The 3:12-provisions are part of a legal system specified for owners of close corporations (companies owned and managed by a small group of businesspeople), for taxation of capi-tal gains and dividend. The reason for special rules for the taxation of these owners is to prevent them from transforming their income, to only be subject of the lower taxation of capital gains, instead of income of service. Since the rules were put in force, they have been subject to several changes. The most recent changes took effect on the 1 January 2006. They involve a higher importance for the rule of salary-based taxation. The rule of salary-based taxation means that compensation paid out to employees may increase the part of a company owner’s income which is taxed at the lower taxation of capital gains. The salary-base is calculated including compensation paid out in cash to employees based within the area of the European Economic Community. When applying the rule several problems in the interpretation arise. Questions concerning whether the part of per diem and allowance for expenses, which are subject to taxation, should be considered compensation paid out in cash, as well as whether board members are to be considered as employees. In addition, it is not certain how to deal with salaries in subsidiaries, which are trading companies, and salaries paid to employees outside of the European Economic Community. / 3:12-reglerna utgör en del av ett skattesystem för beskattning av kapitalvinst och utdelning för fåmansföretagsdelägare. Anledningen till att dessa skall beskattas enligt särskilda regler är att förhindra inkomstomvandling, så att exempelvis tjänsteinkomster inte beskattas som kapitalinkomster, och därmed med en lägre skattesats. Sedan regelverkets tillkomst har flera förändringar skett. De senaste förändringarna trädde i kraft den 1 januari 2006, och innebär bl.a. att löneunderlaget får en ökad betydelse vid be-skattning av fåmansföretagsdelägare. Löneunderlagsregeln innebär att ersättningar utbetal-da till arbetstagare får öka den delen av fåmansföretagsdelägarens inkomster som beskattas som inkomst av kapital, och därför till en lägre skattesats än inkomst av tjänst. I löneunderlaget ingår kontanta ersättningar utbetalda till arbetstagare inom EES-området. Denna bestämmelse innebär flera tolkningssvårigheter vid dess tillämpning. Frågor uppstår om den skattepliktiga delen av kostnadsersättningar och traktamenten skall räknas som en kontant utbetald ersättning, samt om styrelseledamöter räknas som arbetstagare. Dessutom är rättsläget osäkert vad gäller löner utbetalade i dotterbolag som är handelsbolag, och löner utbetalade till arbetstagare utanför EES-området. Vad gäller den senaste är det troligt att löneunderlagsregeln står i strid med EG-rätten. Det finns inte något klart och tydligt svar att finna för dessa tolkningsproblem varken i lag-text, förarbete, praxis eller doktrin. Rättsläget vid tillämpningen av löneunderlagsregeln är därför osäkert. Eftersom bestämmelsen utgör en sådan viktig del vid beskattning av få-mansföretagare är det anmärkningsvärt att lagstiftaren inte lade mer vikt vid att utforma re-geln på ett annat sätt.

<p>The 3:12-provisions are part of a legal system specified for owners of close corporations (companies owned and managed by a small group of businesspeople), for taxation of capi-tal gains and dividend. The reason for special rules for the taxation of these owners is to prevent them from transforming their income, to only be subject of the lower taxation of capital gains, instead of income of service. Since the rules were put in force, they have been subject to several changes. The most recent changes took effect on the 1 January 2006. They involve a higher importance for the rule of salary-based taxation. The rule of salary-based taxation means that compensation paid out to employees may increase the part of a company owner’s income which is taxed at the lower taxation of capital gains. The salary-base is calculated including compensation paid out in cash to employees based within the area of the European Economic Community.</p><p>When applying the rule several problems in the interpretation arise. Questions concerning whether the part of per diem and allowance for expenses, which are subject to taxation, should be considered compensation paid out in cash, as well as whether board members are to be considered as employees. In addition, it is not certain how to deal with salaries in subsidiaries, which are trading companies, and salaries paid to employees outside of the European Economic Community.