The article provides for an analysis of the legal nature of Article 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which declares "the right to protection against unjustified dismissal". In the focus of attention is the question, whether this right constitutes a human or a fundamental right or it is a right without the status of being fundamental or alternatively only a basic principle. The considerations are based on the legal theory of human rights and particularly social rights, as well as on the understanding of this right in the various international treaties and the constitutional traditions of the Member States. Furthermore, the article addresses the question of implementation of Article 30 in the national laws, scrutinizes the interpretation of Art. 51 Abs 1 of the Charter and highlights the deficiencies and possibilities. Also the image of this right mirrored in the European Union's law and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is examined.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the status of the EU Charter in the system of EU law and its application by Member States. EU fundamental rights in the EU can be perceived as controversial, because they can be regarded as a means of control of Union institutions, but also as a way of expansion of EU competences. In this context I will explore the EU Charter. The thesis is composed of 5 Chapters. In the First Chapter I will explain why human rights protection was not included in the Founding Treaties; furthermore I will elaborate on the case law of the Court which gave rise to EU fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. I will also explain why human rights are a sensitive issue between the EU and Member States. Chapter Two examines the development, content and the legal effects of the EU Charter. It also explores the parallel regime of the EU Charter and EU fundamental rights as general principles after the Treaty of Lisbon. Chapter Three is the core of this thesis. It explains the scope of application of the EU Charter by Member States. Based on the case law of the Court of Justice it will be shown that Member States are bound by EU fundamental rights when they act in the scope of EU law, which comprises of implementation of EU law, but also of derogation from EU law. It will be shown...

This thesis deals with the fundamental right to the protection of personal data as enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ('the Charter'). An analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on Article 8 of the Charter reveals an intriguing paradox: although this provision has been repeatedly invoked in order to enhance protection of personal data and has featured prominently in several far-reaching judgments (Digital Rights Ireland, Google Spain or Schrems), there is considerable uncertainty as to the substantive scope of the right to the protection of personal data. The relationship between the right to privacy and the right to data protection has proved difficult to untangle, and the autonomous nature of Article 8 of the Charter has not always been respected. The aim of the thesis is to analyse the purpose and content of this fundamental right with reference to the CJEU's case law and recent academic debate. This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the European legal framework for data protection and demonstrates the limited value of the 'Explanations relating to the Charter' in interpreting Article 8. Chapter 2 analyses the CJEU's approach to interpreting and applying Article 8, while Chapter 3 is...

in English This thesis deals with the right to personal data protection as enshrined in Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) and its relationship with Article 7 Charter, the right to respect for private and family life. Since both of the rights have immediate relevance for EU data protection, their coexistence in the Charter necessitates an explanation as to their relationship, interaction and the merit of adding an independent right to personal data protection. However, such explanation is difficult to trace. International human rights instruments have traditionally safeguarded the protection of personal data by the right to privacy. The common constitutional traditions of the Member States differ significantly in the enactment of data protection and the EU legislation in force is likewise treating data protection as a privacy subset. The thesis firstly attempts to assess whether the right to personal data protection is capable of autonomous standing, detached from the privacy right and secondly, whether the CJEU allows the right to personal data protection to stand as an autonomous right in reality. To deal with the first research task, the paper analyses the doctrinal sources discussing the personal data-privacy concepts and seeks to identify the value of Article's 8...

The thesis seeks to answer the question whether the European Union (EU) constitutional treaty offers improved protection for human rights in the EU jurisdiction. Within this context, it first seeks to find out what the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the constitutional treaty promises for the human rights&rsquo / field. Furthermore, it examines how the possible accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights will affect this field. Then, it focuses on what the constitutional treaty offers for third countries concerning human rights. Finally, in the light of the recent developments on the treaty, the discussion enlightens the role of the constitutional treaty on protecting and developing human rights in the EU.

