This report describes the organization and content of lexical information required for the task of machine translation. In particular, the lexical-conceptual basis for UNITRAN, an implemented machine translation system, will be described. UNITRAN uses an underlying form called lexical conceptual structure to perform lexical selection and syntactic realization. Lexical word entries have two levels of description: the first is an underlying lexical-semantic representation that is derived from hierarchically organized primitives, and the second is a mapping from this representation to a corresponding syntactic structure. The interaction of these two levels will be discussed and the lexical selection and syntactic realization processes will be described.

No description available.

Implicit concept mapping (iCmap; Aidman & Egan, 1998), measures: (1) the complexity of conceptual activation, and (2) the degree to which integration is internally consistent. These characteristics describe aspects of both Dual Code theory (DCT; Paivio,1986) and of lexical meaning (Johnson-Laird, 1987). Within the DCT literature, two kinds of representations have been proposed, verbal and nonverbal, and in the case of concrete words both kinds of representations will be activated compared to abstract words, which only have a verbal representation. 40 Participants completed Experiment 1, which aimed to assess degree of conceptual change due to learning. The results revealed no change in performance. 120 Participants completed Experiment 2 with a modified task called, progressive concept mapping (proCmap). The results indicated that concrete nouns had greater consistency between trials relative to abstract nouns, whereas abstract nouns had greater complexity. These results provide confirmatory evidence that proCmap is sensitive to information associated with conceptual structure

A proposta geral desta tese é discutir argumentos de uma linha cognitivista sobre o uso típico de intuições na literatura epistemológica. Em particular, o uso feito por epistemológicos interessados no projeto conhecido como análise do co-nhecimento. A questão central desta tese já está formulada em seu título: qual a estrutura psicológica do conceito ordinário de conhecimento? Em outras palavras, investigamos qual a organização psicológica da unidade mental que responde por nossos julgamentos intuitivos ordinários sobre casos de conhecimento. Argumen-tamos que a resposta a esta pergunta pode gerar lições importantes para o projeto epistemológico, em especial quanto a sua satisfatoriedade. Nossa investigação per-corre literaturas da epistemologia, psicologia comparativa, psicologia do desenvol-vimento, e a psicologia popular (folk). Em uma segunda parte da tese, tratamos de outros argumentos que surgem desta linha cognitivista na literatura epistemológi-ca, tais como argumentos empíricos sobre a robustez de intuições – no sentido de serem amplamente compartilhadas – e considerações sobre as bases cognitivas de uma intuição. Por fim, descrevemos uma forma de dar sentido à metodologia epis-temológica que leva em consideração argumentos cognitivistas em termos da no-ção de equilíbrio reflexivo. / The proposal of this dissertation is to discuss issues from a cognitivist line about the typical use of intuitions in the epistemological literature. In particular, issues about the use of epistemologists interested in the traditional project of the analysis of knowledge. The central question of this dissertation is already formulated in its title: What is the psychological structure of ordinary concept of knowledge? In oth-er words, we investigate what is the psychological organization of the mental unity that responds for our intuitive judgments about cases of knowledge. We argue that the answer for this question can provide important lessons for the epistemological project, especially about whether it can be satisfied. Our inquiry goes through the literature of epistemology, comparative psychology, psychology of development, and folk psychology. In a second part, we deal with other kinds of arguments from this cognitivist line in epistemology, such as empirical arguments about the ro-bustness of intuitions – in the sense of being widely shared – and considerations about the cognitive basis of intuitions. Finally, we describe one way of making sense of the epistemological methodology which takes into account cognitivist ar-guments in terms of the notion of reflective equilibrium.