</p> / <p>3:12-reglerna utgör en del av ett skattesystem för beskattning av kapitalvinst och utdelning för fåmansföretagsdelägare. Anledningen till att dessa skall beskattas enligt särskilda regler är att förhindra inkomstomvandling, så att exempelvis tjänsteinkomster inte beskattas som kapitalinkomster, och därmed med en lägre skattesats.</p><p>Sedan regelverkets tillkomst har flera förändringar skett. De senaste förändringarna trädde i kraft den 1 januari 2006, och innebär bl.a. att löneunderlaget får en ökad betydelse vid be-skattning av fåmansföretagsdelägare. Löneunderlagsregeln innebär att ersättningar utbetal-da till arbetstagare får öka den delen av fåmansföretagsdelägarens inkomster som beskattas som inkomst av kapital, och därför till en lägre skattesats än inkomst av tjänst.</p><p>I löneunderlaget ingår kontanta ersättningar utbetalda till arbetstagare inom EES-området. Denna bestämmelse innebär flera tolkningssvårigheter vid dess tillämpning. Frågor uppstår om den skattepliktiga delen av kostnadsersättningar och traktamenten skall räknas som en kontant utbetald ersättning, samt om styrelseledamöter räknas som arbetstagare. Dessutom är rättsläget osäkert vad gäller löner utbetalade i dotterbolag som är handelsbolag, och löner utbetalade till arbetstagare utanför EES-området. Vad gäller den senaste är det troligt att löneunderlagsregeln står i strid med EG-rätten.</p><p>Det finns inte något klart och tydligt svar att finna för dessa tolkningsproblem varken i lag-text, förarbete, praxis eller doktrin. Rättsläget vid tillämpningen av löneunderlagsregeln är därför osäkert. Eftersom bestämmelsen utgör en sådan viktig del vid beskattning av få-mansföretagare är det anmärkningsvärt att lagstiftaren inte lade mer vikt vid att utforma re-geln på ett annat sätt.</p>

專門職業過去向以其負擔無限責任豎立專業形象，然英美等大型訴訟的發生反使得專業人士成了求償的「深口袋」，這正是英美有限責任合夥制度產生的濫觴。 英美的有限責任合夥立法初衷，係為律師、會計師等專業人士承擔無限責任尋求解套的途徑，而面對我國專門職業者如律師、會計師等，亦遭遇大案，面臨無限責任沈重負擔之際，本論文嘗試從英美法制，尤其是以美國法制為著眼點，尋求制度引進的可行性。事實上令專業負有限責任，在美國尚可組成專業公司或有限責任企業，然此兩種制度除了稅制考量外，也較偏向公司經營管理，甚至因為可以公開招募而容易觸動聯邦證券交易法的干預，也因此，有限責任合夥延續舊有合夥法律關係的組織特性，廣受傳統上以合夥成立的專業組織所青睞。 以美國有限責任合夥法制而言，其本質為合夥，因此其優勢為保有合夥諸多彈性自由的管理規則，賦予合夥人廣大的協議空間，另一方面使合夥人僅負有限責任，免除無限責任的負累，然反面觀之，其最爭議者在於債權人保護的疑慮，美國於2001年爆發恩隆弊案，涉案的安達信會計師事務所正是於伊利諾州註冊登記為有限責任合夥，有限責任合夥在恩隆案中於是受到前所未有的考驗，事實上在美國各州，也透過保險、獨立基金的設置甚至揭開面紗法則適用不同程度保障債權人。 相較之下，英國的有限責任合夥法制，則以公司法為其內涵，因此有限責任合夥法受到更多的管理與限制，除了內部管理沿襲合夥的規定外，在事務執行及破產清算等，均需依循公司法規的管制，在債權人保護上英國法則直接在其有限責任合夥法規定成員擔保及資產取回的機制。 本文認為在立法走向上，得借鏡美國法制，另立新法，使有限責任合夥維持其合夥本質，並賦予法人格，且加強債權人保護之配套措施，期能提供專業組織架構的另一選擇。 / Professionals such as accountants and lawyers used to keep its reputation by taking unlimited liability. However, such unlimited liability makes these professionals to be deep pockets, as the result of the frequent lawsuits in recent years. Due to this reason, adopting limited liability partnership (LLP) seems to be the solution. LLP is a form of doing business, combining the feature of a limited corporation and the flexibility of a general partnership. LLP in United Kingdom and United States all granted the privilege of limited liability to the innocent partners, also keeping their personal assets apart from the creditors’ claim. LLP is available to all types of business in UK; however, in some US states, the LLP is only available to specific licensed professionals. Because of the character of the limited liability, protecting the interest of the creditors would be the most significant problem. To solve this dilemma, US adopt several methods such as using the insurance, doctrine of piercing the veil and creating the asset segregation to balance the interest between the professionals and the creditors. In UK, the company law and insolvency law all tried to cover LLP, in order to keep the LLP’s assets as a guarantee to creditors; such laws also request to disclose important business information of prospective risks to the public. Besides, both UK and US laws require the word “LLP” must be specified in the name of any LLP organizations. In 2001, the Enron scandal was a shock to the world. Arthur Andersen, a well known LLP accounting firm which provides dishonest service for Enron, has triggered the debate of whether LLP is still appropriate. Therefore, my study is going to analyze the pros and cons of LLP in the following chapter. Because of the unlimited liability is the only choice for professionals in Taiwan, we are going to learn from the UK and US laws. As for my conclusion, it is necessary enact an LLP Act to provide an alternative to the professionals.

