The enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 promised the most fundamental reform to be made in U.S. financial services regulation in more than half a century. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) removed barriers that forced separation between commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies; and it allowed subsidiaries of banks or insurance companies to engage in a broad range of financial activities that were not permitted for banks or insurers themselves. Few doubted the potential for GLB to have a profound impact on financial service providers and on the financial market. However, there is a striking lack of empirical research on the effects of diversification by financial firms. The first goal of this dissertation is to identify domestic “assurbanks” (insurers owning banks) and “bancassurers” (banks owning insurers) and to identify the unique subsidiaries of financial services companies licensed as commercial banks, thrifts, or insurance companies in the U.S. We construct a unique dataset that links the banking and insurance regulatory datasets. A second objective is to investigate the effects of integrating the banking and insurance sectors of the U.S. economy. We evaluate the market structure and operating performance of financial institutions in the integrated banking and insurance industry. Gains from exploiting scope economies and product mix efficiencies are often cited as motives for financial institution integration. A third objective is to estimate efficiency effects from the economies of scope across the two formally separate sectors by estimating multi-product costs, revenue, and profit functions. The final objective is to test whether scope economies exist for firms that jointly produce financial products across multiple sectors and to explain the variation of scope economy estimations. The empirical evidence suggests that both domestic assurbanks and bancassurers are large in size and count for a significant portion of the banking and insurance market share. These firms are also more diversified in terms of their traditional products with a focus on personal line products. Large bancassurers appear more interested in investing in small-size life and property-liability subsidiaries. Large assurbanks are more interested in acquiring small-size thrifts. Banks prefer to affiliate with life insurance more than property-liability insurance, and insurers are more likely to affiliate with thrift saving banks than to affiliate with commercial banks. Diversified firms have higher profitability in their traditional lines of business. Bancassurers perform well in the insurance business, but most assurbanks lose money in their banking division. The scope economy results; investigating consumption complementarities suggests that a significant number of cost scope diseconomies, revenue scope economies, and weak profit scope economies exist in the post-GLB U.S. integrated banking and insurance sectors. The scope economies are variant among firms, and certain firm characteristics (size, business portfolio, geographic diversification, product mix and diversification, insurance distribution system, and X-efficiency) are the determinants of scope economies.

China's media have undergone significant commercialisation since the introduction of the economic reforms initiated three decades ago. But how this process is unfolding is still not well discussed. Book publishing, the oldest media sector but the one least studied, has been in the forefront of media commercialisation and provides a useful vantage point for the investigation of this transformation. This thesis will examine the role of the party-state and the market during the commercialisation of state publishing, paying particular attention to the core processes of conglomeration and corporatisation and, since the party-state has also been decentralised, to the role of regional government. Drawing on original documentary research and primary data generated in an internship in a provincial publishing group, this thesis advances three main arguments. Firstly, that the process of commercialisation in publishing cannot be fully understood outside of the transformation of the wider economic and political context, especially the shift in the general organisation of industry and the evolution of party ideology. Secondly, that this process has been marked by persistent tensions and contradictions. And thirdly, that despite the ongoing commercialisation the publishing industry remains controlled predominantly by the party-state and is far from being a market-driven business. Decentralisation may have enabled local governments to gain strong control over the economics of local publishers, but the central party-state remains dominant on political issues.

In the late 20th century, the global economy experienced a radical shift due to widespread deregulation and, subsequently, rapid financialization. Examining archival and contemporary trade magazines and corporate reports, this project considers the interconnections between television audience constructions/ratings and financial institutions amid these structural changes. In chapter one, this thesis starts by charting the pre-history of media financialization and financial stakeholders’ early influence over the radio industry and its antecedent industries (i.e., the telegraph and telephone) between 1800 and 1943. After charting a historical overview of media industries’ relationships to Wall Street, the second chapter details the financialization of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) between 1943 and 1970 and considers the correlation between Nielsen ratings and stock prices. In the third chapter, these theories are brought into the 21st century, examining how media companies like Disney “pitch” their audiences to Wall Street and how financial incentives have led streaming platforms to engage in performative social justice in order to cater to upscale white audiences.

This study was conducted to investigate norms for motherhood and gender equality among Swedish mothers. The aim was to find if there are differences in how women relate to the norms, how they control impressions they send out, and if there is any conflict regarding these norms. Used theoretical framework was norms in general and impression management. We used a qualitative approach, and conducted interviews with mothers of young children.   The results show that women relate to the norms about the good mother as a norm, feeling guilt and shame, not being able to reach up to all expectations, but also facing sanctions when being too good. On the other hand we find that the Swedish gender equality ideal, aren’t a norm but an ideal and that some women refer to equality in the household as a question of that both should be satisfied. We believe this is a proof of that the Swedish equality has not yet been integrated in the society norms, for our informants. We also find that norms and ideal affect the impression management. Various number of expectations therefore results into a norm conflict for the mother. All together these expectations are unreachable, and results in sanctions of for example guilt and shame. We introduce a new concept to describe all these norms and the norm conflict within the mother; norm conglomeration. Our conclusion are that to be a good mother you must be moderate both related to motherhood norms and ideals of gender equality.

