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Whither to, the judiciary in Zimbabwe? A critical analysis of the human rights jurisprudence of the Gubbay and Chidyausiku Supreme Court benches in Zimbabwe and comparative experiences from UgandaMapfumo, Tafadzwa January 2005 (has links)
"The judiciary in Zimbabwe used to be viewed as a progressive bench recognised for its activism, particularly its purposive approach in interpreting the Bill of Rights to ensure protection of human rights. It was one of the best Commonwealth judiciaries, which was inspired by international standards in interpreting human rights and at the same time contributed to the origination of normative standards through its decisions. Although Zimbabwe is a dualist system, the judiciary accepted and drew inspiration from international human rights treaties. The Supreme Court (SC) under Chief Justice (CJ) Gubbay (the Gubbay bench) made several progressive pronouncements that favoured the promotion and protection of human rights. In tandem with its tradition of judicial independence, the judiciary interpreted draconian legislation in favour of human rights often striking down the offensive clauses in legislation. Indeed the perception towards the judiciary by the common person was that of a protector of human rights. One landmark human rights decision on the Land Reform Programme (LRP) stated that farm invasions were unlawful and an affront to section 16 of the Constitution. The SC ordered the executive to take necessary measures to ensure that invasions were sanctioned. It further requested the executive to furnish a plan of action for the LRP. The execuitve did not welcome this ruling and the SC judges wre hounded out of office in a clear culmination of judiciary-executive tension. A new bench came in under CJ Chidyausiku (the Chidyausiku bench). This bench made several rulings that took away individual property rights without justification. In a clear shift of jurisprudential ideology, the current bench has not engaged in activism resulting in less, if not no, protection of human rights. The disparity in the jurisprudence is evident in other cases. The current bench seems to have abrogated its mandate to protect human rights. This study is thus prompted to investigate why the different benches in Zimbabwe have produced totally variant jurisprudence, particularly in light of the fact that the judiciary is operating under the same laws and is appointed under the same procedures as before. ... Chapter 1 sets out the focus and content of the study. Chapter 2 gives a national framework for human rights protection in Zimbabwe. This looks at the structure of courts in Zimbabwe. Special emphasis is placed on the SC as the court that has the prime mandate of protecting human rights. Constitutional guarantees for the independence of the judiciary and the Bill of Rights, among others, is analysed. Chapter 3 deals with human rights jurisprudence of the SC benches. The chapter focuses on approach of the benches to human rights protection. It examines the approach to procedural and technicalities that often hinder human rights litigation and protection such as standing, delay, interpretation, compliance with court orders and use of international instruments. Chapter 4 focuses on the experiences from Uganda and analyses the approach of the Ugandan courts. Chapter 5 consists of best practices from the two jurisdictions, conclusion and recommendations for the Zimbabwean judiciary." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2005. / Prepared under the supervision of Professor Frederick Jjuuko at Human Rights and Peace Centre, Faculty of Law, Makerere University in Uganda / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM
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The Supreme Court's Chief Umpire: Judging the Legal Rhetoric and Judicial Philosophy of John G. Roberts, Jr.Hudkins, Jay 2011 August 1900 (has links)
Many Supreme Court followers contended that Judge John Roberts entered his Supreme Court confirmation hearings as a "stealth candidate" who lacked a paper trail the Judiciary Committee could vet to discern the interpretive approach, or judicial philosophy, to which Judge Roberts' subscribed. This dissertation used rhetorical criticism as a methodological approach for examining this claim. A close-reading of Roberts' law journal articles, his writings from his service during the Reagan and Bush (41) administrations, the text of his appellate court confirmation testimony and published opinions, and the text of his Supreme Court confirmation testimony and published opinions reveals that Roberts was not a "stealth candidate" but instead a jurist who resolved constitutional, judicial, political, and statutory issues by incorporating components of originalism and positivism into his prudentialist judicial philosophy.
The first two chapters of the dissertation provide the requisite background for the study. Chapter I discusses the challenges of the nomination and confirmation processes for Supreme Court Justices, and the chapter discusses the crucial powers that the Chief Justice possesses. Chapter II introduces readers to legal arguments, argument modalities, and judicial philosophies, and the chapter offers a new definition for the terms "legal rhetoric" and provides a new methodology for studying judicial discourse.
The subsequent chapters comprise the core of the study. Chapter III examines Roberts' law review articles and the letters, memoranda, and position papers he wrote while working for the Reagan and Bush administrations, Chapter IV investigates Roberts' appellate court confirmation testimony and his published opinions, and Chapter V investigates Roberts' Supreme Court confirmation testimony and his published opinions. Following a chronological approach reveals that Roberts consistently used certain argument types within corresponding argument modalities to formulate his argumentative strategies, and each chapter demonstrates that Roberts' adhered to a prudentialist interpretive approach to resolve constitutional and statutory questions. Finally, Chapter VI argues that scholars should examine judicial discourse from an interdisciplinary perspective and reevaluate their conceptions about legal rhetoric and rhetorical criticism.
