The focus of this study is the relationship between the Chinese central government and Song Zheyuan, the key provincial leader of North China, in the period immediately preceding the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the impact of tensions in that relationship on Japan policy. The most urgent task confronting the Chinese government in the late 1930s was to secure an equitable and formally-negotiated settlement of outstanding questions with the Tokyo government. The efforts of the Nanjing government are examined in terms of the divisions within the government and in the context of the public debate on Japan policy which was extended to cover fundamental questions of the regime's diplomatic maturity and the function of diplomacy in the new state. However, the Sino-Japanese question was not purely a diplomatic issue. Tensions between central and northern regional authorities and continuing provincial independence combined with persistent political and military interventions by the Japanese armies in North China to undermine the initiatives of the centre as the lack of an effective central Japan policy eroded regional confidence in the centre. By 1935 Nanjing's control in the North was breaking down and the initiative in contacts with Japan in the region passed to provincial leaders: Song Zheyuan emerged as a key figure in relations with Japan. In 1935-7 Song occupied all the significant political and military offices in Hebei and Chaha'er provinces. Nanjing was entirely dependent on Song for the defence of the North, yet Song remained ambivalent towards Nanjing and Japan, berating the central authorities for their 'abandonment' of the North while maintaining close contact with the Japanese military. While he had no formal role in foreign affairs, his informal function in the relations with Japan demands closer attention.

There has been a dangerous gap between American and Chinese perceptions of Chinese foreign policy, a gap contributing to acceptance of the Thucydides Trap. With the help of a theoretical framework and empirical evidence, this paper aims to summarize and understand the differences, in an effort to help overcome them and prevent a self-fulfilling prophecy. The author identifies five variables that shape perceptions and then categorizes Chinese foreign policy along several dimensions. Using the South China Sea and the Belt and Road Initiative as case studies, the author finds that US and Chinese interpretations of Chinese behavior along these dimensions are influenced by different variables. While the Chinese views are more affected by history, American perceptions are driven by considerations of power. The two countries understand both identity and norms differently, as well. By showing where the two countries' perceptions diverge, the author hopes to help reduce misunderstandings. The paper concludes with some practical recommendations along these lines.

The success of Chinese foreign policy since 1949 can be demonstrated empirically in terms of core national interests defined by the realist international relations perspective: state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and socioeconomic development. Influential realist writers, however, fail to consistently identify or explain the success of Chinese foreign policy, despite the work of area specialists who suggest that Chinese foreign policy displays consistent and effective, strategic patterns of force. Strategic thought arises from culturally differing ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions, as modified within specific historical conditions. Using the theoretical approach of comparative strategic culture, an abstract conceptual framework is developed for philosophical analysis of western and Chinese strategic culture. Classical and contemporary western realist-strategic paradigms coexist in theoretical and practical tension, resulting in a western strategic ethnocentrism which explains realist failure to recognize Chinese strategic patterns in foreign policy. Chinese philosophical assumptions, reinforced in linguistic structure, create a culturally paradigmatic approach to strategic thought, modified by the modern historical context of civil/national wars and state-building. The modern Chinese strategic paradigm of protracted war is characterized by the mutually constitutive relationship between the military and political dimensions of force, and by a cumulative, discontinuous pattern of foreign policy and state-building, in which force is created, stored, and applied over space and time. / Graduate

The Confucius Institutes (CIs) are part of a major new Chinese Government initiative promoting the learning of the Chinese language and culture internationally. They operate through a network of institutes located in learning institutions around the world, and while they have an education focus, they also reflect political changes in China’s relationship with the rest of the world. A transformation in China’s approach to foreign relations has been evident since the belligerence and self-sufficiency of the Mao era, and cautious engagement of the Deng era. In the early 21st century, China’s new foreign policy is more confident and engaged behaviour than it has ever been. The conceptual sources of China’s foreign policy have broadened from Marxism-Leninism to include some contemporary international values and traditional Chinese norms. However, managing the sphere of ideas both domestically and externally, and securing the nation’s economic development, are the main means the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains its legitimacy in the early 21st century. While China’s leadership has given the CIs considerable political independence, they are part of the Party’s propaganda system. Despite some foreign concerns about the Confucius Institutes being a propaganda tool, many other countries have similar programmes; the difference is China’s political system. Through the CIs, China is building the architecture of a major power, and has succeeded in improving its international influence. But because of the lack of international attractiveness of China’s political system, this is likely to be slow. The CIs reflect a more confident and effective Chinese foreign policy; and one that offers greater opportunities for engagement.

