Much research has been conducted about the diffusion of nonviolent civil resistance and its various mechanisms, with a majority of the attention being paid to diffusion on a global level via external pressure and normative imitation. There is little research, however, about the mechanisms that occur on a much narrower field via individual-level communications, which lead to individuals learning from surrounding ideas and adapting them to fit their situation. Using the case study of the independence movement of the late 1980s in the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, I provide a nuanced analysis of these communications between the former republic and its neighbors, specifically Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, all of which were going through their own independence movements at the same time. I address the importance of these individual-level communications to the movement's success and ultimately conclude that without them, the diffusion of nonviolent civil resistance into Ukraine would not have occurred and the movement would not have proven to be successful in bringing down the Soviet regime.

Why do some (non)violent civil resistances in nondemocracies achieve democracy while others do not? In order to answer this question, this project examined factors that result in different outcomes and the mechanisms critical to democratization. In particular, I paid close attention to whether autocracies failing after successful (non)violent civil resistance adopted transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms such as trials, truth commissions, and amnesty, and how civil society worked in each course of democratization. I explored the conditions of democratic consolidation (e.g., economic development, democratic neighbors, and political institution) and among them, focused on the civil culture that led citizens to participate positively and actively in politics with belief and trust. I found that in the course of democratization, implementing TJ policies is necessary in order to build inter-group trust and encourage citizens to participate critically in political reform. Because TJ mechanisms are designed to make past wrongdoers accountable and reconcile conflicting sides, these approaches can strengthen civic culture and promote reconciliation by restoring the rule of law and rebuilding victims’ dignity. In addition, I argued that a robust civil society (CS) plays a vital role in sustaining democracy, not only by encouraging TJ adoption, but also by playing roles such as supporter, mobilizer, enforcer, monitor, and so on. In this context, I suggested that (non)violent civil resistance can contribute to building a robust CS. Particularly, nonviolent and large resistance with diverse participants can increase the capacity, legitimacy, and representativeness of a CS so that it can play its role(s) properly. Statistical analysis with large-n data supported these arguments. Despite the controversy in the literature, adoption of TJ policies turned out to be a positively significant factor for achieving democratic consolidation; and, the robustness of CS, which can be developed through (non)violent civil resistance, was significant as well, particularly at the early phase of the democratization process. The application to the 2011 Arab Uprising cases (Tunisia and Egypt) that focused on TJ adoption and the role of CS revealed consistent conclusions as well. Although there are several limitations to this study, I attempted to reveal the importance of the linkages among steps to democratization and increase understanding of the “process” rather than simply the “cause” or “result.” In addition, the findings can be implemented in policies for proliferating democracy by supporting/encouraging democratization from the ground up (i.e., below), CS growth, and TJ adoption after transition.

This dissertation advances the literature on civil resistance by proposing an alternative way of thinking about action and organization, and by contributing a new case study of Palestinian struggle in the occupied West Bank. Civil resistance, also known as civil disobedience, nonviolent action, and people power, is about challenging unjust and oppressive regimes through the strategic use of nonviolent methods, including demonstrations, marches, boycotts, strikes, sit-ins, protest camps, and many others (Sharp 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2015). This study employs an approach that minimizes analytical (as well as normative) expectations of perfectly nonviolent forms of struggle (Celikates 2015), and I link this modified pragmatic action model to an organizational principle that has generally been overlooked or discounted in the research literature. On the whole, civil-resistance studies has focused on forms of action to the detriment of exploring forms of organization, or has relegated organization to a subset of action. My research clarifies a participatory approach to organization that is community based, sometimes known as the committee or council system (Arendt 1963). It is radically democratic, yet not necessarily confined to purely horizontal forms of organization. Rather, the model allows, and requires with increasing scale, upward delegation to decision-making and other task-contingent bodies. I argue that without a theoretical framework for apprehending systems of networked and tiered popular governance, Palestinian civil resistance has been insufficiently understood. The dissertation examines Palestinian cases through this framework, linking the conjunction of unarmed action and participatory organization to highpoints of Palestinian struggle. Among the cases is a small civil-society movement in the West Bank that began around 2009 striving to launch a global popular resistance. My research suggests that civil-resistance theorists consider the non-dominative element of organization as they do the non-dominative element of action, that just as violent resistance strategies can counter the logic of people power, so too can centralized organization. This logic does not require that participatory organization be perfectly horizontal any more than civil resistance must be perfectly nonviolent. / Graduate / 0615 / 0626 / 0333 / mjcarpenter78@gmail.com

