During the dot com era the word 'personalisation' was a hot buzzword. With the fall of the dot com companies the topic has lost momentum. As the killer application for UMTS or the mobile internet has yet to be identified, the concept of Multi-Dimensional-Personalisation (MDP) could be a candidate. Using this approach, a recommendation of mobile advertisement or marketing (i.e., recommendations or notifications), online content, as well as offline events, can be offered to the user based on their known interests and current location. Instead of having to request or pull this information, the new service concept would proactively provide the information and services – with the consequence that the right information or service could therefore be offered at the right place, at the right time. The growing availability of "Location-based Services“ for mobile phones is a new target for the use of personalisation. "Location-based Services“ are information, for example, about restaurants, hotels or shopping malls with offers which are in close range/short distance to the user. The lack of acceptance for such services in the past is based on the fact that early implementations required the user to pull the information from the service provider. A more promising approach is to actively push information to the user. This information must be from interest to the user and has to reach the user at the right time and at the right place. This raises new requirements on personalisation which will go far beyond present requirements. It will reach out from personalisation based only on the interest of the user. Besides the interest, the enhanced personalisation has to cover the location and movement patterns, the usage and the past, present and future schedule of the user. This new personalisation paradigm has to protect the user's privacy so that an approach supporting anonymous recommendations through an extended 'Chinese Wall' will be described.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:39:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Regiane Yuriko Hioki.pdf: 498093 bytes, checksum: 39ed65cb8dbeb0dc398127b7d1674918 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-12-14 / Due to the increase of trading volume resulting from Investment Banks activities, such as mergers and acquisitions, spin-off operations and securities issues (shares, subscription bonus and debentures), and because of the material values involved in these transactions, the regulations become essential in order to avoid the misuse of insider information. Due to those facts it becomes essential that regulators and financial institutions adopt best practices of corporate governance, as a mechanism of defense, especially as regard to the aspects of Information Barriers - Chinese Wall. The purpose of the research was to examine the main laws and regulations issued by regulatory bodies, associations and self regulatory organizations presents in Brazil, USA and England, as well as compare them. To accomplish it was conducted a descriptive study based on literature and secondary data analysis, which contemplated laws and recommendations issued by regulators, associations and self regulatory organizations. As a result were not identified regulatory gaps, either big issue when comparing the laws. It was observed in Brazil, unlike what happens in the United States and England, that the guides are not centralized in one regulatory body, association or self regulatory organizations. It was also found that some of the regulations in the market due to its wideness some interpretations and guidelines have been developed in order to assist its implementation / Em decorrência do aumento do volume de negociações efetuadas por Bancos de Investimentos, como as operações de fusões e aquisições, cisões de empresas e emissão de valores mobiliários (ações, bônus de subscrição e debêntures), e consequentemente pela relevância dos valores financeiros envolvidos nestas transações, torna-se necessária à existência de regulamentações visando coibir o uso indevido de informações privilegiadas insider information. Desta forma torna-se fundamental que os órgãos reguladores e instituições financeiras adotem boas práticas de governança corporativa, como mecanismos de defesa, principalmente no que tange aos aspectos de Barreiras da Informação Chinese Wall. O objetivo da pesquisa foi de analisar as principais legislações e regulamentações emitidas por órgãos reguladores, associações independentes e entidades autorreguladoras presentes no Brasil, Estados Unidos e Inglaterra acerca das práticas de Barreiras de Informação Chinese Wall, bem como comparar as regulamentações vigentes nos países objeto de estudo. Para tanto, foi realizado estudo descritivo com base em pesquisa bibliográfica e análises de dados secundários, o qual contempla as legislações e recomendações emanadas pelos reguladores, associações independentes e entidades autorreguladoras. Como resultado não foram identificadas lacunas regulamentares, tampouco divergências representativas entre as legislações. Observou-se no Brasil, diferentemente do que ocorre nos Estados Unidos e Inglaterra, que os direcionamentos não estão centralizados em um único órgão regulador, associação independente ou entidade autorreguladora. Constatouse também, que as algumas regulamentações vigentes no mercado brasileiro devido à sua amplitude, possuem interpretações e orientações de forma a auxiliar a sua respectiva implementação

