Les rémunérations des dirigeants des sociétés cotées suscitent un vif débat tant sur leur montant que sur les principes guidant leur détermination. Ce débat est souvent intensifié par une forte médiatisation prompte à indigner l’opinion publique et à inciter le législateur à se saisir de la question. Celui-ci cherche alors à encadrer les pratiques litigieuses tantôt en imposant des mesures impératives, tantôt en favorisant l’autorégulation. La présente étude a pour ambition d’apprécier la pertinence et l’efficacité de l’ensemble de ces règles relevant du droit dur et du droit souple. Un tel examen du droit positif montre une réelle incapacité à apporter une réponse au problème de l’acceptabilité sociale des rémunérations par le biais de l’outil juridique. En témoigne l’évolution de la législation française depuis ces vingt dernières années, basée sur l’impératif de transparence et l’évolution des procédures de détermination et d’attribution des rémunérations des dirigeants. Les juges ne semblent pas davantage disposer de leviers efficaces de lutte contre l’excès des rémunérations en droit des sociétés. Maints espoirs ont donc été fondés sur les principes provenant du droit souple et en particulier de la gouvernance d’entreprise, espoirs cependant également déçus à bien des égards. Finalement, demeure particulièrement prégnante la question de savoir si le droit, qu’il soit dur ou souple, peut constituer cet outil utile et efficace de régulation du niveau de rémunérations des dirigeants de sociétés cotées / The remuneration of directors of listed companies generated a lively debate and even controversy as to their amount or to the principles guiding their determination. This debate is often intensified by vivid media coverage aimed at instigating the public opinion and encouraging the legislator to take up the question. The latter then seeks to regulate the practices in question either by imposing mandatory measures at times, or by encouraging self-regulation at others. This study aims to assess the relevance and effectiveness of all of these rules under the hard law and soft law. Such an examination of the substantive law shows a real inability to provide an answer to the problem of the social acceptability of these remunerations through legal tool. It also reviews the evolution of French legislation during the last twenty years, based on the need for transparency and the development of procedures for determining and awarding the remuneration of directors. Judges do not appear to have effective leverage and means of struggle in the Corporate Laws against the excesses of the remuneration. So many hopes have been based on the principles derived from the soft law and in particular, Corporate Governance, yet those hopes were however deceived in many ways. Finally, the question that remains particularly urgent and haunting is whether the law, be it hard or soft, can be a useful and effective tool for regulating the level of remuneration of directors and executives of listed companies

The explosion of the global financial crisis in 2007-08 reignited the urgency to reflect on the origins and causes of financial collapses. As the above events kick-started an economic meltdown that is still ongoing, comparisons with the Great Crash of 1929 started to abound. In particular, the externalities that a broad spectrum of societal groups had to bear as a consequence of various banking failures highlighted the necessity of a more inclusive and balanced regulation of firms whose activities impact on a wide range of stakeholders.The thesis is centred on the proposal of a paradigm, the “enlightened sovereign control”, that provides a theoretical, institutional and substantive framework as a response to the legal issues analysed in the thesis. These stem primarily from the analysis of two sequences of events (the 2001-03 wave of “accounting frauds” and the 2007-08 global crisis) which represent the background upon which modern financial scandals are explained. This is done by highlighting a number of common denominators emerging from the case studies (Enron and Parmalat, Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers) which caused financial instability and scandals. The research is grounded on the initial recognition of theoretical themes in the field of corporate and financial law, which eventually link with the more practical events examined. This parallel enquiry leads to the investigation of two heavily interrelated spheres of law and finally highlights more practical legal issues that emerge from the analysis.Through this multifaceted approach, the thesis contends that the occurrence of financial crises during the last decade is essentially rooted in two main problems: a corporate governance one, represented by the lack of effective control systems within large public firms; and a corporate finance one identified with the excesses of financial innovation and related abuses of capital market finance. Research conducted in this thesis ultimately seeks to contribute to current debates in the areas of corporate and financial law, through the proposals of the “enlightened sovereign control” paradigm.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T16:44:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Roberto Max Hermann Filho.pdf: 1985582 bytes, checksum: 8ec2531d52ed0c21750dd838bb876b1a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-10-24 / Since the failure of Barings Bank in 1995, the corporate world has experienced a series of financial scandals, which losses have gone up exponentially and reached almost five billion Euros in the Société Générale case. Those losses are generated by the dealing desks, where traders take advantage of, amongst other things, a broken control framework to take non authorized positions that resulted in severe losses due to unfavorable market moves (rogue trader type of fraud). The objective of this work is to conduct a case study approach comparing the key deficiencies amongst five important losses: Baring Bank, Allied Irish Bank, Enron, National Australian Bank and Société Générale. The key finding, which can be very helpful to prevent occurrence of new similar cases, brings up the common causes in all cases: internal environment lenient with internal controls and ethical standards; inadequate measurement and understanding of risks; ineffective systems and controls carried out with scarce and unqualified human resources; failures related to information sharing, communication and monitoring / Desde a quebra do banco Barings em 1995, o mundo corporativo enfrenta uma série de escândalos financeiros, cujos valores sobem de forma exponencial, chegando a quase cinco bilhões de euro em 2008 (perda enfrentada pelo banco francês Société Générale). Essas perdas estão diretamente relacionadas com mesas de tesouraria, onde traders se aproveitaram, dentre outras coisas, de falhas de controle para assumirem posições de mercado, muito além do autorizado pelas instituições, sofrendo, assim, com oscilações negativas, que resultaram em perdas enormes (este tipo de fraude é conhecido no meio financeiro como Rogue Trader type of fraud). A justificativa deste trabalho é fazer uma análise detalhada das falhas de controle que resultaram nesse tipo de situação, utilizando como base cinco importantes casos: Barings, Allied Irish Bank, Enron, National Australian Bank e Société Générale. Os resultados obtidos, por meio deste estudo, que devem ser utilizados, como ponto de atenção, na prevenção a novos incidentes similares, mostram que as causas comuns, em todos os casos, são um ambiente interno leniente com controles e valores éticos; inadequada avaliação e entendimento dos riscos assumidos; atividades de controles ineficazes, com poucos recursos humanos, problemas de sistemas e baixa qualificação profissional; falhas nas atividades de informações, comunicações e monitoramento