Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

¡@Ever since the foundation in 2000, the branches of Administrative Enforcement Agency have been handling the cases of monetary payment duty in public law with the total amount reaching 3,0178,624, by only about the workforce of 400 people in average while bringing in 1,133,000,000 financial income for the nation in six years. Among these cases, 24,386,174 are closed, which are more effective than in the past and helpful in keeping the publics from evading their duties by luck and therefore realizing the social fairness and justice, thus manifesting the public authority. However, there are still many problems hiding behind the new organizations and their systems, as the number indicates: unresolved cases reach 5,809,904 while 3,732 1,1609,753 dollars are unexecuted. In order to reduce the number of unclosed cases and enhance the administrative efficiency from two indexes: rate of the case-closing and levied tax, the thesis had combined the transaction cost theory from the Coase Theorem with the concept of opportunity cost in law economics, and had discussed the forming causes and strategies from three aspects under the principle of maximum efficiency, while not omitting the point of view of the public choices by the people of the duty. Three main conclusions are therefore made as follow: Firstly, speaking of system in terms of case management and evaluation, the amount of case closed must outnumbers the case received, while different types of cases (according to the amount of money) must be reduced in proportion; moreover, specific execution procedure should be arranged according to its types, and to indicate a clear termination of the time rather than being delayed for too long. Secondly, as far as the case efficiency is concerned, the more payment channel ,the better. In addition, by using information technology, it is effective in exchanging the information among different individuals, and speeding up the case to be closed. Thirdly, in the part of case receiving, be sure to monitor the loading of cases according to the workforce and to adjust the human resource or control the speed of case receiving. Setting up the voucher re-transfer evaluation mechanism to avoid the running-empty of administrative procedure and the waste of resource; to build up the pre-case database and to provide decision support system of the case execution so as to reduce the cost of research and decision making.

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The choice of firm boundaries is one of the most fundamental elements of organizational strategy. It determines industry positioning, enables the development and leverage of distinctive capabilities, and ultimately establishes the basis for sustainable competitive advantage. In the modern economy, organizational unbundling and vertical disintegration has become a recurrent theme across many industries, reflecting a major transformation in industrial organization and firm strategy. What are the drivers of this modern trend of vertical disintegration? How do we reconcile this modern phenomenon with the vertical integration logic of previous decades? Beginning with Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as the underlying framework, we draw from the Information Processing, Coordination and Capabilities literatures to develop an integrated theoretical framework for examining and rationalizing the determinants of vertical disintegration. The recent restructuring of the US electric utility industry provides a suitable empirical context to undertake a rigorous examination of this theoretical framework: a context that manifests institutional heterogeneity, high levels of uncertainty, intense coordination requirements, and a variety of competing market and organizational institutions in transition. We employ multi-level modeling techniques, to account for firm heterogeneity and time-variant institutional parameters in our longitudinal panel data, thus allowing for a richer analysis of institutional effects. The results show that there has been systematic vertical disintegration in the electric utility industry over the period of study, 1994-2002, influenced by both firm-level and state/federal-level institutional factors as well as structural market attributes, which serve as proxies for demand and supply uncertainty. Using IT investment intensity as a proxy for firm-level IT Capability, we also established an overall significant negative effect of IT on vertical integration, consistent with previous studies about the effects of IT on firm size. The main findings confirmed several standard TCE propositions, and also address several known shortcomings, most notably the ambiguity in the treatment of uncertainty. In addition, the robust examination of the empirical evidence associated with the restructuring of the Electric Utility industry allowed us to isolate the relative effects of various institutional mechanisms and structural market attributes. These findings help to illuminate the understanding and ultimately the programming of deregulation effects.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 183-195). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 183-195). Also available on the Internet.

No description available.

The diploma work is focused on situation and function of Czech mobile providers market. The theoretical background is based on Ronald Coase's findings. The functionality of theoretical hypothesis is verified and further discussed on the basis of foreign telecommunication markets. Different real economics provide valuable experience concerning identification of possible assets and problems. The acquired information is consequently used for analysis of Czech mobile market. Next to the evaluation of the current situation the focus is given to the planned auction of frequencies. Conditions of this auction are described and the potential influence to future Czech mobile providers market is monitored.

Behavioral economics is widely recognized as a rising field in economics, one whose discoveries and implications are not yet completed or understood. At the same time, economic theory plays an enormous role in our governmental and legal system. In particular, the Coase Theorem and its implications have affected nearly every area in the field of law and economics. This paper proposes a experimental test of Coasean bargaining in situations using two competitive players whose payoffs depend on minimizing their costs of mitigating the externality. A rational player’s action can be predicted ahead of time, and the rationality of the game’s outcome can be objectively measured. If behavioral effects found in consumer goods situations by other experimenters carry over to competitive business situations, then a substantial review of law regarding such situations is in order.