Jouant un rôle crucial pour l’efficience des marchés, la banque d’investissement contemporaine se caractérise par l’exercice d’une grande diversité d’activités aussi complexes qu’hétérogènes sous un même toit. Agissant tantôt auprès d’une clientèle de particuliers, d’entreprises, d’institutions financières, de fonds d’investissement ou de gouvernements, et tantôt pour son propre compte, elle compose avec une multitude d’intérêts divergents, ce qui soulève un certain questionnement quant à la portée de l’obligation de loyauté dont elle peut être tributaire envers ses clients. Les implications répétées des banques d’affaires dans la vague de récents scandales financiers ont inévitablement affecté la confiance que les épargnants témoignent envers l’intégrité de cette institution et des marchés financiers en général. Elles ont de plus contribué significativement à relancer le débat concernant la pertinence de contrôler, et même d’éliminer les conflits d’intérêts, un phénomène largement répandu au sein de la banque d’investissement. À titre de mécanismes préventifs, les solutions de marchés et l’autodiscipline des intermédiaires financiers sont imparfaits. La réglementation des conflits d’intérêts se justifie alors afin de pallier les défaillances du marché et de l’autorégulation. Pour autant qu’il maintienne sa réglementation dans un rapport efficience-équité acceptable, l’État est appelé à concevoir des normes de contrôle aux objectifs variés, allant de la réforme structurelle du secteur financier à l’élaboration de principes généraux devant servir de balises à la conduite des intermédiaires financiers. Ainsi, dans une industrie caractérisée par une forte conglomération, la réponse des législateurs semble s’articuler autour du traitement adéquat des conflits d’intérêts, traitement qui s’opère par divers mécanismes, dont la muraille Chine, la divulgation et le refus d’agir. / Playing a key role in market efficiency, the modern investment bank offers a wide variety of services that are as complex as they are different, all under one roof. Acting sometimes in the interest of individuals, businesses, financial institutions, investment funds or governments and sometimes in its own interest, an investment bank must contend with a multitude of diverging interests, which raises certain questions as to the extent of any duty for loyalty it may owe to its clients. Repeated involvement by investment banks in the wave of recent financial scandals has inevitably affected investors’ confidence with respect to the integrity of these institutions and financial markets in general. This factor has significantly contributed to renewing the debate concerning the relevance of controlling, or even eliminating, conflicts of interest, which are a wide-spread phenomenon in the investment banking industry. In terms of preventive measures, market-related solutions and self-discipline by financial intermediaries are inherently flawed. Therefore, in order to offset such deficiencies, it becomes justifiable to regulate conflict of interest situations. Numerous possibilities exist and, as long as regulation is maintained at an acceptable effectiveness/fairness ratio, the State is called upon to establish monitoring standards for various objectives, ranging from a structural reform of the financial sector to developing general principles to serve as guidelines for the conduct of financial intermediaries. Thus, in an industry characterized by a strong tendency for conglomeration, the response from regulators seems to hinge on adequate handling of conflicts of interest, which includes various mechanisms such as the Chinese wall, disclosure and a refusal to act.

Jouant un rôle crucial pour l’efficience des marchés, la banque d’investissement contemporaine se caractérise par l’exercice d’une grande diversité d’activités aussi complexes qu’hétérogènes sous un même toit. Agissant tantôt auprès d’une clientèle de particuliers, d’entreprises, d’institutions financières, de fonds d’investissement ou de gouvernements, et tantôt pour son propre compte, elle compose avec une multitude d’intérêts divergents, ce qui soulève un certain questionnement quant à la portée de l’obligation de loyauté dont elle peut être tributaire envers ses clients. Les implications répétées des banques d’affaires dans la vague de récents scandales financiers ont inévitablement affecté la confiance que les épargnants témoignent envers l’intégrité de cette institution et des marchés financiers en général. Elles ont de plus contribué significativement à relancer le débat concernant la pertinence de contrôler, et même d’éliminer les conflits d’intérêts, un phénomène largement répandu au sein de la banque d’investissement. À titre de mécanismes préventifs, les solutions de marchés et l’autodiscipline des intermédiaires financiers sont imparfaits. La réglementation des conflits d’intérêts se justifie alors afin de pallier les défaillances du marché et de l’autorégulation. Pour autant qu’il maintienne sa réglementation dans un rapport efficience-équité acceptable, l’État est appelé à concevoir des normes de contrôle aux objectifs variés, allant de la réforme structurelle du secteur financier à l’élaboration de principes généraux devant servir de balises à la conduite des intermédiaires financiers. Ainsi, dans une industrie caractérisée par une forte conglomération, la réponse des législateurs semble s’articuler autour du traitement adéquat des conflits d’intérêts, traitement qui s’opère par divers mécanismes, dont la muraille Chine, la divulgation et le refus d’agir. / Playing a key role in market efficiency, the modern investment bank offers a wide variety of services that are as complex as they are different, all under one roof. Acting sometimes in the interest of individuals, businesses, financial institutions, investment funds or governments and sometimes in its own interest, an investment