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Dissertation presented in the fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of master of arts In the faculty of Arts, Department of History at the University of Zululand. / Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi the leader of KwAZulu government and Inkatha, was amongst other South African homeland leaders. In early 1970s he became the leader of Kwa-Zulu Self-Governing homeland. In 1975 he formed the pseudo-political party that became known as Inkatha Cultural Movement that worked congenially with KwaZulu Government for almost three decades. After the formation of Inkatha, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was soon possessed by a strong desire of insatiable power hunger that forced him to part ways with his old comrades of the African National Congress in 1979 after the aborted London Meeting between him and the Oliver Reginald Tambo the leader of the exiled African National Congress. This became a true political turning point that led to a political watershed that was marked by the untold hostility between Inkath/KwaZulu Government and the African National Congress. Buthelezi being well aware of this hostility, then tried all possible means to convince all those that were close to him including the apartheid government that the African National Congress was baying for his blood. This then led to establishment of the covert relationship between him and some of the senior members of both Defence and the Police Force.. He then embarked on making a watertight defence around him that would protect him against any possible attack from the African National Congress. In 1981 he established the KwaZulu Police (KZP) as part of his defence. The KwaZulu Police was said to be a police force that would do the maintenance of law and order but its main aim was to be a para-military force that would defend Inkatha members against its political opponents. As the eighties unfolded he consolidated his relationship with the apartheid government by accepting an offer of having some of 200 members of Inkatha to be taken for training in Namibia in a place known as Caprivi Strip. These people were trained under the guise of becoming the protectors of KwaZulu VIPs but in mere fact they had been trained to kill all anti-Inkatha. They were the referred to as the Caprivi Trainees since they were trained in Caprivi Strip in Namibia. These people had been trained in different ways of killing those who were anti-Inkatha in huge numbers. The likes of Romeo Mbambo, Israel Hlongwane, Gcina Mkhize and many more became Chief Buthelezi’s private army that killed hundreds of the African Nation Congress ad COSATU members. These people made a harrowing admission in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In the TRC it was where all the violation of civil liberties were heard coming from these people and others. The Caprivi Trainees, KwaZulu Police, Vigilantes and the Warlords were the ones who turned KwaZulu into a political slaughter house in terms of violation of civil liberties of all non-Inkatha people while Inkatha and KwaZulu Government were cheering them up.

This MA Report explores existing literature pertaining to three aspects of politics during or directly following crises in the United States: state-building, suppression or expansion of civil liberties, and enduring alterations to the American social hierarchy. While acknowledging the many insights of all three areas of literature, the Report argues that literature on state-building is too concentrated on formal, top-down explanations. As a result, it neglects the crucial dependence state-building has on aspects, such as the active participation of civil society groups. The Report further argues that political science’s absence from research literature on civil liberties during crises needs to end. The abundance of legal and historical accounts on this subject offers a wealth of descriptive insights. However, they fail to offer causal explanations for why crises have such an inconsistent and dynamic impact on civil liberties. Finally, research over the impact of crises on American social hierarchies needs to move away from assuming social groups’ interests a priori. Instead, scholars should attempt to unearth what these interests actually were among these groups within the historical context given, looking specifically to the discursive contests among social groups as they attempt to frame crises in advantageous ways. / text

Existing literature suggests evidence that American citizens have implicit and explicit biases against Muslims that influence or allow biased policies. In general, many of these biases stem from media framing, ethnic discrimination, and religious stereotypes. Some of these stereotypes associate Muslims with terrorism and violence, and public opinion research has concluded that Americans do not believe Muslims uphold American values. Thus, after 9/11, security policies against Muslims have resurfaced the question of suppressing individual liberties for the general welfare of all. My paper analyzes public opinion towards security legislation that discriminates against Muslims and examines how willing Americans are to support policies that infringe on civil liberties. My research poses three main questions: 1) Are opinions on national security influenced by the framing; 2) Does bias and ethnic-profiling make minorities more prone to support protection of civil liberties and 3) Are discriminatory policies against Muslims politicized by party affiliates? Using a survey, I found that framing the chosen policies to emphasize liberty or security had little influence on responses. Furthermore, I argue that, while literature suggests that minority groups tend lean pro-liberty relative to the White demographic, this concept is not substantial across all races when considering current Muslim-profiling policies. Finally, we find some evidence that ideology and ethnocentrism have become closely related factors after the 2016 Presidential Campaign, and that negative feelings of Muslims and national security policy have become more polarized than in the past.

