Este trabalho busca analisar a influência do endividamento e da restrição financeira das companhias nos seus custos de emissão em ofertas iniciais de ações (IPOs) e ofertas subsequentes de ações (SEOs). A metodologia utilizada baseou-se na análise de regressão múltipla e na análise de regressão com variáveis instrumentais em uma amostra de 106 observações para IPOs e 66 observações para SEOs. Os resultados indicam que, para IPOs, os custos de emissão de ações têm relação negativa com endividamento possivelmente em função do benefício econômico do endividamento. Já as empresas consideradas restritas financeiramente pagam mais caro para fazer seu IPO. Em SEOs, as comissões dos bancos de investimento só têm relação negativa com o endividamento até certo nível de alavancagem financeira. A partir de um determinado ponto os custos ficam maiores, indicando que empresas sobrealavancadas pagam maiores comissões para realização das ofertas. Empresas endividadas e restritas também pagam mais caro para realizar a SEO, indicando que empresas com estas características de fato podem demorar a ajustar sua estrutura de capital, conforme apontado por Leary e Roberts (2005) e por Longstaff e Strebulaev (2014). Os resultados são robustos quanto ao tratamento de endogenia das variáveis endividamento e custos de emissão de ações. / This study aims to analyze the influence of financial leverage and financial constraints on the issue costs of IPOs and SEOs. The analysis was made based on ordinary least square and instrumental variable regression of a sample of 106 observations for IPOs and 66 observations for SEOs. The results showed that for IPOs the cost of issuing equity had a negative relationship with leverage possibly due to tax shields. Constrained companies pay more to issue equity in IPOs. Financial leverage had a negative coefficient to explain investment banks commission in SEOs, but it happens only until certain level of leverage. Overleveraged companies pay higher commissions to issue equity in SEOs. Additionally, leveraged companies that are also considered financially constrained pay higher commissions. Thus, leveraged and constrained companies may spend more time to adjust their capital structure, as showed by Leary and Roberts (2005) and Longstaff and Strebulaev (2014). All results are robust for the endogeneity between leverage and equity issue costs.

Univ., Diss.--Genf, 2002.

Univ., Diss.--Witten/Herdecke, 2003.

Este trabalho busca analisar a influência do endividamento e da restrição financeira das companhias nos seus custos de emissão em ofertas iniciais de ações (IPOs) e ofertas subsequentes de ações (SEOs). A metodologia utilizada baseou-se na análise de regressão múltipla e na análise de regressão com variáveis instrumentais em uma amostra de 106 observações para IPOs e 66 observações para SEOs. Os resultados indicam que, para IPOs, os custos de emissão de ações têm relação negativa com endividamento possivelmente em função do benefício econômico do endividamento. Já as empresas consideradas restritas financeiramente pagam mais caro para fazer seu IPO. Em SEOs, as comissões dos bancos de investimento só têm relação negativa com o endividamento até certo nível de alavancagem financeira. A partir de um determinado ponto os custos ficam maiores, indicando que empresas sobrealavancadas pagam maiores comissões para realização das ofertas. Empresas endividadas e restritas também pagam mais caro para realizar a SEO, indicando que empresas com estas características de fato podem demorar a ajustar sua estrutura de capital, conforme apontado por Leary e Roberts (2005) e por Longstaff e Strebulaev (2014). Os resultados são robustos quanto ao tratamento de endogenia das variáveis endividamento e custos de emissão de ações. / This study aims to analyze the influence of financial leverage and financial constraints on the issue costs of IPOs and SEOs. The analysis was made based on ordinary least square and instrumental variable regression of a sample of 106 observations for IPOs and 66 observations for SEOs. The results showed that for IPOs the cost of issuing equity had a negative relationship with leverage possibly due to tax shields. Constrained companies pay more to issue equity in IPOs. Financial leverage had a negative coefficient to explain investment banks commission in SEOs, but it happens only until certain level of leverage. Overleveraged companies pay higher commissions to issue equity in SEOs. Additionally, leveraged companies that are also considered financially constrained pay higher commissions. Thus, leveraged and constrained companies may spend more time to adjust their capital structure, as showed by Leary and Roberts (2005) and Longstaff and Strebulaev (2014). All results are robust for the endogeneity between leverage and equity issue costs.