bank must contend with a multitude of diverging interests, which raises certain questions as to the extent of any duty for loyalty it may owe to its clients. Repeated involvement by investment banks in the wave of recent financial scandals has inevitably affected investors’ confidence with respect to the integrity of these institutions and financial markets in general. This factor has significantly contributed to renewing the debate concerning the relevance of controlling, or even eliminating, conflicts of interest, which are a wide-spread phenomenon in the investment banking industry. In terms of preventive measures, market-related solutions and self-discipline by financial intermediaries are inherently flawed. Therefore, in order to offset such deficiencies, it becomes justifiable to regulate conflict of interest situations. Numerous possibilities exist and, as long as regulation is maintained at an acceptable effectiveness/fairness ratio, the State is called upon to establish monitoring standards for various objectives, ranging from a structural reform of the financial sector to developing general principles to serve as guidelines for the conduct of financial intermediaries. Thus, in an industry characterized by a strong tendency for conglomeration, the response from regulators seems to hinge on adequate handling of conflicts of interest, which includes various mechanisms such as the Chinese wall, disclosure and a refusal to act.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:15:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2000-04-13T00:00:00Z / Trata do problema principal-agent entre investidor e administrador de fundos no Brasil. Aborda as evidências de conflitos de interesses, os efeitos positivos e negativos da competição de mercado, as formas de controle via regulamentação e auto-regulamentação no Brasil e em outros países. Explora os mecanismos utilizados por uma amostra de instituições administradoras de fundos no Brasil para lidar com a questão, com suas vantagens e fraquezas.

Le conflit d’intérêts du banquier, terminologie galvaudée à force d’être invoquée à chaque nouvelle crise, sans pour autant que le droit puisse pleinement s’en saisir, est une notion particulière, autonome et originale qui aspire pourtant instamment à une existence juridique.Il est d'abord le résultat d’une incompatibilité d’un pouvoir et d’un devoir se trouvant concomitamment entre les mains du banquier. Autrement dit, c’est l’état de fait où le banquier détient le pouvoir d’affecter un intérêt, prédéfini comme supérieur, qu’il est tenu de protéger par devoir. S'il se trouve ainsi au cœur du droit de la représentation, qui régit une partie considérable des rapports clients-banquier, il ne s'y cantonne pas et peut aussi bien s’épanouir hors du cadre contractuel.Il suppose, pour exister, un préalable : une relation de confiance, dont le maintien semble avoir justifié des règles aussi nombreuses que disparates. Or, après en avoir effectué une revue critique, il apparaît que, principalement héritées de réglementations spécifiques aux services d’investissement, elles ne parviennent pas à pleinement l'appréhender au sein de ce domaine, et a fortiori pas dans sa sphère d’expression, qui s’étend bien au-delà. Une meilleure gestion juridique de cet objet d'étude nécessite alors que soient recherchées des critères de simplification et d'efficacité.Dans une approche prospective, l’analyse de l’interprétation des concepts de droit auxquels il est fait recours pour contrôler les conflits d’intérêts contractuels du banquier s'impose et révèle que l’obligation de gestion du conflit d’intérêts présente des traits communs à l’obligation traditionnelle de garantie du fait personnel. Une approche comparative des droits anglo-américains confirme la nature particulière de cette obligation du banquier face au conflit d’intérêts. Une telle obligation appelant nécessairement un régime spécifique, dont une ébauche de régime a finalement été proposée. / Banker’s conflict of interests is a hackneyed concept being invoked with each new crisis without being fully seized by the law. Special, autonomous and original, this concept longs earnestly to legal existence. Conflict of interest is the result of an incompatibility of a power and a duty being simultaneously in the hands of the banker. It is the situation where the banker has the power to affect an interest, pre-defined as superior, that he has the duty to protect. The concept stands at the heart of the fiduciary and agency law governing a considerable part of banker-client relationship, but is not restricted to this area and can both flourish outside the contractual context. Banker’s conflict of interests assumes the existence of a prior : a relationship of trust, which it maintenance appears to have justified many and disparate rules. Mainly inherited from regulations specific to investment services, it appears, after a critical review, that they fail to fully understand the conflict of interest in this area, let alone within its sphere of expression, which extends far beyond. A better legal management of the studied object then imposes a search for simplification and efficiency. In a prospective approach, analyzing the interpretation of legal concepts to which recourse is made to control the contractual Banker’s conflict of interests reveals that the obligation to manage the conflict of interest has common features with the traditional guarantee obligation. A comparative approach of the Anglo-American law confirms the unique nature of the banker's obligation facing the conflict of interest. Such an obligation necessarily require specific rules and a draft is being proposed in the thesis.