Les libertés publiques ont toujours rencontré des obstacles affectant leur réel exercice en Tunisie. Les transitions démocratiques souvent invoquées par les dirigeants, se sont avérées des périodes au cours desquelles, cet exercice est le plus vulnérable. A chaque période, correspondent des priorités présentées par l’élite dirigeante pour justifier l’ajournement de l’exercice des libertés publiques. Les institutions politiques, l’organisation du pouvoir et le cadre normatif, ne permettent pas de dire qu’ils offrent un terrain favorable aux libertés publiques. Ces d.dernières, sont d’autant plus vulnérables, qu’elles évoluent dans un milieu politico-idéologique peu propice à leur épanouissement. Les affrontements entre les modernistes et les conservateurs, sont la plus part du temps résolus grâce au consensus, fruit d’une alliance entre la modernité et la tradition. Toujours est-il, à chaque ouverture d’une période transitoire, le débat se durcit et aussi la peur de perdre les acquis d’une Tunisie réformiste. / Civil liberties have always meet difficulties to their real exercise in Tunisia. Democratic transitions which are often put forward by political leaders reveal themselves as the most critical periods for freedoms exercise. During each period, priorities are invoked in order to justify delaying the freedom exercise. Political organization and legal rules does not allow affirming that they offer a favorable environment and conditions for freedom exercise. The civil liberties are evolving in a unfavorable ideological and politic context. Confrontations between modernists and conservatives are most of the time avoided by the resort to the agreement in order to reconcile tradition and modernity. Let us underline that at each opening of a transitional period that the debates get harder and the fear losing the rights collectively acquired grows.

Currently, Title II of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001 appears to be stalled as a result of controversy over the intent and meaning of the law. Proponents of the title advocate the necessity of the act to combat modern terrorism, whereas opponents warn of circumventions of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Using punctuated equilibrium as the theoretical foundation, the purpose of this case study was to explore the dialogue and legal exchanges between the American Civil Liberties Union and the Department of Justice related to the National Security Agency's metadata collection program. In specific, the study sought to explore the nature of resistance to changes needed to mollify the controversies associated with Title II. Data for this study were acquired through publicly available documents and artifacts including transcripts of Congressional hearings, legal documents, and briefing statements from the US Department of Justice and the American Civil Liberties Union. These data were deductively coded according to the elements of PET and then subjected to thematic analysis. Findings indicate that supporters and opponents of the law are locked in a consistent ideological polarization, with supporters of the law touting the necessity of the authorizations in combatting terrorism and opponents arguing the law violates civil liberties. Neither side of the debate displayed a willingness to compromise or acknowledge the legitimacy of the other viewpoint. Legislators who accept the legitimacy of both researched viewpoints could create positive social change by refining the law to meet national security needs while preserving constitutional protections.

This research examines the political implications of the Millennial generation on American politics by exploring the interaction of generational cohort with race, social issues, and civil liberties. Relying on the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey and the 2018 General Social Survey, I examine (1) Millennial attitudes toward race and ethnicity by looking specifically at racial linked fate, (2) how Millennials interact with race and evangelical Christianity and how this interaction influences social policy preferences, and (3) how generational factors influence Millennial attitudes toward American civil liberties. I find that there are measurable effects of generational cohorts on the predicted value of Linked Fate for racial minority groups in the United States. My results suggest that Millennials are significantly more likely to have higher levels of linked fate for Latino and Asian Americans. However, I do not find sufficient evidence to suggest that African Americans' level of linked fate is affected either positively or negatively for Millennials. Second, for the investigation on social policy, the results suggest that those who sit at the intersection of the three groups- the Latino-Millennial evangelicals- hold policy preferences that contrast from those who are solely either Latino, Millennial, or evangelical. Latino-Millennial evangelicals are significantly more likely to hold liberal policy preferences on issues of climate change but more conservative attitudes on aid to the poor. Lastly, on issues of American civil liberties, the results indicate that Millennials are far more likely to support free speech (even for controversial actors), than both the Boomer generation and Generation X. Millennials are also more likely to oppose governmental intervention in religion and are significantly more likely to support abortion rights for women.