This thesis analyses whether China tries to gain more power in the IMF staying within the current international U.S.-dominated system. The analysis focuses on China's behavior in the IMF during the reform process of the last decade. The thesis examines the ways in which China can gain more power staying in the IMF. However, current power structures make it difficult to implement changes and China might therefore use political groups such as the BRICS and their New Development Bank to exert pressure. But the intention of the BRICS is not to overthrow the system but to reform it. Using official statements and speeches delivered by Chinese, U.S. or IMF staff in the IMF as well as articles published in newspapers Chinese claims and US reactions were analyzed. The results suggest that China stays within the international system and does not try to overthrow it. Nevertheless, pressure is created through the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). The intention of this thesis is to give a current account of Chinese behavior in the international community, supporting the understanding of underlying dynamics. Keywords IMF, China, Reforms, BRICS, New Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, international system, challenge

<p>Bakgrund</p><p>Inom de investmentbanker som idag erbjuder heltäckande tjänster inom värdepappershandel och företagsrelaterade finanstjänster uppstår konflikter som grundar sig på vems intresse som kommer i första hand. I denna process har finansanalytikern en central roll där det finns en risk att hamna i en intressekonflikt med corporate finance avdelningen. Finansanalytikerns oberoende är viktigt då analyserna har påverkan på kursbildningen på värdepappersmarknaden.</p><p>Syfte</p><p>Syftet med denna kandidatuppsats är att beskriva hur ett antal svenska investmentbanker arbetar för att främja finansanalytikerns oberoende i sin yrkesroll. För att tydliggöra oberoendet kommer intressekonflikten mellan analysavdelningen och corporate finance avdelningen att beskrivas då problematiken kring finansanalytikerns oberoende här är som tydligast.</p><p>Metod</p><p>En kvalitativ ansats har valt för att uppfylla uppsatsens syfte. Tre personliga djupintervjuer genomfördes med investmentbanker och Finansinspektionen. Ytterligare en telefonintervju genomfördes med ett analyshus som marknadsför sig som oberoende. Detta gav sammanlagt tre olika perspektiv på problemet.</p><p>Slutsats</p><p>Investmentbankerna främjar finansanalytikerns oberoende genom att skapa förutsättningar för att denne ska kunna ha en hög integritet i sin yrkesroll. Dessa förutsättningar skapas genom att följa lagen och de rekommendationer som Finansinspektionen ger. Tillsammans med interna regler och incitament stärks finansanalytikerns oberoende gentemot corporate finance avdelningen.</p> / <p>Background</p><p>Within today’s full-service investment banks conflicts of interest related to who’s interest that comes first appears. Within this process the equity researcher has a fundamental profession and is exposed to conflicts of interest mainly towards the corporate finance department. The equity researcher’s independence is of importance since the analyses have impact on the determination of prices on the securities market.</p><p>Purpose</p><p>The purpose of this bachelor thesis is to describe how a number of Swedish investment banks operate to promote independence in the equity researcher’s profession. To describe the independence, conflicts of interest between the equity research department and the corporate finance department will be described. This situation chosen because of the problematic situation concerning the equity researcher’s independence that appears.</p><p>Method</p><p>A qualitative approach has been chosen to fulfil the purpose of the bachelor thesis. Three personal in-depth interviews have been conducted with investment banks as well as the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. One additional telephone interview was conducted with a company promoting itself as an independent equity researcher. This together gave us three different perspectives of the problem.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>The investment banks promote the equity researcher’s independence by creating conditions to maintain a high integrity in their profession. These conditions are created by following the law and the recommendations given by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. Together with internal rules and incentives, the equity researcher’s independence towards corporate finance will strengthen.</p>