La protection des droits fondamentaux par l’Union européenne et la problématique de la qualification juridique de l’Union ne sont pas isolées. Au contraire, elles sont profondément liées. Sous l’effet de la protection des droits fondamentaux, l’Union peut être classée dans la catégorie des fédéralismes. Cette nature fédérative exerce en retour une influence sur la protection des droits fondamentaux. La protection des droits fondamentaux et la nature de l’Union forment ensemble l’identité de l’Union. Cette identité pourrait-elle se concrétiser par une Fédération de droit ? Cette hypothèse de qualification, qui s’inspire du modèle de l’État de droit et repose sur les exigences du cosmopolitisme, vise une Fédération dont l’un des objectifs fondateurs est la protection des droits fondamentaux. Cette hypothèse offre certaines clés de compréhension sur l’articulation du processus de fédéralisation et de la protection des droits fondamentaux. Cependant, à bien des égards, l’articulation entre ce processus et cette protection est conflictuelle. Les obstacles à cette qualification sont nombreux. Les États membres souhaitent en effet préserver leur souveraineté. Les impératifs du fédéralisme économique ou les attentes d’une sécurité fédérative soulèvent également de multiples inquiétudes. Ces obstacles affectent tant le processus de fédéralisation que la protection des droits fondamentaux. En conclusion, ils empêchent de qualifier pleinement l’Union de Fédération de droit. / The protection of fundamental rights by the European Union and the issue of the Union's legal nature are not isolated. On the contrary, they are deeply linked. The Union can be classified in the category of federalism under the effect of the protection of fundamental rights. In return, this federative nature has an influence on the protection of fundamental rights. The protection of fundamental rights and the nature of the Union together form the identity of the Union. This identity could be a federal rule of law (Fédération de droit)? This hypothesis, which is based on the rule of law model and the requirements of cosmopolitanism, aims at a Federation whose founding objectives include the protection of fundamental rights. This hypothesis offers some keys to understanding how the federalization process and the protection of fundamental rights are articulated. However, the relationship between this process and the protection of fundamental rights is often conflictual. There are many obstacles to this qualification. Indeed, Member States wish to preserve their sovereignty. The imperatives of economic federalism or the expectations of federal security also raise multiple concerns. These obstacles impact both the federalization process and the protection of fundamental rights. In conclusion, they prevent this qualification of european federal rule of law.

La thèse analyse la nature, la portée et l’effectivité du principe de non-discrimination en raison de l’âge dans le système juridique de l’Union européenne du point de vue théorique ainsi que du point de vue de la protection juridictionnelle que l’Union européenne lui confie. Au niveau conceptuel, on met en évidence que l’âge représente un critère discriminatoire très particulier, se prêtant à être employée aussi de façon légitime en tant que instrument de gestion du marché du travail, et ayant une portée universelle, puisque il s’agit d’un facteur touchant tout le monde. Au niveau applicatif, il faut souligner que – dans la mesure où l’âge n’est pas toujours un facteur de discrimination – la Cour de justice – s’appuyant sur le fait que la directive 2000/78, visant à combattre les discriminations fondées (aussi) sur l’âge, introduit des multiples et larges justifications aux disparité de traitement liées à l’âge – exerce un contrôle assez souple. En même temps, toutefois, suite aux arrêts Mangold et Kücükdeveci, la Cour de justice a étendu les marges de son contrôle du moment où elle a affirmé que le principe de non-discrimination en raison de l’âge fait partie des principes généraux du droit de l’UE, dont le respect doit être assuré aussi dans les litiges entre particuliers. / This thesis focuses on the development of the issue of age discrimination in the EU context and in the Court of Justice leading cases. On the one side, the paper underlines the weaknesses of this specific ground of discrimination due to three main elements: i) the variability and universal impact of the “age factor”; ii) the existence of some provisions (such as art. 6, Council Directive 2000/78/EC) which seem to be unable in ensuring a complete protection in this field; iii) the role of age as an intrinsic criteria of labour market legislation, meaning that, in some circumstances, differences in treatment may be justified under legitimate aims. On the other side, the analysis of recent ECJ case law addresses other reflections concerning, first of all, the horizontal direct effect given to non-discrimination on ground of age as a general principle of EU law; then, the role and the importance of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and its provisions on age discrimination; furthermore, the necessity to balance the protection of this fundamental right with Member States discretion concerning employment policies.