A proposta geral desta tese é discutir argumentos de uma linha cognitivista sobre o uso típico de intuições na literatura epistemológica. Em particular, o uso feito por epistemológicos interessados no projeto conhecido como análise do co-nhecimento. A questão central desta tese já está formulada em seu título: qual a estrutura psicológica do conceito ordinário de conhecimento? Em outras palavras, investigamos qual a organização psicológica da unidade mental que responde por nossos julgamentos intuitivos ordinários sobre casos de conhecimento. Argumen-tamos que a resposta a esta pergunta pode gerar lições importantes para o projeto epistemológico, em especial quanto a sua satisfatoriedade. Nossa investigação per-corre literaturas da epistemologia, psicologia comparativa, psicologia do desenvol-vimento, e a psicologia popular (folk). Em uma segunda parte da tese, tratamos de outros argumentos que surgem desta linha cognitivista na literatura epistemológi-ca, tais como argumentos empíricos sobre a robustez de intuições – no sentido de serem amplamente compartilhadas – e considerações sobre as bases cognitivas de uma intuição. Por fim, descrevemos uma forma de dar sentido à metodologia epis-temológica que leva em consideração argumentos cognitivistas em termos da no-ção de equilíbrio reflexivo. / The proposal of this dissertation is to discuss issues from a cognitivist line about the typical use of intuitions in the epistemological literature. In particular, issues about the use of epistemologists interested in the traditional project of the analysis of knowledge. The central question of this dissertation is already formulated in its title: What is the psychological structure of ordinary concept of knowledge? In oth-er words, we investigate what is the psychological organization of the mental unity that responds for our intuitive judgments about cases of knowledge. We argue that the answer for this question can provide important lessons for the epistemological project, especially about whether it can be satisfied. Our inquiry goes through the literature of epistemology, comparative psychology, psychology of development, and folk psychology. In a second part, we deal with other kinds of arguments from this cognitivist line in epistemology, such as empirical arguments about the ro-bustness of intuitions – in the sense of being widely shared – and considerations about the cognitive basis of intuitions. Finally, we describe one way of making sense of the epistemological methodology which takes into account cognitivist ar-guments in terms of the notion of reflective equilibrium.

A proposta geral desta tese é discutir argumentos de uma linha cognitivista sobre o uso típico de intuições na literatura epistemológica. Em particular, o uso feito por epistemológicos interessados no projeto conhecido como análise do co-nhecimento. A questão central desta tese já está formulada em seu título: qual a estrutura psicológica do conceito ordinário de conhecimento? Em outras palavras, investigamos qual a organização psicológica da unidade mental que responde por nossos julgamentos intuitivos ordinários sobre casos de conhecimento. Argumen-tamos que a resposta a esta pergunta pode gerar lições importantes para o projeto epistemológico, em especial quanto a sua satisfatoriedade. Nossa investigação per-corre literaturas da epistemologia, psicologia comparativa, psicologia do desenvol-vimento, e a psicologia popular (folk). Em uma segunda parte da tese, tratamos de outros argumentos que surgem desta linha cognitivista na literatura epistemológi-ca, tais como argumentos empíricos sobre a robustez de intuições – no sentido de serem amplamente compartilhadas – e considerações sobre as bases cognitivas de uma intuição. Por fim, descrevemos uma forma de dar sentido à metodologia epis-temológica que leva em consideração argumentos cognitivistas em termos da no-ção de equilíbrio reflexivo. / The proposal of this dissertation is to discuss issues from a cognitivist line about the typical use of intuitions in the epistemological literature. In particular, issues about the use of epistemologists interested in the traditional project of the analysis of knowledge. The central question of this dissertation is already formulated in its title: What is the psychological structure of ordinary concept of knowledge? In oth-er words, we investigate what is the psychological organization of the mental unity that responds for our intuitive judgments about cases of knowledge. We argue that the answer for this question can provide important lessons for the epistemological project, especially about whether it can be satisfied. Our inquiry goes through the literature of epistemology, comparative psychology, psychology of development, and folk psychology. In a second part, we deal with other kinds of arguments from this cognitivist line in epistemology, such as empirical arguments about the ro-bustness of intuitions – in the sense of being widely shared – and considerations about the cognitive basis of intuitions. Finally, we describe one way of making sense of the epistemological methodology which takes into account cognitivist ar-guments in terms of the notion of reflective equilibrium.