Thesis advisor: Robert S. Ross / This dissertation presents a structured and focused comparison of how Chinese leaders and academics have perceived the security cooperation of states on China’s periphery. This study examines three cases: the U.S.S.R.-Vietnam Alliance (1978-1989); the U.S.-Japan Alliance (1990-2016) and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance (1990-2016). They exemplify adversarial alliances in that they represent security cooperation that threatened or potentially threaten Chinese vital interests. Similarly, they all represent adversarial alliances of an asymmetric power relationship between a larger and smaller state. I gathered this data from Chinese journal articles and books related to the three cases, interviewed Chinese academics and think tank analysts, and compared the Chinese perceptions with non-Chinese primary and secondary sources. The research explores how well four concepts describe alliance behavior in the evidence. The first three concepts relate to how China views the alliances’ intentions, capabilities, and cohesion. The fourth concept relates to China’s self-perception as a rising state relative to the adversarial alliances. Knowledge of Chinese past and present perceptions of adversarial alliances should assist academics and policy makers in understanding the implications of security cooperation of states that are in close proximity to the Chinese mainland. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Critics of the liberal peace point out that the imposition of liberal democratic structures of governance through United Nations Peacekeeping Operations has not led to a sustainable peace being built. In reply, supporters of the liberal peace argue that even though the liberal peace is imperfect, there are no better alternatives. The objective of this thesis is to examine the Chinese approach to peacebuilding and explore the possibility that it may be a potential alternative to the liberal peace. The thesis examines the Chinese understanding of the causes of insecurity in Africa, what the Chinese position is with regards to United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in Africa; and what role China see itself playing vis-à-vis United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. The Chinese approach to peacebuilding recognises poverty alleviation as the foundation upon which sustainable peace can be built in post-conflict countries. Beijing does not believe the external imposition of a political ruling superstructure can succeed, and sees the liberal peace as neo-colonialism and liberal hubris. However, there is no set Chinese model of peacebuilding which can replace the liberal peace, or which African countries might follow. This is because the Chinese developmental model respects the local context, is based on pragmatism, and relies on trial and error to find the way forward. The Chinese have been keeping a low profile in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and have focused on providing transportation and logistical support to UNMIL. The Chinese focus on infrastructure rehabilitation is appreciated by Liberians and is making a positive contribution to the life of ordinary people. On the deep societal divide that lies at the heart of the Liberian civil war and continues to cause instability, both the Chinese approach to peacebuilding and the liberal peace remain silent.