Les raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général en droit de l’Union européenne sont des intérêts permettant la justification de restrictions aux différentes libertés de circulation. Ces raisons impérieuses sont donc un mode de justification. Un mode de justification essentiellement prétorien car c’est la Cour de justice qui l’a théorisé. Elle a instauré ces raisons dans l’arrêt Cassis de Dijon, étendu leur application à toutes les libertés de circulation et encadré cette application. Ainsi, ces raisons impérieuses sont soumises à la volonté de la Cour et à ses incertitudes. Par conséquent, si la jurisprudence est incertaine concernant les intérêts qualifiés de raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général voire contradictoire à propos des conditions liées aux raisons impérieuses, les raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général sont un mode de justification par essence prétorien. D’ailleurs, si certains textes de droit de l’Union européenne reprennent la théorie élaborée par la Cour de justice, ils restent vraiment fidèles à la jurisprudence. Ces textes, aussi bien de droit primaire que de droit dérivé, reprennent des éléments essentiels de la théorie des raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général et notamment les conditions élaborées par la Cour. Ces textes copient aussi les imperfections prétoriennes concernant la théorie des raisons impérieuses. On va même jusqu’à avoir une frontière entre les raisons impérieuses et les autres modes de justification tout aussi floue dans les textes que dans la jurisprudence de la Cour. Ainsi, malgré la reprise de la théorie des raisons impérieuses dans des textes, ce mode de justification reste par essence jurisprudentiel. / The mandatory requirements in the European Union law are reasons who can justify restrictions to the differents freedom of movements. So, those mandatory requirements are a justification method. An essentially jurisprudential justification method because it is the Court of justice who theorized it. It established thoses reasons in the Cassis de Dijon case, extended their application to every free movements and regulated their application. So, those mandatory requirements are also subject to the will of the Court and to its uncertainties. Therefore, if the jurisprudence is uncertain about interests named as mandatory requirements and even conflicting about its conditions, the mandatory requirements are an essentially jurisprudential justification method. Although, if some European Union law texts resume the jurisprudential made theory, they are truly loyal to the jurisprudence. Those texts, both primary and secondary law, pick up essential elements of the theory, in particular the conditions created by the Court. But those texts also copy the Courts imperfections about the theory. They even have a border between mandatory requirements and other justification methods equally blurred in the texts and in the jurisprudence. Thus, despite the retake of the theory of mandatory requirements in texts, this justification method stays essentially jurisprudential.

La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne a acquis une force juridique contraignante depuis l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne. Les institutions européennes et les Etats membres lorsqu’ils mettent en oeuvre le droit de l’Union européenne sont donc liés par ses dispositions. Mais les autorités publiques ne devraient pas être les seules à être soumises au respect des droits et libertés qu’elle garantit. En effet, les particuliers, parce qu’ils peuvent, à l’instar des pouvoirs publics, attenter aux droits primordiaux de leurs semblables, devraient également être tenus de respecter cet instrument juridique lorsqu’ils se trouvent placés dans une situation régie par le droit de l’Union européenne. Autrement dit, la Charte des droits fondamentaux devrait déployer des effets juridiques dans le cadre des relations de droit privé lorsqu’il existe un lien de rattachement avec le droit de l’Union européenne. Cet effet horizontal permettrait ainsi aux particuliers de jouir effectivement des droits et libertés consacrés par la Charte. On attend donc des autorités publiques, conformément à leurs obligations positives, qu’elles protègent les droits que les particuliers tirent de cet instrument juridique. La reconnaissance de l’effet réflexe de la Charte des droits fondamentaux aura ainsi pour conséquence de créer des obligations tant pour les institutions européennes et les Etats membres que pour les personnes privées. / The Charter of fundamental rights has acquired a binding legal force since the coming into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon. Hence, the institutions of the European Union and member states when they implement the law of the European Union are bound by the provisions of the Charter. But the addressees of this legal instrument should not be only public authorities. Individuals, whenever it could impinge on freedoms and basic rights, should be subject, to compliance with the Charter when the matter falling the scope of EU law. In other words, the Charter of fundamental rights should have legal effects in private law relations when there is a connecting link to EU law. Horizontal effect would allow individuals to have full enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Charter. Public authorities must therefore, in keeping with their positive obligations, protect the rights derive from the provisions of this legal instrument. Therefore, the recognition of horizontal effect of the Charter will create obligations for both institutions of European Union and member states and private persons.

The content of the presented thesis is the introduction of selected institutes of the laws on political parties and their enactment in the Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The thesis is divided into two chapters. The first addresses the fundamental questions of the legal regulations on political parties in both countries. The second deals with the funding of political parties. Because this is a comparative thesis, individual legal regulations are always introduced in the first two subchapters. The third subchapter compares the most significant institutes and their possible use in the Czech law is proposed. The main points of the first chapter are especially the process of political party creation, the comparison of anchored attributes of a democracy capable of defence in the laws and last but not least also the contemplation of the possible expansion of the addressees of the right to form and join political parties and political movements, pursuant to Article 20 par. 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, also to foreigners staying in the Czech Republic for a long time. The second chapter of this thesis deals with the current topic that has been a part of political life since its beginning - the funding of political parties. Both compared countries have gone through...