The purpose of the dissertation is to investigate the degree of compatibility of two fields: phenomenology and computational cognitive science. The former field proposes to explicate all structures of conscious experience in terms of conscious experience. The latter proposes to explicate all structures of consciousness partly in terms of unconscious causal factors. These endeavors have been seen as mutually exclusive. I put forward the thesis that the original formulation of phenomenology may be seen to have a computational theory of mind in the background. To this end, I show in the first chapter that the founder of phenomenology articulated, prior to founding phenomenology, a computational theory of mind in terms of its two modern theses: (1) syntactic representations, and (2) their causal generation and interaction. Insofar as I am able to provide sufficient evidence for this thesis, I am theoretically licensed to proceed to trace its influence on the founding of phenomenology proper. On the above textual basis, I proceed in the second chapter to discuss Husserl's methodology in the founding work of phenomenology - the Logical Investigations. I there show how my compatibility thesis may be true; indeed, I demonstrate that formal evidence is the causal product of what Husserl calls “unsere Denkmaschine” – a thought-machine that manipulates syntactic symbols. The third chapter discusses several arguments against (Humean) associationism, and by extension against (Churchlandian) connectionism, and show that they demand in their stead computationalism, both on account of the nature of the explananda as well as for the sake of theoretical completeness. In the fourth chapter, I discuss, with a view to deepening my interpretation, the much-celebrated property (since Chomsky) of productivity. This leads to a discussion of the methodological relation between “universal grammar,” as it appears directly in the 4th Logical Investigation, and the computational theory of mind. In the fifth chapter, I discuss how Husserl’s descriptive treatment of the propositional attitudes (as act-matters & act-qualities), nominalization, and categorial intuition may be supplemented on the explanatory side by a language of thought.

Hypercomputation, which is the general concept embracing all machinery capable of carrying out more tasks than Turing Machines and beyond the Turing Limit, has implications for various fields including mathematics, physics, computer science and philosophy. Regarding its philosophical aspects, it is necessary to reveal the position of hypercomputation relative to the classical computational theory of mind in order to clarify and broaden the scope of hypercomputation so that it encompasses some phenomena which are regarded as problematic because of their property of being uncomputable. This thesis points to a relation between hypercomputation and the agent-causation theory of free will by exploring that theory&#039 / s alleged infinite-regress feature, which has been regarded by some authors as problematic and used against the agent causation theory. In order to cope with this problem, we propose a certain hypercomputer, viz. the reverse Zeus machine. The reverse Zeus machine can help to understand the infinite-regress aspect of agent causation better than accelerating Turing machines (or ordinary Zeus machines). Accelerating Turing machines are abstract machines which perform temporal patterning in an accelerating manner by executing each step in half the time required for the previous step. This allows them to compute infinitely many operations in finite time. Although reverse Zeus machines have the same working principle as accelerating Turing machines, we show that agent causation can be represented by reverse Zeus machines better than by the classical Zeus machines.

Ce mémoire se penche sur la possibilité de la conscience artificielle. Plus spécifiquement, je me demande s’il est possible qu’un robot, un ordinateur ou toute autre machine ait une conscience phénoménale, i.e. qu’il y ait un effet que cela fait que d’être ces systèmes. Après avoir brièvement caractérisé la conscience phénoménale, j’investiguerai quelques problèmes qui sont propres à la conscience, soit le problème difficile de la conscience ainsi que le problème des autres esprits, dans le but d’établir le cadre conceptuel qui nous permettra de réfléchir quant à la possibilité de la conscience artificielle. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je défendrai la thèse selon laquelle la conscience artificielle est possible en m’appuyant notamment sur le principe d’invariance organisationnelle défendu, entre autres, par David Chalmers, ainsi que sur la théorie computationnelle de l’esprit. Finalement, dans le troisième et dernier chapitre, j’évaluerai diverses objections contre la possibilité de la conscience artificielle que je tenterai tour à tour de réfuter dans le but maintenir ma thèse initiale aussi intacte que possible. / This thesis examines the possibility of artificial consciousness. More specifically, I consider the possibility for a robot, computer or any other machine to have phenomenal consciousness, i.e. that there is something it is like to be those systems. After having briefly characterized phenomenal consciousness, I will investigate some problems that are specific to consciousness, namely the hard problem of consciousness as well as the problem of other minds, in order to establish the conceptual framework that will allow us to reflect upon the possibility of artificial consciousness. In the second chapter, I will defend the thesis that artificial consciousness is possible by relying on the principle of organizational invariance which is defended by David Chalmers, among others, as well as on the computational theory of the mind. Finally, in the third and last chapter, I will assess various objections against the possibility of artificial consciousness which I will try to refute in turn in order to keep my initial thesis as intact as possible.

The guiding question for this essay is: who is the learner? The aim is to examine and criticize one answer to this question, sometimes referred to as the theory of the learning brain, which suggests that the explanation of human learning can be reduced to the transmitting and storing of information in the brain’s formal and representational architecture, i.e., that the brain is the learner. This essay will argue that this answer is misleading, because it cannot account for the way people strive to learn in an attempt to lead a good life as it misrepresents the intentional life of the mind, which results in its counting ourselves out of the picture when it attempts to provide a scientific theory of the learning process. To criticize the theory of the learning brain, this essay will investigate its philosophical foundation, a theory of mind called cognitivism, which is the basis for the cognitive sciences. Cognitivism is itself built on three main tenets: mentalism, the mind-brain identity theory and the computer analogy. Each of these tenets will be criticized in turn, before the essay turns to criticize the theory of the learning brain itself. The focus of this essay is, in other words, mainly negative. The hope is that this criticism will lay the groundwork for an alternative view of mind, one that is better equipped to give meaningful answers to the important questions we have about what it means to learn, i.e., what we learn, how we do it and why. This alternative will emphasize the holistic and intentional character of the human mind, and consider the learning process as an intentional activity performed, not by isolated brains, but by people with minds that are extended, embodied, enacted and embedded in a sociocultural and physical context.