in their book Every Thing Must Go. I address two criticisms that are commonly levelled against OSR, (1) that it cannot give an adequate account of the difference between physical structure and mathematical structure, and (2) that it cannot give an adequate account of the relationship between the world and our representations of the world. I then show how Peirce’s philosophical framework, as encapsulated in his pragmatism, theory of the categories, Scholastic realism, and theory of the continuum, could provide an answer to these difficulties. OSR will also be used to illuminate an aspect of Peirce’s philosophy which I believe has not been sufficiently emphasized in the literature, namely its structuralist aspect. Specifically, it will be shown that Peirce’s philosophy leads to a worldview very similar to that of OSR, via a path of reasoning that is completely different from those standardly used to argue for OSR. This thesis as a whole is an attempt to throw light on the nature of patternhood through an elucidation and justification of this path of reasoning, which I call the alternative path to OSR.

Este trabalho dedica-se ao ramo da Semiótica que Charles S. Peirce chamou de Gramática Especulativa: o estudo das condições formais para que um Signo funcione como tal, o levantamento dos tipos possíveis de Classes de Signos e sua classificação. A Gramática Especulativa é o primeiro ramo da Semiótica, a Lógica o segundo e a Comunicação o terceiro. Um tratamento semiótico frutuoso da Comunicação depende, portanto, de que a Gramática e a Lógica estejam suficientemente desenvolvidas. Esta foi a motivação deste trabalho. Depois de uma introdução geral sobre Peirce e o desenvolvimento de Semiótica, apresentamos uma proposta de geração de 66 Classes de Signos e sua classificação numa Tabela Periódica. Discutimos brevemente cada uma das Classes de Signos e fazemos algumas considerações sobre como esta tabela pode ajudar a resolver alguns problemas da Lógica e a construir uma Teoria da Comunicação formalmente semiótica. / This work is dedicated to the branch of Semiotic that Charles S. Peirce called Speculative Grammar: the study of the formal conditions that enable a Sign to function as such, the survey of all possible types of Signs and their ordered classification. The Speculative Grammar is the first branch of Semiotic, Logic is the second and Communication is its third one. A fruitful semiotic treatment of the Communication depends, therefore, on that the Grammar and Logic are sufficiently developed. This was the motivation of this work. After an introduction about Peirce and the development of his Theory of Signs, we present a proposal for a generation of 66 Classes of Signs and make some considerations on how this table could help to solve some problems of Logic and to construct of a formally semiotic Theory of Communication.

Este trabalho dedica-se ao ramo da Semiótica que Charles S. Peirce chamou de Gramática Especulativa: o estudo das condições formais para que um Signo funcione como tal, o levantamento dos tipos possíveis de Classes de Signos e sua classificação. A Gramática Especulativa é o primeiro ramo da Semiótica, a Lógica o segundo e a Comunicação o terceiro. Um tratamento semiótico frutuoso da Comunicação depende, portanto, de que a Gramática e a Lógica estejam suficientemente desenvolvidas. Esta foi a motivação deste trabalho. Depois de uma introdução geral sobre Peirce e o desenvolvimento de Semiótica, apresentamos uma proposta de geração de 66 Classes de Signos e sua classificação numa Tabela Periódica. Discutimos brevemente cada uma das Classes de Signos e fazemos algumas considerações sobre como esta tabela pode ajudar a resolver alguns problemas da Lógica e a construir uma Teoria da Comunicação formalmente semiótica. / This work is dedicated to the branch of Semiotic that Charles S. Peirce called Speculative Grammar: the study of the formal conditions that enable a Sign to function as such, the survey of all possible types of Signs and their ordered classification. The Speculative Grammar is the first branch of Semiotic, Logic is the second and Communication is its third one. A fruitful semiotic treatment of the Communication depends, therefore, on that the Grammar and Logic are sufficiently developed. This was the motivation of this work. After an introduction about Peirce and the development of his Theory of Signs, we present a proposal for a generation of 66 Classes of Signs and make some considerations on how this table could help to solve some problems of Logic and to construct of a formally semiotic Theory of Communication.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T14:23:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo Maciel Gazoni.pdf: 1119902 bytes, checksum: 4f9aaed6e07679dd3a63ba771c24b3ee (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-17 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The study examines programming processes from the point of view of semiotics. Based on key concepts of computation and programming, it presents a critical review of the book Semiotics of Programming by Kumiko Tanaka-Ishii. The starting point is the Peircean argument of the affinity between the structure of logical reasoning and the mechanical processes in the logical machines of Jevons, Marquand e Babbage. The author takes the view that the philosophy of machines developed by Peirce in this context can serve as the basis of a computational semiotics and anchor a semiotics of programming appropriate to overcome prevailing dualist and Cartesian approaches, according to which human reasoning differs essentially from processes in nature in general and from mechanical processes in particular. The study reveals gaps in the semiotic theory of computation by Tanaka-Ishii, proposes ways to overcome them through the application of Peirce s semiotics and argues that the Peircean approach promises a better understanding of the cognitive processes involved in computation and programming / O estudo examina os processos de programação do ponto de vista da semiótica. Com base em conceitos chave da computação e programação, apresenta numa análise crítica do livro Semiotics of Programming de Kumiko Tanaka-Ishii. O ponto de partida é o argumento peirceano da afinidade entre as estruturas do raciocínio lógico e dos processos mecânicos nas máquinas lógicas de Jevons, Marquand e Babbage. O autor defende a tese de que a filosofia das máquinas desenvolvida por Peirce nesse contexto pode servir como base de uma semiótica computacional e ancorar uma semiótica da programação apropriada para ultrapassar abordagens preponderantes dualistas e cartesianas, conforme as quais o raciocínio humano difere essencialmente de processos na natureza em geral e de processos mecânicos em particular. O estudo revela lacunas na teoria semiótica computacional de Tanaka-Ishii, propõe caminhos para preenchê-las através da aplicação da semiótica de Peirce e postula que a abordagem peirceana promete uma melhor compreensão dos processos cognitivos envolvidos na computação e na programação