Submitted by Marcella Vaz (mcz@bmalaw.com.br) on 2016-01-21T14:04:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Francisco Müssnich (clean).pdf: 1403440 bytes, checksum: 490bbad9a8ecdd796462048f14a079e7 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2016-02-16T17:19:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Francisco Müssnich (clean).pdf: 1403440 bytes, checksum: 490bbad9a8ecdd796462048f14a079e7 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Almeida (maria.socorro@fgv.br) on 2016-02-16T18:18:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Francisco Müssnich (clean).pdf: 1403440 bytes, checksum: 490bbad9a8ecdd796462048f14a079e7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-02-16T18:18:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Francisco Müssnich (clean).pdf: 1403440 bytes, checksum: 490bbad9a8ecdd796462048f14a079e7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-15 / The potential damage caused by insider trading is very high, because the offense affects not only the parties directly related to the transaction carried out while in possession of inside information, but also the stock market as a whole, undermining investor confidence. Severe sanctions under the administrative, civil and criminal law are necessary to discourage the offense. In this, Brazil’s securities regulator, the CVM - Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, plays a particularly important role because it wields the state’s power to intervene in the capital markets. At the same time, liability for insider trading offense should be based on a strong body of evidence, even if the evidence of insider trading is indirect only. The use of information barriers, which reduces the potential for conflicts of interest by restricting access to undisclosed material information, is not in itself sufficient to exclude liability for insider trading. Theories such as the 'corporate mind' can make Chinese walls ineffective protection against liability, even if they properly perform their function of segregating information. The theory of constructive or imputed knowledge cannot be applied in determining liability for insider trading / O insider trading é ilícito de elevado potencial danoso, pois impacta não só as pessoas diretamente relacionadas com a operação realizada com a informação privilegiada, mas também o mercado de capitais como um todo, afetando a confiança dos investidores. É importante, portanto, a repressão severa do ilícito nas esferas administrativa, civil e penal, destacando-se o papel regulador da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, enquanto representante da intervenção do poder estatal no âmbito do mercado de capitais. Não obstante, para a responsabilização pelo ilícito do insider trading, deve-se exigir um conjunto probatório robusto, ainda que apenas indiciário. A utilização de uma espécie de muralha segregadora, se minimiza situações de conflito de interesses ao evitar o acesso amplo a informações relevantes não divulgadas ao mercado, não é, por si só, capaz de excluir responsabilidade por eventual insider trading. Importante ter cuidado com construções teóricas, como a da 'mente corporativa', capazes de esvaziar de utilidade barreiras como uma Chinese Wall. Impossível transpor a teoria do domínio do fato à apuração de ilícitos de insider trading.

Instances of fraudulent acts are often headline news in the popular press in South Africa. Increasingly, these press reports point to the government tender process as being the main enabler used by the perpetrators committing the fraud. The cause of the tender fraud problem is confidentiality breach of information. This is accomplished, in part, by compromising the tender information contained in the government information system. This results in the biased award of a tender. Typically, the information in the tender process should be used to make decisions about a tender’s specifications, solicitation, evaluation and adjudication. The sharing of said information to unauthorised persons can be used to manipulate and corrupt the process. This in turn corrupts the tender process by awarding a tender to an unworthy recipient. This research studies the generic steps in the tender process to understand how information is used to corrupt the tender process. It proposes that conflict of interest, together with a lack of information confidentiality in the information system, paves the way for possible tender fraud. Thereafter, a system of internal controls is examined within the South African government as well as in foreign countries to investigate measures taken to reduce the breach of confidential information in the tender process. By referring to the Common Criteria Security Model, various critical security areas within the tender process are identified. This measure is assisted with the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) standard which has guiding principles for the management of confidential information. Thereafter, an information security policy,the Chinese Wall Model will be discussed as a means of reducing instances where conflict of interest may occur. Finally, an adapted Chinese Wall Model, which includes elements of the tender process, is presented as a way of reducing fraud in the government tender process. Finally, the research objective of this study is presented in the form of Critical Success Factors that aid in reducing the breach of confidential information in the tender process. As a consequence, tender fraud is reduced. These success factors have a direct and serious impact on the effectiveness of the Chinese Wall Model to secure the confidentiality of tender information. The proposed Critical Success Factors include: the Sanitisation Policy Document, an Electronic Document Management System, the Tender Evaluation Ethics Document, the Audit Trail Log and the Chinese Wall Model Prosecution Register.