La trascendencia práctica del tema del régimen jurídico de las joint ventures es indudable. En los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea, y más especialmente en España, las joint ventures remiten a una idea de mayor eficiencia económica, permitiendo a las empresas formar alianzas entre ellas, y así mejorar su competitividad, adaptando sus estructuras a las dimensiones crecientes de los mercados europeos y mundiales.Las joint ventures no están reguladas como tales en ninguna legislación nacional europea. El derecho comunitario se concentra por su parte en el análisis de los efectos de estas operaciones sobre la competencia. Las joint ventures adquieren en la práctica, únicamente, su contenido jurídico.Este estudio tiene por objetivo presentar un análisis a la vez teórico y práctico del régimen jurídico de las joint ventures, intentando definir el "valor añadido" del trabajo del jurista profesional cuando interviene en la creación y el funcionamiento de las joint ventures. La adopción de esta óptica funcionalista permite integrar el análisis de los diversos aspectos jurídicos de las joint ventures, sus estructuras contractuales y societarias así como su tratamiento en derecho de la competencia, que se abordan tradicionalmente en estudios separados, e insistir en la interelación existente entre las diversas ramas del derecho afectadas. Este estudio se concentra esencialmente en las cuestiones planteadas por las joint ventures en el ámbito del derecho de las obligaciones y del derecho societario.El jurista profesional desempeña, en primer lugar, una función de naturaleza organizativa, creando un conjunto de reglas obligatorias (reglas jurídicas) para todas las empresas participantes en la operación, de acuerdo con sus intereses estratégicos. El resultado puede ser, por ejemplo, la conclusión de un simple contrato, la constitución de una AEIE o la de una sociedad de capital. La complejidad de la organización jurídica de la joint venture impide estudiar de manera separada, como dos piezas aisladas, el llamado acuerdo de base de la joint venture por un lado, y la sociedad eventualmente constituida, la llamada filial común, por otro. El hecho de no entender la filial común como parte de un todo unitario y más complejo no permite describir correctamente las especialidades del régimen aplicable a dicha sociedad frente a sociedades constituidas en otros contextos económicos. La organización compleja de las joint ventures se diferencia de otros negocios jurídicos complejos por razón de su finalidad económica específica, la de establecer una alianza entre empresas. Tal como indica el derecho comunitario de la competencia, la joint venture es una operación en la que: (i) participan dos o más empresas independientemente activas en el mercado; (ii) se agrupan recursos necesarios al desarrollo de una actividad económica común en el seno eventualmente, pero no obligatoriamente, de una entidad separada (la llamada empresa común"); (iii) las empresas participantes ejercen un control conjunto sobre dicha actividad económica común. Estos tres elementos forman el núcleo de la definición de la joint venture en derecho.La cuestión de la validez y eficacia jurídica de los pactos presentes en el contrato complejo de joint venture, cuando implica la existencia de una sociedad de capital, es la que más dificultades plantea. El problema respecto a la joint venture, como respecto a muchos otros contratos complejos, es organizar un discurso sobre el uso de la libertad y sus consecuencias en el ámbito del derecho de sociedades.Mientras el jurista profesional organiza la joint venture, atrae también la atención del legislador sobre las necesidades jurídicas de las empresas que deciden "aliarse" en el seno de una joint venture. Los pactos presentes en los contratos complejos de joint venture no dependen únicamente del contenido del derecho aplicable a la sociedad "filial común" por ejemplo, sino también de la creatividad de los juristas profesionales. Las finalidades a cubrir por el contrato lo serán en regla general mediante combinaciones originales y complejas de mecanismos jurídicos, demostrándose una vez más el papel relevante de la práctica en la formación del derecho. Como consecuencia, puede observarse una tendencia a la flexibilización del derecho aplicable a las sociedades de capital, sobre todo en los países europeos continentales. Esta adaptación del derecho a la realidad práctica se observa también, y de manera significativa, en otras ramas del derecho, como en derecho de la competencia donde el legislador intenta introducir un tratamiento cada vez más pragmático de los efectos producidos por las joint ventures sobre los mercados. El análisis de la organización jurídica de las joint ventures en la práctica demuestra, sin embargo, la falta de utilidad y de oportunidad de una ordenación legal de la joint venture como tal en Europa. Como