El objetivo de esta tesis es ofrecer una reconstrucción de la teoría de la investigación de John Dewey, prestando atención a sus antecedentes en los escritos del padre del pragmatismo, Charles Sanders Peirce, y a algunas derivaciones de tal teoría en la teoría de la argumentación contemporánea y en los estudios sociales de la ciencia. La misma está dividida en tres partes dedicadas a (I) explorar algunos antecedentes de la teoría de la investigación de Dewey, (II) desarrollar y analizar críticamente los aspectos centrales de tal teoría y, por último, (III) seguir la pista de algunas de sus derivaciones. El punto de partida es el análisis de la concepción de la lógica de la investigación de Peirce, tal como éste la fuera construyendo a partir de su crítica a la filosofía moderna. Ofrecemos una reconstrucción de las ideas de Peirce que permite dar cuenta de que, pese a las importantes diferencias entre las ideas de Peirce y Dewey, los desarrollos de este último pueden ser considerados como una prosecución, en nuevas y profundas direcciones, de algunas de las ideas más destacadas del primero y que constituyen, por ello, una lectura posible de algunos de los escritos más destacados de Peirce. En la segunda parte, la central de esta tesis, se aborda la teoría de la investigación de Dewey. En este marco, se reconstruye la teoría de la experiencia de Dewey, que constituye, como se argumenta, un verdadero punto de partida para la teoría de la investigación. Se argumenta que la teoría de la experiencia de Dewey puede ser considerada como un análisis de las consecuencias para la filosofía de algunos de los resultados más influyentes en el campo de la biología, la psicología y la antropología social en relación con la comprensión de los seres humanos. Se reconstruye también la teoría de la investigación que, al ser comprendida como una forma de la experiencia, permite dar cuenta del carácter mediador y transformacional del conocimiento. Se analizan, asimismo, las consecuencias que para la comprensión de la lógica se siguen de dicha concepción y se argumenta que, pese a lo que Peirce y algunos intérpretes contemporáneos sostienen, la lógica de Dewey puede ser considerada una verdadera lógica. Además, en esta segunda parte se analiza la concepción deweyana de la valoración y se reconstruye una perspectiva acerca de la interdependencia del conocimiento y los valores. Asimismo, se argumenta que, y contra lo que las críticas de Horkheimer y Marcuse sugieren, la teoría de la valoración de Dewey tiene un potencial crítico que permite plantear y abordar el problema de los fines de la acción y, en especial, los de esa acción cognitiva a la que llamamos ciencia. En la tercera y última parte de esta tesis se abordan algunas de las derivaciones de la teoría de la investigación de Dewey. En primer lugar, se exploran las relaciones entre la propuesta de Dewey y la de uno de los más destacados representantes de la teoría de la argumentación contemporánea, a saber, Stephen Toulmin. Se muestra que en la obra de este último puede identificarse una dimensión pragmatista y deweyana. En segundo lugar, se aborda la cuestión de la relación entre la teoría de la investigación de Dewey y el giro hacia las prácticas de los estudios sociales de la ciencia. En particular, se analizan algunos aspectos de la obra de Bruno Latour y de la de Karin Knorr Cetina, mostrando las profundas e interesantes continuidades que suponen con el trabajo de Dewey. Además, se aborda un problema fuertemente discutido en el ámbito de la sociología del conocimiento, a saber, el problema de la reflexividad de los estudios de la ciencia, con el objetivo de ofrecer una mirada deweyana sobre tal cuestión, lo que permitirá sostener una interpretación de la filosofía del conocimiento de Dewey como filosofía política de la ciencia.

The subject of this thesis is Roger Bacon`s work De signis. Its goal is to consider in what sense Bacon works out the general theory of signs. In this sense the thesis` method is situated in the field of "archeology of sings". First it examines Bacon`s definition of sign as a relation, investigates its formal properties and ways of application in particular cases, i.e. Bacon`s classification of signs. Then it shows the way in which Bacon applies this general notion in particular examinations, that is in problems of what the words signify, concept of univaocation and equivocation, theory of analogy and last but not least it considers a question of the nature of signification itself. The last chapter is dedicated to the examination of the (re)imposition phenomenon together with consideration of result it has on the notion of sign relation`s nature and how it serves as an explanation of the process in which these relations work. Keywords: Roger Bacon, John Deely, Charles S. Peirce, medieval semiotics, archeology of signs.