In Feldstudien konnte häufig mittels der Low–Cost Hypothese gezeigt werden, dass normatives Verhalten von den dafür aufzuwendenden Kosten abhängt. Doch hängt die Durchsetzung einer Norm ebenfalls von der Höhe der Kosten ab? Die Gültigkeit der Low – Cost Hypothese bei diesen kollektiven Gütern zweiter Ordnung ist bislang im Feld wenig erforscht. In unserer Studie wird die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen anhand nachbarschaftlicher Kontrollen analysiert. Es werden Daten einer postalischen Befragung von 631 Personen in Leipzig aus dem Jahr 2001 ausgewertet: Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Befürwortung sozialer Kontrollen und der Bereitschaft, soziale Kontrollen tatsächlich an sich zu erdulden, wird mit steigenden Kosten der zu erduldenden Kontrollhandlungen schwächer. Zudem lässt sich die Logik der Low – Cost Hypothese auf andere soziologische Konstrukte übertragen: Die Wirkung von Kriminalitätsfurcht und Autoritarismus ist umso weniger handlungsrelevant, je höher die Kosten der zu erduldenden Kontrollhandlungen sind. Diese Befunde demonstrieren die Gültigkeit der Low–Cost Hypothese im Zusammenhang mit kollektiven Gütern zweiter Ordnung.:Einleitung; Die Übertragung der Low – Cost Hypothese auf die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen; Datenbasis und Operationalisierung; Schlussfolgerung und Ausblick / In field studies, there is evidence that the occurrence of normative behaviour is dependent on its costs. This effect is known as the low cost hypothesis. However, is the enforcement of social norms as well dependent on its costs? So far, there has been little research on the validity of the low – cost hypothesis for so called second order collective goods. In our work, the enforcement of social norms is studied by means of analyzing social control in neighbourhoods. We use data of a mail survey conducted in 2001 in Leipzig, Germany, with 631 respondents: Correlations between approval of social control and willingness to tolerate social control personally decrease with increasing costs to tolerate these control activities. Additionally, the logic of low – cost is transferable to other sociological constructs: The effect of fear of crime and authoritarianism is the less relevant for tolerating social control activities, the higher the costs for these control activities. These empirical findings confirm the low cost hypothesis for the production of second order collective goods.:Einleitung; Die Übertragung der Low – Cost Hypothese auf die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen; Datenbasis und Operationalisierung; Schlussfolgerung und Ausblick

The present study examines General Deterrence Theory (GDT) and its "parent," Rational Choice Theory (RCT), in an information security setting, assessing the behavioral intent to violate organizational policy under varying levels of certainty, severity and celerity of negative sanction. Also assessed is the individual computer user's time orientation, as measured by the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) instrument (Strathman et. al, 1994). How does rational consideration of violation rewards influence the impact of sanctions on individuals? How does time orientation impact intent to violate security policy? How do these operate in an IS context? These questions are examined by assessing the responses of university students (N = 443) to experimental manipulations of sanctions and rewards. Answering vignettes with the factorial survey method, intent to violate is assessed in a setting of Internet piracy of electronic textbooks while being monitored by computer security systems. Findings show that, although traditional GDT variables and reward impact intent to violate, CFC does not cause the hypothesized moderating effect on these variables. However, post-hoc analysis reveals a direct effect of time orientation on behavioral intent, as well as a weak moderating effect opposite of the hypotheses, indicating increased time orientation positively moderates, rather than negatively moderates, the impact of reward on intent to violate. Implications for theory and practice, and future research directions, are discussed.

This study reviews Rational Choice theory and Informal Institutions theory and uses new data to explain the persistence and scale of Argentina's informal domestic work sector. The domestic work sector in Argentina represents a typical case in Latin America: almost entirely dominated by women and high informality levels. The sector has had legal recognition for over a decade, but most of the sector's workers work under precarious conditions without access to those stipulated rights. In line with the adoption of new feminist policies during the last decade in Argentina, recent governments have brought more attention to women working in the domestic sector. This study investigates the implementation of a current financial incentive called Registradas which aims to increase registration levels in the domestic work sector. The material was collected during 29 weeks in Buenos Aires through interviews, surveys with employers, and observational studies from a Facebook group with domestic workers. The findings suggest that the two theories complement each other. Employers and employees in the domestic work sector act rationally from self-interest. However, unwritten rules, expectations of others' behavior, and perceptions of domestic work as an occupation also influence both groups' perceptions of choice and cost evaluation. These unwritten rules restrict and disadvantage employees due to power imbalances, gender norms, lack of information about their labor rights, and poverty. Finally, the study found that the program Registradas has had little effect on the sector's informality rates. The RCT suggests that the low impact could be due to formal employment not being a costly beneficial choice for the employers and neither the employees. This conclusion, however, needs to be understood in a context where labor laws and social security are not systematically and effectively enforced. Weak formal institutions thus enable a competing informal institution of informal employment and, ultimately, costs and benefits of the available choices for employers and employees. / Este estudio revisa la teoría de la Elección Racional y la teoría de las InstitucionesInformales, y utiliza nuevos datos para explicar la persistencia y la escala del sector informaldel trabajo doméstico en Argentina. El sector del trabajo doméstico en Argentina representaun caso típico en América Latina: está dominado casi en su totalidad por mujeres y presentaaltos niveles de informalidad. Aunque el sector cuenta con reconocimiento legal desde hacemás de una década, la mayoría de las trabajadoras del sector laboran en condicionesprecarias, sin acceso a los derechos estipulados. En línea con la adopción de nuevaspolíticas feministas durante la última década en Argentina, los últimos gobiernos hanprestado más atención a las mujeres que trabajan en el sector doméstico. Este estudioinvestiga la implementación del incentivo económico actual llamado Programa Registradas,el cual tiene como objetivo aumentar la formalidad del sector doméstico. El material serecopiló durante 29 semanas en Buenos Aires, mediante entrevistas, encuestas aempleadores y estudios observacionales de un grupo de Facebook con trabajadorasdomésticas. Los resultados sugieren que las dos teorías se complementan. Tanto losempleadores como los empleados del sector doméstico actúan racionalmente en función desus propios intereses. Sin embargo, las reglas no escritas, las expectativas sobre elcomportamiento de los demás y la percepción del trabajo doméstico como una ocupacióntambién influyen en la percepción de la elección y la evaluación de costos de ambos grupos.Estas reglas no escritas restringen y perjudican a las empleadas debido a los desequilibriosde poder, las normas de género, la falta de información sobre sus derechos laborales y lapobreza. Finalmente, el estudio encontró que, hasta la fecha, el Programa Registradas noha tenido ningún efecto significativo en la reducción de la tasa de informalidad del sector. Lateoría de la Elección Racional sugiere que el bajo impacto podría deberse a que el empleoformal no es una opción costosa ni beneficiosa ni para los empleadores ni para losempleados. Sin embargo, esta conclusión debe entenderse en un contexto en el que lalegislación laboral y la obra social no se aplican de forma sistemática y eficaz. La debilidadde las instituciones formales permite, por tanto, una institución informal competidora delempleo informal y, en última instancia, influye en los costos y beneficios de las opcionesdisponibles para empresarios y trabajadores.