在1993年中國成為石油淨進口國後，年消費量不斷擴大，產量卻無法大幅提升，石油供給不足的缺口正逐步擴大，且依國際能源總署評估，中國將是未來世界能源爭奪上的關鍵國家。 能源因素從1993年以來逐步地成為中國外交方面的思考。中國在處理外交事務越來越重視能源問題。在21世紀的石油價格不斷提升的趨勢對中國經濟造成相當大的衝擊，一旦能源供應短缺，享受經濟快速發展的中國面將臨極大的危險。另外在軍事力量加強的同時中國需要建立石油儲備來因應軍事行動之所需。 從外交戰略而言，中國處於亞洲中心，東接太平洋，西與中亞產油地區接壤，南出巴基斯坦，具備非常有利的地緣戰略優勢。中國需藉助有利的地緣戰略位置，在不流血的「石油戰爭」中儘早規劃以為因應，方不致遭受其它國家的戰略的箝制。 因此，本論文的研究目的在於以1993年至2006年能源因素影響中國外交政策和計劃的追蹤資料，搭配政治分析法， 探討以下問題： 一，分析預測將來中國能源方面的需求趨勢；二，探究能源需求促使中國政府採取何種外交手段。三，在中國外交決策中能源因素扮演何種的決定因素。 / Since 1993, China has become an importer of oil; the oil consumption has been growing. At the same time, China couldn’t increase the oil production, as the result, the lack of oil supplying has continuously increased. If we analyze from the point of international resource consumption, China comes to be the key country between those, who will struggle for the energy resources in the future. Since 1993, energy factor has been implemented to the consideration in the Chinese diplomacy. China has started to pay more and more attention to the energy factor while dealing with its international affairs. In 21 century, the oil price has been increasingly rising, that has become a serious danger for Chinese economy. The sudden lack of energy resources will be the great threat for fast developing Chinese economy. Also, been increasing its military power, China needs to create strategic oil stocks in order to move effectively its military forces. If we consider from strategic point of view, China is in the center of Asia, with Pacific Ocean on its East Coast, bordering with Pakistan on the South, China has very favorable geographical strategic advantages. China needs to use its strategic position for early planning strategy in its “non-blood war” for oil resources. Otherwise, China will face containment from the other countries. The purpose of this study is thus to investigate the following issues based upon the date for the influence of energy factor on Chinese foreign policy and intentions during the period of 1993-2006: 1.Understanding the trends for the future growth of energy demand in China. 2.Investigating what kind of measures can be applying by Chinese government in the face of these trends. 3.Figuring out how big the role of energy factor in the Chinese foreign policy implementation.

The growing importance of China in Africa today makes the examination of the history of Communist China’s foreign policy towards Africa a necessary undertaking. In recent years, there has been an escalation of attention paid to China’s political and economic role in developing nations, with particular attention granted to China’s policies in African countries. However, China did not just begin to pay attention to Africa at the close of the twentieth century, and it is the purpose of this paper to look at the beginnings of these policies. Chronologically, this paper focuses on the birth and early evolution of China’s foreign policy towards Africa, namely from the years 1954 to 1964. These dates represent not only the beginning, but also a significant change in China’s foreign policies towards Africa. While many of the policies adopted and adapted by Communist China during this period were to encompass the whole of the emerging third world, this paper focuses on Africa, and in particular Zambia for more specific examples. China played an important role in the newly independent nations of Africa in the early 1960s, and it continues to play a significant, and often controversial, role there today. / text

Following the end of the Cold War and the political fall-out from the Tiananmen incident, the US and China ended the last century and began the new one with three well publicised fall outs: the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the Spy Plane Incident in 2001. In each of these incidents the two states immediately resorted to confrontation and animosity before shifting towards a peaceful resolution. How did these transformations become possible? How did this relationship plunge towards confrontation over three apparent accidents? What factors were shaping these events and the main actor's behaviour? This thesis provides an alternative framework for analysing these interactions; one that takes into account dynamics other than those emphasised in neo-utilitarian approaches to IR. Emphasising social dynamics, I ask a series of ‘how possible' questions so as to lend insight into the processes of change that have taken place. I examine each case in detail and develop an argument that focuses upon investigating how the situations arose, how meaning was constructed and renegotiated, how identities were produced, and how emotional dynamics were drawn upon. Chapter One introduces the puzzles that this thesis will be addressing before setting out the conceptual focus of the research. Chapter Two provides a theoretical discussion relating to the current literature surrounding US-Chinese relations, before setting out the theoretical assumptions and methodological tools that I employ. Chapters Three, Four and Five represent the empirical ‘heart' of the thesis, with each providing detailed analysis of the interaction in question. To finish, Chapter Six highlights the themes that have emerged over the course of the empirical investigations, before concluding with a discussion relating to the contribution to the literature and possible avenues of future research.

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