<p>Within the framework of Jackendoff’s conceptual semantics, this study investigates the semantic properties that govern the distribution of object control (such as <i>John persuaded Mary to help Sally</i>) and exceptional case marking (such as <i>John wanted Mary to help Sally</i>) in English. In contrast to Jackendoff’s approach to control, one central idea here is that the<i> to-</i>infinitive complements under discussion should receive a uniform semantic analysis, and thus that control behaviour cannot be explained in terms of semantic argument type of the complement clause. In order to arrive at such an analysis of these<i> to-</i>infinitival complements, they are taken to constitute Situations in conceptual structure, and clauses (TPs) in syntax.</p><p>It is argued here that it is indeed possible to establish the character of the semantic properties that govern the two constructions OC and ECM. Not only does the semantic type of the governing predicate play a role—attitude predicates, as opposed to force dynamic predicates, are exclusively coded as ECM in syntax—but also the realisation of the semantic argument position that corresponds to the Patient/Beneficiary role in conceptual structure. With force dynamic predicates, OC will arise when this argument position is filled with an explicit argument. When it is empty, or left implicit, however, the result will be ECM in syntactic structure.</p>

Within the framework of Jackendoff’s conceptual semantics, this study investigates the semantic properties that govern the distribution of object control (such as John persuaded Mary to help Sally) and exceptional case marking (such as John wanted Mary to help Sally) in English. In contrast to Jackendoff’s approach to control, one central idea here is that the to-infinitive complements under discussion should receive a uniform semantic analysis, and thus that control behaviour cannot be explained in terms of semantic argument type of the complement clause. In order to arrive at such an analysis of these to-infinitival complements, they are taken to constitute Situations in conceptual structure, and clauses (TPs) in syntax. It is argued here that it is indeed possible to establish the character of the semantic properties that govern the two constructions OC and ECM. Not only does the semantic type of the governing predicate play a role—attitude predicates, as opposed to force dynamic predicates, are exclusively coded as ECM in syntax—but also the realisation of the semantic argument position that corresponds to the Patient/Beneficiary role in conceptual structure. With force dynamic predicates, OC will arise when this argument position is filled with an explicit argument. When it is empty, or left implicit, however, the result will be ECM in syntactic structure.

The science and technology program developed by the Ministry of National Education of Turkey aims at training students as science and technology literates. In order to achieve this, method implemented by teachers should enhance science process skills, increase achievement and actualize differentiation in the conceptual structure of students. The present study aims to investigate the effectiveness of guided inquiry experiments over traditionally designed experiments on the acquisition of science process skills, content knowledge achievement and differentiating conceptual structure of 8th grade students about floating, sinking, buoyancy and pressure subjects. Guided inquiry laboratory manuals were developed for the experimental group. Traditional confirmation type laboratory manuals were developed for the control group. The study was conducted with 55 eighth grade students at a private elementary school in the Bah&ccedil / elievler district, Istanbul. In this quasi-experimental study, two of the three intact groups assigned as experimental group, while the control group. Unit achievement test (UAT), science process skills test (SPST) and two-tiered test for determining differentiation in conceptual structure (DDSCT) were used as data collection instruments. All of these instruments were administered to the students as pre-test and post-test. It was found that guided inquiry experiments were effective than traditional confirmation type experiments in differentiation of students&rsquo / conceptual structure about floating, sinking, buoyancy and pressure. However, there was not a significant difference in the effectiveness of both inquiry and traditional methods on enhancing the students&rsquo / science process skills and their achievement at the unit of force and motion.

Cette thèse porte sur la fonction tutorale telle que prescrite dans le référentiel de formation des étudiants en soins infirmiers. Nous nous inscrivons dans le cadre théorique de la didactique professionnelle dont nous avons utilisé les concepts comme révélateurs de l’instrumentalisation de Rabardel. Notre recherche se propose d’appréhender le tuteur comme un instrument psychologique dont les étudiants pourraient se saisir pour développer leur professionnalité. Nous avons ainsi élargi le cadre de la théorie instrumentale en proposant une typologie de l’instrumentalisation puis en décrivant le schème de l’interaction tutorale. / This thesis focuses on the role of tutors as prescribed in the repository of training nursing students. We are part of the theoretical framework of professional didactic we used the concepts as indicative of the instrumentalization of Rabardel. Our research aims to understand the tutor as a psychological instrument that students could take to develop their professionalism. We have expanded the scope of the instrumental theory by proposing a typology of the instrumentalization and articulating the schema of tutorial interaction.