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Jouant un rôle crucial pour l’efficience des marchés, la banque d’investissement contemporaine se caractérise par l’exercice d’une grande diversité d’activités aussi complexes qu’hétérogènes sous un même toit. Agissant tantôt auprès d’une clientèle de particuliers, d’entreprises, d’institutions financières, de fonds d’investissement ou de gouvernements, et tantôt pour son propre compte, elle compose avec une multitude d’intérêts divergents, ce qui soulève un certain questionnement quant à la portée de l’obligation de loyauté dont elle peut être tributaire envers ses clients. Les implications répétées des banques d’affaires dans la vague de récents scandales financiers ont inévitablement affecté la confiance que les épargnants témoignent envers l’intégrité de cette institution et des marchés financiers en général. Elles ont de plus contribué significativement à relancer le débat concernant la pertinence de contrôler, et même d’éliminer les conflits d’intérêts, un phénomène largement répandu au sein de la banque d’investissement. À titre de mécanismes préventifs, les solutions de marchés et l’autodiscipline des intermédiaires financiers sont imparfaits. La réglementation des conflits d’intérêts se justifie alors afin de pallier les défaillances du marché et de l’autorégulation. Pour autant qu’il maintienne sa réglementation dans un rapport efficience-équité acceptable, l’État est appelé à concevoir des normes de contrôle aux objectifs variés, allant de la réforme structurelle du secteur financier à l’élaboration de principes généraux devant servir de balises à la conduite des intermédiaires financiers. Ainsi, dans une industrie caractérisée par une forte conglomération, la réponse des législateurs semble s’articuler autour du traitement adéquat des conflits d’intérêts, traitement qui s’opère par divers mécanismes, dont la muraille Chine, la divulgation et le refus d’agir. / Playing a key role in market efficiency, the modern investment bank offers a wide variety of services that are as complex as they are different, all under one roof. Acting sometimes in the interest of individuals, businesses, financial institutions, investment funds or governments and sometimes in its own interest, an investment bank must contend with a multitude of diverging interests, which raises certain questions as to the extent of any duty for loyalty it may owe to its clients. Repeated involvement by investment banks in the wave of recent financial scandals has inevitably affected investors’ confidence with respect to the integrity of these institutions and financial markets in general. This factor has significantly contributed to renewing the debate concerning the relevance of controlling, or even eliminating, conflicts of interest, which are a wide-spread phenomenon in the investment banking industry. In terms of preventive measures, market-related solutions and self-discipline by financial intermediaries are inherently flawed. Therefore, in order to offset such deficiencies, it becomes justifiable to regulate conflict of interest situations. Numerous possibilities exist and, as long as regulation is maintained at an acceptable effectiveness/fairness ratio, the State is called upon to establish monitoring standards for various objectives, ranging from a structural reform of the financial sector to developing general principles to serve as guidelines for the conduct of financial intermediaries. Thus, in an industry characterized by a strong tendency for conglomeration, the response from regulators seems to hinge on adequate handling of conflicts of interest, which includes various mechanisms such as the Chinese wall, disclosure and a refusal to act.

Jouant un rôle crucial pour l’efficience des marchés, la banque d’investissement contemporaine se caractérise par l’exercice d’une grande diversité d’activités aussi complexes qu’hétérogènes sous un même toit. Agissant tantôt auprès d’une clientèle de particuliers, d’entreprises, d’institutions financières, de fonds d’investissement ou de gouvernements, et tantôt pour son propre compte, elle compose avec une multitude d’intérêts divergents, ce qui soulève un certain questionnement quant à la portée de l’obligation de loyauté dont elle peut être tributaire envers ses clients. Les implications répétées des banques d’affaires dans la vague de récents scandales financiers ont inévitablement affecté la confiance que les épargnants témoignent envers l’intégrité de cette institution et des marchés financiers en général. Elles ont de plus contribué significativement à relancer le débat concernant la pertinence de contrôler, et même d’éliminer les conflits d’intérêts, un phénomène largement répandu au sein de la banque d’investissement. À titre de mécanismes préventifs, les solutions de marchés et l’autodiscipline des intermédiaires financiers sont imparfaits. La réglementation des conflits d’intérêts se justifie alors afin de pallier les défaillances du marché et de l’autorégulation. Pour autant qu’il maintienne sa réglementation dans un rapport efficience-équité acceptable, l’État est appelé à concevoir des normes de contrôle aux objectifs variés, allant de la réforme structurelle du secteur financier à l’élaboration de principes généraux devant servir de balises à la conduite des intermédiaires financiers. Ainsi, dans une industrie caractérisée par une forte conglomération, la réponse des législateurs semble s’articuler autour du traitement adéquat des conflits d’intérêts, traitement qui s’opère par divers mécanismes, dont la muraille Chine, la divulgation et le refus d’agir. / Playing a key role in market efficiency, the modern investment bank offers a wide variety of services that are as complex as they are different, all under one roof. Acting sometimes in the interest of individuals, businesses, financial institutions, investment funds or governments and sometimes in its own interest, an investment bank must contend with a multitude of diverging interests, which raises certain questions as to the extent of any duty for loyalty it may owe to its clients. Repeated involvement by investment banks in the wave of recent financial scandals has inevitably affected investors’ confidence with respect to the integrity of these institutions and financial markets in general. This factor has significantly contributed to renewing the debate concerning the relevance of controlling, or even eliminating, conflicts of interest, which are a wide-spread phenomenon in the investment banking industry. In terms of preventive measures, market-related solutions and self-discipline by financial intermediaries are inherently flawed. Therefore, in order to offset such deficiencies, it becomes justifiable to regulate conflict of interest situations. Numerous possibilities exist and, as long as regulation is maintained at an acceptable effectiveness/fairness ratio, the State is called upon to establish monitoring standards for various objectives, ranging from a structural reform of the financial sector to developing general principles to serve as guidelines for the conduct of financial intermediaries. Thus, in an industry characterized by a strong tendency for conglomeration, the response from regulators seems to hinge on adequate handling of conflicts of interest, which includes various mechanisms such as the Chinese wall, disclosure and a refusal to act.