Les rémunérations des dirigeants des sociétés cotées suscitent un vif débat tant sur leur montant que sur les principes guidant leur détermination. Ce débat est souvent intensifié par une forte médiatisation prompte à indigner l’opinion publique et à inciter le législateur à se saisir de la question. Celui-ci cherche alors à encadrer les pratiques litigieuses tantôt en imposant des mesures impératives, tantôt en favorisant l’autorégulation. La présente étude a pour ambition d’apprécier la pertinence et l’efficacité de l’ensemble de ces règles relevant du droit dur et du droit souple. Un tel examen du droit positif montre une réelle incapacité à apporter une réponse au problème de l’acceptabilité sociale des rémunérations par le biais de l’outil juridique. En témoigne l’évolution de la législation française depuis ces vingt dernières années, basée sur l’impératif de transparence et l’évolution des procédures de détermination et d’attribution des rémunérations des dirigeants. Les juges ne semblent pas davantage disposer de leviers efficaces de lutte contre l’excès des rémunérations en droit des sociétés. Maints espoirs ont donc été fondés sur les principes provenant du droit souple et en particulier de la gouvernance d’entreprise, espoirs cependant également déçus à bien des égards. Finalement, demeure particulièrement prégnante la question de savoir si le droit, qu’il soit dur ou souple, peut constituer cet outil utile et efficace de régulation du niveau de rémunérations des dirigeants de sociétés cotées / The remuneration of directors of listed companies generated a lively debate and even controversy as to their amount or to the principles guiding their determination. This debate is often intensified by vivid media coverage aimed at instigating the public opinion and encouraging the legislator to take up the question. The latter then seeks to regulate the practices in question either by imposing mandatory measures at times, or by encouraging self-regulation at others. This study aims to assess the relevance and effectiveness of all of these rules under the hard law and soft law. Such an examination of the substantive law shows a real inability to provide an answer to the problem of the social acceptability of these remunerations through legal tool. It also reviews the evolution of French legislation during the last twenty years, based on the need for transparency and the development of procedures for determining and awarding the remuneration of directors. Judges do not appear to have effective leverage and means of struggle in the Corporate Laws against the excesses of the remuneration. So many hopes have been based on the principles derived from the soft law and in particular, Corporate Governance, yet those hopes were however deceived in many ways. Finally, the question that remains particularly urgent and haunting is whether the law, be it hard or soft, can be a useful and effective tool for regulating the level of remuneration of directors and executives of listed companies

La tesi affronta il tema della responsabilità dei membri del consiglio di amministrazione di s.p.a verso la società per gli inadempimenti dei doveri gestori insiti negli atti o nelle omissioni collegiali. L'accertamento dei presupposti della responsabilità degli amministratori deve avvenire su base individuale con conseguente possibilità di imputazione del danno da risarcire ad alcuni consiglieri e non ad altri, che pure abbiano compartecipato al medesimo inadempimento: il singolo amministratore può infatti essere esonerato da responsabilità mediante la prova della personale immunità da colpa (dimostrando di essere stato diligente alla luce della natura del suo incarico e delle sue specifiche competenze) anche a prescindere dalla manifestazione formale del dissenso ex art. 2392 cc., ult. comma. La solidarietà rappresenta la regola di attuazione dell'obbligazione risarcitoria tra gli amministratori ritenuti corresponsabili in relazione al medesimo fatto dannoso. È possibile tuttavia pervenire ad una graduazione della condanna risarcitoria in virtù dell'eventuale connotazione dolosa dell'inadempimento di un singolo consigliere e dell'applicazione del regime risarcitorio differenziato di cui all'art. 1307 c.c.. La società può inoltre rinunziare alla solidarietà anche ex ante con adozione in via statutaria di un regime di responsabilità parziaria per tutti o alcuni degli amministratori, purchè nei soli rapporti tra società e amministratori e nei limiti di cui all'art. 1229 cc. / This thesis provides an analysis of the pertinent aspects of the liability of corporate directors for breach of their fiduciary duties in case of collegial functioning of an Italian s.p.a.'s board of directors. The liability of the directors must be determined on an individual basis and whether they are exculpated from liability for a breach of their duties can vary for each director based on his specialized skills and on the role he plays in the board (independent director, president, member of a committee), regardless of the entering of the dissent from the board's action into the corporate records. The liability is joint and several where two or more directors jointly participate in the same breach of a fiduciary duty with a right of contribution inter se. The corporation ( S.P.A. ) may waive to the protection secured by the joint and several liability rule either (i) by opting for a proportional liability regime with respect to the directors' liability vis-a-vis the corporation and except for the cases of directors' fraud or gross negligence or (ii) by entering into partial settlements with one director (or more directors) for the portion of the damage attributable to his (or their) personal fault.