This study aims to investigate the methodological differences of wind power project economic analysis and to indicate the preferred methodology among the considered cases. The study compares the economic appraisals of onshore wind power projects. The economic appraisals of wind power projects are for evaluating wind power projects' impact on an economy. Economic appraisals of wind power projects include economic justifications of projects in comparison with the next best alternative projects, consider negative and positive externalities but exclude transfer payments such as taxes and subsidies. Also, in wind power project economic appraisals, the valuations of costs and benefits are at shadow prices and discounting of future costs and benefits at a social discount rate. There are methodological guidelines from different institutions on how to conduct project economic analysis. This study compares methodologies of three onshore wind power project economic appraisals conducted by the European Investment Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Mott MacDonald and discusses methodological differences for each case study in comparison with each other. The results of this study are for any investors, institutions and government authorities involve in wind power projects and seek not only corporate profits but also social benefits. They may consider the methodological differences identified in this study to improve the assessment of wind power project economic impacts. The results indicate that the identified methodological differences complement each other rather than substitute. The preferred methodology for onshore wind power projects economic analysis would be the methodology that considers the identified differences for the comprehensive evaluations.

This thesis consists of three essays and studies CEO compensation and mergers and acquisitions in empirical corporate finance. The first essay is sole-authored and is titled ‘The Effect of Social Interactions on Executive Compensation.' The second essay ‘The Role of Investment Banker Directors in M &A: Can Experts Help?' is a joint work with Qianqian Huang, Erik Lie, and Ke Yang. The third essay is titled ‘The Strategic Use of CEO Compensation in Labor Contract Negotiations' and is coauthored with Erik Lie and Tingting Que. In the first essay, I examine how executives' social interactions affect their compensation. Using the social networks among 2,936 chief executive officers (CEOs) during 1999-2008, I report that the compensation of a pair of socially connected CEOs is significantly more similar than that of a pair of non-connected CEOs. I further find that CEO compensation responds to a peer's change in pay caused by industry performance, especially if that change in pay is positive rather than negative and when the firm is suffering from weak corporate governance. I interpret these results as consistent with the notion that relative earnings concerns within social networks affect negotiations about compensation. Finally, I find that the past practice of backdating stock option grants spread across social networks, suggesting that social networks serve as a conduit for interpersonal information flow about compensation practices. Taken together, I show that CEOs' peer interactions have a substantial impact on executive pay. In the second essay, we examine how directors with investment banking experience affect firms' acquisition behavior. We find that firms have a higher probability of acquisition when an investment banker is a director. Furthermore, acquirers with investment banker directors on the board have significantly higher announcement returns, especially if the deal is relatively large and the bankers' experience and/or network is current. We also find evidence that investment banker directors help reduce the takeover premium and advisory fees paid to outside consultants. Finally, the presence of investment banker directors is positively related to long-run operating and stock performance. Lastly, in the third essay, we study whether firms strategically alter CEO compensation to improve their bargaining position with labor unions. We conjecture that (i) firms in heavily unionized industries offer lower compensation packages to their CEOs than do their non-union counterparts, (ii) unionized firms temporarily curtail CEO compensation before union contract negotiations, and (iii) the curtailment in compensation is most pronounced for option grants due to their discretionary nature. Our results support these conjectures. We also find that CEOs are more likely to sacrifice compensation if they hold a relatively large stake in the company whose value depends on the contract negotiations. Finally, we report evidence that curtailing CEO compensation helps reduce the negotiated salary growth.