en el caso de la organización de la empresa, basta con que los operadores "candidatos" a la alianza encuentren en el derecho positivo los legal tools, o instrumentos jurídicos, adaptados a los objetivos económicos legítimos que persiguen ( por ejemplo, diversas formas sociales, la AIE, la UTE, la cuenta en participación etc), y sobre la base de los cuales puedan conservar y reforzar el sentimiento de confianza que necesitan tener en la operación y en su "aliado" para alcanzar con éxito estos objetivos. / This study provides a comprehensive analysis of both practical and theoretical legal issues raised by joint ventures in Europe. In the European Union member states and especially in Spain, joint ventures are viewed as a high efficient strategic operation - allowing alliances between firms, which may improve their competitiveness and adapt them to the growing dimensions of European markets and to the new global economy. Joint ventures are not organised as such by any statute law in Europe. European law focuses on the analysis of the effects they may produce on competition. Joint ventures obtain a legal content only in practice.The aim of this study is to define the "added value" of the practical work of lawyers, when they take part in processes of creation of joint ventures. This question allows to integrate the analysis of different legal aspects of joint ventures - their contractual and corporate structure as well as their legal treatment under competition law - which are traditionally treated in separate studies, and to point out the existence of on-going interfaces between them. This study focuses essentially on the contractual and corporate aspects of joint ventures. Practitioners set up, first of all, mechanisms which are compulsory - i.e. legal rules - for the firms involved in the operation according to their strategic interests. The result may be, for instance, the creation of a mere "contractual joint venture", of an European Economic Interest Grouping, or the incorporation of a "joint venture company". The complexity of the joint venture legal organisation prevents from studying separately the so-called "joint venture agreement" on which is based the operation, and the company which may be incorporated within it. The joint venture company is only a part of a more complex ensemble, which needs to be understood as such in order to be correctly analysed.The complex legal organisation of joint ventures differs from any other complex legal organisations because of its specific purpose, ie. establish a strategic alliance between firms. It aims to organise an operation in which: (i) participate two or more firms independently active on the market; (ii) are gathered the resources necessary to carry out a common business activity, possibly but not obligatory within a separate entity; and (iii) the participating firms jointly control the common business activity. Those three features are at the basis of the legal definition of joint ventures.The question of the legal validity and efficiency of the terms and conditions present in incorporated joint venture agreements is the more problematic one for the practitioners. The main difficulty in relation with joint ventures like in relation with many other complex agreements is to determine the limits of use of contractual freedom in company law.While organising the operation, the practitioners are also drawing the attention of the legislator on the legal needs of the firms willing to enter into alliances. The terms and conditions present in joint venture agreements depend not only on the content of the statute law applicable to the joint venture company for example, but also on the creative skills of the practitioners. The joint venture agreement needs to cover different purposes generally through original and complex combinations of legal mechanisms, proving once again the relevant role of practice in the generation of law.As a result, it is possible to observe a certain "flexibilization" of the rules in company law, especially in continental Europe. This new tendency develops in parallel with the movement observed in competition law towards a more realistic and pragmatic analysis of joint venture effects on the markets.The analysis of the legal organisations of joint ventures existing in practice demonstrates however the lack of necessity for a statutory regulation of this (strategic) operation in Europe. Like in the case of the organisation of a firm, the economic players willing to enter into strategic alliances only need to find in statute law different "legal tools" which may adapt their legitimate economic interests - such as different company forms, the Economic Interest Grouping, the partnership - and on the basis of which they can conserve and reinforce the confidence they need to have in their partner and in the operation in order to achieve successfully their purposes.