Since China launched open door policy of economic reform in 1978, China has registering a sustained economic growth, which made it one of the worlds¡¦leading economies, also became the world's third biggest economy. Since late 1980s, China has not only became the world factory, with huge market, cheap labor force, and the main destination of foreign direct investments, but also became a world class political power whose influence is continuously growing in Asia and all over the world. China has also paid much attention to Africa region Since 1950s. China provided grant, interest-free loan, and low-interest loan to African nations at that time. After 1980s, in order to promote the share in common with Africa, China gradually took reform in foreign aid institutions and foreign aid management systems in various forms. After the end of the Cold-War, the foreign aid concept within western nations had put more focus on the development and cooperation. China was also deeply influenced by this trend; as a result, it led to the normalization of ¡§South-South Cooperation¡¨. In this research, the author analyses the development and strategies of China's Africa foreign aid policy, and tries to examine China's methods and objectives under the international political and economic new order. The result reveals that while China pursuing the political and economic interests through the foreign aid, it must be exchanged with African nations so that the internal and external of foreign aid project could move forward. The establishment of FOCAC in 2000 was a three year of frameworks and goals for Sino-Africa in relative cooperation areas. China published the ¡§China's Africa Policy¡¨ in January 2006, who also declared to establish a new strategic partnership relations with African nations. It was also a dollar diplomacy competing era between China and Taiwan since 1990s, and China tried to aid every African nation diplomatic ally in order to prevent other African nations from establishing relationships with Taiwan.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study aimed to look at non-interference as a doctrine in China’s Africa Policy. This involved looking at the non-interference principle in general, not only in Beijing’s policies. The non-interference principle as contained in the policies of the African Union, United Nations and in the policies of Western and Asian states were discussed, noting a gradual shift away from strict non-interference towards non-indifference and humanitarian intervention. Beijing’s orthodox understanding of non-interference, on the other hand, is based on respect for the sovereignty of other states and a belief that, unless requested, no state should interfere in the domestic affairs of another state. The doctrine of non-interference, as understood by Beijing was then applied to the crisis in Darfur. In the case of Darfur, Beijing initially adhered to its understanding of non-interference, in spite of criticism that its behaviour was based solely on China’s own interests. China initially ignored international expectations to intervene in the affairs of Khartoum. In fact, Beijing continued to support Khartoum and abstained from UN Security Council resolutions on the matter. Initially the government in Beijing was not willing to make any adjustments to the non-interference doctrine, as the situation in Darfur did not seem to present any reason for Beijing to disregard its own policies. Yet Beijing gradually shifted in non-interference; seen in its pressure on Khartoum to allow the AU/UN hybrid peacekeeping force. The reasons for the shift are ascribed to various factors ranging from international pressure and even the possible reputational risk. China managed to balance its economic and political interests in Sudan with its duties and expectations of the Security Council. At the same time, Beijing continued to protect the sovereignty of the Khartoum government by adhering to its beliefs of the right of the state. The subtle shift away from Beijing’s orthodox understanding of non-interference can be seen as China changing its non-interference doctrine to suit its new role in the international community. It can also be seen as China still adhering to the non-interference doctrine, as it places emphasis on avoiding sanctions and still requires permission from the host state for external intervention. Another key element is that it adapted when its interests were at risk. It would seem probable that this trend will continue, resulting rather in Beijing implementing a form of ‘pro-active non-interference’ based on the situation. Such a position would indicate a shift in the doctrine of non-interference based on the situation and pressure, but according to certain core values of Beijing. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die navorser het ondersoek ingestel na die nietussenkomsleerstelling soos dit in China se Afrika-beleid vervat word. Die nietussenkomsbeginsel soos geformuleer in die beleidsdokumente van die Afrika-unie (AU), Verenigde Nasies (VN), en in die beleidsdokumente van die Westerse en Oosterse state is ook ondersoek. Die wegbeweging van die streng toepassing van die nietussenkomsleerstelling na ’n beleid van onverskilligheid en tussenkoms wat gebaseer is op die beskerming van menseregte was ’n geleidelike proses. Beijing se konvensionele begrip van hierdie beginsel was volgehou met die verstand dat soewereiiteit van ander state gerespekteer moet word en state nie moet inmeng by die interne sake van ander state nie, behalwe wanneer dit versoek word. Die klem word in beleidsdokumente eerder gelê op respek, gelykheid, samewerking en wedersydse voordeel. Die nietussenkomsleerstelling soos dit verstaan word deur Beijing word ondersoek aan die hand van die Dafoer-krisis. Dit toon Beijing het aanvanklik volgehou met die toepassing van die nietussenkomsleerstelling in China se buitelandsse beleid en optrede, ten spyte van die aantuigings dat hierdie gedrag slegs ter wille van eie belang is. Beijing het haar aanvanklik nie aan die internasionale gemeenskap se verwagting om in te gryp by die sake van Khartoum gesteur nie; China het aangehou om Khartoum te ondersteun en van die VN-veiligheidsraad te weerhou rakende hierdie kwessie. Beijing se optrede teenoor Khartoum het met tyd verander. Sjinese verteenwoordigers het druk op Khartoum begin plaas in 2006 om AU/VN-magte in Darfoer toe te laat. Verskeie redes kan aangevoer word hoekom Beijing uiteindelik haar beleid aangepas het. Van hierdie redes sluit in internasionale druk en die moontlikheid vir China om nie meer as gasheerland vir die Olimpiese Spele in 2008 op te tree nie. Dit kom voor of China daarin geslaag het om die land se ekonomiese en politiese belange in Soedan te balanseer met die verwagtinge wat ander lande van China as ’n permanente VN-lid gehad het. Beijing het gepoog om in so ’n mate in te gryp dat Khartoum se soewereiniteit steeds gerespekteer word. Aan die hand van hierdie subtiele veranderinge in China se beleid en optrede, kan die afleiding gemaak word dat Beijing nie die nietussenkomsleerstelling streng toegepas het nie, maar na die Darfoer-krisis eerder neig na ’n proaktiewe toepassing van die nietuseenkomsleerstelling. Byvoorbeeld, Beijing keur steeds nie die instelling van sanksies goed nie en vereis dat soewereinitiet van state gerespekteer word. Dit blyk dat China die buitelandse beleid aangepas het om steeds die land se belange te beskerm en om te voldoen aan die internasionale vereistes. Hierdie meer proaktiewe optrede blyk om net in sekere gevalle toegepas te word. Daar word bevind dat daar ’n aanpassing van die is met betrekking tot die oorspronklike posisie van die nietussenkomsleerstelling. Beijing sal egter voortgaan om getrou te wees aan aspekte van die oorspronklike leerstelling.