This thesis offers an original account of the South African Constitutional Court's reasoning in identifying unfair discrimination perpetrated by the state. I use this account to develop proposals for improving the Court's jurisprudence, in line with its stated aim of addressing patterns of group disadvantage. The Court's Harksen test for unfair discrimination makes dignity the touchstone for identifying this wrong. However, the Court has not explained what is required to prove a violation of dignity or how dignity fits with its concern for group disadvantage. I demonstrate that three necessary conditions must be satisfied for the Court to conclude that dignity has been violated: there must be a) unfavourable treatment on the basis of protected grounds; b) that threatens to create or perpetuate patterns of group disadvantage; and c) that lacks adequate justification. I also investigate important features of the Court's reasoning that have been overlooked in the existing literature, including its concern for messages expressed by discrimination and the fluctuating intensity with which it reviews justifications. Among my proposals for developing this reasoning, I argue that the Court should remove human dignity from the Harksen test and openly acknowledge the considerations doing the work in its decisions. I also provide a detailed critique of five of the Court's most controversial decisions where it found discrimination to be fair despite clear indications that it entrenched patterns of disadvantage. I show that in all five cases the Court applied an indefensibly weak intensity of review, falling below the baseline level of scrutiny which ought to be applied in unfair discrimination cases. I contend that consistent application of this baseline will help to make the Court better at preventing and addressing patterns of group disadvantage. I conclude with a restatement of the Harksen test that consolidates the Court's reasoning and my proposals.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / Some digitised pages may appear illegible due to the condition of the original hard copy / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis is a response to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in South African Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, in which certain provisions of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act were subjected to constitutional review. The outcome of the case was the striking down of certain provisions of the Act as unconstitutional, and the removal of Judge Willem Heath from his position as head of the Unit. The provisions were said to infringe upon the principle of separation of powers, an implicit term of the Constitution of South Africa. This principle affects the extent of the judicial power because of its influence on determining the acceptability of extra-judicial functions. The doctrine of separation of powers is therefore considered in its historical and theoretical context, with particular reference to the way in which it tends to limit or define the role of judges. Following this analysis, the status of institutions supporting constitutional democracy is examined, and the legislation governing Special Investigating Units is compared with that which regulates the office of the Public Protector. As a result, some alternative legislative means of achieving the ends of the Units, namely the combating of state corruption and maladministration, are suggested. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis volg op die uitspraak van die Grondwetlike Hof in South African Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, waarin sekere bepalings van die Wet op Spesiale Ondersoekeenhede en Spesiale Tribunale aan grondwetlike hersiening onderwerp is. Die uitkoms van die saak was dat sekere ongrondwetlike bepalings van die Wet ongeldig verklaar is, en dat Regter Willem Heath van sy posisie as hoof van die Eenheid onthef is. Dit is bevind dat die bepalings die beginsel van skeiding van magte, 'n implisiete term van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet, geskend het. As gevolg van sy invloed op die bepaling van aanvaarbaarheid van buite-juridiese funksies, beïnvloed dié beginsel die omvang van die juridiese mag. Die skeiding van magte leerstuk word dus in sy historiese en teoretiese konteks oorweeg, met spesifieke verwysing na die manier waarop dit neig om die rol van regters te beperk of te omskryf. Na hierdie analise word die status ondersoek van instellings wat grondwetlike demokrasie ondersteun, en die wetgewing wat die Spesiale Ondersoekeenhede beheer, vergelyk met dié wat die Openbare Beskermer reguleer. Op grond hiervan word sekere alternatiewe wetgewende metodes voorgestelom die doeleindes van die Eenhede, naamlik die bekamping van staatskorrupsie en wanadministrasie, te bereik.

台灣司法院大法官早在1948年就開始進行違憲審查，迄今已釋憲超過65餘載，共作成730餘則大法官解釋，違憲宣告的比例大約30%至40%之間，其中與社會權相關的案件約20餘件，面對社會權應如何司法性的提問，我國學者多認為大法官對於社會權案件之釋憲立場過於難以捉摸，時而寬鬆時而嚴謹，大法官於社會權案件之審查上，並未創造出一套如同自由權般穩定且具有預測可能性的審查標準。 對於我國大法官於社會權案件中的釋憲難題，若僅著墨於方法論上的研究，忽略國家整體社會發展的歷史脈絡，將有見樹不見林之遺憾，而此種將社會發展歷史脈絡融入大法官釋憲過程中，最受國際推崇者莫過於南非憲法法院。南非在歷經長達數百年的種族隔離後，終於揮別威權擁抱民主，並擁有一部為世人所稱羨的新憲法，然而新民主南非所面臨來自於經濟、社會、政治與轉型正義等各方面之挑戰，並未因新憲法的制定而全盤迎刃而解。相反的，民主化後的新政府因財政短缺，導致無法實踐南非憲法中所保障之社會權，求助無門的民眾最終只能向憲法法院訴請權利保障。南非憲法法院面對困擾全球各地憲法法院之亙古難題「社會權如何司法性」時，並不懼怕挑戰，展現出以人為本之人權保障與弱勢保障之高度，做出許多為世人所稱羨之社會權憲法判決。 反思我國之社會權釋憲案件，多數均非由經濟弱勢者所提出，甚或有些與弱勢生存保障密切相關之釋憲案，最終這些弱勢群體之弱勢成因、社會處境現狀並未在釋憲場域中被凸顯、被衡量，導致憲法權利保障所連結之個人或群體從事現場域中消失了。對此，人民權利保障與權力分立原則同為憲法之兩大基石，二者間並無孰輕孰重之差別，故在社會權案件中，雖需考量資源有限性等權力分立之問題，然而過度尊重立法者之形成自由忽略人民權利保障之作法，仍有進一步改善之空間。