La trascendencia práctica del tema del régimen jurídico de las joint ventures es indudable. En los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea, y más especialmente en España, las joint ventures remiten a una idea de mayor eficiencia económica, permitiendo a las empresas formar alianzas entre ellas, y así mejorar su competitividad, adaptando sus estructuras a las dimensiones crecientes de los mercados europeos y mundiales.Las joint ventures no están reguladas como tales en ninguna legislación nacional europea. El derecho comunitario se concentra por su parte en el análisis de los efectos de estas operaciones sobre la competencia. Las joint ventures adquieren en la práctica, únicamente, su contenido jurídico.Este estudio tiene por objetivo presentar un análisis a la vez teórico y práctico del régimen jurídico de las joint ventures, intentando definir el "valor añadido" del trabajo del jurista profesional cuando interviene en la creación y el funcionamiento de las joint ventures. La adopción de esta óptica funcionalista permite integrar el análisis de los diversos aspectos jurídicos de las joint ventures, sus estructuras contractuales y societarias así como su tratamiento en derecho de la competencia, que se abordan tradicionalmente en estudios separados, e insistir en la interelación existente entre las diversas ramas del derecho afectadas. Este estudio se concentra esencialmente en las cuestiones planteadas por las joint ventures en el ámbito del derecho de las obligaciones y del derecho societario.El jurista profesional desempeña, en primer lugar, una función de naturaleza organizativa, creando un conjunto de reglas obligatorias (reglas jurídicas) para todas las empresas participantes en la operación, de acuerdo con sus intereses estratégicos. El resultado puede ser, por ejemplo, la conclusión de un simple contrato, la constitución de una AEIE o la de una sociedad de capital. La complejidad de la organización jurídica de la joint venture impide estudiar de manera separada, como dos piezas aisladas, el llamado acuerdo de base de la joint venture por un lado, y la sociedad eventualmente constituida, la llamada filial común, por otro. El hecho de no entender la filial común como parte de un todo unitario y más complejo no permite describir correctamente las especialidades del régimen aplicable a dicha sociedad frente a sociedades constituidas en otros contextos económicos. La organización compleja de las joint ventures se diferencia de otros negocios jurídicos complejos por razón de su finalidad económica específica, la de establecer una alianza entre empresas. Tal como indica el derecho comunitario de la competencia, la joint venture es una operación en la que: (i) participan dos o más empresas independientemente activas en el mercado; (ii) se agrupan recursos necesarios al desarrollo de una actividad económica común en el seno eventualmente, pero no obligatoriamente, de una entidad separada (la llamada empresa común"); (iii) las empresas participantes ejercen un control conjunto sobre dicha actividad económica común. Estos tres elementos forman el núcleo de la definición de la joint venture en derecho.La cuestión de la validez y eficacia jurídica de los pactos presentes en el contrato complejo de joint venture, cuando implica la existencia de una sociedad de capital, es la que más dificultades plantea. El problema respecto a la joint venture, como respecto a muchos otros contratos complejos, es organizar un discurso sobre el uso de la libertad y sus consecuencias en el ámbito del derecho de sociedades.Mientras el jurista profesional organiza la joint venture, atrae también la atención del legislador sobre las necesidades jurídicas de las empresas que deciden "aliarse" en el seno de una joint venture. Los pactos presentes en los contratos complejos de joint venture no dependen únicamente del contenido del derecho aplicable a la sociedad "filial común" por ejemplo, sino también de la creatividad de los juristas profesionales. Las finalidades a cubrir por el contrato lo serán en regla general mediante combinaciones originales y complejas de mecanismos jurídicos, demostrándose una vez más el papel relevante de la práctica en la formación del derecho. Como consecuencia, puede observarse una tendencia a la flexibilización del derecho aplicable a las sociedades de capital, sobre todo en los países europeos continentales. Esta adaptación del derecho a la realidad práctica se observa también, y de manera significativa, en otras ramas del derecho, como en derecho de la competencia donde el legislador intenta introducir un tratamiento cada vez más pragmático de los efectos producidos por las joint ventures sobre los mercados. El análisis de la organización jurídica de las joint ventures en la práctica demuestra, sin embargo, la falta de utilidad y de oportunidad de una ordenación legal de la joint venture como tal en Europa. Como