abstract: Why and when do political actors use violence? This project answers these questions by exploring the dynamics of the interactions between state authorities and political dissidents. Both the state and the dissidents face the dilemma of using violence to achieve their political goals. While structural factors influence state violence and dissident violence, I contend that we need to examine how the dynamics of the state-dissident interactions shape these actors’ political behavior. This project first asks if nonviolent methods of resistance are effective--and perhaps even more successful than violent methods--why do opposition movements ever resort to violence? I argue that the efficacy of nonviolent resistance changes over time. When the likelihood of demobilization increases, dissident movements doubt the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance and weigh violence as an alternative tactic. The first chapter of this dissertation shows that the failure in expanding the size of a movement over several periods provides increases the risk of demobilization, and so dissident violence. I also argue while the expansion of the movement decreases the risk of dissident violence, a sudden and large expansion in the size of the movement overburdens its monitoring and sanctioning capacities, which raises the risk of dissident violence. These arguments are supported empirically using two different datasets. In the second theoretical part of this project, I examine the effects of foreign interventions on the dynamics of state repression and dissident violence. I find that the diplomatic statements and efforts such as disapproving state behavior, asking for political reform, and threatening to impose economic sanctions and to deploy military forces either did not have a significant effect, or increased state repression and decreased state concession during the Arab Spring. Finally, the last part of this project contributes to the literature on the formal modeling of dissent-repression by developing a recursive model of political violence dynamics. In addition to addressing several drawbacks in the literature, this model endogenizes the mobilization and demobilization of the movement and explains how these changes affect dissident violence. Due to the complexity of the developed mathematical model, I use a computational model to find the optimal outcomes. This computational model also can be used for simulating the state’s and the dissidents’ behavior under different scenarios. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Political Science 2018

This thesis presents a quantitative study that aims to investigate whether Brian Martin is right in his theory about how more powerful actors have a greater capacity to prevent outrage and anger after opressions and thus suffer less from political jiu-jitsu, a process in which oppression becomes counterproductive. This is done by looking at whether more powerful regimes getaway more easily with repressing nonviolent campaigns. By designing a measuring scale for the scope of political jiu-jitsu, the connection between the scope and three different aspects of power - national capacity, wealth and state oppression - is investigated. The results shows that the more powerful the oppressive states are in terms of national capacity and wealth, the less extensive political jiu-jitsu. On the other hand, a higher degree of state oppression results in more extensive political jiu-jitsu. The results linked to the degree of staterepression are statistically significant and it can thus be said that the differences in the extent of political jiu-jitsu are not due to chance. The results indicate that more powerful states getaway with repressing nonviolent campaigns more easily, if power is measured in terms ofnational capacity or wealth. If, on the other hand, power is measured in the amount of noppression, it is more costly for the states that exercise more oppression.

This paper investigates how changes in states’ repression tactics impact the dynamics of civil protests. Research on the repression-dissident nexus has commonly studied repression as one concept, lacking disaggregation into its different types. In an empirical study of the Gezi Park protest campaign, erupting in late May 2013 in Istanbul, Turkey, this paper focuses on the impact of indiscriminate versus selective repression. Specifically, it examines if the change from an indiscriminate to a more selective state repression strategy had a de-escalatory effect on the protest activity in the Gezi campaign. The study finds support for the hypothesis that this was the case. Further, it concludes that disaggregation of the repression concept is key for capturing the dynamic character of the repression-dissident relationship.

This thesis paper set out to investigate the research puzzle of why some nonviolent conflicts lead to democratisation while others do not, as well as what explains this variation. A time series, cross-case comparison between the Arab Spring revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt was conducted exploring the link between organisational structure of prominent organisations participating in the movement and the success or failure of the countries’ later democratisation efforts. The hypothesis formulated claims that formal organisational structures are more likely to lead to successful democratisation. After the empirical material was collected, the results of the analysis lead to the conclusion that there is a link between organisational structure and successful or failed democratisation via the mediating variables of clear leadership and the presence of durable organisations. Afterwards, the limitations of the study are discussed. To strengthen the existing body of literature, potential avenues for future research are presented.