Bakgrund Inom de investmentbanker som idag erbjuder heltäckande tjänster inom värdepappershandel och företagsrelaterade finanstjänster uppstår konflikter som grundar sig på vems intresse som kommer i första hand. I denna process har finansanalytikern en central roll där det finns en risk att hamna i en intressekonflikt med corporate finance avdelningen. Finansanalytikerns oberoende är viktigt då analyserna har påverkan på kursbildningen på värdepappersmarknaden. Syfte Syftet med denna kandidatuppsats är att beskriva hur ett antal svenska investmentbanker arbetar för att främja finansanalytikerns oberoende i sin yrkesroll. För att tydliggöra oberoendet kommer intressekonflikten mellan analysavdelningen och corporate finance avdelningen att beskrivas då problematiken kring finansanalytikerns oberoende här är som tydligast. Metod En kvalitativ ansats har valt för att uppfylla uppsatsens syfte. Tre personliga djupintervjuer genomfördes med investmentbanker och Finansinspektionen. Ytterligare en telefonintervju genomfördes med ett analyshus som marknadsför sig som oberoende. Detta gav sammanlagt tre olika perspektiv på problemet. Slutsats Investmentbankerna främjar finansanalytikerns oberoende genom att skapa förutsättningar för att denne ska kunna ha en hög integritet i sin yrkesroll. Dessa förutsättningar skapas genom att följa lagen och de rekommendationer som Finansinspektionen ger. Tillsammans med interna regler och incitament stärks finansanalytikerns oberoende gentemot corporate finance avdelningen. / Background Within today’s full-service investment banks conflicts of interest related to who’s interest that comes first appears. Within this process the equity researcher has a fundamental profession and is exposed to conflicts of interest mainly towards the corporate finance department. The equity researcher’s independence is of importance since the analyses have impact on the determination of prices on the securities market. Purpose The purpose of this bachelor thesis is to describe how a number of Swedish investment banks operate to promote independence in the equity researcher’s profession. To describe the independence, conflicts of interest between the equity research department and the corporate finance department will be described. This situation chosen because of the problematic situation concerning the equity researcher’s independence that appears. Method A qualitative approach has been chosen to fulfil the purpose of the bachelor thesis. Three personal in-depth interviews have been conducted with investment banks as well as the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. One additional telephone interview was conducted with a company promoting itself as an independent equity researcher. This together gave us three different perspectives of the problem. Conclusion The investment banks promote the equity researcher’s independence by creating conditions to maintain a high integrity in their profession. These conditions are created by following the law and the recommendations given by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. Together with internal rules and incentives, the equity researcher’s independence towards corporate finance will strengthen.

Bakgrund: Flertalet tidigare studier har undersökt fenomenet underprissättning vid börsintroduktioner utifrån en rad olika perspektiv och teorier. Däremot har ingen tidigare studie analyserat investmentbankernas direkta påverkan på utfallet och om det finns en tydlig korrelation mellan en viss typ av investmentbank och graden av underprissättning. Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att, med utgångspunkt i att validera tidigare teorier och studier, undersöka alternativa förklaringsgrunder till fenomenet genom att analysera sofistikeringsgraden av de underliggande processerna bland investmentbanker och därmed bidra med en mer holistisk och nyanserad förståelse. Metod: Då studien både ämnar fastställa utbredningen av ett fenomen samt undersöka dess alternativa förklaringsgrunder, kombineras en kvantitativ och kvalitativ metodik. Studien tar avstamp i en statistisk analys, följt av en kvantitativ klassificering samt slutligen en kvalitativ datainsamling i form av semistrukturerade intervjuer med strategiskt utvalda respondenter. Slutsats: Studiens resultat lyckas både styrka och motsäga befintlig teori inom området och presenterar därtill en alternativ syn på bakomliggande förklaringsgrunder till underprissättning, vilka utgår från investmentbankens egna perspektiv. / Background: Several previous studies have investigated the phenomenon of underpricing based upon different theories and from various perspectives. However, none of these previous studies have analysed the direct impact of the investment bank on the final result and if there is a clear correlation between certain types of investment banks and the level of underpricing. Purpose: The purpose of this study is, based upon validating previous theories and studies, to investigate alternative explanations of the phenomenon by analysing the level of sophistication in the underlying processes of the investment bank and by doing this, contributing to a more holistic and nuanced understanding. Method: Since this study both intends to determine the scope of, and find alternative explanations of, a phenomenon, a combined quantitative and qualitative research method is applied. The study takes its starting point in a statistical analysis, followed by a quantitative classification and finally a qualitative data collection in terms of semi-structured interviews with a strategic selection of interviewees. Conclusion: The result of the study succeeds in both strengthening and contradicting existing theories within the field and presents in addition an alternative view on the underlying explanations of underpricing, from the perspective of the investment bank.