en el caso de la organización de la empresa, basta con que los operadores "candidatos" a la alianza encuentren en el derecho positivo los legal tools, o instrumentos jurídicos, adaptados a los objetivos económicos legítimos que persiguen ( por ejemplo, diversas formas sociales, la AIE, la UTE, la cuenta en participación etc), y sobre la base de los cuales puedan conservar y reforzar el sentimiento de confianza que necesitan tener en la operación y en su "aliado" para alcanzar con éxito estos objetivos. / This study provides a comprehensive analysis of both practical and theoretical legal issues raised by joint ventures in Europe. In the European Union member states and especially in Spain, joint ventures are viewed as a high efficient strategic operation - allowing alliances between firms, which may improve their competitiveness and adapt them to the growing dimensions of European markets and to the new global economy. Joint ventures are not organised as such by any statute law in Europe. European law focuses on the analysis of the effects they may produce on competition. Joint ventures obtain a legal content only in practice.The aim of this study is to define the "added value" of the practical work of lawyers, when they take part in processes of creation of joint ventures. This question allows to integrate the analysis of different legal aspects of joint ventures - their contractual and corporate structure as well as their legal treatment under competition law - which are traditionally treated in separate studies, and to point out the existence of on-going interfaces between them. This study focuses essentially on the contractual and corporate aspects of joint ventures. Practitioners set up, first of all, mechanisms which are compulsory - i.e. legal rules - for the firms involved in the operation according to their strategic interests. The result may be, for instance, the creation of a mere "contractual joint venture", of an European Economic Interest Grouping, or the incorporation of a "joint venture company". The complexity of the joint venture legal organisation prevents from studying separately the so-called "joint venture agreement" on which is based the operation, and the company which may be incorporated within it. The joint venture company is only a part of a more complex ensemble, which needs to be understood as such in order to be correctly analysed.The complex legal organisation of joint ventures differs from any other complex legal organisations because of its specific purpose, ie. establish a strategic alliance between firms. It aims to organise an operation in which: (i) participate two or more firms independently active on the market; (ii) are gathered the resources necessary to carry out a common business activity, possibly but not obligatory within a separate entity; and (iii) the participating firms jointly control the common business activity. Those three features are at the basis of the legal definition of joint ventures.The question of the legal validity and efficiency of the terms and conditions present in incorporated joint venture agreements is the more problematic one for the practitioners. The main difficulty in relation with joint ventures like in relation with many other complex agreements is to determine the limits of use of contractual freedom in company law.While organising the operation, the practitioners are also drawing the attention of the legislator on the legal needs of the firms willing to enter into alliances. The terms and conditions present in joint venture agreements depend not only on the content of the statute law applicable to the joint venture company for example, but also on the creative skills of the practitioners. The joint venture agreement needs to cover different purposes generally through original and complex combinations of legal mechanisms, proving once again the relevant role of practice in the generation of law.As a result, it is possible to observe a certain "flexibilization" of the rules in company law, especially in continental Europe. This new tendency develops in parallel with the movement observed in competition law towards a more realistic and pragmatic analysis of joint venture effects on the markets.The analysis of the legal organisations of joint ventures existing in practice demonstrates however the lack of necessity for a statutory regulation of this (strategic) operation in Europe. Like in the case of the organisation of a firm, the economic players willing to enter into strategic alliances only need to find in statute law different "legal tools" which may adapt their legitimate economic interests - such as different company forms, the Economic Interest Grouping, the partnership - and on the basis of which they can conserve and reinforce the confidence they need to have in their partner and in the operation in order to achieve successfully their purposes.