Beginning in December 2010, Tunisian citizens used techniques of protest, resistance and intervention in a struggle for freedom from the systems that had for decades denied them agency, autonomy and dignity. As a result of their resistance, in January 2011 the Tunisian people successfully deposed the authoritarian president Ben Ali after 23 years in power. Though this movement began spontaneously and operated without designated leadership, the role of the national labor union - The Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) - was vital in mobilizing and directing the uprising. This thesis will interpret the events of the 2011 Tunisian uprising through the framework of civil resistance, as defined by Gene Sharp and Hardy Merriman. Through the use of political defiance and noncooperation, civil resistance employs nonviolent tactics to challenge and remove entrenched political leaders and systems. This study will analyze the Tunisian uprising and the role of the UGTT in the movement using three indicators of civil resistance success: unity, strategic planning, and nonviolent discipline. Despite sporadic incidents of violence, this thesis asserts that the 2011 Tunisian uprising successfully enacted nonviolent civil resistance, and the implementation of nonviolent political action has made the establishment of a genuine and lasting democracy a real possibility for the future. The UGTT were invaluable in the 2011 uprising as facilitators and collaborators with the Tunisian people, and currently function in a pivotal nonpartisan and objective intermediary political role. Though the outcome remains uncertain and the conclusion of the revolution in flux, the 2011 Tunisian uprising has set an example and a precedent for civil resistance to the rest of the world.

This thesis seeks to understand which opportunities make excluded ethnic groups use nonviolence. The research question is: Under which conditions do politically-excluded ethnic groups initiate nonviolent resistance rather than violent resistance? The study challenges an existing assumption that ethnic exclusion creates opportunities for violence and hinders nonviolence, by exploring if constraints to violence favor nonviolence. I hypothesize that two opportunities from nonviolence theory – autocracy and mass participation – and two constraints to violence – the state having a powerful ally and high territorial outreach – constitute alternative pathways to nonviolence. I make a joint evaluation of these contrasting theoretical views with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), using a comprehensive dataset of 79 campaigns initiated by excluded ethnic groups. The theory evaluation is complemented by three informative within-case studies: the Lithuanian Sajudis campaign (1988), the Druze resistance in Israel (1981) and the Malawian Anti-Banda campaign (1992). I find that opportunities from both theoretical strands work in combination. One pathway – mass participation in a state with high outreach and no powerful ally – leads to nonviolence in almost 71% of the cases occurring in that setting, and explains roughly 63% of all nonviolent campaigns initiated by excluded groups.

The use of nonviolent tactics has become the most common way to achieve change. The field of civil resistance has been predominantly focussed on the dynamics related to the outcome, however, about the types of organisational structures that are most effective, is no general consensus, yet. This thesis will try to fill this research gap by combining insights from organisational science, social movement studies, and civil resistance literature. The research question that is posed is: How does the organisational structure affect the outcome of civil resistance campaigns? A theoretical typology is created, proposing a four-fold classification system based on two relational characteristics, namely (1) the extent to which relations are either formal or informal, and (2) the extent to which the relations are hierarchical or lateral. A distinction is made between four quadrants with four different types of structures that affect four critical factors that affect the outcome of civil resistance campaigns: mass mobilisation, loyalty shifts, tactical diversity, and resilience. A ‘nested analysis’ approach is used combining quantitative and qualitative methods of research. After having conducted the analysis, the study showed that organisational structures affect the outcome of civil resistance campaigns in several ways. However, the main findings that were expected to be found did not yield significant evidence, as such the formulated hypothesis can ultimately be rejected. The results of the quantitative analysis show that the odds of success are 2.98 times larger in campaigns with formal organisational structures compared to informal structures, and the odds of success are 17.7 times larger in cases with centralised structures compared to clustered structures. Overall, centralised structures have the highest odds of success. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis suggests that unity, trust, and organisational capacity affect the likelihood that civil resistance campaigns achieve success. Future research should focus to further develop this theoretical model, assess the interaction between structural conditions and type of organisational structure adopted by civil resistance campaigns, and the impact that ICTs have on mobilising processes and organisational structure of civil resistance campaigns.