This dissertation consists of two topics. Chapter 1 examines the relationship between contingent commission use and underwriting performance as well as underwriting risk using data from 2005 to 2016. Top brokers were banned from receiving contingent commissions following the inquiry in 2004 led by Eliot Spitzer, former New York Attorney-General. But the ban raised concerns about whether it created a level playing field across the industry, as smaller brokers continued taking them. In addition, despite the possible conflicts of interest, contingent commissions have also been recognized as a way to better align agent and insurer incentives. Regulators agreed to relax the terms for the leading brokers in 2010, resulting in a less onerous compliance regime for contingent commission use. It is important to study the effectiveness of contingent commission use on improving underwriting performance. This study finds strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that contingent commissions’ usage is associated with better underwriting performance as well as lower underwriting risk. This study also finds a curvilinear relationship between underwriting performance and the level of contingent commission use. Chapter 2 investigates the impact of executive overconfidence on capital structure decisions and reinsurance purchases using a sample of 37 publicly-traded property-liability insurance groups for the period 2002 to 2016. This study finds that insurance firms with overconfident executives have significantly higher leverage ratios than those without overconfident executives. This study also finds evidence that insurance firms with overconfident executives cede more reinsurance, and this evidence is stronger for insurers with more limited business capacity than those with ample business capacity. The results of this study also indicate that overconfident executives prefer internal reinsurance to external reinsurance. This research provides evidence that personality traits of executive impact capital structure decisions and reinsurance purchases for insurance firms, which should be of interest to policyholders and regulators. / Business Administration/Risk Management and Insurance

在保險市場中，保險商品主要透過保險經紀人、保險代理人以及保險人所掌握的直接通路予以販售，特別是在大型商業財產及責任保險的行銷通路上，保險經紀人扮演了舉足輕重的角色。本論文主要是以商業財產及責任保險市場為研究重心，並由經濟觀點探討保險經紀人的仲介角色、市場競爭態勢、報酬結構以及業務安排方式等，同時以保險監理的角度檢討保險經紀行業存在的誠信自律、利益衝突以及客戶公平對待等問題。 不同於保險代理人，保險經紀人係基於保單持有人之利益為其安排保險。因此，保險經紀人必須透過多家保險人提供報價的方式，從中選擇價格及條件最佳者做為保險業務安排之對象；換言之，誠實的報價程序，方足以保障客戶之利益並維繫保險市場的健全。然而國外近年發生的大型保險經紀人與部分保險人共謀提供不實之報價事件，不僅嚴重影響到保單持有人的權益，更引發了對於保險經紀人不當市場力量運用以及或有佣金（contingent commissions）制度存廢的廣泛討論。2004年10月14日紐約州總檢察官Eliot Spitzer向紐約州最高法院針對全球最大保險經紀商Marsh & McLennan及部分保險人所涉及的投標詐欺、操縱價格、收受保險公司或有佣金等三大罪狀提出了民事訴訟。此案例不僅使得涉案公司付出鉅額賠償，更暴露出大型保險經紀人公司存在已久的市場壟斷、價格操控、利益衝突等問題。 對照於英、美等國在保險經紀人制度方面的成熟與發達，我國在此方面尚屬新興發展階段，所謂他山之石可以攻錯，借重先行者的經驗，不僅可以避免重蹈覆轍，更可加快成長的腳步；在全球化的浪潮衝擊之下，保險經紀市場唯有與國際充分接軌，並健全相關制度，才能為國內保險市場的業務成長，帶來蓬勃生機，並立下永續發展的堅固磐石。 / In the insurance market, policies are sold through direct channels controlled by insurance companies or intermediaries, such as brokers and agents. Brokers play a vital role in the property & casualty insurance market and serving commercial clients with complex and large exposures. This report focusing on the commercial property & casualty insurance market, we look at the economic performance by brokers, the competitive structure of the marketplace, the compensation arrangements for brokers, and the placement with insurers. Furthermore, we also from regulators’ point of view to study and review a variety of issues, such as the ethics and conduct , conflict of interest, treating customers fairly, which are raised from insurance brokers industry. In contrast to captive agents, brokers act on behalf of the insured, for this circumstance, the role of the brokers is to increase price and coverage competitiveness, by providing the customers access to a wider range of possible insurers. Clearly the integrity of the bidding process is very important to protect the interest of customers and to the health of the insurance brokers market. Unfortunately, the integrity of the placement process by brokers has been questioned due to the allegations of bid rigging in which one or more global brokers and a few insurers appear to have conspired to submit non-competitive bids. This anti-competitive practice is not only detrimental to the customers but also cause public concerned that too much market power lead to abuses by brokers and that contingent commissions should be abolished. On October 14, 2004, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed suit against Marsh & McLennan alleging that the insurance brokers engaged in bid rigging and received widespread kickbacks from insurance companies. On January 31, 2005, Marsh agreed to pay $850 million in restitution to buyers as part of an agreement to settle the suit, but lawsuits still in progress. The above-mentioned case has revealed conflict of interest, anti-competitive and market manipulation for meg-brokers, in fact, these problems existed for a long time. Comparing with US and UK insurance brokers market, Taiwan is belong to emerging market, to gain knowledge of pioneer’s developing experience, we could shorten the time to get more progress. When we deal with the globalization challenge, local insurance broker market should be complied with international practices, improve relative rules and regulations is also necessary, once above situations are available, it could help domestic insurance market rapid and healthy growth.