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The Chief Justice: Democratic Leadership of the Judicial Decision-Making Process in the Hidden BranchRoot, David 27 October 2016 (has links)
My dissertation examines chief justice leadership of the United States Supreme Court during the judicial decision-making process. With the office steeped in secrecy, I borrow seminal concepts from the leadership literature such as autocratic, laissez-faire, and democratic leadership and adapt them to the office in order to systematically identify dominant patterns of leadership. While chief justices use different styles, the office is chiefly democratic in both structure and operation, which makes the chief justice a “first among equals” and requires him to be just as good of a political negotiator as he is a competent legal judge. This is a unique, but under appreciated, feature of the chief justice when compared to the associate justices. / 10000-01-01
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“A very unfortunate circumstance”: the colonial evolution of defining British sovereignty emanating from murdercases in New South Wales, 1790 –1836Chaves, Kelly Kathleen Unknown Date (has links) (PDF)
Governor Arthur Phillip did not magically extend British sovereignty over the continent of Australia when he read his orders to the assembled convicts and members of the military in January 1788. To the international community, this act of declaratory sovereignty claimed Australia for Britain. Gaining practical legal authority over the indigenous population, however, took years and a number of court cases to obtain. The British established their sovereignty over the Australian Aborigines by integrating them into the British legal system. This legal incorporation eventuated in stages. Three important stages were: first in 1790, when the British attempted to punish Aborigines for the murder of white men, secondly in 1827, when the British tried to punish white settlers for the deaths of indigenes, and lastly in 1836 when the British decided to punish indigenes for murders committed amongst themselves. Previous colonial experience influenced British officials’ dealing with the indigenous population of Australia. Many of the colonisers who settled in Australia, Britain’s penultimate colony, had lived in other parts of the British Empire. This prior colonial experience shaped the views and outlooks of legal policy towards the Aborigines.
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THE POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUSBeckett, Elizabeth Jean 01 January 2013 (has links)
In June 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the fate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in a case called National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. While initially the decision seemed favorable to supporters of the bill, Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion could likely render the bill ineffective in implementation and it creates more Constitutionally confusing precedent than it resolves. Among the questions that now rise to the surface are: will Congress be able to raise the tax to a level where it will become effective? What is now mandatory for states to adopt into their Medicaid programs? Where is the line for the federal government with regards to coercion? What are the definitions of direct and indirect taxes? And, how binding is the Origination Clause of the Constitution?
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The Ottoman Ulema Group And State Of PracticingGundogdu, Ismail 01 February 2009 (has links) (PDF)
In this study, it is aimed to analyze the learned (ilmiye) group that was important part of the military class of the Ottoman Empire and the ilmiye group had three important members. They were judges (kadis), professors (mü / derrises) and muftis (mü / ftü / s) and they were analyzed from the beginning to the end of the career line as a dynamic process. Due to the vast nature of the subject, one needed to delimit the research in terms of time and space. In that regard, it was chosen the 18th century and the districts belonging to the Anatolian kazâ / skerlik (chief justice). Due also to the impossibility to cover the whole Ottoman eras of six hundred years, the eighteenth century was chosen, the period following the classical period and preceding the era of modernization. This was because the 18th century was the era when the classical institutions of the Ottoman Empire could no longer resist the forces of change. The extent of changes, which took place in this century, might constitute a topic for other researches. On the other hand, the need to delimit the area of research to the Anatolian chief justice (kazâ / skerlik) was a result of technical and methodological necessity.
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A critical evaluation of the independence of the Office of the Chief Justice and its role in promoting judicial transformation in South AfricaPhatshwane, Rebaone Jeremia 07 1900 (has links)
The legislative supremacy of Parliament has dominated the constitutional law of South Africa for a very long time. In the pre-constitutional era, the judiciary had no power to question the deeds of Parliament. Despite the need for the judiciary to be independent from the two other governmental branches to execute its function effectively, it was surely dependent on them. However, the creation of the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) as a separate governmental department by the Constitutional Seventeenth Amendment Act, read together with Superior Court Act, mandated by the requirements of a supreme Constitution (and not Parliament), changed things so that the judiciary is no longer dependent on government for its day-to-day administration. This thesis examines the independence of the OCJ and its role in promoting judicial transformation in the new South Africa. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. M. (Human Rights Law)
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